# Bhagelu & Anr v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors

- **Citation:** (2016) 5 ILRA 1247
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-05-20
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/bhagelu-anr-v-deputy-director-of-consolidation-ors-43720
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A.K. Srivastava, Dinesh Pathak, Rakesh Pathak, S.C.

Consolidation of Holdings - Revisional jurisdiction - Scope - Deputy Director of Consolidation.
Revisional power cannot be exercised in favour of a party whose appeal had already been dismissed by
Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and who had not preferred any revision thereagainst - Revisional authority
exceeded jurisdiction in entertaining and allowing such revision. (Paras 19-23)

Consolidation proceedings - Remand - Limited scope--Where remand by appellate authority is
confined to rights of a particular party - Consolidation Officer cannot reopen or adjudicate rights of other
parties whose appeals had attained finality - Jurisdiction confined strictly to scope of remand. (Paras 20-21)

U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Section 229-B - Ex parte decree -
Abatement on consolidation.
Where proceedings relating to setting aside ex parte decree were pending and decree had not attained finality
- On commencement of consolidation, proceedings abate - Such decree cannot be treated as final or
binding against contesting co-tenure holder. (Paras 16-18)

Compromise - Legal effect - Survival independent of decree.
Compromise entered between parties does not become extinct merely because decree based thereon is set
aside or proceedings abate - Unless compromise itself is set aside on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or
illegality, it continues to bind parties. (Paras 26-28, 32-33)

Consolidation proceedings - Sale by tenure holder - Effect.
Execution of undisputed sale deed transferring substantial portion of holding - Vendor cannot subsequently
claim exclusive title contrary to transfer - Rights of transferee and co-sharers required to be recognised.
(Para 18)

Family settlement - Co-sharers - Share determination.
1248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Revenue entries showing joint possession of parties over long period - In absence of contrary evidence, such
entries can be relied upon for determining shares - Deputy Director of Consolidation justified to that extent.
(Paras 17-18)

IN RESULT: Writ petition partly allowed.

List of Cases cited:

## Text

5 All. Bhagelu & Anr. Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.

1247
32. With these observations/directions, writ petition stands disposed of.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Writ B No.- 980 Of 1974

Bhagelu & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
P.P. Chaudhary, Awadhesh Kumar Singh, S.L. Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.K. Srivastava, Dinesh Pathak, Rakesh Pathak, S.C.

Consolidation of Holdings - Revisional jurisdiction - Scope - Deputy Director of Consolidation.
Revisional power cannot be exercised in favour of a party whose appeal had already been dismissed by
Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and who had not preferred any revision thereagainst - Revisional authority
exceeded jurisdiction in entertaining and allowing such revision. (Paras 19-23)

Consolidation proceedings - Remand - Limited scope--Where remand by appellate authority is
confined to rights of a particular party - Consolidation Officer cannot reopen or adjudicate rights of other
parties whose appeals had attained finality - Jurisdiction confined strictly to scope of remand. (Paras 20-21)

U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Section 229-B - Ex parte decree -
Abatement on consolidation.
Where proceedings relating to setting aside ex parte decree were pending and decree had not attained finality
- On commencement of consolidation, proceedings abate - Such decree cannot be treated as final or
binding against contesting co-tenure holder. (Paras 16-18)

Compromise - Legal effect - Survival independent of decree.
Compromise entered between parties does not become extinct merely because decree based thereon is set
aside or proceedings abate - Unless compromise itself is set aside on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or
illegality, it continues to bind parties. (Paras 26-28, 32-33)

Consolidation proceedings - Sale by tenure holder - Effect.
Execution of undisputed sale deed transferring substantial portion of holding - Vendor cannot subsequently
claim exclusive title contrary to transfer - Rights of transferee and co-sharers required to be recognised.
(Para 18)

Family settlement - Co-sharers - Share determination.
1248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Revenue entries showing joint possession of parties over long period - In absence of contrary evidence, such
entries can be relied upon for determining shares - Deputy Director of Consolidation justified to that extent.
(Paras 17-18)

IN RESULT: Writ petition partly allowed.

