# Bhagwan Bahadur & Ors v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 1860
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-22
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 167 of 1982
- **Bench:** Manish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/bhagwan-bahadur-ors-v-deputy-director-of-consolidation-ors-51898
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Civil Laws - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226, - UP Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Sections 18,
18(1)(E) & 20 - UP Consolidation and
Holdings Act, 1953 - Sections - 9(A)(2) &
48, - UP Land Revenue Act, 1901 -
Sections 57, - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections 107 & 116 - Writ Petition -
challenging the impugned revisional court's order
passed u/s 48 of Act, 1953 - petitioners claimed
that entries with regards to trees standing on
Gata in question in the revenue record of year
1930 was continued till Act, 1950 was enforced
and as such same was covered by section
18(1)(e) of the Act, 1950 - however, respondents
had not raised any objections prior to 1970 and
when the consolidation had come in the village,
they filed an objection u/s 9-A(2) claiming cotenancy right against the trees in question -
relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court
rendered in case of Ramnath Singh, court held,
that - the entries for the purposes of section 20
of Act, 1950 cannot be doubted or questioned or
even incorrect entry (unless shown to have been
made fraudulently and surreptitiously) will be
sufficient
to
confer
the
right
of
Adivasi/Sirdar/Bhumidhar upon the person and if
the entry is continued from the last 11 years, in
that case, since before start of consolidation then
it cannot be questioned
in consolidation
proceedings - hence, the present writ petition is
allowed - impugned order is hereby quashed.
(Para - 20, 22)

Writ Petition Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1860 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and there is no bar on exercise of powers and
the inherent powers of this court can always
be invoked for imparting justice and
bringing a quietus to the issue between the
parties.

47. As discussed above, the court is
inclined to hold accordingly only because
there is no formal embargo in section 147 of
the N.I. Act. This principle would not help
any convict in any other law where other
applicable
independent
provisions
are
existing as the offence punishable under
section 138 of the N.I. Act is distinctly
different from the normal offences made
punishable under Chapter XVII of IPC (i.e.
the offences qua property).

48. In view of the observations and in
view of the guidelines as laid down in the
case of Damodar S. Prabhu (Supra) and
also in view of the observations made in the
judgment referred above and taking into
account the fact that the parties have settled
the dispute amicably by way of compromise,
this Court is of the view that the
compounding of the offence as required to
be permitted.

49. Accordingly, the present application
under section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed in terms
of the compromise arrived at between the
parties to this litigation out of the Court. The
impugned
judgment
and
order
dated
07.04.2021 passed by the learned Court of
Additional Court No.3 (N.I. Act), Lucknow,
whereby the applicant has been convicted
under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act, 1881 and has been directed to
undergo
imprisonment
for
two
years
alongwith fine of Rs.45,00,000/- and in case of
default of payment of fine, the applicant has
been directed to undergo additional simple
imprisonment for a period of one and half year
and a sum of Rs.38,00,000/- was also directed
to be paid to the complainant as damages, is
hereby modified. The conviction and sentence
under Section 138 of the N.I. Act 1981 in
Complaint Case No.7097 of 2017, Police
Station
Talkatora,
District
Lucknow
(Sanchetna Financial Services Private Limited
Vs. Ravindra Kumar Yadav) stands annulled
as this court intends, otherwise to secure the
ends of justice as provided under section 482
Cr.P.C. The applicant shall be treated as
acquitted on account of compounding of the
offence with the complainant/person affected.

50. The learned trial court is directed to
release the remaining amount of Rs.9,00,000/-
deposited by the applicant before the learned
Additional Court No.3 (N.I. Act), Lucknow in
compliance of the order passed by learned
Sessions Judge, Lucknow during the hearing
of Criminal Appeal No.165 of 2021 in favour
of the opposite party no.2 within fifteen days
from the date of certified copy of this
judgment and order is produced before it.

51. Office is directed to communicate
this order to the learned trial court concerned
immediately.

52. No order as to costs.
---------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1860
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH KUMAR, J.

