# Brikesh Pandey v. C.B.I., Lko

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 194
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-23
- **Case number:** Application U/S 528 No. 1352 of 2026
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/brikesh-pandey-v-c-b-i-lko-54446
- **Pages:** 12

## Text

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194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
bidders, while there were few in respect of the larger plots. Appellant before the Supreme Court
made bid a little in excess of the reserved price. The bid was cancelled on the basis of bids received
in excess of appellant's bid but, in respect of smaller plots. The Supreme Court, in those facts
found, the basis of action of the authority to cancel not having nexus to rationale or reason.
Paragraph 32 from the judgment is reproduced below.

"32. An auction process has a sanctity attached to it and only for valid reasons that the highest bid can
be discarded in an auction which is otherwise held in accordance with law. If a valid bid has been made
which is above the reserve price, there should be a rationale or reason for not accepting it. Therefore, the
decision to discard the highest bid must have a nexus to the rationale or the reason. Merely because the
authority conducting the auction expected a higher bid than what the highest bidder had bid cannot be a
reason to discard the highest bid. In the instant case, no other party had placed a bid higher than the appellant
herein. There was no infirmity in the conduct of the auction. No other party had complained about the
process of auction conducted by the GDA-respondent No.2. The bid offered by the appellant herein was the
highest and above the reserve price. In the circumstances, the said bid ought to have been accepted by GDA-
respondent No.2 rather than cancelling the same without notice to the appellant herein. Hence, the
cancellation of the bid submitted by the appellant herein is quashed." (emphasis supplied)

8. We have demonstration on facts undisputed that reserved price was presumably duly fixed, at Rs.
140/- per cubic meter for the Arazi in question. It was notified for auction on aforesaid notice dated 17th
February, 2026, listed under serial no. 15. Immediately preceding earlier years had brought in bids less than
that of petitioner, who had bid Rs. 361 per cubic meter. As aforesaid, the bid was more than double than the
revised reserved price fixed. Reliance by State on higher bids received against other plots have not been
demonstrated to be on same basis of quantity or quality, in respect of the mineral to be mined. As such, we do
find arbitrariness in the opinion formed. Impugned cancellation itself does not disclose any basis for the
opinion. The subsequent instructions have also not met with the requirement of demonstration that things
were done in a proper manner.

9. Impugned order dated 19th March, 2026 as well as notification for e-tender-cum-auction
dated 20th March, 2026 are set aside and quashed. Consequences to follow.

10. The writ petition is allowed and disposed of.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 194
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Application U/S 528 No. 1352 of 2026

Brikesh Pandey ...Applicant
Versus
C.B.I., Lko. ...Opposite Party
4 All. Brikesh Pandey Vs. C.B.I., Lko.
195
Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to whether the prosecution sanction orders issued u/s 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 for prosecuting the applicants u/s 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 61(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023, were vitiated on account of alleged non-application of mind, and whether such alleged defect
in sanction could be examined at the pre-trial stage so as to discharge the applicants and quash the
proceedings.

Headnotes
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 7, 17-A(1), 19 - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - s. 61(2)
- Challenge to prosecution sanction - Validity - Discharge application - Trap case - Scope of
interference at pre-trial stage - The case arose from a complaint made by one Rohan Gupta, a
selected candidate for the post of Assistant Branch Post Master (ABPM) under Grameen Dak
Sewa, alleging that certain officials demanded illegal gratification of Rs. 25,000/- for permitting
him to join his post - Upon verification, the CBI registered an FIR u/s 7 of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 and s. 61(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - A trap operation was
conducted wherein one accused allegedly received the bribe amount on the instructions of
another accused, while the remaining accused were also present at the spot, resulting in their
arrest - After investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted alleging demand and acceptance of
undue advantage in connivance with the applicants - The competent authority thereafter
granted sanction for prosecution - The applicants moved discharge applications before the trial
court contending absence of involvement and invalidity of sanction, which were rejected and
charges were framed - Aggrieved thereby, the applicant filed instant application before the High
Court challenging the said orders.
Held: In the present case, as per the prosecution case, the applicant Achche Lal was caught red handed
while accepting bribe money and the other applicant Brikesh Pandey was also arrested during the trap
proceedings - In view of the provision contained in the first proviso appended to s. 17-A of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CBI v. Santosh Karnani
(infra), it appears that no previous sanction for prosecution of the applicants was required and the submission
of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the entire proceedings stand vitiated for the defect in
prosecution sanction order, has no force and the same is rejected - Thus, there is no error or illegality in the
impugned orders, accordingly, petitions lack merits and are dismissed. [Paras 34, 35] (E-13)