List of Cases cited:

1. Shadi Ram v. Amin Chand, AIR 1930 Lahore 937
2. Lal Ji Singh and others v. Shiv Pujan Singh and others, 1981 AWC 845
3. Thakur Din and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad and others, 1983 All.L.J. 1382
4. Girdhari Lal and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1985 RD 135
5. Nathoo Lal v. Durga Prasad, AIR 1954 SC 355
6. Thiru John v. Returning Officer, AIR 1977 SC 1724

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)

1. Petitioners, Bhagelu and Ganga Ram, both sons of Ram Swaroop (now deceased and
substituted by legal heirs) have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, being
aggrieved by order dated 02.02.1974 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti
(hereinafter referred to as the "DDC"), whereby it has allowed Revision No. 469 of respondent no.
4 and dismissed Revision No. 451 filed by petitioners and held that except sale deeds executed by
petitioners, in remaining land, respondents no. 3 (Bhulai) and 4 (Ram Autar) each, shall have half
share.

2. The dispute relates to Khata No. 19, Plots No. 11, 181, 208(M), 240, 243, 208/2, 206 and
240(M).

3. Petitioners claimed to be recorded Bhumidhar in basic year entry. Respondents 3 and 4
filed objection claiming sole Bhumidhari and Sirdari rights stating that petitioners have no such
right over disputed land. Respondents 3 and 4 are off shoot in the same family tree of petitioners
though from different branches. Petitioners on incorrect facts filed suit under Section 229-B of U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1950") and
it being decreed, got disputed plot recorded solely in their names though they have no rights.
Petitioners have sold their rights on 25.08.1969 in favour of Mst. Sukhani wife of Bhulai. There is
no compromise between parties and names of petitioners be expunged and names of Respondents 3
and 4 be entered.

4. Petitioners contested matter stating that Respondents 3 and 4 are not in any way from
common family tree but they are distant relatives. Their names were incorrectly recorded in respect
of disputed plots. When petitioners came to know they filed suit under Section 229-B. Respondent
4, Ram Autar entered in a compromise with petitioners while Respondent 3 did not appear despite
service, hence matter proceeded ex parte against him and suit was ultimately decreed in favour of
petitioners. Petitioners have deposited ten times rental and became Bhumidhar.
5 All. Bhagelu & Anr. Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.

1249
5. Smt. Sukhani, wife of Bhulai, also filed an objection claiming mutation of her name over
Plots No. 240 and 208.

6. Consolidation Officer (hereinafter referred to as the "CO") vide order dated 22.06.1971
rejected objections and decided matter in favour of petitioners. Respondents 3 and 4 preferred
Appeals No. 1062 and 1063 respectively under Section 11 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1953 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1953"), which was allowed by Settlement Officer
(Consolidation), Harraiya, Basti (hereinafter referred to as the "SOC") and the matter was
remanded in respect of Respondent 3. In regard to Respondent 4, Ram Autar SOC said that he had
already entered into a compromise, cannot withdraw.

7. On remand, CO again decided matter vide order dated 04.06.1973 holding that
Respondent 3 has no interest left and ex parte decree was binding upon him. Thereagainst Bhulai
preferred Appeal No. 3703 under Section 11 of Act, 1953, which was allowed by SOC directing
that name of Bhulai should be entered and petitioners' name should be deleted for the reason that
they have already sold their share in disputed land vide sale deed dated 25.08.1969 in favour of
Smt. Sukhani. Thereafter two revisions were filed, i.e., Revisions No. 469 by Respondent 4 and
451 by petitioners. DDC allowed revision filed by Respondent 4 and dismissed revision filed by
petitioners holding that Respondents 3 and 4 both are entitled for half share each.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that DDC has committed manifest error in
law by allowing revision of Respondent 4, whose appeal was already dismissed by SOC and,
thereagainst he had not filed any revision. After remand, the order passed by CO was challenged
only by Respondent 3 and appeal was filed only by Respondent 3, therefore, Respondent 4 could
not have filed revision. He further submitted that admission, i.e., compromise entered by
Respondent 4 was binding upon him and could not have been ignored at all. He further said that
suit filed under Section 229-B of Act, 1950 having been decreed ex parte, and having not abated at
all, there was no occasion for authorities below to treat suit as abated. Since decree dated
22.05.1969 was not set aside, it was binding and hence no relief could have been granted to
Respondent 3 also.

9. I have heard Sri Awadhesh Kumar Singh, Advocate for petitioners and Sri Dinesh
Pathak, Advocate for contesting respondents.

