# C/M Baroda U.P. Gramin Bank v. The Presiding Officer, Employees Provident Fund & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 1397
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-01-21
- **Case number:** Misc. Single No. 5973 of 2011
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/c-m-baroda-u-p-gramin-bank-v-the-presiding-officer-employees-provident-fund-ors-45487
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Service Law-Employees Provident Fund &
Misc. provisions Act, 1952-Sec. 7A-Regional
Rural
Banks
Act,
1976-Petitioner
bankchallenging order of Tribunal-denied to pay
towards
EPF
of-engaged
sweepers-paid
consolidated amount on monthly basis-by
Branch Manager-on the ground-not employees
of the Bank-u/s 2(f)-any person employed for
1398 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
wages in any kind of work-is employee-safai
karmachari-employed
by
management-paid
wages regularly-master servant relationship
exists-Petition Dismissed.

B. Held, that after due consideration of the
issues involved, I am of the considered opinion
that Safai Karmachari are employed by the
management
of
the
branches
and
the
management has full control on them and they
are paid wages regularly on the basis of which
master and servant relationship exists between
the Bank and Safai Karmachari and they would
be 'employees' within the meaning of Section
2(f) of the Provident Fund Act and are entitled
all the benefits as such. No other argument or
fact was placed by the petitioners to assail the
findings recorded by the Tribunal. Having
considered the arguments of counsels and the
order of Tribunal, I do not find any infirmity
with the order of Tribunal. The petition being
without merits is hereby dismissed.

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-8)

List of cases cited:-

## Text

2 All. C/M Baroda U.P. Gramin Bank Vs. The Presiding Officer, Employees Provident Fund & Ors.
1397
of the child is thirteen years. The provision
of Section 10 of the Act of 1986 would be
attracted only in absence of any certificate
issued
by
the
prescribed
Medical
Authority.

14. In the instant case it is clear that
the prescribed authority has given his
considered opinion and indicated the age
of the child to be thirteen years and in light
of Section 16 of the Act of 1986, and the
said age having been determined by the
prescribed authority shall be a conclusive
evidence as to the age of the child. In the
present case I am of the view that the age
determined by the prescribed Medical
Authority is thirteen years and therefore
the
proceedings
drawn
against
the
petitioner under the Act of 1986 clearly
borne out. The petitioner has setup a case
with regard to a person whose identity has
been disputed. The photograph of the
person setup by the petitioner does not
match with the photograph which was
taken at the time of incident which is also
in the records of the respondents as well as
the certificate issued by the Chief Medical
Authority.

15. In case such a stand was taken by
the petitioner regarding identity then onus
will go on the petitioner to prove to the
satisfaction of the authorities concerned.
While on the other hand the State has
clearly proved that the offence has been
committed by the petitioner by employing
a person whose age has already been
determined by the prescribed Medical
Authority to be less than fourteen years.

16.

The
Deputy
Labour
Commissioner has considered the entire
conspectus of the case and has come to a
clear finding against the petitioner and
imposed penalty of Rs.20,000/- upon him.
No other fact or material had been brought
on record which may persuade this Court
to interfere with the impugned order. No
other ground was urged by the petitioner.

17. In pursuance to the interim order
of this Court dated 06.08.2015, the
petitioner
has
already
deposited
Rs.20,000/- on 18.08.20215. In light of the
above no further action in this regard is
required to be taken.

18. I do not find any reason to
interfere with the order of the Deputy
Labour Commissioner. The writ petition is
without merit and is hereby dismissed.
----------
(2020)02ILR A1397

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 21.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Misc. Single No. 5973 of 2011

C/M Baroda U.P. Gramin Bank
 ...Petitioner
Versus
The
Presiding
Officer,
Employees
Provident Fund & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Anupras Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Pradeep Raje, Om Prakash Pandey, Rajesh
Kumar Verma

A. Service Law-Employees Provident Fund &
Misc. provisions Act, 1952-Sec. 7A-Regional
Rural
Banks
Act,
1976-Petitioner
bankchallenging order of Tribunal-denied to pay
towards
EPF
of-engaged
sweepers-paid
consolidated amount on monthly basis-by
Branch Manager-on the ground-not employees
of the Bank-u/s 2(f)-any person employed for
1398 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
wages in any kind of work-is employee-safai
karmachari-employed
by
management-paid
wages regularly-master servant relationship
exists-Petition Dismissed.