Case Law Cited
Sushant Gupta v. CBI, 2025 SCC OnLine All 3138; Neera Yadav v. C.B.I. (Bharat Sangh): 2005 SCC
OnLine All 1217; Surendar Singh v. CBI: 2026 SCC OnLine All 2049; Neera Yadav v. C.B.I. (Bharat
Sangh): 2006 SCC OnLine All 141; State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri: (2006) 7 SCC
172; Sushant Gupta v. CBI, 2025 SCC OnLine All 313; Surendra Dhariwal v. State of Rajasthana and
another: Crl. Appeal Nos.3717-3718 of 2025, decided on 25.08.2025; Parkash Singh Badal v. State of
Punjab: (2007) 1 SCC 1; Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of India: (2012) 1 SCC 532; CBI v. Ashok
Kumar Aggarwal: (2014) 14 SCC 295 - referred to

Ashok Kumar Choudhary v. Central Bureau of Investigation: 2026:AHC-LKO:22051; CBI v. Santosh Karnani:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 427 - followed
State of Mohammed Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh; (1979) 4 SCC 172 - distinguished

List of Acts
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

List of Keywords
Application u/s 528 BNSS; Challenging validity of sanction orders; Special Judge Anti Corruption; Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita; Prevention of Corruption Act; Discharge application; Senior Superintendent of Post Offices;
196 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Grameen Dak Sewa(GDS); Superintendent of Police, CBI; Selection; Post; Training; Demand of bribe; FIR;
Trap; Complainant; Spot; Charge-Sheet; Undue advantage; Competent authority issued sanction orders;
Verification memo; Pre trap memo; Post trap memo; Transcription; Recorded conversation; Call records;
Tainted money; Framed charges; Proceedings void ab initio; Previous approval; Application dismissed.

Case Arising From
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Application u/s BNSS No. - 1346 of 2026)

Connected with other matter

(Application u/s BNSS No. - 1352 of 2026)

From the Judgment and Orders dated 30.01.2026 and 21.02.2026 passed by Special Judge, Anti Corruption,
CBI, Court No.2, Lucknow in Session Trial No.1604 of 2025 arising out of RC No.00620025A0001 Police Station
- CBI/ACB, Lucknow as well as Trial Court.

Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Applicant(s):
Jai Praksah Awasthi

Adv. for the Opposite Party(s):
Aakash Prasad

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Ayushi Upadhyaya, the learned counsel for the applicants and Shri Aakash
Prasad, the learned counsel for the respondent-CBI.

2. Both the aforesaid applications have been filed challenging validity of two separate orders
dated 30.01.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption, CBI, Court No.2, Lucknow
in Session Trial No.1604 of 2025 arising out of RC No.00620025A0001 under Section 61 (2) to
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) read with Section 7 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Police
Station- CBI/ACB, Lucknow, whereby the applications filed by the applicants seeking their
discharge, have been rejected. The applicants have also sought quashing of separate orders dated
21.02.2026 passed by the trial Court framing charges against them and they have challenged
validity of the prosecution sanction orders dated 30.07.2025 passed by the Senior Superintendent of
Post Offices, Azamgarh Division. They have prayed to discharge them of the alleged offences.

3. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that on 03.02.2025, one Rohan Gupta gave a complaint
to the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., Lucknow stating that he had been selected on the post of
ABPM (Assistant Branch Post Master) under GDS (Grameen Dak Sewa) and he had completed
three days' training. Ramesh Kumar and Brikesh Pandey (the applicant in Application No. 1352 of
2026) had demanded Rs.25,000/- for permitting him to join the post. After discreet verification,
CBI registered FIR bearing No. RC0062025A0001 under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 and 61(2) of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) against Ramesh Kumar and
Brikesh Pandey.
4 All. Brikesh Pandey Vs. C.B.I., Lko.
197

4. A trap was laid on 04.02.2025 during which on the instructions of the named accused
Ramesh Kumar, Achche Lal (the applicant in Application No. 1346 of 2026) demanded bribe from
the complainant through gesture and he received the amount from the complainant. The other
named accused Brikesh Pandey (the applicant in Application No. 1346 of 2026) was also present
there alongwith them. All the three persons were caught on the spot.

