# Bhibhuti Narain Singh v. Food Corporation of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 2 ILRA 977
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-08-14
- **Case number:** Service Single No. 9694 of 2006
- **Bench:** B. Amit Sthalekar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/bhibhuti-narain-singh-v-food-corporation-of-india-ors-43060
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India,
Art.-226-Writ
petition-territorial
jurisdiction-order
impugned
passed
at
Chandigarh-even
appeal and mercy petition dismissed at
New Delhi-merely because posted at
Barabanki-disciplinary proceeding initiated
at Lucknow-hence has jurisdiction-held-in
view of law laid down by Full Bench in
Rejendra Kumar Misra case as well as
Supreme Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singhpetition before Lucknow Bench , Allahabad
High Court-not maintainable.

Held: Para-15
From the impugned orders, it is noticed
that the chargesheet was issued to the
petitioner on 19.07.1995 when he was
working at Faridkot from the Regional
Office of the Food Corporation of India,
Chandigarh. In the meantime he was
transferred to Lucknow. The appellate
order was passed by the Zonal Manager,
Zonal Office (North), Food Corporation of
India, New Delhi, the review order dated
09.09.2000 was also passed by the
Managing Director, Food Corporation of
India, Headquarters, New Delhi. The
mercy petition of the petitioner was also
rejected by the Chairman for and on
behalf of the Board of Directors, Food
Corporation of India, Headquarters, New
Delhi. The only order which has been
passed within the State of U.P. is the
communication order dated 09.02.2001
passed by the District Manager, Food
Corporation of India, District Office,
Faridkot communicating the appellate
order dated 09.09.2000. Merely because
the order has been communicated to the
petitioner when he was posted as
Assistant
Manager,
Barabanki
or
Lucknow,
U.P.
will
not
confer
any
jurisdiction upon the Lucknow Bench of
the Allahabad High Court. None of the
orders, impugned in the writ petition
have been passed by any authority in
NOIDA or Lucknow within the State of
U.P.
Case Law discussed:
(1995) 6 SCC 634; (2007) 7 SCC 309; AIR
1966 SCC 1313; AIR 1974 296(V.61, C.66);
W.P. No. 6492 of 2010; AIR 1961 SC 532;
2005(5) AWC 4542(FB)

## Text

2 All]. Bhibhuti Narain Singh Vs. Food Corporation of India & Ors.
977

11. In this view of the matter the
impugned orders dated 22.10.2013 and
27.05.2014 cannot survive being illegal
and without jurisdiction and the same are
accordingly quashed.

12. The writ petition is allowed.

13. The respondents are directed to
pay the entire arrears of salary and
allowances payable to the petitioner and
also to pay him all his retirement benefits
in accordance with Rules and Regulations
as if there had been no disciplinary
proceedings or order passed therein.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 14.08.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE B. AMIT STHALEKAR, J.

Service Single No. 9694 of 2006

Bhibhuti Narain Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Food Corporation of India & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri T.B. Singh, Sri Sudhir Pandey
Sri Sunil K Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Ashutosh Kr. Singh, Shree Chandra
Misra

Constitution
of
India,
Art.-226-Writ
petition-territorial
jurisdiction-order
impugned
passed
at
Chandigarh-even
appeal and mercy petition dismissed at
New Delhi-merely because posted at
Barabanki-disciplinary proceeding initiated
at Lucknow-hence has jurisdiction-held-in
view of law laid down by Full Bench in
Rejendra Kumar Misra case as well as
Supreme Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singhpetition before Lucknow Bench , Allahabad
High Court-not maintainable.

Held: Para-15
From the impugned orders, it is noticed
that the chargesheet was issued to the
petitioner on 19.07.1995 when he was
working at Faridkot from the Regional
Office of the Food Corporation of India,
Chandigarh. In the meantime he was
transferred to Lucknow. The appellate
order was passed by the Zonal Manager,
Zonal Office (North), Food Corporation of
India, New Delhi, the review order dated
09.09.2000 was also passed by the
Managing Director, Food Corporation of
India, Headquarters, New Delhi. The
mercy petition of the petitioner was also
rejected by the Chairman for and on
behalf of the Board of Directors, Food
Corporation of India, Headquarters, New
Delhi. The only order which has been
passed within the State of U.P. is the
communication order dated 09.02.2001
passed by the District Manager, Food
Corporation of India, District Office,
Faridkot communicating the appellate
order dated 09.09.2000. Merely because
the order has been communicated to the
petitioner when he was posted as
Assistant
Manager,
Barabanki
or
Lucknow,
U.P.
will
not
confer
any
jurisdiction upon the Lucknow Bench of
the Allahabad High Court. None of the
orders, impugned in the writ petition
have been passed by any authority in
NOIDA or Lucknow within the State of
U.P.
Case Law discussed:
(1995) 6 SCC 634; (2007) 7 SCC 309; AIR
1966 SCC 1313; AIR 1974 296(V.61, C.66);
W.P. No. 6492 of 2010; AIR 1961 SC 532;
2005(5) AWC 4542(FB)

(Delivered by Hon'ble B. Amit Sthalekar, J.)