Writ B No. 167 of 1982

Bhagwan Bahadur & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
5 All. Bhagwan Bahadur & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.
1861
Sri Harsih Chandra Singh, Sri Dharampal
Singh, Sr. Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ajay Kumar Singh, Sri Ashish
Kumar Singh, Sri Punit Kumar Gupta

Civil Laws - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226, - UP Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Sections 18,
18(1)(E) & 20 - UP Consolidation and
Holdings Act, 1953 - Sections - 9(A)(2) &
48, - UP Land Revenue Act, 1901 -
Sections 57, - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections 107 & 116 - Writ Petition -
challenging the impugned revisional court's order
passed u/s 48 of Act, 1953 - petitioners claimed
that entries with regards to trees standing on
Gata in question in the revenue record of year
1930 was continued till Act, 1950 was enforced
and as such same was covered by section
18(1)(e) of the Act, 1950 - however, respondents
had not raised any objections prior to 1970 and
when the consolidation had come in the village,
they filed an objection u/s 9-A(2) claiming cotenancy right against the trees in question -
relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court
rendered in case of Ramnath Singh, court held,
that - the entries for the purposes of section 20
of Act, 1950 cannot be doubted or questioned or
even incorrect entry (unless shown to have been
made fraudulently and surreptitiously) will be
sufficient
to
confer
the
right
of
Adivasi/Sirdar/Bhumidhar upon the person and if
the entry is continued from the last 11 years, in
that case, since before start of consolidation then
it cannot be questioned
in consolidation
proceedings - hence, the present writ petition is
allowed - impugned order is hereby quashed.
(Para - 20, 22)

Writ Petition Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. Lal Bahadur Vs Ram Adhar (1985 LCD 415),

2. Anjuman Islam Lakhimpur Vs Chandra Prakash
Pitaria (2007 325 LCD 721,

3. Niazu Vs DDC 2015 128 RD 797),

4. Sant Bux Singh Vs joint Director of
Consolidation & ors.(1986 RD 2016),

5. Adi Pherozshah Gandhi Vs h m Seervai (AIR
1971 SC 385),

6. Rajinder Vs St. of Har. (1991 vol 1 Crimes 973PH),

7. Shaikh Piru Bux Vs Kalandi Pati (AIR 1970 SC
1885),

8. Ramnath Singh & anr. Vs DDC (2014 vol 32
LCD 659).

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Kumar, J.)

1. Heard.

2. The present writ petition has been
preferred for quashing of the impugned
revisional order dated 31.12.1981 passed by
respondent
no.1-Deputy
Director
Consolidation Faizabad under Section 48 of
Uttar Pradesh Consolidation and Holdings
Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as "Act,
1953) in Revision No. 1517 titled as Ram
Naresh vs. Ram Bahadur and others.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners
has submitted that the dispute with regard to
the 32 trees entered in favour of the
ancestors of the petitioners and 9 trees in
favour of the ancestors of the respondents on
gata no. 1906 area 4 bigha 7 biswa 10
biswansi in 1337 fasli i.e. in Khasra of the
year 1930. It is further submitted that the
gata no. 1906 belonged to zamindar Azam
Ali Khan. In 1344-45 fasli i.e. year 1937-38,
the name of the ancestor of the petitioners
was continued and the name of the zamindar
was deleted. It is further submitted that the
name of the ancestor of the petitioner was
continued and he was covered by Section
18(1)(e) of the U.P. zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter
referred to as Act, 1950), which has come
1862 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
into force on 01.07.1952 and prior to that the
ancestors of the petitioners had become
grove holder.

4. It is further submitted that since the
year 1937-38, the respondents had not raised
any objections by filing either any case
under the provisions of Oudh Rent Act 1886
(hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1886) read
with amended Oudh Rent Act, 1921
(hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1921), U.P.
Land Revenue Act, 1901 (hereinafter
referred to as "Act, 1901") or under the Act,
1950. It is submitted that the village had
come under the consolidation in the 1970's
and after about 30 years, for the first time the
respondents filed an objection under Section
9(A)(2) claiming co-tenancy right against
the 9 trees.