5. A charge-sheet was submitted on 29.03.2025 against (1) Ramesh Kumar Tudu, (2) Brikesh
Pandey and (3) Achche Lal for offences under Section 61(2) BNS and Section 7 of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 stating that the investigation has revealed that for allowing the complainant to
join the post, Ramesh Kumar Tudu demanded and accepted undue advantage from the complainant
in connivance with Brikesh Pandey and Achche Lal.

6. On 30.07.2025, the competent authority issued separate orders granting sanction for
prosecution of the applicants. The prosecution orders are detailed orders containing narration of the
facts of the case. The sanctioning authority states that after carefully examining the material placed
on record including copy of complaint, FIR, verification memo, pre trap memo, post trap memo,
transcription of recorded conversation made between the complainant and the accused persons
Ramesh Kumar Tudu and Brikesh Pandey during verification and trap proceeding, statement of
witnesses, other relevant materials placed before the authority regarding the allegations,
circumstances of the case and after being fully satisfied after applying his mind, the authority
considered that the applicants have committed the offences 61(2) BNS and Section 7 PC Act, and
they should be prosecuted for the said offences.

7. The applicants filed applications before the trial Court seeking their discharge. Achche Lal
sought his discharge mainly on the ground that he had received the bribe amount on the instructions
of Ramesh Kumar Tudu. Brikesh Pandey sought his discharge on the ground that there was no
evidence of his involvement in demanding and receiving the bribe.

8. The applications seeking discharge have been rejected by means of an order dated
20.01.2026. The trial court held that the call records, trap memorandum, involvement of Achche
Lal in the conversation and recovery of tainted money from the Achche Lal do not warrant his
discharge. Regarding Brikesh Pandey, the trial Court held that the material indicates that he was
involved in demanding money from the complainant to permit him to join the duties of the post on
which he has been appointed. Brikesh Pandey was an integral part of the entire process. Whether he
was in fact involved or not, would be determined after scrutiny of evidence during the trial.

9. The trial Court has framed charges against the applicants by means of an order dated
21.02.2026.

10. The validity of the prosecution sanction order has been challenged on the ground that in
the verbatim similar prosecution sanction orders, the sanctioning authority has stated that he
accords sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for the prosecution of
the applicants for the offences punishable under Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
(BNS) 2023, and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and for
198 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
any other offences made out from the aforesaid facts and circumstances for taking cognizance of
the said offences against the said accused by the Court of competent jurisdiction.

11. The learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that Section 19 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act prohibits taking cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13,
and 15 of the Act. Section 19 of the aforesaid Act does not provide for a grant of sanction for
prosecution of the offence under Section 61(2) of BNS. The mention of Section 61(2) of BNS
indicates that the sanction order has been passed in a mechanical manner, without application of
mind.

12. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on a
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Mohammed Iqbal Ahmed versus
State of Andhra Pradesh; (1979) 4 SCC 172, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court held that it
is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction had been granted by the sanctioning
authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction had been made out constituting the offence.
The Court has to see whether or not the sanctioning authority at the time of giving sanction, was
aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind to the same.

13. The learned counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court
rendered in the case of Sushant Gupta v. CBI, 2025 SCC OnLine All 3138, wherein this Court
had set-aside a similarly worded prosecution sanction order.

14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-CBI has submitted that what is required
in Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is that no court shall take cognizance of any
offence under section 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 without previous
sanction by the competent authority. It does not prohibit grant of sanction for any other offence and
the mere mention of the offence of criminal conspiracy along with the offence under Section 7 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, would not invalidate the sanction for prosecution for the offence
under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

15. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for respondent CBI has placed reliance
on the decision rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Neera Yadav v. C.B.I.
(Bharat Sangh): 2005 SCC OnLine All 1217. He has also placed reliance on the judgments of this
Court in Surendar Singh v. CBI: 2026 SCC OnLine All 2049 and Ashok Kumar Choudhary versus
Central Bureau of Investigation: 2026:AHC-LKO:22051.

