# Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management

- **Citation:** (2011) 3 ILRA 1350
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2011-11-04
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 21674 of 2011
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/bolam-v-friern-hospital-management-42009
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Arms Act, cancellation of Fire Arm
licence-on ground non-furnishing correct
information relating to current address
and
permanent
address-cancellationheld-proper-but
can
not
bar
fresh
application with correct particulars.
3 All] Arvind Kumar V. State of U.P. and others
1351
Held: Para 32

In the case in hand, it is not disputed by
the
petitioner
that
his
forefathers/grandfather
belong
to
village Makdoompur (Doksaha), P.S. and
District Kaushambi. In para 14 of the
writ petition the petitioner however,
says that he has given address where he
actually resides. He has not stated that
he has severed all connections and
relations with the place of his forefathers
and
has
settled
permanently
at
Allahabad. No details have been given to
show and to ascertain whether the
petitioner has permanently settled at
Allahabad. Neither the place of birth nor
property details at Allahabad nor any
other fact is on record to demonstrate
that he has permanently settled at
Allahabad.
Actual
place
of
address
obviously would satisfy the requirement
of "current address" but whether it can
satisfy the "permanent address" or not
would depend on case to case. In the
present case, no such material has been
brought on record to show that "current
address" of the petitioner can be treated
to be his "permanent address". It is in
these circumstances, I do not find any
error apparent on the face of record in
the orders impugned in the writ petition
passed by the authorities below.
Case law discussed:
(1910) 1 L.R. 32; A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 666; AIR
1940 Lah. 449; 1963 AIR 1521=1964 SCR (2)
73; AIR 1955 SC 36; [1892] 3 Ch. 180; (1875)
ILR 1 All 51; AIR 1973 SC 505; AIR 1984 SC
1420; AIR 2000 SC 525=2000(2) SCC 20;
1971 (2) SCC 293; 1981 SCC (4) 517=1981
SCALE (3) 1641; (1959) 2 All ER 787; AIR
1965 Rajasthan 11; 2006 (1) UP Cr.R. 415;
2005 (TLS) 316893 (writ petition no. 32033 of
2004 decided on 19.10.2005)

## Text

1350 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
(Delivered by Hon'ble Amar Saran,J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioners and the learned A.G.A for the
State.

2. This writ petition has been filed for
quashing of an FIR dated 2.10.2011
registered at case crime No. 3440 of 2011,
under sections 269, 308, 328 and 418 IPC,
P.S. Baradari, district Bareilly.

3. Briefly allegations in the FIR were
that the informant Smt. Sabiha Hamid had
gone to the Nursing Home run by the
petitioners for the purpose of her delivery.
On 4.11.2011, the informant was discharged
but she started complaining of great pain
and thereafter the petitioners prescribed
some medicines but she was again
hospitalized
between
16.2.2011
and
23.2.2011. Later on, she was refered to
another Centre, where it was discovered that
the petitioners had left a cotton bundle in
her stomach at the time of operation as a
result of which the anus pipe had putrefied
which she needs to get operated at
S.G.P.G.I. Lucknow.

4.

Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners placing reliance on Jacob
Mathew Vs. State of Punjab and another;
AIR 2005 SC 3180, Martin F. D' Souza
Vs. Mohd. Ishfaq AIR 2009 SC 2049,
Bolam Vs. Friern Hospital Management
Committee; 1957 (2) All. E.R. 118 and
Mahadev Prasad Kaushik Vs. State of U.P
2009 AWC-1-453 has argued that gross
negligence
is
not
disclosed.
It
is
contended that in the said decisions, it has
been held that if the accused are properly
qualified and if they act in a manner
required to provide medical care on the
standards of normal doctors, who exercise
reasonable skills and during that act if any
mis-happening occurs because of some
defect in the equipment, the doctor cannot
be put to blame. In the present case, the
allegations were that during the course of
operation, the petitioners have left a
cotton bundle in the stomach of the victim
causing her great pain which required a
subsequent operation.

5. In our view, prima facie this
appears to be a case of gross negligence
as no doctor who takes reasonable care
would allow a piece of cotton to remain in
the stomach after an operation. In the
circumstances, it cannot be said that the
FIR does not disclose any prima facie
offence against the petitioners.