5. It is further submitted that if the
conflict
is
between
the
earlier
and
subsequent settlement entries then as per the
law settled in catena of judgments of this
Court, the later entry would be preferred
over the earlier entry unless contrary is
proved by cogent strong evidence and in
support of his submission, learned counsel
for the petitioner has relied upon the
judgment i.e. Lal Behari vs. Ram Adhar;
1985
LCD
415,
Anjuman
Islamia
Lakhimpur vs. Chandra Prakash Pitaria;
2007 [25] LCD 721 and Niazu vs. D.D.C.,
2015 [128] RD 797.

6. It is further submitted that the basis
of claim of co-tenacy by the respondents
were on two grounds firstly, there name was
entered in Khasra of 1337 fasli and
secondly, a compromise was entered
between the parties in the proceedings under
Section 107/116 Cr.P.C.

7. It is further submitted that the
compromise which has been relied is in the
proceedings under section 107/116 Cr.P.C.
which is preventive in nature and the
compromise if any, made under those
proceedings
is
not
binding
in
the
proceedings under the Act, 1953.

8. It is further submitted that the
respondents in their objection before the
consolidation officer or before the appellate
authority had not challenged the subsequent
entry of 1345 fasli much less proved it to be
a wrong entry by any evidence whatsoever,
rather not a word has been said about the
subsequent entry except claiming their cotenacy right as per the two counts as
submitted above.

9. On the other hand, Shri Hemant
Kumar Pandey, learned State Counsel and Shri
Avinash Mishra, learned counsel for the
private respondents have submitted that the
name of the ancestors of the respondents were
entered in the khasra of 1337 fasli against 9
trees but in the 1345 fasli, their names were not
there though they are legally entitled for their
co-tenancy rights on the 9 trees in pursuance
of entry made in the 1337 fasli and they have
rightly filed an objection under Section
9(A)(2) during the consolidation proceedings
before the consolidation officer.

10. It is further submitted that the
compromise was entered and once it is
accepted by the ancestors of the petitioners in
the compromise regarding the co-tenacy rights
of the respondents then they cannot take a uturn rather they are bound by the same as the
said compromise was entered before the SubDivisional
Magistrate
in
the
criminal
proceedings under Section 107/116 Cr.P.C. It
is further submitted that the older the entry,
more credible it is, as a general rule.

11. It is further submitted that the
settlement entry can be rebutted only by
5 All. Bhagwan Bahadur & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.
1863
documentary evidence. It can even be
rebutted by an oral evidence and in support
of his submission, the learned State Counsel
has relied upon the judgment dated
28.01.1996 passed by this Court in the case
of Sant Bux Singh vs. Joint Director of
Consoldiation and Others; 1986 RD 216.

12. After hearing the learned counsel
for the parties and going through the records
of the case, it is an undisputed fact between
the parties that the name of the ancestors of
the petitioners i.e. his maternal grandfather
was entered in the Khasra of 1337 fasli
against 31 trees and the name of the
ancestors of the respondents was entered
against the 9 trees situated at gata no. 1906.
In the settlement entry of 1344-45 fasli, the
name of the zamindar Azam Ali Khan as
well as the name of the ancestors of the
respondents was deleted but the name of the
ancestors of the petitioners was retained and
intact in the settlement year 1344-45 fasli
i.e. year 1937-1938.

13. The respondents had never filed
any case under the the Act, 1886 and the Act,
1901 against the settlement entry in 1344-45
fasli in favour of the ancestors of the
petitioners. Thereafter, the Act, 1950 has
come into force w.e.f. 01.07.1952 and at that
time, the entry of 1344-45 fasli was intact
and the entry in the name of the ancestors of
the petitioners is protected by Section 18 of
the Act, 1950. For convenience, the same is
quoted hereinbelow:-

"18. Settlement of certain lands
with intermediaries or cultivators as
Bhumidhar.-(1) Subject to the provisions of
Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17, all lands-

(d) held as such by-

(i) an occupancy tenant;

(ii) a hereditary tenant;

(iii) a tenant or Patta

[ possessing the right to transfer
the holding by sale,]

Dawami or Istamrari referred to
in Section 17;

(e) held a grover holder,

on the date immediately preceding
the date of vesting shall be deemed to be
settled by the State Government witsh such
intermediary, [lessee, tenant, grantee or
grove-holder,] as the case may be, who
shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be
entitled to take or retain possession of this
bhumidhar thereof."