B. Held, that after due consideration of the
issues involved, I am of the considered opinion
that Safai Karmachari are employed by the
management
of
the
branches
and
the
management has full control on them and they
are paid wages regularly on the basis of which
master and servant relationship exists between
the Bank and Safai Karmachari and they would
be 'employees' within the meaning of Section
2(f) of the Provident Fund Act and are entitled
all the benefits as such. No other argument or
fact was placed by the petitioners to assail the
findings recorded by the Tribunal. Having
considered the arguments of counsels and the
order of Tribunal, I do not find any infirmity
with the order of Tribunal. The petition being
without merits is hereby dismissed.

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-8)

List of cases cited:-

1. CESC Ltd. v. Subhash Chandra Bose

2. C.V. Satheeshchandran Vs. General Manger,
UCO Bank and others (2008) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 653

3. M/s Ahmadabad Cooling Printing Ltd. Vs.
Rehmat Ali

4. M/s P.M. Patel and sons and others Vs. Union
of India and others (1986) 1 Supreme Court
Cases 32

5. Sub Regional Provident Fund Office and
another Vs. Godavari Garments Limited (2019)
8 Supreme Court Cases 149

6. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner,
Andhra Pradesh Vs. Sri T. S. Hariharan, 1971
(2) Supreme Court Cases 68

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anupras Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri R.
K. Verma, learned Advocate appearing for
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Om
Prakash Pandey, learned counsel for
respondent No.3.

2. By means of the present writ
petition the petitioner has challenged the
order dated 4.7.2011 passed by Employees
Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal as well
as order dated 31.12.2007 passed by
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner
(II), Varanasi issued in proceedings under
Section 7A of the Employees Provident
Fund and Misc. Provision Act, 1952
(hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Petitioner has further challenged the order
dated 26.8.2011 issued by Regional
Provident
Fund
Commissioner
(II),
Allahabad.

3. Petitioner has submitted that he is
a Regional Rural Bank sponsored by the
Bank of Baroda and set up by the
Government under the Regional Rural
Banks Act, 1976. Originally the petitioner
was known as Sultanpur Regional Rural
Bank. However, the petitioner bank along
with
other
Regional
Rural
Banks
sponsored by the Bank of Baroda in U.P.
was merged together into two new entities
namely Baroda Eastern U.P. Gramin Bank
and Baroda Western U.P. Gramin Bank
vide notification dated 23.2.2006 issued by
the
Central
Government
under
the
provisions of the Regional Rural Bank
Act. Thereafter vide Notification dated
31.3.2008 the above two Gramin Banks
were merged into Baroda U.P. Gramin
Bank by the Central Government.

4. He has submitted that the work of
cleaning of the premises in the instant case
is done by the persons engaged as part
time sweepers and are paid consolidated
amount on monthly basis by the Branch
2 All. C/M Baroda U.P. Gramin Bank Vs. The Presiding Officer, Employees Provident Fund & Ors.
1399
Manager of the Bank and they are working
only for a period of half to one hour per
day and such persons were not restrained
to work elsewhere and are in fact
employed to do similar or other work in
other establishments. On the basis of
above facts the petitioner has urged that
the petitioner is not liable to deposit any
money towards its contribution in regard
to such persons engaged as sweepers by
the Bank as per the Provident Fund Act.
His main contention is that such part time
sweepers cannot be termed as bank
employees because though they were
doing the work of sweeping but the same
cannot be said to be employees of the
Bank within the meaning of definition of
Section 2(f) of the Provident Fund and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act.