1. The petitioner has filed this writ
petition seeking quashing of the orders
dated 07.10.1998 (Annexure-1 to the writ
petition) passed by the General Manager
(Punjab) Food Corporation of India,
978 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Chandigarh,
respondent
no.5,
the
appellate
order
dated
29.09.1999
(Annexure-2 to the writ petition) passed
by the Executive Director (N) Food
Corporation of India, NOIDA, the Review
order dated 09.09.2000 (Annexure-3 to
the writ petition) passed by the respondent
no.1, Chairman, Food Corporation of
India, New Delhi, the order dated
09.02.2001(Annexure-4
to
the
writ
petition) passed by the District Manager,
Food Corporation of India, Faizabad
communicating to the petitioner that his
appeal/review against the order dated
09.09.2000 has been rejected and the
order dated 20.07.2006 (Annexure-5 to
the writ petition) passed by the Chairman,
Food Corporation of India, Headquarters,
New Delhi rejecting the mercy petition of
the petitioner.

2. I have heard Sri Sudhir Pandey,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Shree Chandra Misra as well as Sri
Shikhar Anand, learned counsel for the
respondents.

3. Sri Shree Chandra Misra has raised
a preliminary objection that no cause of
action has accrued to the petitioner within
the State of U.P. and all the impugned
orders have been passed either at New Delhi
or Chandigarh and therefore, the High
Court either at Allahabad or the Lucknow
Bench of the Allahabad High Court does
not have jurisdiction to entertain this writ
petition and mere communication of some
order by the District Manager, Faizabad
communicating the above orders to the
petitioner would not confer jurisdiction on
the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High
Court to entertain the writ petition.

4. In order to determine the
preliminary objection raised by the
learned counsel for the respondents brief
facts of the case would be necessary to be
narrated. The petitioner while posted as
Assistant Manager (Quality Control) at
Faridkot, Punjab in the Food Corporation
of India was served with a chargesheet
vide memo dated 19.07.1995 under
Regulation 58 of the Regulations, copy of
the chargesheet has been filed as
Annexure-6 to the writ petition. A perusal
of the same will demonstrate that it has
been issued by the Senior Regional
Manager, Regional Office of the Food
Corporation of India, Chandigarh, Punjab.
This chargesheet was communicated to
the
petitioner
through
the
District
Manager, Food Corporation of India,
Gurudaspur
as
disclosed
in
the
chargesheet.
By
an
order
dated
15.06.1998 the petitioner was transferred
to
Lucknow.
He was
relieved on
03.08.1998 and he joined the Lucknow
office of the Food Corporation of India on
04.08.1998.
In
pursuance
of
the
chargesheet which was issued to him, a
departmental enquiry was held. The
charges were proved against the petitioner
and thereafter the impugned punishment
order dated 07.10.1998 (Annexure-1 to
the writ petition) was passed and a
penalty of stoppage of two increments of
pay with cumulative effect effective from
01.01.1999 was
passed
against
the
petitioner in exercise of powers under
Regulation 56 of the Food Corporation of
India (Staff) Regulations 1971. This order
has been passed by the Senior Regional
Manager,
Regional
Office,
Food
Corporation of India, Chandigarh, Punjab.
Aggrieved
the
petitioner
filed
a
departmental appeal which was also
dismissed by an order dated 29.09.1999
passed by the Zonal Manager, Zonal
Office (N), New Delhi, copy of which has
been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ
2 All]. Bhibhuti Narain Singh Vs. Food Corporation of India & Ors.
979
petition. Aggrieved by this order, the
petitioner filed a review petition, which
has been rejected by an order dated
09.09.2000 passed by the Managing
Director, Food Corporation of India,
Headquarters, New Delhi. This order was
communicated to the petitioner by letter
dated 09.02.2001 by the District Manager
Incharge Food Corporation of India,
District Office, Faizabad. The petitioner
preferred a mercy petition which has also
been rejected by the Chairman for and on
behalf of the Board of Directors, Food
Corporation of India, Headquarters, New
Delhi, copy of which has been filed at
page 43 of the writ petition.