14. The submission of the learned
counsel for the petitioners that as per Section
57,
U.P.
Land
Revenue Act,
1901
(hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1901")
which deals with the presumption as to
entries
,
the
provision
is
quoted
hereinbelow:-

"57. Presumption as to entries. All
entries in the record-of-rights prepared in
accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter shall be presumed to be true until
the contrary is proved; and all decisions
under this Chapter in cases of dis- pute
shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 40, be binding on all
Revenue Courts in respect of the subjectmatter of such disputes; but no such entry or
decision shall affect the right of any person
to claim and establish in the Civil Court any
interest in land which requires to be
recorded in the registers pre- scribed by [*
* *] Section 32."

15. Section 18 of the Act, 1950
provides that all land held by a grove holder
on the date immediately preceding the date
of vesting shall be deemed to be settled by
the
State
Government
with
such
intermediary [lesse, tenant, grantee or grove
holder], who shall subject to the provisions
1864 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of this Act, be entitled to take or retain
possession as bhumidhari thereof and
Section 57 of Act, 1901 provides all entries
in the records of rights prepared in
accordance with the provisions of this
chapter shall be presumed to be true until the
contrary is proved. It is an undisputed case
of the respondents that they had not led any
evidence either documentary or oral to
prove the subsequent entry made in the 1345
fasli is a wrong entry on any ground.

16. Learned counsel for the private
respondents had very fairly submitted that
the objections were filed on two grounds
firstly, on the basis of the entry in the 1337
fasli and secondly, on the basis of
compromise entered into between the parties
in the criminal proceedings lodged under
Section 107/116 Cr.P.C. and they had not
questioned the subsequent entry of 1345
fasli. The respondents were claiming for cotenancy rights on the basis of entry in 1337
fasli as their names were recorded in the
khasra. Once it is an admitted case that there
was no effort to prove that the entry in 1345
fasli was wrong then as per Section 57 it
would be presumed that the entry was
rightly made. The judgments relied by the
learned counsel for the petitioner on this
point are quoted hereinbelow:-

(i) The relevant para of the
judgment passed in the case of Lal Behari
(supra) is quoted hereinbelow:-

"5. It is well settled that under
Section 57 of the Land Revenue Act the
entries in the current records of the latest
settlement are presumed to be correct unless
rebutted by cogent evidence. However, in
this
connection
the
question
which
sometimes arises for consideration is,
whether the entries made in the subsequent
settlements, which are different with those of
the earlier settlements, would stand rebutted
by the earlier settlement entries or not? It
goes without saying that at each settlement
the entries are made in accordance with the
prescribed procedure contained in Chapter
IV of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. Therefore,
the entries in the record-of-rights prepared
in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter IV would be presumed to be true
unless the contrary is proved as provided
under Section 57 of the Act. Thus, where the
entries made at the earlier and subsequent
settlements are conflicting, the entries made
in subsequent settlement can be given
preference with those of the previous
settlement unless the contrary is proved by
cogent and strong evidence. During the
course of every subsequent settlement
proceeding the then existing entries in the
record-of-right are checked and verified and
the same are corrected, if found to be wrong,
after following the prescribed procedure
under Chapter IV of the Land Revenue Act.
Thus, the entries at the latest settlement
would be presumed to be correct and the
earlier conflicting settlement entries would
not be enough evidence to rebut the
correctness of the subsequent settlement
entries. The entries in the record of rights of
the latest settlement would, therefore, be
presumed to be correct unless rebutted by
cogent evidence and the same cannot be
discarded merely on the ground of
conflicting entries in the earlier settlement
records."

(ii) The relevant para of the
judgment passed in the case of Anjuman
Islamia Lakhimpur (supra) is quoted
hereinbelow:-

"16. This Court has held in a
decision as reported in 1985 (3) LCD 415,
Lalbihari and others v. Ram Adhar and
others, that as per provisions of Section 57
of the U.P.L.R. Act, 1901, entries in
concurrent records of latest settlement are
presumed to be correct unless rebutted by
5 All. Bhagwan Bahadur & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.
1865
cogent evidence. The appellant has failed to
produce any cogent evidence in support of
their claim. As per Sections 101 and 102 of
the Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof
certainly rested on the plaintiff appellant to
demonstrate that the land in dispute was a
Kabristan or it was dedicated as a waqf.
This Court finds strength from a recent
decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
as reported in (2006) 5 SCC 588, Anil Rishi
v. Gurbaksh Singh (paras 8 and 9) in
deriving the above conclusion."