6. The writ petition is accordingly
dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.11.2011

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 21674 of 2011

Arvind Kumar

 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.P. Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Pankaj Rai (Addl.C.S.C.)
C.S.C.

Arms Act, cancellation of Fire Arm
licence-on ground non-furnishing correct
information relating to current address
and
permanent
address-cancellationheld-proper-but
can
not
bar
fresh
application with correct particulars.
3 All] Arvind Kumar V. State of U.P. and others
1351
Held: Para 32

In the case in hand, it is not disputed by
the
petitioner
that
his
forefathers/grandfather
belong
to
village Makdoompur (Doksaha), P.S. and
District Kaushambi. In para 14 of the
writ petition the petitioner however,
says that he has given address where he
actually resides. He has not stated that
he has severed all connections and
relations with the place of his forefathers
and
has
settled
permanently
at
Allahabad. No details have been given to
show and to ascertain whether the
petitioner has permanently settled at
Allahabad. Neither the place of birth nor
property details at Allahabad nor any
other fact is on record to demonstrate
that he has permanently settled at
Allahabad.
Actual
place
of
address
obviously would satisfy the requirement
of "current address" but whether it can
satisfy the "permanent address" or not
would depend on case to case. In the
present case, no such material has been
brought on record to show that "current
address" of the petitioner can be treated
to be his "permanent address". It is in
these circumstances, I do not find any
error apparent on the face of record in
the orders impugned in the writ petition
passed by the authorities below.
Case law discussed:
(1910) 1 L.R. 32; A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 666; AIR
1940 Lah. 449; 1963 AIR 1521=1964 SCR (2)
73; AIR 1955 SC 36; [1892] 3 Ch. 180; (1875)
ILR 1 All 51; AIR 1973 SC 505; AIR 1984 SC
1420; AIR 2000 SC 525=2000(2) SCC 20;
1971 (2) SCC 293; 1981 SCC (4) 517=1981
SCALE (3) 1641; (1959) 2 All ER 787; AIR
1965 Rajasthan 11; 2006 (1) UP Cr.R. 415;
2005 (TLS) 316893 (writ petition no. 32033 of
2004 decided on 19.10.2005)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J. )

1. This writ petition is directed
against order dated 10.08.2009 passed by
District Magistrate, Allahabad cancelling
firearm licence of petitioner on the ground
that he has not given correct information in
his application inasmuch as at Item No. 5
and 6 of the application, i.e., information
relating to current and permanent address,
the petitioner has disclosed same address
in both columns, namely, 224/18 C
Beniganj, Post G.T.B. Nagar, P.S. Kareli,
Allahabad whereas his permanent address
is Village Makdoompur (Doksaha), P.S.
and District Kaushambi and, therefore, he
is guilty of contravening Rule 51 which is
punishable under Section 30 of Arms Act
for giving wrong information and as such
his application is liable to be rejected.

2. The said order has been confirmed
in appeal by Commissioner vide order
dated 15.02.2011.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that he is presently residing at
224/18 C Beniganj, Post G.T.B. Nagar,
P.S. Kareli, Allahabad and has been issued
a driving licence, ration card as well as
domicile certificate and, therefore, address
given by him satisfies the requirement of
"permanent address" and his application
ought not have been rejected for this
reason.

4. Learned Standing Counsel on the
contrary
submitted
that
petitioner's
forefathers
belong
to
Village
Makdoompur (Doksaha), P.S. and District
Kaushambi and since the petitioner has
not broken relations with the place of his
forefathers, his permanent address would
be that of his forefathers and since this
was not disclosed by him, he was guilty
of
non-disclosure
of
correct
information/or concealment of correct
information hence violated Rule l51 and
his application has rightly been rejected.
1352 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011

5. The only question up for
consideration in this case is what is
"permanent address"? Whether it is distinct
from current address and if so, in what
manner ?