5. The submission of Sri Sudhir
Panday, learned counsel for the petitioner
are three fold:

1. That, the writ petition does not
suffer from vice of non-maintainability on
ground of territorial jurisdiction;

2. That, the impugned order of
penalty has been passed by the Senior
Regional Manager, Chandigarh, Punjab
although as per the Schedule-II of the
Regulations (copy filed at page 30 to the
writ petition), the Zonal Manager is the
competent authority to award major
penalty since the penalty of withholding
of two increments with cumulative effect
is a major penalty.

3. That, the Zonal Manager, is the
appellate authority of the Senior Regional
Manager and that the appellate authority
of any order passed by the Zonal Manager
is
the
Managing
Director,
Food
Corporation of India.

6. The inferential submission,
therefore, is that the order of penalty
having been passed by the Senior
Regional Manger is without jurisdiction
and as a consequence the appellate order
passed by the Zonal Manager is also
without jurisdiction.

7. The second submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioner is that
since the orders have been passed by the
authorities, who were not competent to
pass the same, the doctrine of merger,
namely, that the order of disciplinary
authority would merge in the order of the
appellate authority does not apply. Before
the second and third submissions of the
learned counsel can be considered it
would be appropriate and in the fitness of
things that the first and preliminary
objection with regard to the territorial
jurisdiction be examined, discussed and
decided.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has also placed reliance upon the
following decisions of the Supreme
Court:

1. (1995) 6 SCC 634, Allahabad
Bank Vs. Prem Narain Pande and Others

2. (2007) 7 SCC 309, Municipal
Corporation of Delhi Vs. Qimat Raj
Gupta and Others.

3. AIR 1966 SCC 1313, State of
Punjab Vs. Amar Singh Harika

4. AIR 1974 296 (V.61, C.66),
Serajuddin and Co. Vs. State of Orissa
and Others. 5. Writ Petition No.6492
(S/S) of 2010, Janmejai Sachan Vs. State
of U.P. and Others.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Prem Narain
Pande (supra) and Janmejai Sachan
(supra) would be directly applicable with
regard to his submission on the question
of territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow
980 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Bench of the Allahabad High Court. In
the circumstances, it would be necessary
to discuss the facts of the case of Prem
Narain Pande (supra) and Janmejai
Sachan (supra). In the case of Prem
Narain Pande (supra), the respondent in
the Special Appeal was working as Junior
Management
Scale-I
posted
in
the
Regional Office of the Allahabad Bank at
Lucknow.
He
was
served
with
a
chargesheet dated 24.08.1983 with regard
to his working as Manager of the
Allahabad Bank, District Lakhimpur
Kheri. The chargesheet was served upon
the respondent no.1 while working at the
Central Zone, Lucknow. In the meantime,
on 15.07.1985, the respondent no.1 was
transferred from Lucknow to Ranchi,
Bihar.
After
transfer,
the
Assistant
General Manger, Zonal Office, Allahabad
Bank, Patna Zone took over as the
Disciplinary Authority in respect of the
pending enquiry against the respondent
no.1. An enquiry was held and thereafter
the Assistant General Manager, Zonal
Office, Patna passed the order dated
21.03.1986 dismissing the respondent
no.1 from service of the Bank. The
respondent challenged the order of
dismissal by filing writ petition in the
Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High
Court taking the plea, inter alia, that the
disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against him by the Deputy General
Manager, Central Zone, Lucknow and
therefore the Assistant General Manager,
Zonal Office, Patna had no authority or
jurisdiction
to
pass
the
impugned
dismissal order and it was the disciplinary
authority which initiated the proceedings
which was competent to pass the final
order of penalty. The Supreme Court in
paragraph 12 of the judgment has held
that if the Deputy General Manager has
initiated the disciplinary proceedings
against the delinquent officer and if at the
stage of passing final orders he is
substituted
by
another
competent
disciplinary
authority
like
Assistant
General Manger, then in such a case, the
penalty order though passed by the
Assistant General Manager will have a
linkage
with
the
initiation
of
the
disciplinary proceedings by the Deputy
General Manager as disciplinary authority
and in such an eventuality the appeal
would lie to the General Manager, who is
also one of the appellate authorities as
mentioned in the amended Schedule and
in either case the reviewing authority
against the appellate authority will remain
the same, namely, the Chairman and
Managing Director. The Supreme Court,
therefore, held that it cannot be held as
assumed by the High Court that under the
Regulations it is the disciplinary authority
which initiates the proceedings that has
necessarily to complete the proceedings
till the stage of Regulation-7 and it is that
very authority who must pass the final
orders of penalty. It is on this short
ground that the decision of the High Court
was held to be non-sustainable. In my
opinion, the aforesaid judgment has no
application to the facts of the present case
and in fact the Supreme Court only upset
the judgment of the High Court on the
question where the High Court held that
since the proceedings had continued at
Patna, therefore, the Assistant General
Manager, Patna was not competent to
complete the enquiry and it was only the
disciplinary authority, namely, the Deputy
General Manger, Lucknow who was
competent to continue the departmental
enquiry. In my opinion the said judgment
does not answer the preliminary objection
of the respondents that the writ petition is
not maintainable in the Allahabad High
Court, Lucknow Bench on the ground that
2 All]. Bhibhuti Narain Singh Vs. Food Corporation of India & Ors.
981
no cause of action has accrued within the
State of U.P.