(iii) The relevant paras of the
judgment passed in the case ofNiazu (supra)
is quoted hereinbelow:-

"14.
The
SOC
allowed
the
objection of the petitioner relying upon the
settlement entry of 1365 fasli and the entries
in
the
subsequent
years.
He
has
categorically recorded that the entry of 1365
fasli was a settlement entry and, therefore,
liable to be relied upon and that no evidence
had been adduced to rebut these entries. He
has also referred to the admission in the
statements of -Saffaq and Faizanda, who
have admitted the possession of the
petitioner over the land in question. He
further
recorded
that
the
contesting
respondent, namely Saffaq was present in
the Court, as admitted by his witness
Faizanda but did not care to appear and
depose before the Court. On the aforesaid
reasoning and evidence the claim of adverse
possession as set up by the petitioner was
accepted.

15. The DDC, on the contrary, has
not taken into consideration the fact that the
entry under class 9, in favour of the
petitioner was a settlement entry. What has
been recorded by the DDC for rejecting the
claim of the petitioner, is true only for
normal revenue entries and the said
reasoning will not apply to a settlement
entry. This view is fully fortified by the
judgment relied upon by the learned
Counsel for the petitioner in the case of Lal
Behari (supra). The case law cited on behalf
of the respondents does not deal with
settlement entries and, therefore, the same
has no application in the facts and
circumstances of the case.

16. Accordingly and for the
reasons given above, I am of the considered
opinion that the order passed by the DDC is
vitiated as the revisional authority has
misdirected himself. It has further failed to
consider the reasoning given by the
appellate authority while deciding in favour
of the petitioner, in his judgment of reversal.
The revisional order, therefore, cannot be
sustained and is liable to be set aside.

17. Accordingly I allow the writ
petition and set aside the order passed by the
DDC on 7.6.1984 and affirm the order
passed by the SOC. No order as to costs."

17. As far as the submission regarding
agreement entered into between the parties
before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the
criminal proceeding lodged under Section
107/116 Cr.P.C. is concerned, the same
could not be said to be binding between the
parties in the proceedings initiated under the
Act, 1953. The proceedings under Section
107/116 Cr.P.C. are preventive in nature and
not adjudicated by the judicial court and the
rights of parties are not adjudicated by the
criminal court. It is a compromise just to
give an undertaking that in future the parties
shall maintain peace and would not be
involved in criminal activity. The judgments
relied by the learned counsel for the
petitioners quoted hereinbelow:-

(i) The relevant para of the
judgment passed in the case of Adi
Pherozshah Gandhi vs. H. M. Seervai
reported in AIR 1971 SC 385 is quoted
hereinbelow:-
1866 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"35.
Now
in
disciplinary
proceedings the advocate was not estopped
from questioning the charge that he was
guilty of corrupt practice. In a civil
proceeding the decision of a criminal court
is not res judicata. To give an example, if a
person is involved in a traffic offence in
which some one is injured he may in the
criminal court receive a light sentence but if
he is sued in a civil court for heavy damages
he can plead and prove that he was not
negligent or that accident was due to the
contributory negligence of the defendant.
The decision of the criminal court would not
preclude him from raising this issue before
the civil court."

(ii) The relevant portion of the
judgment passed in the case of Rajinder vs.
State of Haryana reported in [1991] 1
Crimes 873- PH is quoted hereinbelow:-

"Security
proceedings
under
section 151 were on the same facts, as the
impugned
FIR
enumerates.
Security
proceedings cannot be equated with a
criminal
prosecution.
That
was
a
proceeding for preventive measure and the
impugned FIR was registered with respect to
the substantive offence committed by the
petitioners."

