# Bhupendra Vikram Singh v. State Of U.P. & Ors. 390 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES - **Citation:** (2016) 3 ILRA 389 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2016-03-09 - **Bench:** Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, Attau Rahman Masoodi - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/bhupendra-vikram-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-390-indian-law-reports-allahabad-43540 - **Pages:** 3 ## Headnote Mukesh Kumar Sharma, Akhilesh Kumar Kalra Counsel for Respondents:- C.S.C Panchayat Election - impersonation allegation - name decripancy - quo-warranto - maintainability. Petitioner challenged election of respondent No. 6 as Pramukh of Kshetra Panchayat - alleging impersonation via contesting as Rakiya Bano instead of Sakiya Bano - claiming inherent disqualification - sought issuance of writ of quo-warranto to oust her. Held - Name Variation for same person does not presume impersonation or inherent disqualification absent evidence of material election impact - Writ of quo-warranto unavailable- The same could have been challenged through an election petition. IN RESULT - Petition stands rejected. ## Text 3 All. Jagannath Mishra & Anr. Vs State Of U.P. & Ors. 389 3. A mandamus has also been sought for taking action against the respondents no. 4 to 14 for their having indulged in illegal activities. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and what we find is that the occasion and the cause arising out of the action is purely individual to the petitioners and is not related to the dispensation of justice in courts by virtue of being office bearers of a court attached Bar Association. In such a situation, in our opinion, a writ petition for the nature of the relief, as prayed for, would not be maintainable, moreso when the dispute or the doubt relating to the continuance of an office bearer of a registered association under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 would be amenable to the authority of Section 25 of the 1860 Act. 5. Apart from this, the remedy of approaching the civil court against the impugned action of the Bar Council can be availed of, if permissible. 6. However, so far as the contents of the resolution are concerned, we find that the impugned resolution has been passed against the petitioners not due to any financial complaint or any other disciplinary matter. It is only on the ground that the petitioners had been instrumental in getting the strike, which was continuing for about four months, withdrawn and that they were seen in the company of the contesting opposite parties in the dispute of raising of a wall that had given rise to the strike. We may put on record that the Seven-Judges Bench of the Allahabad High Court has already taken cognizance of such strikes and has, in a particular case, declared them to be unlawful following the decisions of the apex court. In our considered opinion, a strike which endlessly continues for months together, therefore, does call for an appropriate action against those who are fostering such strikes but that would be a separate forum and not this writ petition. 7. So far as the question of the Bar Council taking any action is concerned, it would be appropriate that once the Bar Council takes notice of any such unlawful strike then it is for the Bar Council to take an appropriate action, in case unauthorised resolutions, as alleged, are sought to be given effect to by such persons who want the continuance of unlawful strikes. 8. We are, therefore, not inclined to entertain the writ petition and the writ petition, therefore, is consigned to records, with the aforesaid observations. -------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: LUCKNOW 09.03.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE AMRESHWAR PRATAP SAHI, J. THE HON'BLE ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI, J. Writ C No. - 4936 of 2016 Bhupendra Vikram Singh. ...Petitioner Versus State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents 390 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES Counsel for the Petitioner: Mukesh Kumar Sharma, Akhilesh Kumar Kalra Counsel for Respondents:- C.S.C Panchayat Election - impersonation allegation - name decripancy - quo-warranto - maintainability. Petitioner challenged election of respondent No. 6 as Pramukh of Kshetra Panchayat - alleging impersonation via contesting as Rakiya Bano instead of Sakiya Bano - claiming inherent disqualification - sought issuance of writ of quo-warranto to oust her. Held - Name Variation for same person does not presume impersonation or inherent disqualification absent evidence of material election impact - Writ of quo-warranto unavailable- The same could have been challenged through an election petition. IN RESULT - Petition stands rejected. (Delivered by Hon'ble Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, J. & Hon'ble Attau Rahman Masoodi, J.) 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. The petitioner, being a member of a local body Kshetra Panchayat, Bazar Shukul, district Amethi, had contested the election of the post of Pramukh of the said Kshetra Panchayat. The respondent No.6 has been elected as Pramukh and the contention of the petitioner is that she had succeeded in getting elected on the strength of impersonation. The ground for challenge, therefore, is that the name of the respondent No.6 is "Shakiya Bano" and she was a sitting member of the same block and, therefore, obtaining the certificate and contesting the election as "Rakiya Bano", is a clear case of impersonation and a practice which clearly disqualifies her from occupying the Office of Block Pramukh. The contention is that in view of this alleged inherent disqualification having incurred on the facts aforesaid, a writ of quo warranto should be issued to dislodge the respondent No.6 restraining her from acting as Pramukh of the Kshetra Panchayat, Bazar Shukul, district Amethi. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State. 4. The question in regard to the name of the respondent No.6 having been transformed into "Rakiya Bano" from "Shakiya Bano, is a subject to leading of evidence and it would not fall within the definition of any inherent disqualification to issue a writ of quo warranto on the basis of the facts for which evidence is to be led as to whether such fact has materially affected the declaration of result of the election as also the election of a wrong person. The fact that the person is the same, has not been disputed before us. The difference of name or the occurrence of two names of the same person would necessarily result in impersonation cannot be assumed as an unimpeachable presumption for entertaining a prayer for quo warranto, more so when the fact that the same person has contested the election who was a 3 All. Bhupendra Vikram Singh Vs State Of U.P. & Ors. 391 member, is not disputed. In view of this, in our opinion, a writ of quo warranto would not be maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case and the petitioner who has already contested the election, could have also filed an election petition for the same. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere in the matter without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner to contest the matter in law before the appropriate forum. 5. The writ petition is accordingly rejected. --------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.02.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J. Matters Under Article 227 No. - 377 of 2016 Smt. Neetu Rana ...Petitioner Versus The State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Shri Nitin Kumar Agrawal Counsel for the Respondents: Govt. Advocate, Shri A.C. Srivastava Held - 29.02.2016 : Para 1: The respondent declined to file a counter-affidavit, and both parties agreed to have the petition decided at the admission stage. Para 2: The applicant (wife) challenged an appellate court order dated 11 January 2016, which had set aside an interim residence order originally granted in her favor. Para 3: The Magistrate initially allowed the wife to live in the "shared household." The appellate court set this aside and remanded the case because the husband claimed no notice was received and argued the house belonged solely to his mother. Para 4: The wife argued the remand was flawed because the appellate court already concluded the house wasn't a "shared household." The husband countered that since the property belonged to the grandmother/mother, it didn't fall under the Act. Para 5: The Court examined the definitions of "domestic relationship," "shared household," and "respondent." It noted that ownership is secondary to the factum of living together.