5. A complaint was filed by the
Bareilly
Kshetriya
Gramin
Bank
Employees Union with the Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner, Bareilly
that part time sweepers employed by the
Bank were not being given benefits of
Provident Funds Act. On receipt of the
aforesaid
complaint
the
Assistant
Provident Fund Commissioner directed the
petitioner to provide details about of
engagements of such part time sweepers
since 1.6.2001. The Bank denying the
allegations made in the said complaint
stated that there was no post of sweepers
in the Bank and said part time sweepers
were not employees of the Bank. Due to
the fact that they were not the employees
of the Bank there was no statutory duties
in relation to such part time persons as
provided in Employees Provident Fund
and Misc. Provision Act, 1952. The Bank
further informed by means of the letter
dated 2.12.2009 that in view of the
Bipartite Settlement entered into between
the Bank Employees Unions and the
Banks, such part time sweepers who do
not work for more than six hours do not
fall within the definition of "employees"
and are not entitled to the benefit of the
Provident Fund contribution. The Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner vide letter
dated 10.4.2013 issued notice to the Bank
for
commencing
proceedings
under
Section 7A of the Act holding such part
time Safai Karmachari are employees of
the Bank under the Act and issued
directions to deposit the statutory dues in
respect of such part time workers.

6. Being aggrieved by the order
dated
10.4.2013
of
the
Regional
Commissioner, the petitioner filed appeal
before
Employees
Provident
Fund
Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal by
means of the order dated 4.7.2011 rejected
the appeal of the petitioner on the ground
that even part time employees are
considered
employees
of
the
establishment, therefore, the part time
sweepers are the employees of the Bank
and the Bank is liable to pay the provident
fund dues under the Act and the scheme.
Vide order dated 26.8.2011 passed by
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner
(II), Allahabad the petitioner was ordered
to deposit the dues within fifteen days.

7. The order of the appellate tribunal
has been assailed before us in the present
writ petition. Subsequent to the order
passed by appellate tribunal recovery
proceedings under Section- 7(A), 8(b) and
18 (g) of the Act were commenced by the
Commissioner, Bareilly which have also
been impugned in the instant writ petition.
The appellate tribunal while deciding the
controversy in question has considered the
meaning of the term "employee" as given
under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act as well
as pronouncements of various High Courts
1400 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and concluded that the definition of
Section 2(f) is extremely wide so as to
include even the petitioners who are
working in connection with the work of
appellant establishment and are being paid
wages for the same. After the aforesaid
consideration, he has held that there is no
infirmity in the order passed by Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner and thereby
dismissed the appeal.

8.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents, on the other hand, has
submitted that they are "employees"
within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the
Act read with Provident Fund Act and it
does not make a difference whether they
are working for one hour or for 8 hours as
the definition of employees as stated in
Employees Provident Fund Act, does not
make any such distinction as the definition
being extreme wide and being a beneficial
piece of legislation and as such a liberal
interpretation has to be taken so as to
include Safai Karmachari within the ambit
and scope of the Act and they are entitled
to the benefit of Provident Fund.

9. Learned counsel appearing for
Baroda U.P. Gramin Bank Employees
Union
has
submitted
that
bipartite
agreement
also
cannot
restrict
the
meaning, scope and ambit of Section 2(f)
of the Provident Funds Act and its
members are entitled to the benefit under
the Act.