6. The application form is at page 16
(Annexure-1 to the writ petition). Columns
5 and 6 reads as under:

^^5- orZEkku irk% 224@18 lh csuhxat iks0
th0Vh0ch0 uxj bykgkckn

1⁄4v1⁄2 fudV dk Fkkuk & Fkkuk djsyh

6- LFkkbZ irk% 224@18 lh csuhxat iks0
th0Vh0ch0 uxj bykgkckn

fudV dk Fkkuk & Fkkuk djsyh**

7. There is also a caution at the
bottom of application form which says that
any
concealment
of
information
or
misstatement would be contrary to Rule 51
and shall be punishable under Section 30
of Arms Act. It is not in dispute that
petitioner's ancestors are resident of
Village Makdoompur (Doksaha), P.S. and
District Kaushambi.

8. The requirement in Clauses 5 and
6 is "current address" and "permanent
address". The word 'address' though by
itself may have different connotations but
in the context in which requirement is to be
read in the form prescribed in Rule 51 is
the place of residence where the applicant
is residing presently and another is place of
permanent residence. It has to be seen
when a residence can be termed as present
place of residence other than permanent
residence and when both the terms namely,
present residence and permanent residence
constitute one and the same thing. A
person may be resident of a place presently
with a clear intention of shifting therefrom
on occurrence of certain events or after a
specified time known from very beginning
to person concerned or for some other
reason. Entire gamut of circumstances
cannot be illustrated for the reason that the
current address, i.e., the place of present
residence though temporary but has to be
distinguished from short visit to a
particular place for some time i.e., few
hours, few days and may be few weeks.
For example, if a person has gone to a city
for his business or purpose for professional
assignment and stays there in a hotel for
one, two or more days or even for one or
more weeks, it cannot be said to be current
address in the context in which it is
required in the present case for the reason
that it shall not qualify requirement of
present residence of the person concerned.
The current address, to my mind cannot be
read so as to include such an address which
has occasioned due to visit of the person
concerned outside the place of his
residence in connection with some work or
otherwise and he had no intention to stay
there after completion of the job. In wider
sense though even in such a case address
of hotel or other place of boarding may
constitute and fulfil the requirement of
"current address" but looking in the
context for which such requirement is
provided in the form under Rule 51, it shall
not qualify.

9. In Flowers v. Flowers, (1910) 1.
L . R. 32, the word 'resides' came to be
considered by a Full Bench of this Court
and it was held that a mere casual
residence in a place for a temporary
purpose with no intention of remaining is
not covered by the word "resides".
Similarly in Balakrishna v. Sakuntala
Bai, A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 666 the Court said
that the expression "resides" implies
something more than "stay" and implies
some intention to remain at a place and not
merely to pay it a casual visit.
3 All] Arvind Kumar V. State of U.P. and others
1353

10. In Charan Das v. Surasti Bai,
A1R 1940 Lah. 449, the Court said that
the sole test on the question of residence
would be whether a party had animus
manendi, or an intention to stay for an
indefinite period, at one place.

11. In Jagir Kaur & Another vs
Jaswant Singh, 1963 AIR 1521=1964
SCR (2) 73 the Court observed that a
person would be said to reside at a place
when it is not a flying visit to or a casual
stay in a particular place. There shall be
animus manendi or an intention to stay for
a period, the length of the period
depending upon the circumstances of each
case. The Apex Court defines the word
"resides" as under :

"a person resides in a place if he
through choice makes it his abode
permanently or even temporarily. Whether
a person has chosen to make a particular
place his abode depends upon the facts of
each case.

12. Some illustrations were also
considered which would be useful to refer
at his stage. There may be following cases
:

(i) A, living in a village, goes to a
nearby town B to attend a marriage or to
make purchases and stays there in a hotel
for a day or two.

(ii) A, a tourist, goes from place to
place during his peregrinations and stays
for a few days in each of the places he
visits,

(iii) A, a resident of a village, who is
suffering from a chronic disease, goes
along with his wife to a town for medical
treatment, takes a house and lives there for
about 6 months.

(iv) A, a permanent resident of a
town, goes to a city for higher education,
takes a house and lives there, alone or with
his wife, to complete his studies.

In the first two cases, A makes only a
flying visit and he has no intention to live
either permanently or temporarily in the
places he visits. It cannot, therefore, be
said that he "resides" in the places he
visits. In the last two illustrations, though
A has a permanent house elsewhere, he has
a clear intention or animus manendi to
make the places where he has gone for
medical relief in one and studies in the
other, his temporary abode or residence.