16. In Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P.: (1979) 4 SCC 172, the appellant was said to
have been caught red handed while receiving Rs.125/- as bribe. The resolution of the Standing
Committee read as follows: -

"As per note of the Commissioner, M.C.H., the Standing Committee unanimously accords
sanction for prosecution of Shri Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed (in the scale of 110?180) Section Officer of
town Planning Section (under suspension) in a competent Court for the offence mentioned in the
note of the Commissioner M.C.H., dated January 18, 1969 so as to enable the Commissionor to
4 All. Brikesh Pandey Vs. C.B.I., Lko.
199
sign the prosecution order and send it to the Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau for taking further
action at the earliest."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"3. A perusal of the resolution of the Sanctioning Authority clearly shows that no facts on
the basis of which the prosecution was to be sanctioned against the appellant are mentioned in the
sanction nor does this document contain any ground on which the satisfaction of the Sanctioning
Authority was based and its mind applied. This document merely mentions that the sanction has
been given on the basis of a note of the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation which appears to
have been placed before the Committee. It is obvious, therefore, that this note, if any, must have
come into existence either on March 31, 1969 or at any date prior to this. The prosecution could
have proved the facts constituting the offence which were placed before the Sanctioning
Authority by producing the note at the trial. But no such thing has been done. What the
prosecution did was merely to examine two witnesses PWs 2 and 7. PW 2 has produced the order
implementing the Resolution of the Sanctioning Authority which is Ex. P10 and is dated April 21,
1969, that is to say after the sanction was given. This document no doubt contains the facts
constituting the offence but that does not solve the legal issues that arise in this case. It is
incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning
Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the
offence. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by producing the original sanction which
itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by
adducing evidence aliunde to show that the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority and
the satisfaction arrived at by it. It is well settled that any case instituted without a proper sanction
must fail because this being a manifest difficulty in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are
rendered void ab initio?."
(Emphasis added)

17. The aforesaid judgment was given while examining the validity of a judgment passed by
the High Court allowing an appeal against a judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court where
the prosecution had failed to adduce evidence to show the facts placed before the sanctioning
authority and the satisfaction arrived by it. In the present case, this stage has not yet arrived and the
petitioner has challenged the validity of the prosecution sanction order before commencement of
the trial. Therefore, the ratio laid down in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. (supra) would not
apply to the present case.

18. In Neera Yadav v. C.B.I. (Bharat Sangh): 2006 SCC OnLine All 141, the following
questions had been referred to the Full Bench: -

"1. Whether in the case of public servant which can be removed only by the Central
Government and sanction under section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is also given,
further sanction under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code is also required because at the
relevant time the said public servant was also employed in connection with the affairs of the State
Government.

2. Whether public servant who is charged under section 13 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act as also under section 120-B IPC and the sanction u/s 19 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act is already given by the Central Government, yet the sanction by the State
200 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Government under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary since he is being
charged under section 120-B IPC also.

3. If the answer to the above two questions is in affirmative, then, whether the alleged act
or omission for which the petitioner are being charged had reasonable connection to the discharge
of their official duty calling for applicability of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."

The Full Bench gave the following answers to the aforesaid questions: -

"(I) For prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, once sanction under
Section 19 of the said Act is granted, there is no necessity for obtaining further sanction under
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(II) Where a public servant is sought to be prosecuted under the provisions of
Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120-B, I.P.C. and sanction under Section 19 of
Act of 1988 has been granted, it is not at all required to obtain sanction under Section 197
Cr.P.C. from the State Government or any other authority merely because the public servant is
also charged under Section 120-B, I.P.C.

(III) The offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as well as charge of
criminal conspiracy, cannot be said to constitute "acts in discharge of official duty."
(Emphasis added)

19. In Surendar Singh v. CBI, 2026 SCC OnLine All 2049, the petitioner had challenged the
validity of a prosecution sanction order, a charge-sheet for offences under Section 120-B read with
Sections 409, 420, 468, 471, 460, 477, 201 IPC, Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 65 and 66 of Information Technology Act. This
Court referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Parkash Singh Badal
v. State of Punjab: (2007) 1 SCC 1, wherein it has been held that: -

"48. The sanction in the instant case related to the offences relatable to the Act. There is
a distinction between the absence of sanction and the alleged invalidity on account of nonapplication of mind. The former question can be agitated at the threshold but the latter is a
question which has to be raised during trial."