(iii) The relevant para of the
judgment passed in the case of Shaikh Piru
Bux vs. Kalandi Pati reported in AIR 1970
SC 1885 is quoted hereinbelow:-

"11. In our opinion the High Court
was right in coming to the conclusion that
the compromise was not binding on the
Hindu community. The learned Additional
Sub-Judge had misdirected himself in law in
coming to the contrary conclusion. The
compromise was not arrived at in a suit
fought in a representative capacity but was
filed in a proceeding under Section 107,
Criminal Procedure Code. The signatories
declared inter alia that "neither we, the
Musalmans nor we the Hindus can at any
time in future create any disturbance
towards each other's religion and will deal
with each other as before. We will not create
any disturbance in any function of either
party and will not create breach of peace
with
each
other
amongst
ourselves.......There is no apprehension of
breach of peace as we the Hindus and the
Musalmans have amicably settled the matter
nor will there occur any breach of peace in
future. So we both parties having settled the
matter amicably, hereby submit this petition
and pray that the case be disposed of in
terms of this compromise petition." It is
signed by a number of persons but there is
no indication that they represented the two
communities. It may be that these persons,
who signed the compromise, were important
persons in the communities and it may be
that both the communities should act
according to the compromise effected by the
so- called important persons. But in law it
does not debar the parties from asserting
their legal rights in a Civil Court. We need
not decide what the compromise means, and
particularly the whether the words inscribed
on the pillars were part of the compromise
effected by the leaders."

18. From the above judgments, it is
clear that the compromise filed in the
criminal proceedings under Section 107/116
Cr.P.C. cannot be equated with the
compromise filed in a regular trial or in
determining the civil rights and title of the
parties.

19. The respondents had waited so
long i.e. when their names were not added in
1345 fasli i.e. in the year 1937-1938.
Thereafter, the entries were intact after the
Act, 1950 came into force on 01.07.1952
and for the first time after about 30 years
raised the objection in the consolidation
proceedings cannot be raised at such a
5 All. Bhagwan Bahadur & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.
1867
belated stage in the light of the law laid
down by this Court in the case of Ramnath
Singh and another vs. D.D.C. reported in
[2014(32) LCD 659]. The relevant para is
quoted hereinbelow:-

"It is specifically mentioned by the
Deputy Director of Consolidation that in
Khasra 1359 Fasli, name of Nawab as main
tenure holder and Aniruddh Singh as sub
tenant was entered, same position was there
in Khasras of 1361 and 1362 Fasli, Khasra
of 1360 Fasli was not available, however
since 1363 Fasli name of Aniruddh Singh
was entered as main tenure holder and name
of Nawab Singh was expunged. 1363 Fasli
corresponds to 1955-56 A.D. Objections
were filed in 1993 i.e. after about 38 years.
Absolutely no reason was given for this
undue delay and silence. The lower
revisional court allowed the revision placing
reliance upon section 20 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R.
Act and U.P. Land Reforms amendment Act
1954. Under Section 20 it is provided that
every person who on the date immediately
preceding date of vesting was a sub tenant
shall be called Adhiwasi. Thereafter through
operation of law Adhiwasis became Sirdars.
1359 Fasli ended on 30.06.1952 and
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was enforced w.e.f.
01.07.1952. Accordingly section 20 was
squarely applicable. The Settlement Officer
of Consolidation decided the matter in
favour of the petitioners on the ground that
it was not shown that entry of 1359 and 1363
were correctly made. In case of old entries
particularly for applying section 20 of the
Act it is not necessary to see whether the
entries are correct. In any case it was for the
other side to show that entry was wrong.
After such long time it is almost impossible
to file supporting orders, documents etc. to
prove correctness of entry. Entries can not
challenged after a long time vide Sahibdar
Khan Vs. Sadllo Khan, A.I.R 2003 S.C.2073.
Moreover in following authorities it has
been held that correctness of the entries for
the purposes of section 20 can not be
doubted or questioned and even in correct
entry ( unless shown to have been made
fraudulently or surreptitiously) will be
sufficient
to
confer
the
right
of
Adhivasi/Siradar/Bhumidhar
upon
the
person shown to be defacto occupant, in
preference to de jure occupant.

1.Amba Prasad Vs. Abdul Noor
Khan, A.I.R. 1965, S.C. 54.