13. The difference between current
residence or current address and permanent
residence or permanent address may exist
visibly in some cases but may not exist at
all in some other cases. Permanent
residence may be place of resident of
ancestors but not always. The place of
residence of forefathers may or may not
satisfy the requirement of permanent
residence. This all depend on a particular
facts of the case. Sometimes the permanent
address or permanent residence both being
interchangeable, for the purpose of present
case, looking to context in which required
it may equate with the term 'domicile' but
in different situation it may not also.

14. "Domicile" does not mean always
the place of ancestors or place of residence
of forefathers of the incumbent concerned.
Albeit in a different context the Apex
Court in Central Bank of India Vs. Ram
Narain AIR 1955 SC 36 referred to the
Writers on "Private International Law" and
said that generally they are agreeable that
1354 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
absolute
definition
of
"domicile"
is
impossible to day down. The simplest
definition of this expression is said to have
been given by Chitty, J. in Cragnish v.
Craignish [1892] 3 Ch. 18o, observing
"that place is properly the domicile of a
person in which his habitation is fixed
without any present intention of removing
therefrom."
This
definition,
however
cannot be said to be absolute one. The term
'domicile' lends itself to illustrations but
not to definition. In English Law most of
the jurists agrees that two constituent
elements for existence of domicile are (1) a
residence of a particular kind, and (2) an
intention of a particular kind. There must
be the factum and there must be the
animus. The residence need not be
continuous but it must be indefinite, not
purely fleeting. The intention must be a
present intention to reside for ever in the
country where the residence has been taken
up. It is also a well established proposition
that a person may have no home but he
cannot be without a domicile. The law may
attribute to him a domicile in a country
where in reality he has not. In other words,
one of the constituents giving birth to
domicile of a person is the place where he
was born.

15. A Division Bench of this Court in
Fatima Begam vs Sakina Begam And
Another, (1875) ILR 1 All 51 held as
under :

"The words dwelling or residence are
synonymous with domicile or home, and
mean that place where a person has his
fixed permanent home, to which, whenever
he is absent, he has the intention of
returning. In Lord v. Colvin 4 Drew 366:
28 L.J. Chanc. 361 it was held "that place
is properly the domicile of the person in
which he has voluntarily fixed the
habitation of himself and family, not for a
mere special and temporary purpose, but
with a present intention of making it his
permanent
home
unless
and
until
something
(which
is
unexpected
or
uncertain) shall occur to induce him to
adopt some other permanent home."

16. Following the authority of
Central Bank of India Vs. Ram Narain
(Supra); in a later decision, the Apex
Court in Abdul Samad v. State of West
Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 505 said that a
person cannot have two simultaneous
domiciles. It denotes connection with the
territorial system of law. Every person
must have a domicile. Mere residence is
not domicile.

17. Recognizing difference in the
meaning of word 'domicile' in the context
of admission in Medical Colleges in a
particular
State
vis
a
vis
Private
international Law, in Pradeep Jain Vs.
Union of India AIR 1984 SC 1420 the
Court said that domicile used in the rules
regulating admissions to medical colleges
framed by some of the States may be
interpreted
in
the
loose
sense
of
"permanent residence in the State" in
which the medical college is situated and
not in the technical sense in which it is
used in private international law.