20. This Court also relied upon the judgment in the case of Dinesh Kumar v. Airport
Authority of India: (2012) 1 SCC 532, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court followed the
aforesaid law laid down in Parkash Singh Badal (supra) and held that: -

"9. While drawing a distinction between the absence of sanction and invalidity of the
sanction, this Court in Parkash Singh Badal expressed in no uncertain terms that the question of
absence of sanction could be raised at the inception and threshold by an aggrieved person.
However, where sanction order exists, but its legality and validity is put in question, such issue has
to be raised in the course of trial. Of course, in Parkash Singh Badal, this Court referred to
invalidity of sanction on account of non-application of mind.

10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction order exists, can be raised on
diverse grounds like non-availability of material before the sanctioning authority or bias of the
sanctioning authority or the order of sanction having been passed by an authority not authorised
or competent to grant such sanction. The above grounds are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
All such grounds of invalidity or illegality of sanction would fall in the same category like the
4 All. Brikesh Pandey Vs. C.B.I., Lko.
201
ground of invalidity of sanction on account of non-application of mind?a category carved out by
this Court in Parkash Singh Badal, the challenge to which can always be raised in the course of
trial.

13. In our view, having regard to the facts of the present case, now since cognizance has
already been taken against the appellant by the trial Judge, the High Court cannot be said to have
erred in leaving the question of validity of sanction open for consideration by the trial court and
giving liberty to the appellant to raise the issue concerning validity of sanction order in the course
of trial. Such course is in accord with the decision of this Court in Parkash Singh Badal and not
unjustified."

21. Both the aforesaid judgments have been followed in CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal:
(2014) 14 SCC 295, in which it was held that: -

"59. Undoubtedly, the stage of examining the validity of sanction is during the trial and
we do not propose to say that the validity should be examined during the stage of inquiry or at pretrial stage."

22. This Court also took into consideration the judgment in the case of State (Inspector of
Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri: (2006) 7 SCC 172, wherein the Hon'ble the Supreme Court
relied upon the judgment in State of Karnataka v. C. Nagrajswami: (2005) 8 SCC 370 wherein it
was held that: -

"14. Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction has been accorded for
prosecution of the accused persons or not is a matter which should be dealt with at the stage of
taking cognizance. But in a case of this nature where a question is raised as to whether the
authority granting the sanction was competent therefor or not, at the stage of final arguments after
trial, the same may have to be considered having regard to the terms and conditions of service of
the accused for the purpose of determination as to who could remove him from service.

15. Grant of proper sanction by a competent authority is a sine qua non for taking
cognizance of the offence. It is desirable that the question as regards sanction may be determined
at an early stage. (See Ashok Sahu v. Gokul Saikia [1990 Supp SCC 41] and Birendra K. Singh v.
State of Bihar [(2000) 8 SCC 498].)"

23. This Court noted in Surendar Singh (supra) that the judgment in State of Karnataka v.
C. Nagrajswami (supra) does not take into consideration the precedents in the cases of Parkash
Singh Badal, Dinesh Kumar and Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra) and it does not mandate that
in all cases, it is mandatory to examine the validity of the prosecution sanction order at the
inception of trial. In view of the aforesaid legal position, this Court declined to examine the validity
of the prosecution sanction order at the stage when examination of prosecution witnesses was
already in progress. This Court had also weighed the factor that the petition had been filed after a
delay of 10 years from the date of the prosecution sanction order. This Court left it open for the
petitioner to raise the plea of validity of the prosecution sanction order before the trial court at the
appropriate stage.
202 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