2.Smt. Sonawati vs. Sri Ram A.I.R.
1968, S.C. 466

3.Nath Singh and others Vs. The
Board of Revenue and others, A.I.R. 1968,
S.C. 1351

4.Wali Mohammad Vs. Ram Surat,
A.I.R. 1989, Supreme Court 2296

5.Hira Lal and another Vs. Gajjan
and others, 1990 (3) S.C.C. 285.

6.Chandrika Prasad Vs. Pullo,
A.I.R. 2000, Supreme Court 1785.

7.Ram Avadh and others Vs. Ram
Das and others, 2008 (8) S.C.C. 58.

In the last authority of 2008 it has
been held that if entry is continuing for 11
years since before start of consolidation
then
it
can
not
be
questioned
in
consolidation proceedings.

Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners has cited the following 3
authorities which do not support his
contention:

1.1464 R.D. Page 208, Shri Ram
Vs. Pilau Singh.

2.1963 R.D. Page 111, Phagu Vs.
Sita Ram.

3.1997 C.C.C. 480, Gurumukh
Singh Vs. D.D.C."

20. In the case of Ramnath Singh
(supra), this Court had relied upon the
judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court,
wherein it has been held that correctness of
1868 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the entries for the purposes of Section 20,
Act, 1950 cannot be doubted or questioned
or even incorrect entry (unless shown to
have
been
made
fraudulently
and
surreptitiously) will be sufficient to confer
the right of Adivasi/Sirdars/Bhumidhar
upon the person and if the entry is continued
from last 11 years, in that case, since before
start of consolidation then it cannot be
questioned in consolidation proceedings.
Similarly in the present case, the entry was
made in the year 1937-38 i.e. 1344-45 fasli
when Act,
1921
was
in
operation.
Thereafter, it remained intact when Act,
1950 has came into force w.e.f 01.07.1952
and
thereafter,
in
the
consolidation
proceedings, which were started in the year
1970's i.e. after 30 years from the date of
1345 fasli and 20 years from the date of Act,
1950, then for the first time in the
consolidation proceedings the objection was
raised by the respondents which is not
permissible under the law laid down by this
Court and over and above that the
respondents had never come with a case that
settlement made in 1345 fasli in favour of
the ancestors of the petitioners was made
fraudulently or surreptitiously.

21. In the aforesaid facts and
circumstances of this case, the present writ
petition is allowed.

22. The revisional order dated
31.12.1981 passed by respondent no. 1Deputy Director Consolidation is hereby
quashed.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1868
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.
Writ B No. 563 of 2024

Saiyed Mohammad Rehaan & Ors.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Director of Consolidation District
Sultanpur & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Dwijendra Mishra, Ajeet Kumar

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Mohan Singh

Civil Laws - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226, - UP Consolidation and
Holdings Act, 1953 - Section - 9(A)(2) - Writ
Petition - challenging the impugned remand
order passed by the revisional court - petitioners
claimed by filing of an objection u/s 9-A-(ii) of the
Act, 1953 their rights over the plots in question
on the basis that same was owned and possessed
by their ancestors and have developed on them
on the basis of General Rules of Succession - it
was St.d that said plots have been wrongly
recorded in the name of opponents - objection
was allowed - appeal - consolidation officer
decide the appeal on 28.09.2000 by undue haste
- grounds taken that on 28.09.2000 there is no
any date is fixed for hearing and order sheet
would indicate that order sheet has been altered
- Revision - DDC allowed the revision and
remanded the matter back to the Settlement officer
(Consolidation) for determination afresh - court
observed that, arbitrariness in passing the order
dated 28.09.2000 is writ large on the face of order
and the order sheet, - the dates were changed and
the order sheet deliberately manipulated so as to
pass the order before his superannuation - such an
exercise by a judicial officer or revenue officer
discharging judicial function is strongly condemned
- held, a judicial order should inspire confidence and
a judicial order which does not inspire confidence
shall be set aside and the manner of passing the
order should be above reproach and should be just,
fair and reasonable and should not be leave any
room for suspicion or arbitrariness - hence, writ
petition being devoid merits - Dismissed. (Para -
17, 18, 19)

Writ Petition Dismissed. (E-11)