18. In Union of India Vs. Dudh
Nath Prasad AIR 2000 SC 525 =2000 (2)
SCC 20 the question of residence and
domicile was considered in the context of
the question, whether Dudh Nath belong to
Scheduled Caste or not. Dudh Nath Prasad
was born in State of Bihar (Siwan District)
and belong to Nunia community which a
scheduled
caste
in
the
Presidential
Notification for the State of West Bengal
but not in the State of Bihar. He was
3 All] Arvind Kumar V. State of U.P. and others
1355
selected in Indian Administrative and
Allied Services against a reserved vacancy
of Scheduled Caste and appointed as such
based on caste certificate issued by Sub
Divisional Officer Howrah, State of West
Bengal on the basis of Presidential
Notification of State of West Bengal. The
question to be considered was, whether for
the purpose of caste certificate the
petitioner would be treated to be resident
of Bihar or West Bengal. The relevant
instructions in this regard use the words
"District in which the parents of the
candidate ordinarily reside." Dudh Nath
contended that his parents were not
ordinarily residing in District Siwan
(Bihar) and therefore, he had rightly been
issued caste certificate by the officer at
Howrah. It was upheld. In order to
construe the words "ordinarily resident"
reliance was placed on Section 20 of the
Representation of the People Act 1950
which provides the meaning of "ordinarily
resident". The Court first of all rejected the
meaning of the word "ordinarily resident"
as defined in Section 20 of Representation
of Peoples Act, observing that the said
definition is for a particular purpose and
not applicable in general. Referring to
various definitions given in Oxford
English
Language
Dictionary
and
Black's Law Dictionay and some other
authorities vis a vis the word 'domicile'. It
was held that etymologically. "residence"
and "domicile" carry the same meaning,
inasmuch as both refer to the permanent
home, but under Private International law,
"domicile" carries a little different sense
and exhibits many facets. In spite of
having a permanent home, a person may
have a commercial, a political or forensic
domicile. 'Domicile' may also take many
colours; it may be domicile of origin,
domicile of choice, domicile by operation
of law or domicile of dependence.
Domicile and residence are different and
yet are related concepts and have to be
understood in the context in which they are
used having regard to nature and purpose
of statute in which these words are used.
The Court held that Dudh Nath's parents
were residing in State of West Bengal
since long and for all intents and purpose,
they were entitled to be treated as
"ordinarily residing" in the State of West
Bengal.

19. Commenting upon the word
"residence'" in D.N. Chanchala Vs. The
State of Mysore, 1971(2) SCC 293 with
reference to Rule 3 of Mysore Medical
Colleges (Selection for Admission) Rules
1970 the Court observed that 'residence'
contemplated therein must prima facie
have an element of continuity or regularity
in
residence
and
would
not
mean
intermittent stay such as during the
vacations.

20. In Smt. Jeewanti Pandey vs
Kishan Chandra Pandey, 1981 SCC (4)
517=1981 SCALE (3) 1641 the Court said
that in its ordinary sense "residence" is
more or less of a permanent character. The
word 'resides' means to make an abode for
a considerable time; to dwell permanently
or for a length of time; to have a settled
abode for a time. It is the place where a
person has a fixed home or abode. If there
is fixed home or such abode at one place
the person cannot be said to reside at any
other place where he had gone on a casual
or temporary visit, e.g. for health or
business or for a change. If a person lives
with his wife and children, in an
established home, his legal and actual
place of residence is the same. If a person
has no established home and is compelled
to live in hotels, boarding houses or houses
of others, his actual and physical habitation
1356 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
is the place where he actually or personally
resides. It means the actual place of
residence and not legal constructive
residence. It certainly does not correlate
the place of origin. The word 'resides' is a
flexible one and has many shades of
meaning, but it must take its colour and
content from the context in which it
appears and cannot be read in isolation

21. The term address has been
defined in Black's Law Dictionary 5th
Edition, at page 36 as under:

"Address. Place where mail or other
communications will reach person. . . . . . .
. . . Generally a place of business or
residence."

22. The term "domicile" is also
defined in Black's Law Dictionary 5th
Edition, at page 435. Besides others it
says, that "Citizenship" "habitancy," and
"residence" are severally words which in
particular cases may mean precisely the
same as "domicile." while in other uses
may have different meanings.

23. "Residence", as per Black's Law
Dictionary, signifies living in particular
locality while "domicile" means living in
that locality with intent to make it a fixed
and permanent home. It also defines
different kinds of "domicile" as under:

"Commercial Domicile. A domicile
acquired by the maintenance of a
commercial establishment.

Corporate domicile. Place considered
by law as center of corporate affairs and
place where its functions are discharged.

Domicile of choice. The essentials of
"domicile" of choice are the fact of
physical presence at a dwelling place and
the intention to make that place home.

Domicile of origin. The home of the
parents. That which arises from a man's
birth and connections. The domicile of the
parents at the time of birth, or what is
termed the "domicile of origin." constitutes
the domicile of an infant, and continues
until abandoned, or until the acquisition of
a new domicile in a different place.