10. With respect to family tree there is a dispute between parties. Respondents 3 and 4 have
claimed family tree as under:
1250 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11. Petitioners claimed that Respondents 3 and 4 are not family members and from
different branch. They have given their family tree in para 3 of writ petition as under:

12. Petitioners filed Suit No. 471 under Section 229-B of Act, 1950 impleading
Respondents 3 and 4 as also Gram Sabha Kaptan Ganj and State of U.P. before Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Harraiya. The Respondent 3 did not respond hence order was passed to press ex parte
against him. A compromise dated 22.05.1969 entered between petitioners and Ram Autar was
placed whereupon Sub-Divisional Magistrate decided suit in terms of aforesaid compromise vide
order dated 22.05.1969.

13. Thereupon Respondent 3, Bhulai filed application dated 05.07.1971 for setting aside ex
parte decree dated 22.05.1969 passed against him alleging that he has no knowledge of suit, hence
could not file any written statement or contest suit. Petitioners contested this application. Sub-
5 All. Bhagelu & Anr. Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.

1251
Divisional Magistrate passed order dated 08.08.1972 holding that no ex parte order was passed
against Bhulai and, therefore, his name shall continue in revenue records.

14. It appears that petitioners then preferred a review whereupon Deputy Collector passed
an order stating that further proceedings in the matter shall continue. This order dated 08.08.1972
was challenged by Petitioner 2 in Revision No. 1505/B before Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division,
Gorakhpur. Commissioner vide order dated 22.12.1972 observed that decree dated 22.05.1969 was
passed in terms of compromise when suit was already proceeding and, therefore, it must be deemed
to be an ex parte decree passed against Bhulai.

15. Bhulai filed application dated 05.07.1971 under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. for setting
aside ex parte decree but Deputy Collector erred in observing that no ex parte order was passed
against Bhulai. Thus, order dated 08.08.1972 as also review order dated 30.10.1972, both were
defective. Commissioner vide order dated 22.12.1972 made recommendation to allow revision, set
aside orders dated 08.08.1972 and 30.10.1972 and remand matter to Trial Court for dealing with
application of Respondent 3, filed under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C., and decide again in accordance
with law.

16. Commissioner made a reference to Board of Revenue in terms of aforesaid
recommendation dated 22.12.1972 and it is nobody's case and nothing has been brought on record
as to what ultimately happened in Board of Revenue. In absence of anything otherwise, I do not
find any reason to treat that proceedings in suit under Section 229-B were pending and it cannot be
said that decree dated 22.05.1969 attained finality so far as Respondent 3, Bhulai is concerned. On
commencement of consolidation, the proceeding stood abated.

17. It is also evident from record that only two Khataui extracts were filed, i.e., 1292 fasli
and 1359 fasli. In 1292 fasli, name of Matadeen was recorded who claimed to be great-grandfather
of petitioners but in 1959 fasli names of petitioners, Respondent 4 and father of Respondent 3 are
mentioned. Subsequent Khatauni mention names of all parties, therefore, in absence of anything
otherwise, the above entries can safely be relied and have been so relied by DDC in impugned
revisional order and to my mind, rightly.

18. It is also evident that petitioners have executed sale deed dated 25.08.1969 of half of
land in favour of Smt. Sukhani wife of Bhulai. This deed relates to Plots No. 181, 208/2, 208/1 and
240, total area 2-13-4 bigha. Total area of disputed land is 4-16-6. Therefore, petitioners have
already sold out almost half of the land to Smt. Sukhani, vide sale deed dated 25.08.1969. This sale
deed is also not in dispute. Since alleged ex parte decree, as I have already observed, did not attain
finality and ultimately abated, I have no hesitation in holding that share of Respondent 3 in
disputed property continued and, therefore, DDC has rightly passed order in his favour.

19. Now question relates to order passed in favour of Respondent 4. Compromise entered
into by Respondent 4 with petitioners in respect of his share was on record and to that extent there
is no dispute. Initially when CO passed order dated 22.06.1971 rejecting objections of Respondents
1252 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
3 and 4, both preferred appeal separately. Appeals No. 1062 was preferred by Respondent 4 and
1063 was preferred by Respondent 3. SOC vide order dated 28.12.1971 dismissed Appeal No. 1062
preferred by Respondent 4 and allowed Appeal No. 1063 preferred by Respondent 3 and to that
extent only matter was remanded. SOC's order dated 28.12.1971 attained finality inasmuch as
Respondent 4, thereagainst did not prefer any revision before DDC.