10. In Janmejai Sachan (supra) the
Superintendent of Police Unnao had
awarded censure entry to the petitioner.
The petitioner during pendency of the
disciplinary proceedings was transferred
from Unnao to Sitapur. The learned
Single Judge, by the interim order dated
15.09.2010
held
that
only
the
Superintendent of Police, Sitapur was
competent
to
pass
the
order
of
punishment. Reliance was placed by the
learned Single Judge upon the case of
Prem Narain Pande (supra). The said
judgment is an interim order and not the
final order, therefore, does not constitute a
precedent unless the Court has finally
decided the issue. This judgment also
does not meet the preliminary objection
regarding non-maintainability of the writ
petition.

11. Learned counsel for the
petitioner next relied upon the judgment
of the Supreme Court in Amar Singh
Harika (supra), wherein it was held that
mere passing of an order of dismissal is
not effective unless it is published and
communicated to the officer concerned.
The judgment of Amar Singh Harika
(supra) is in its own facts. That was a case
in which the respondent was sought to be
dismissed and an order of dismissal was
passed on 03.06.1949. This order was
communicated to 6 persons but not to the
respondent himself, the respondent on
29.01.1951 made a representation to the
Government of Pepsu, in which he asked
for being given a copy of the report of the
Committee, a copy of the allegations on
which the said report was based, and a
copy of the chargesheet. In reply he was
informed on 16.04.1951 by the Pepsu
Government that his report could not be
considered as he has tendered his
resignation. However, on 28.05.1951 he
was informed that he had been dismissed
from service with effect from the date of
his suspension. It is on this date that the
respondent for the first time came to
know about his dismissal. The facts of the
said case also have no application to the
facts of the present case.

12. In the case of Qimat Rai Gupta
and Others (supra), the Supreme Court in
paragraph 27 has held that an order
passed
by
a
competent
authority
dismissing a Government servant from
service
requires
communication.
Reference was made to the judgment of
the Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court in the case of Amar Singh Harika
(supra). The said judgment also has no
application to the facts of the present case
as in the case of present petitioner the
penalty order dated 07.10.1998 had been
communicated to the petitioner and he
also filed a departmental appeal against
the same on 08.01.1999 which was
rejected by the order dated 29.09.1999.

13. The judgment of the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the
case of Serajuddin and Company (supra)
is a matter where the revisional order
under the Mineral Concession Rules,
1960 was found to be a nullity for not
complying with the principles of natural
justice and it was held that where the
order itself was a nullity such defects
could not be cured by giving any
opportunity of hearing. This judgment
also, in my opinion, has no application to
the facts of the present case.

14. This Court cannot examine the
question as to whether the impugned order
982 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in the present case are valid or not, or
whether if there is any defect in the
impugned orders, the same can be cured or
not since the question to be considered by
the Court is a preliminary objection with
regard to the maintainability of the writ
petition itself in the Lucknow Bench of the
Allahabad High Court and therefore, the
Court cannot enter into the merits of the
case.

15. From the impugned orders, it is
noticed that the chargesheet was issued to the
petitioner on 19.07.1995 when he was
working at Faridkot from the Regional
Office of the Food Corporation of India,
Chandigarh. In the meantime he was
transferred to Lucknow. The appellate order
was passed by the Zonal Manager, Zonal
Office (North), Food Corporation of India,
New Delhi, the review order dated
09.09.2000 was also passed by the Managing
Director,
Food
Corporation
of
India,
Headquarters, New Delhi. The mercy
petition of the petitioner was also rejected by
the Chairman for and on behalf of the Board
of Directors, Food Corporation of India,
Headquarters, New Delhi. The only order
which has been passed within the State of
U.P. is the communication order dated
09.02.2001 passed by the District Manager,
Food Corporation of India, District Office,
Faridkot communicating the appellate order
dated 09.09.2000. Merely because the order
has been communicated to the petitioner
when he was posted as Assistant Manager,
Barabanki or Lucknow, U.P. will not confer
any jurisdiction upon the Lucknow Bench of
the Allahabad High Court. None of the
orders, impugned in the writ petition have
been passed by any authority in NOIDA or
Lucknow within the State of U.P.