Domicile
of
succession.
As
distinguished from a commercial, political,
or forensic domicile, means the actual
residence of a person within some
jurisdiction, of such a character as shall,
according
to
the
well-established
principles of public law, give direction to
the succession of his personal estate.

Domicile of trustee. Jurisdiction
which appoints trustee is domicile of
trustee.

Elected domicile. The domicile of
parties fixed in a contract between them
for the purposes of such contract.

Foreign
domicile.
A
domicile
established by a citizen or subject of one
sovereignty within the territory of another.

Matrimonial domicile. The place
where a husband and wife have established
a home, in which they reside in the relation
of husband and wife, and where the
matrimonial contract is being performed.

Municipal Domicile. One which as
distinguished from "national domicile" and
"quasi national domicile" (see those titles,
infra), has reference to residence in a
county, township, or municipality.
3 All] Arvind Kumar V. State of U.P. and others
1357

National domicile. The domicile of a
person, considered as being within the
territory of a particular nation, and not
with reference to a particular locality or
subdivision of a nation.

Natural domicile. The same as
domicile of origin or domicile by birth.

Necessary domicile. That kind of
domicile which exists by operation of law,
as distinguished from voluntary domicile
or domicile of choice.

Quasi
national
domicile.
One
involving residence in a state. See also
National domicile, Supra"

24. Defining the word "address" in
the context of purpose and intention in R.
v. Bishop, (1959) 2 All ER 787, it was
said that the word "Address" is not
referring to postal address, but refers to a
reasonable identification of such a place,
not necessarily a postal address but
something which describes or identifies the
place with reasonable identity.

25. In State Vs. Abdullah Khan
AIR 1965 Rajasthan 11, with reference to
Article 5 of the Constitution, the Court said
that the 'domicile' means the permanent
place of dwelling, or home of the person
concerned.

26. I may also look into the word
"permanent" so as to have much wider
view of the matter.

27. In The New Lexicon Webster's
Dictionary, Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition
(1987) the word 'permanent' is defined as
"continuing and enduring without change."

28. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The
Law Lexicon 2nd Edition (2007) the
word 'Permanent' is defined as under:

"Permanent" is defined to mean not
temporary, or subject to change : abiding,
remaining fixed, or enduring in character,
state or place.

The meaning of the word 'permanent'
according to lexicographers, is continuing
in the same state, or without any change
that destroys form or character, remaining
unaltered or unremoved, abiding, durable,
fixed, lasting, continuing ; as a permanent
impression, permanent institution.

29. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth
Edition defines the word "permanent" as
under:

"Permanent. Continuing or enduring
in the same state, status, place or the like,
without fundamental or marked change,
not subject to fluctuation, or alteration,
fixed or intended to be fixed; lasting;
abiding;
stable;
not
temporary
or
transient."

30. From the above discussion, I am
inclined to follow the meaning of the
words "present address" and "permanent
address" looking into the objective and
purpose for which the two addresses are
required in items 5 and 6 under Rule 51,
instead of giving any hypertechnical or or
superficial or otherwise meaning thereto.
The purpose obviously is to obtain
information regarding antecedents of the
person concerned. His antecedents can be
obtained if he gives information about the
place where he resides presently and if his
permanent residence is something else,
then the present residence must be the
address of that place. The term "permanent
1358 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
address" necessarily cannot always be
equated with the address or the place of
residence of forefathers or ancestors of the
person concerned unless something is
found out to show that the place of origin
or the place of ancestors or forefather is the
place of permanent residence or permanent
address of the applicant also. We can
understand the things from another angle.

31. Two things are clear. "Permanent
address" in common parlance would be
address which is not likely to change
ordinarily and would remain in-tact
identifying the person concerned. "Current
address" is the place at which for the time
being one is residing. Meaning of the word
'permanent' as above clearly shows that
there may or may not be a marked
distinction between a "permanent address"
and "current address". In a given case,
"permanent address" may be current
address also but it is difficult to assume
vice-versa in all cases. One may not have
any confusion with requirement of "current
address" and "permanent address" vis a vis
place of birth or the place of domicile. The
place of birth is where the incumbent is
born but it may be his permanent or current
address or may not. Word 'domicile' covers
within its ambit the place of "current
address" inasmuch as if a person is
presently residing at a place for certain
required period, he may be issued a
certificate of domicilation but by itself it
may not equate in all cases with
"permanent address". The person who has
migrated or shifted to a place other than a
place of his forefathers for the purpose of
job, profession, occupation etc. may say
that place where he is presently residing
would satisfy requirement of "current
address"
but
may
not
satisfy
the
requirement of "permanent address" which
would be his place of his forefathers where
he has and stakes the property of his father
and
forefathers,
his
relations
and
connection in various manners. It also
cannot
be
disputed
that
in
certain
circumstances, one may shift from place of
his forefathers to another in a whole hog
manner breaking his all connections and in
such a case the permanent address would
be different. The two are having different
shades and nuances and would depend on
peculiar facts of particular case. There
cannot be any hard and fast rule in such
matters.