24. In Sushant Gupta v. CBI, 2025 SCC OnLine All 313, the prosecution sanction order
stated that after fully and carefully examining the documents, copies of the statements of witnesses
under Section 161 CrPC and other materials placed before him and having applied his mind
properly in regard to the said allegations and circumstances of the case, the sanctioning authority
considered that offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 409, 418, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471,
477(A) IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
and substantive offences thereof are made out against the applicants and other persons and
therefore the authority accorded sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 for prosecution of the applicants and other persons for the said offences and for any other
offence(s) punishable under any other provisions of law in respect of the said acts and for taking
cognizance of the said offences by a court of competent jurisdiction. The applicants filed an
application for discharge on the ground that no sanction of prosecution had been granted under
Section 197 CrPC and it was granted only under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988. This Court held that: -

"41. The applicants were working in Axis Bank, which is not even a nationalised bank,
and it is not disputed that the applicants were not holding a post where they could not be removed
from service except by or with the sanction of the government. In this view of the matter the
provisions of Section 197 are not attracted to the case of the applicants. The prosecution sanction
order dated 2-2-2022 issued by the President and Head Corporate Affairs of Axis Bank, Mumbai,
states that the allegations levelled against 20 persons, including the applicants, have been
corroborated by the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC and the documents collected
during investigation of the case. After careful examination and perusal of the documents and
statements of the witnesses it has been found that offences under Section 120-B read with Section
409, 418, 419, 420, 468, 471 and 477-A IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the
PC Act and substantive offence thereof are made out against 20 persons, including the applicants.
The sanctioning authority proceeded to state that after fully and carefully examining the
documents, copies of the statements of witnesses under Section 161 CrPC and other materials
placed before him and having applied his mind properly in regard to the said allegations and
circumstances of the case, considered that offences under Section 120-B read with Section 409,
418, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998 and substantive offence thereof are made out against the
applicants and other persons and therefore the authority has accorded sanction under Section 19
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for prosecution of the applicants and other persons "for
the said offences and for any other offence(s) punishable under any other provisions of law in
respect of the said acts and for taking cognizance of the said offences by a court of competent
jurisdiction".
* * *

43. ... The sanction of prosecution "for the said offences and for any other offence(s)
punishable under any other provisions of law in respect of the said Acts" for which no sanction was
obtained, indicates a total non-application of mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable.
It indicates that the sanctioning authority has acted as a mere rubber stamp. Non-application of
mind by the sanctioning authority vitiates the sanction order dated 2-2-2023 as also the order
dated 28-7-2023 passed by the trial court rejecting the discharge application.
4 All. Brikesh Pandey Vs. C.B.I., Lko.
203

44. The order of sanction after a proper application of mind to the relevant facts and
circumstances of the case and the material-on-record is a prerequisite for prosecution of a public
servant, as it is intended to provide a safeguard to a public servant against frivolous and vexatious
litigants. This safeguard cannot be dealt with in a casual and mechanical manner."

25. The learned Counsel for the respondent CBI informed that a challenge made to the
aforesaid order by filing S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 15225 of 2025, which is pending consideration of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

26. In the present case, the only charges are of commission of offence under Section 61(2)
BNS and Section 7 of the PC Act. There is no allegation of commission of the offences under
Sections 409, 418, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A IPC.

27. In Neera Yadav v. C.B.I. (supra), the Full Bench has held that sanction granted under
Section 19 would be sufficient for prosecution for the offence under Section 120-B IPC also, which
is equivalent to Section 61(2) BNS. Further, the offences under Section 7 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 61(2) BNS cannot be said to constitute "acts in discharge of
official duty" and, therefore, no sanction is required for those acts.

28. As per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parkash Singh Badal v. State
of Punjab, Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of India and CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal
the validity of sanction order has to be examined during the trial and not at pre-trial stage.

29. It is also relevant to note that Section 17-A(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
provides as follows: -

"17-A. Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations
made or decisions taken by public servant in discharge of official functions or duties. -

No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence
alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is
relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his
official functions or duties, without the previous approval?

(a) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was
alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of that Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was
alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of that Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his
office, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed:

Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a
person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for
himself or for any other person:

Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section
within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such
authority, be extended by a further period of one month."
204 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

30. In CBI v. Santosh Karnani: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 427, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that: -

"33... Section 17A merely contemplates that police officers shall not conduct any enquiry,
inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant where
the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken in discharge of
official functions or duties, without the previous approval of the competent authority. The first
proviso to the section states that such approval is not necessary in cases involving arrest of the
person on the spot on the charges of accepting undue advantage.