20. Thus, when matter in respect of Respondent 3 was remanded, CO could have
considered that matter to the extent of Respondent no. 3 and not beyond that. In fact CO's order
dated 04.06.1973 passed after remand shows that in initial part he has referred to all the three
objections but in the body of order, he has clearly said that he has considered, after remand, only
the matter of Respondent 3, (Bhulai). This is clear from following extract of order:

''उपरोक्त सभी वाद प्रश्ों का डववेर्ि मेरे पूवागडिकारी िे अपिे आदेश डदिांक 22.6.71 के डिणगय पत्र में डकया
है। इस आदेश से क्षुब्ध होकर अपीलें ब0अ0 र्कबंदी के यहां प्रस्तुत की गई। इि दोिों अपीलों का डिणगय अपिे डिणगय से ब0अ0र्0 िे
अपिे आदेश डदिांक 28.2.72 में डकया है इसमें भुलई का िाम िाररज होिे के हद तक रद्द करते हये ररमान्ड डकया है। इसी आदेश के
अिुपालि में यह डववाद र्कबंदी अडिकारी कप्तािगंज के न्यायालय में डवर्ारािीि था जो ब0अ0र्0 के आदेश डदिांक 27.1.73 द्वारा
इस न्यायालय को स्थािान्तररत होकर आया है।

ब0अ0र्0 के ररमान्ड आदेश के अन्तगगत इस पत्रािली में िब केिल भुलई के हक के सम्बन्ध में जििेचन
करना है । "

"My predecessor-in-office has, in his order dated 22.06.1971, discussed all the
aforesaid issues. Aggrieved by this order, appeals have been filed before the Settlement Officer,
Consolidation. Both these appeals have been decided by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide
his order dated 28.02.1972, remanding the case while setting it aside insofar as it relates to
deletion of Bhulai's name. In compliance of this very order, this dispute was pending before the
court of Consolidaion Officer, Kaptanganj and this case has come to this court by way of transfer
vide order dated 27.01.1973 passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation.

Under remand order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, this case has
to be determined in respect of entitlement of Bhulai only."

(English translation by the Court)

21. Thereafter CO passed order only in respect to Respondent 3 and rejected his objection.
Thereagainst Respondent 3 preferred appeal under Section 11 of Act, 1953 which was allowed by
SOC vide order dated 19.11.1973. In these circumstances, no revision could have been filed by
Respondent 4 against order dated 19.11.1973 passed by SOC.

22. However, it appears that a delayed revision was filed by Respondent 4 challenging
SOC's order dated 28.12.1971 which has been entertained by Revisional Court. I have no objection
in admitting a delayed revision also but from revisional order what I find is that it has not paid any
5 All. Bhagelu & Anr. Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.

1253
attention to the agreement/ compromise executed between petitioners and Respondent 4. Moreover,
it has also misread the order dated 08.08.1972 passed by Deputy Collector on restoration
application of Respondent 3 that the decree dated 22.05.1969 was set aside but Commissioner's
order dated 22.12.1972 shows that Deputy Collector stated in order dated 08.08.1972 that no ex
parte order was passed against Bhulai, hence his name shall continue in revenue records. There is
nothing on record that decree dated 22.05.1969 was set aside in its entirety so as to nullify even the
terms of compromise which were accepted and decree was passed. To this extent order of DDC is
clearly perverse and illegal.

23. Once decree dated 22.05.1969, passed in terms of compromise entered with
Respondent 4, continued, there was no question of granting any relief to Respondent 4. DDC has
committed manifest error in allowing revision of Respondent 4 and declaring his share in property
in dispute which he has already surrendered in favour of petitioners.

24. Even otherwise, if this Court go to the extent of saying that decree dated 22.05.1969
stood set aside since subsequently proceedings abated, even then the that fact is that compromise
entered between petitioners and Respondent 4 was neither challenged nor said to have been entered
on account of any fraud or misrepresentation nor was otherwise held to be not binding between
parties. That be so, binding effect of compromise would continue having the effect of denying any
relief Respondent 4, contrary to the terms of aforesaid compromise.