10. I have heard learned counsel for
the parties and perused the record.

11. The seminal question for
consideration before this Court is as to
whether the Safai Karmachari working in
the establishment of the petitioner and
working for few hours each day and
receiving wages therefor are entitled to be
counted
under
the
definition
of
"employees" under Provident Funds Act.
The admitted position which emerges is
that Safai Karmachari have been engaged
by the Branch Managers and they are
working for half to one hour per day
totalling to about three to six hours in a
week and even as per the petitioner
himself they are paid consolidated amount
on monthly basis though they have stated
that they are free to work elsewhere but no
assertion has been made that they are, in
fact,
working
anywhere
else.
The
definition
of
employee
given
under
Section 2(f) of the Employees Provident
Funds Act is quoted as under:-

"2. Definition:

(f) "employee" means any
person who is employed for wages in
any kind of work, manual or otherwise,
in or in connection with the work of
(an establishment, and who gets, his
wages directly or indirectly from the
employer, and includes any person:

(i) employed by or through a
contractor in or in connection with the
work of the establishment:

(ii) engaged as an apprentice,
not being an apprentice engage under
the Apprentices Act, 1961 (52 of
1961), or under the standing orders of
the establishment."

12. The definition of employee
under Section 2(f) of the Act is
inclusive definition and has wide scope
so as to include the persons engaged
either
directly
or
indirectly
in
employment of the establishment. It
will be noticed that the terms of
definition are very wide including not
only the persons directly employed or
even through a contractor.
2 All. C/M Baroda U.P. Gramin Bank Vs. The Presiding Officer, Employees Provident Fund & Ors.
1401

13. It has been submitted by the
petitioner that Safai Karmachari have been
engaged on local level by the Branch
Managers and undoubtedly they are
receiving wages for the work they are
doing in the premises of the petitioner.
Applying the provisions of Section 2(f) to
the facts of the present case it is clear that
the Safai Karmachari who have been
engaged by the petitioner for the purpose
of cleaning the establishment for which
work they are being paid wages. would be
entitled to be covered under the definition
of "employee". The work which they are
doing is of regular nature as cleaning of
the Branches is done by them on each date
on which the Branch is opened. It is not
the case of the petitioner that it is only due
to some emergency that these workers are
engaged
and
subsequently
they
are
discontinued from their engagements as
they continue to give service of cleaning
of
the
premises
regularly.
Hon'ble
Supreme Court while considering the
provisions of Section 2 (f) of the
Employees Provident Fund Act in the case
of M/s P.M. Patel and sons and others
Vs. Union of India and others (1986) 1
Supreme Court Cases 32 has held in
paragraphs 10 and 11 as under:-

"10. In the context of the
conditions and the circumstances set out
earlier in which the home workers of a
single manufacturer go about their work,
including the receiving of raw material,
rolling the beedis at home and delivering
them to the manufacturer subject to the
right of rejection there is sufficient
evidence of the requisite degree of control
and supervision for establishing the
relationship
of
master
and
servant
between the manufacturer and the home
worker. it must be remembered that the
work of rolling beedis is not of a
sophisticated nature, requiring control
and supervision at the time when the work
is done. It is a simple operation which, as
practice has shown, has been performed
satisfactorily by thousands of illiterate
workers. It is a task which can be
performed by young and old, men and
women, with equal facility and it does not
require a high order of skill. In the
circumstances, the right of rejection can
constitute in itself an effective degree of
supervision and control. We may point out
that there is evidence to show that the
rejection takes place in the presence of the
home worker. That factor, however, plays
a merely supportive role in determining
the existence of the relationship of the
master and servant. The petitioners point
out that there is no element of personal
service in beedi rolling and that it is open
to a home worker to get the work done by
one or the other member of his family at
home. The element of personal service, it
seems to us, is of little significance when
the test of control and supervision lies in
the right of rejection.