32. In the case in hand, it is not
disputed by the petitioner that his
forefathers/grandfather belong to village
Makdoompur (Doksaha), P.S. and District
Kaushambi. In para 14 of the writ petition
the petitioner however, says that he has
given address where he actually resides.
He has not stated that he has severed all
connections and relations with the place of
his forefathers and has settled permanently
at Allahabad. No details have been given
to show and to ascertain whether the
petitioner has permanently settled at
Allahabad. Neither the place of birth nor
property details at Allahabad nor any other
fact is on record to demonstrate that he has
permanently settled at Allahabad. Actual
place of address obviously would satisfy
the requirement of "current address" but
whether it can satisfy the "permanent
address" or not would depend on case to
case. In the present case, no such material
has been brought on record to show that
"current address" of the petitioner can be
treated to be his "permanent address". It is
in these circumstances, I do not find any
error apparent on the face of record in the
orders impugned in the writ petition passed
by the authorities below.
3 All] Bhupendra and another V. State of U.P. and others
1359

33. Learned counsel for the petitioner
drew my attention to Arun Kumar Singh
Vs. State of U.P. and others 2006(1) UP
Cr.R. 415 and Takdeer Singh, Prabhu
Dayal
Vs.
Commissioner,
Jhansi
Division and others 2005 (TLS) 316893
(writ petition no. 32033 of 2004 decided
on 19.10.2005). I have gone through the
aforesaid judgments and do not find the
same applicable to the facts of the present
case. In Arun Kumar Singh (supra) the
judgment shows that this Court took the
view that the petitioner cannot be said to
be guilty of misrepresentation which may
form basis of cancellation of firearm
licence. Same was the view in Takdeer
Singh (supra). In both the cases, firearm
licence was already granted and thereafter
proceedings were initiated for cancellation
thereof. The circumstances in which the
firearm licence was cancelled is specified
in Section 17 but here is a case where
question of grant of firearm licence under
Section 13 has to be considered. In such a
case where information is not given in the
application form in the manner it is
required,
the
authorities
are
quite
competent to reject application for such
lapses. The reason being that in such a case
the petitioner would not be deprived of
moving fresh application furnishing correct
details and information. It is always open
to an applicant whose application has once
been rejected for one or the other
shortcoming or incomplete information, to
move
another
application
fulfilling
requirements of Form prescribed under
Rules.

34. For what has been stated above, I
am of the definite opinion that this writ
petition is devoid of merits.

35. Dismissed.

36. No costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.11.2011

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL,J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 37913 of 2009

Bhupendra and another
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri R.K. Dubey
Sri S.K. Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Arms Act-Section 17 (3)-suspension of five
Arm
Licence-without
pending
any
proceeding for cancellation-suspension by
the licenses authority-without jurisdictionkeeping
suspension
pending
without
follow up action inspite of direction of
Court-held-sheer harassment of individual
having no control over statutory authorityin
action
on
part
of
D.M.
Highly
condemned
and
depreciated-order
quashed
with
cost
of
Rs.
10,000
recoverable from erring officer.

Held: Para 7

In the case in hand though petitioners'
firearm licence was suspended almost four
years back but the District Magistrate
could not find time or occasion to pass a
final order in the matter though it is the
ultimate and statutory function he is
supposed to discharge. In absence of any
explanation whatsoever for not taking
final decision for the last four years,
inaction on the part of District Magistrate
is highly condemnable and depreciated. It
is nothing but sheer harassment to an
individual who has no control over the