34. As may be seen, the first proviso to Section 17A refers to cases wherein a public
servant is charged with acceptance of an undue advantage or attempt thereof. A prior approval or
sanction to investigate such an officer in a trap case is likely to defeat the very purpose of trap and
the investigation, which is not the underlying intention of the legislature. The investigation against
Respondent No. 1, being an accused of demanding a bribe, did not require any previous approval
of the Central Government. That apart, the accusation against Respondent No. 1 does not revolve
around any recommendations made or decisions taken by him in his quasi-judicial or
administrative capacity."

31. In CBI v. Santosh Karnani (supra), the accused could not be arrested at the spot during
the trap and he had absconded, yet the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the investigation against a
person accused of demanding a bribe does not require any previous approval of the Central
Government.

32. CBI v. Santosh Karnani (supra) has been followed in the case of Surendra Dhariwal
Vs. State of Rajasthana and another: Crl. Appeal Nos.3717-3718 of 2025, decided on
25.08.2025.

33. In Ashok Kumar Choudhary v. Central Bureau Of Investigation /Anti Corruption
Bureau Lko, Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC-LKO:22051, this Court after relying on Hon'ble
Supreme Court's precedents on this aspect has held that under Section 17-A of the Prevention of
Corruption Act 1988, grant of prosecution sanction is not required in case an accused is arrested
during the trap proceedings.

34. In the present case also, as per the prosecution case, the applicant Achche Lal was caught
red handed while accepting bribe money and the other applicant Brikesh Pandey was also arrested
during the trap proceedings. In view of the provision contained in the first proviso appended to
Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of CBI v. Santosh Karnani (supra), it appears that no previous sanction
for prosecution of the applicants was required and the submission of the learned Counsel for the
petitioner that the entire proceedings stand vitiated for the defect in prosecution sanction order, has
no force and the same is rejected.

35. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that there is no error or
illegality in the orders dated 30.01.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption, CBI,
Court No.2, Lucknow in Session Trial No.1604 of 2025 arising out of RC No.00620025A0001
4 All. Ram Palat & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
205
under Section 61 (2) to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) read with Section 7 Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, Police Station- CBI/ACB, Lucknow, whereby the applications filed by the
applicants seeking their discharge, have been rejected and in the orders dated 21.02.2026 passed by
the trial Court framing charges against them. The petitions lack merits and are dismissed.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 205
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAMIT GOPAL, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 1158 of 1989

Ram Palat & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to whether, after acquittal of four accused out of the named members of the alleged unlawful
assembly and the trial having ultimately resulted in conviction of only two accused, conviction for the offence
under S. 323/149 I.P.C. could legally be sustained with the aid of S. 149 I.P.C., which requires an unlawful
assembly consisting of five or more persons. (Paras 25-33)

Headnotes
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Ss.141 and 149 - Unlawful Assembly - Essential requirement -
Membership must be five or more persons - S. 149 creates vicarious or constructive criminal
liability only when offence is committed by a member of an unlawful assembly - For constituting
an unlawful assembly one of the main and important ingredients is that the assembly should
consist of five or more persons. (Paras 27-29)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Ss.141 and 149 - Applicability of S. 149 - Where prosecution case
names five or more persons as members of unlawful assembly and evidence is confined to those
named persons - If acquittal of two or more accused reduces the number below five, S. 149
cannot be invoked unless evidence establishes participation of other unnamed or unidentified
persons constituting the unlawful assembly. (Paras 30-31)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Ss.323/149, 141 and 149 - Conviction with aid of S. 149 - Trial of
seven accused - One accused died during trial - Four accused acquitted - Remaining two accused
acquitted of charges under Ss.147, 307/149 and 379 I.P.C. but convicted under S. 323/149
I.P.C. - Acquittal of four accused attained finality - No case of unnamed or unidentified members
of unlawful assembly - Conviction under S. 323/149 I.P.C. unsustainable. (Paras 25-33)
Criminal Law - Acquittal of co-accused - Effect on charge under S. 149 I.P.C. - Acquittal of four
accused rendered S. 149 I.P.C. inapplicable in the case as only two accused were convicted -
Impugned judgment and order convicting accused with aid of S. 149 I.P.C.