11. In our opinion, the home
workers are "employees" within the
definition of contained in clause (f) of
Section 2 of the Employees' Provident
Funs Act. "

In another case of Officer -inCharge, Sub Regional Provident Fund
Office
and
another
Vs.
Godavari
Garments Limited (2019) 8 Supreme
Court Cases 149, Hon'ble Supreme Court
has considered the ratio laid down in
aforesaid case of M/s P.M. Patel and sons
and others (supra) and further considered
various judgments it has been held as
under in paragraphs 9.8 to 11 as under:-

"9.8. The EPF Act is a beneficial
social welfare legislation which was
enacted by the legislature for the benefit of
the workmen. This Court in Daily Partap
1402 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
v. regl. Provident Fund Commr., held that:
(SCC p.98, para 9)

"9....It has to be kept in view that
the Act in question, is a beneficial social
welfare
legislation
meant
for
the
protection of weaker sections of society,
namely, workmen who had to eke out their
livelihood from the meagre wages they
receive after toiling hard for the same."
Hence, the provisions under the EPF Act
have to be interpreted in a manner which
is beneficial to the workmen."

9.9. In the present case, the
women workers were certainly employed
for wages in connection with the work of
the respondent Company. The definition of
"employee" under Section 2(f) is an
inclusive definition, and includes workers
who are engaged either directly or
indirectly in connection with the work of
the establishment, and are paid wages.

10. In the present case, the
women workers were directly engaged by
the management in connection with the
work of the respondent Company, which
was set up as a ready made garments
industry in Marathwada. The women
workers were paid wages on per-piece
basis for the services rendered. Merely
because
the
women
workers
were
permitted to do the work offsite, would not
take away their status as employees of the
respondent Company.

11. The respondent Company
placed reliance on this Court's decision in
CESC Ltd. v. Subhash Chandra Bose,
wherein it was held that :

"14.
In
the
textual
sense
'supervision' of the principal employer or
his agent is on 'work' at the places
envisaged and the word 'work' can neither
he construed so broadly to be the final act
of acceptance or rejection of work, nor so
narrowly so as to be supervision at all
limes and at each and every step of the
work. A harmonious construction alone
would help carry out the purpose of the
Act, which would mean moderating the
two extremes. When the employee is put to
work under the eye and gaze of the
principal employer, or his agent, where he
can be watched secretly, accidentally, or
occasionally, while the work is in
progress, so as to scrutinise the quality
thereof and to detect faults therein, as also
put to timely remedial measures by
directions given, finally leading to the
satisfactory completion and acceptance of
the work, that would in our view be
supervision for the purposes of Section
2(9) of the Act."

14.

Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner, on the other hand, placed
reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in
the case of The Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh Vs. Sri
T. S. Hariharan, 1971 (2) Supreme Court
Cases 68 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court
considered as to whether employment of
few persons for a short period on account
of some pressing necessity or some
temporary emergency beyond the control
of the company, would be held to be
employment under the provisions of
Section 2(f) of the Act. Clearly, the facts
of the case before the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the said case are distinguishable from
the facts of the present case. It is not the
case
of
the
petitioner
that
Safai
Karmachari are employees for short period
on account of pressing necessity or due to
some temporary emergency.

15. Another case relied upon by
petitioner counsel is in the matter of C.V.
Satheeshchandran Vs. General Manger,
UCO Bank and others (2008) 2 Supreme
Court Cases 653 with regard to binding
nature
of
bipartite
agreement.
The
2 All. C/M Baroda U.P. Gramin Bank Vs. The Presiding Officer, Employees Provident Fund & Ors.
1403
controversy in the set of facts of this case
is related to promotion of Assistant
Manager in UCO bank wherein he has
relied upon the bipartite agreement. It has
been held in paragraph 10 that bipartite
agreements are binding upon both the bank
and the appellant. The facts of this case are
clearly distinguishable form the issue
raised by the petitioner in present set of
facts.

16. The Tribunal while holding that
Safai Karmachari are "employees" has
considered the case of M/s Ahmadabad
Cooling Printing Ltd. Vs. Rehmat Ali
where Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that, "where the management engaged the
sweeper who worked twice or thrice a
week, the night watchman who kept watch
in the other shops in the locality and the
gardner who came for work 10 days a
month will be deemed as employee in
order to attract the applicability of the EPF
Act."