16. To the contrary a Seven-Judge
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of
India,AIR 1961 SC 532 has very
succinctly laid down the law on the
question of jurisdiction in para 13 which
reads as under:-

"13.Now
it
is
clear
that
the
jurisdiction conferred on the High Court
by Article 226 does not depend upon the
residence or location of the person
applying to it for relief : it depends only
on the person or authority against whom a
writ is sought being within those
territories. It seems to us therefore that it
is not permissible to read in Article 226
the residence or location of the person
affected by the order passed in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the High
Court. That jurisdiction depends on the
person or authority passing the order
being within those territories and the
residence or location of the person
affected can have no relevance on the
question of the High Court's jurisdiction.
Thus, if a person residing or located in
Bombay, for example, is aggrieved by an
order passed by an authority located, say,
in Calcutta, the forum in which he has to
seek relief is not the Bombay High Court
though the order may affect him in
Bombay, but the Calcutta High Court
where the authority passing the order is
located. It would, therefore, in our
opinion, be wrong to introduce in Article
226 the concept of the place where the
order passed has effect in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the High
Court which can give relief under Article
226."

17. The legal principles propounded in
Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) have been
followed by a Full Bench of this Court in
2005 (5) AWC 4542 (FB) Rajendra Kumar
Mishra vs. Union of India and others.
2 All]. Ranjit Sharma Vs. General Manager-Personal Service UCO Bank Kolkatta & Ors.
983

18. Thus in view of the law laid
down by the Supreme Court in the case of
Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) and the
Full Bench in Rajendra Kumar Mishra
(Supra) this writ petition filed in the
Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench is
not maintainable and is dismissed as such.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.08.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14637 of 2010

Ranjit Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
General Manager-Personal Service, UCO
Bank Kolkatta & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sharad Malviya, Sri A.N. Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri T.P. Singh, Sri V.K. Srivastava

Constitution
of
India-Art.-226-Writ
Petition-challenging
dismissal
order-on
ground non compliance of principle of
Natural Justice-concealed material fact
that the disciplinary proceeding conducted
strict in accordance with law with full
opportunity-due to fraud and manipulation
committed by petitioner-termination due
to loss of confidence-petitioner guilty of
suppressing
material
fact,-disciplinary
authority
taking
different
view
than
enquiry officer-issued show cause noticeinstead of filing reply-present petition-not
maintainable-dismissed
with
cost
of
20,000/-payable to bank.

Held: Para-28
The
petitioner
was
given
ample
opportunity, the evidence was led by the
bank against the petitioner which was
proved on the basis of records available in
the normal course of business. The factum
of the allegations is not being denied by
the petitioner, however, explanations have
been given. Since the bank has lost money
by fraud and manipulation committed by
the petitioner while working as Computer
Terminal Operator, his services was rightly
terminated for loss of confidence and
unsuitability by the Bank. The petitioner is
guilty of not approaching the Court with
clean hands.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Suneet Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sharad Malviya
assisted by Sri A.N. Pandey, learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner and
Sri T.P. Singh, Senior Advocate assisted
by Sri V.K. Srivastava, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents.

2. The petitioner was working as
Computer Terminal Operator (CTO) in
Laxman Patti Branch of UCO Bank at
Bhadohi, for committing irregularities
was placed under suspension, a chargesheet containing seven charges was issued
to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted
reply to the charge-sheet on 12.9.2006
denying
the
allegations,
hence,
an
Enquiry Officer was appointed who after
conducting the enquiry recorded a finding
on 18.2.2009 that charge nos. 2 and 5 are
proved and charge nos. 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are
not proved against the petitioner.

3. The Disciplinary Authority
disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry
Officer in respect of charge nos. 1, 3, 4, 6
and 7, but agreed with the finds in respect
of charge nos. 2 and 5 vide order dated
31.3.2008 and issued notice calling upon
the petitioner to show cause. The
petitioner submitted his reply on 9.4.2008
to the Disciplinary Authority pertaining to
the charge nos. 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7. The
Disciplinary
Authority
after
giving