25. This question has been considered in some of the authorities which may refer hereat.

26. In Shadi Ram Vs. Amin Chand, AIR 1930 Lahore 937, Lahore High Court took a
view that a compromise emerged in a decree would not become extinct upon the decree being set
aside.

27. In Lal Ji Singh and others Vs. Shiv Pujan Singh and others, 1981 AWC 845
following aforesaid authority in Shadi Ram Vs. Amin Chand (supra), this Court held:

"5. By order dated 31-8-1979, the Deputy Director of Consolidation had set aside
the order dated 2-7-1975, which was passed in terms of compromise. The compromise itself was
not set aside. In Shadi Ram v. Amin Chand, AIR 1930 Lahore 937, it was held by the Lahore High
Court that a compromise which has merged in a decree does not become extinct upon the decree
being set aside. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that where a decree or order based
on compromise is set aside but the genuineness of the compromise itself has not been doubted in
any manner, whatsoever, nor it has been set aside being invalid or fraudulently obtained, the
compromise would continue to have the legal force and binding effect on the parties thereto. It
can be referred to and relied upon in that very suit or proceedings and also in other proceedings as
well, for the purpose of showing the terms contained therein, to which the parties had agreed with
open eyes and settled to be bound by it. It can also be referred and relied upon as a valid piece of
evidence containing admissions of parties thereto on relevant facts contained therein. It would,
of course be open to parties to urge and establish the circumstances, dubious in nature, in which it
1254 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
was obtained, so as to indicate that it was not at all genuine and was fraudulently obtained. It can
also be shown that the facts contained therein are erroneous and untrue or that the parties never
intended to be bound by it or that it is opposed to law.

6. A party to the compromise, however, cannot wriggle out of it, unless he succeeds
in establishing facts touching its validity on the ground of being arrived at between the parties not
competent to enter into a compromise or being filed or recorded not in accordance with the
prescribed procedure and law or that it was vitiated by some misrepresentation of facts or undue
influence, coercion or fraud practised either on the party or upon Court. If Court has been
defrauded in accepting a compromise for example, where some one impersonated while executing
and presenting a compromise for and on behalf of a party and the Court accepts the same believing
it to have been arrived at genuinely by the concerned party itself it would be void ab initio and non
est. But where a party is defrauded and the compromise stands vitiated for reasons aforesaid, the
same can be avoided and the party defrauded can resile from it either in the same proceedings
before that Court or in appeal or revision against the order founded on such compromise or by a
separate suit in that behalf. But if the compromise filed and verified before the Court of
competent jurisdiction was found to be genuine and bona fide, it would survive and continue to
have legal force and binding effect although the decree or order which was passed on its basis
was set aside. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has, thus, not acted illegally in placing
reliance upon the earlier compromise filed in the case, which has not been shown to be either
fictitious or fraudulently obtained and thus the parties thereto were bound by it." (emphasis added)

28. In Thakur Din and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad and
others, 1983 All.L.J. 1382, Court again reiterated above view and in paras 10 and 11 said as under:

"10. In view of the above, I am unable to hold that when a decree, based on
compromise, is et aside, being invlid on certain grounds. The compromise, embodied in it, dies with
it and it cannot be read and relied upon in evidence. If the compromise itself has not been set
aside on the ground that it stands vitiated, having been secured by practicing fraud, undue
influence or coercion, it can be referred to in respect of admission, if any, contained therein, as
admissible substantive evidence relevant to the issues involved in the case.

11. It is well-settled that admission is a best piece of evidence and decisive of the
matter provided it is clear, certain and unambiguous and not vitiated by fraud, undue influence or
coercion and should not have been extracted by misrepresentation or extending false promises.
What is admitted by a party to be true must be presumed to be true unless the contrary is shown.
(See AIR 1954 SC 355). However, the admission previously made can be allowed to be explained
in order to show that it was erroneous or vitiated on aforesaid grounds. The maker of the
admission can very well show that the facts admitted are not correct, but the admission will be used
as substantive evidence even if he fails to step into the witness box. It can be read and relied upon
in evidence without even being referred to the maker for contradiction in witness box under Section
145 of the Evidence Act. It will be admissible as substantive evidence by itself in view of Sections
17 and 21 of the Evidence Act though it is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted. What
5 All. Bhagelu & Anr. Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.