17. In the light of above, it is
clear that the Safai Karmachari are
employed with the petitioner-Bank for
the purpose of cleaning their premises
on
regular
basis.
The
petitioner
establishment
is
a
regular
and
continuous
establishment
and
admittedly the Safai Karmachari are
being paid wages on monthly basis for
the work done by them. The bipartite
agreement cannot restrict the width,
ambit
and
scope
of
statutory
enactment and despite the provisions
being made by bipartite agreement the
benefit of provident fund would be
available only to those employees who
work for more than six hours a day,
cannot restrict the scope of the
persons like the Safai Karmachari who
are
otherwise
covered
by
the
definition of employees as provided
under Section 2-F of the Act

18. For determination as to
whether Safai Karmachari fall within
the definition of Section 2 (f) only the
meaning
given
therein
would
be
relevant and the argument of the
petitioner -Bank cannot be accepted
and the width, ambit and scope cannot
be left to the whims and fancies of the
employer to reduce the same even if it
is by means of an agreement or
consent or by any other instrument.
No evidence was led by the petitioner
that
Safai
Karmachari
are
also
employed in any other establishment
nor could the prove this before the
authority or appellate tribunal.

19. After due consideration of
the issues involved, I am of the
considered
opinion
that
Safai
Karmachari are employed by the
management of the branches and the
management has full control on them
and they are paid wages regularly on
the basis of which master and servant
relationship exists between the Bank
and Safai Karmachari and they would
be 'employees' within the meaning of
Section 2(f) of the Provident Fund Act
and are entitled all the benefits as
such.

20. No other argument or fact
was placed by the petitioners to assail
the findings recorded by the Tribunal.

21.

Having
considered
the
arguments of counsels and the order
of Tribunal, I do not find nay
infirmity with the order of Tribunal.
The petition being without merits is
hereby dismissed.
----------
1404 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2020)02ILR A1404

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.02.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BISWANATH SOMADDER, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Income Tax Appeal No. 13 of 2020

Manoj Kumar Sharma ...Appellant
Versus
Income Tax Officer, Gautam Budh Nagar
 ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Chandra Bhan Gupta

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Gaurav Mahajan

Substantial question of law - issues or
questions framed are factual in nature.

Appeal Rejected.(E-10)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Biswanath Somadder, J.
&
Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. This appeal, under section 260-A of
the Income Tax Act, 1961, has been taken out
in respect of a judgment and order of the
learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi
Bench (S.M.C.), New Delhi, dated 3rd
October, 2019. The appellant has essentially
tried to make out a case on two questions of
law, which, according to the learned advocate
appearing for the appellant, are substantial
questions of law. The questions of law are as
follows:-

1. "Whether there was no service of
notice under section 148 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 ?

2.
Whether
additional/fresh
evidence was taken into consideration by the
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-I ?"

2. In our view, the two questions of law
cannot be termed as "substantial questions of
law". The answer to the two questions,
however, are clearly reflected in the order of
the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-I
dated 11th May, 2018, wherefrom the
appellant preferred an appeal before the
learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi
Bench (S.M.C.), New Delhi.

3. So far as the first question is
concerned, the following paragraphs extracted
from the order of the Commissioner of Income
Tax (Appeals)-I will speak for itself:-

"10. The appellant raised a
ground that the address on which the
notices were sent by the Ld. AO being
"Manoj Kumar Sharma, Nai Abadi,
Dadri, G.B. Nagar" was not the
correct address as there could be
more than one Manoj or Manoj
Kumar or Manoj Kumar Sharma in
Dadri and the post office might have
ended up serving the notices of the
Ld. AO to any one of those persons
named Manoj. It was contended by
the appellant that merely because the
notices sent by the Ld. AO were not
returned by the postal authorities it
cannot
be
presumed
that
those
notices
stood
served
upon
the
appellant and the service of notice
was
complete
in
terms
of
the
provisions of law. Based upon such
logic, the appellant has contended
that there was no service of notice u/s
148 and therefore, the impugned
assessment order was bad in law and
liable to be deleted.