1255
weight may be attached to the admission by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible
evidence, and the same would depend on the consideration in totality of the facts and
circumstances and other evidence on record. (See AIR 1966 Sc 405, AIR 1974 SC 117 and AIR
1977 SC 409)."

(emphasis added)

29. The terms of compromise, therefore, in any case, is an admission by parties to
document and can be used as substantial piece of evidence against the maker. This is what has been
said by this Court in Girdhari Lal and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others,
1985 RD 135, wherein Court said:

"7. It appears to be fairly well settled that an admission about a relevant fact by
any one of persons having joint interest in the property in dispute would be an admission against
all co-owners whether they be jointly sued or not, provided it fulfils the triple test; firstly, it
should be an admission about the disputed property, secondly, it should be the admission of the
person jointly interested in the property as co-owner thereof and the admission runs against his
own interest in the property, and lastly, it should not have been collusively made in order to
defraud or designed to deprive the co-owners, of the property in dispute, wholly or partially. Thus,
if the admission of co-owner fulfils these tests and is genuine and not shown to be mala fide, it
would not only bind the maker but also the co-owners. And it can be used as an admissible
substantial evidence against the maker and his co-owners as well and also against all those who
claim under them as their heirs, successors and assigns. This view finds support from a number of
decisions (See Kowsulliah Sundari Dasi and another v. Mukta Sundari Dasi and another, ILR (11)
Cal. 588, Kanta Mohan Mallik and others v. Makhan Santra 39 Calcutta Weekly Notes 277, Mst.
Ramihari Kuer and others v. Devanand Singh and others AIR (33) 1946 Pat. 278; and Bhura and
another v. Bahadur Singh and another AIR 1976 Raj. 249."
(emphasis added)

30. It is well settled that an admission is preserved to be true unless contrary is shown.
(See, Nathoo Lal Vs. Durga Prasad, AIR 1954 SC 355).

31. In Thiru John Vs. Returning Officer, AIR 1977 SC 1724 the Court said:

"It is well-settled that a party's admission as defined in Sections 17 to 20, fulfilling
the requirements of Section 21, Evidence Act, is substantive evidence pro-prio vigors. An
admission, if clearly and unequivocally made is the best evidence against the party making it and
though not conclusive, shifts the onus on to the maker on the principle that what a party himself
admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption is rebutted the
facts admitted must be taken to be established." (emphasis added)

32. In the present case decree passed in terms of compromise with Respondent 4 is not
shown to have been set aside vis-a-vis Respondent 4. Even otherwise the compromise itself being
1256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
not in dispute, it was not open to DDC to grant relief to Respondent 4 in a revision preferred before
him against order of SOC by ignoring the said compromise.

33. The compromise document was already on record. If that be so, in absence of anything
to doubt the same, DDC was bound to treat it as an admission on the part of Respondent 4 and in
that view it could not have declared any share of Respondent 4 to continue which he admitted, and
in any case surrendered, in favour of petitioners.

34. In view of above discussion, I am clearly of the view that impugned judgment passed
by Revisional Court, in so far as Respondent 4 is concerned, i.e., to the extent it allowed Revision
No. 469 preferred by Respondent 4, cannot sustain.

35. The writ petition is allowed partly. Impugned judgment and order dated 02.02.1974, to
the extent it has allowed Revision No. 469 filed by Respondent 4, Ram Autar, is set aside and the
direction with respect of declaring share of Respondent 4 in respect of property in dispute is also
set aside. Instead, I declare that, in respect of disputed property Respondent 3 shall have half share
and remaining part is jointly in the co-ownership of both petitioners.

36. There shall be no order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.
THE HON'BLE SHAMSHER BAHADUR SINGH, J.

Writ C No.- 5016 Of 2012
&
Connected With Other Cases

Hardayal Singh & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
S.K. Tyagi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Mahesh Narain Singh

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 4, 5A, 6, 17 and 48 - Acquisition for planned development -
Challenge to notifications - Delay and laches - Earlier writ petitions - Challenge not pressed - Bar against
re-agitation - Validity of acquisition notifications not open in subsequent writ petitions. (Paras 12-13)