# C/M Janta Prasar Samiti & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 3 ILRA 784
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-03-18
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 16710 of 2015
- **Bench:** Saral Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/c-m-janta-prasar-samiti-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53236
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Civil Law - U.P. Societies Registration Act,
1860 - Sections 4 & 25(1) - Petitioner
after
death
of
his
father
claimed
appointment to post of Manager on basis
of addition in Clause 8(ि) in bye-laws of
3 All. C/M Janta Prasar Samiti & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
785
Society - Prescribed Authority rejected
claim
of
petitioner
-
Validity
of
-
Impugned order - Once specific rider was
put by Clause 10, no amendment or
addition in Clause 8(ि) could be made by
General
Body
of
Committee
of
Management
exercising
power
under
Clause 10 - Any addition or amendment in
Clause 8(क)(ि)(ि) of bye-laws of Society
could be made after amendment in Clause
10 in accordance with bye-laws of Society
by removing rider which stipulated that it
would not affect Clause 8 (क)(ि)(ि) -
Therefore, amendment/addition in Clause
8(ि) was invalid, and there was no waiver
of right by respondent no.4 for being
appointed as Manager, being senior most
legal
heir,
he
claimed
his
right
immediately after death of his father.
(Para 15, 30, 31, 34)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-13)

## Text

784 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
competent to take possession of the
same and report the matter to the
District Magistrate. The District
Magistrate will be competent to
confiscate or get destroyed the
same same in the presence of the
Authorised Officer.
17-H.
Prosecution
and
punishment - Any person found in
possession of Methyl Alcohol in
contravention of these rules shall
be liable for prosecution and
punishment under the provisions of
the Poisons Act, 1919 (Act No.XII
of 1919), as amended from time to
time.

13. From the perusal of the above
quoted rules, it is clear that these rules
provide special provisions with respect to
Methyl alcohol, though these rules do not
apply to other poison which is not methyl
alcohol. For that reason, special power of
confiscation has been provided under Rule
17-F, but for other punishment, provision of
Section 6 of the Poisons Act has been
adopted by Rule 17-H of the amended
Rules 1921. This Court also holds that
power of confiscation is not contrary to
Section 6 of the Poisons Act and is valid.
Therefore,
the
contention of
learned
counsel for the petitioner that Rule 17-F is
beyond the provisions of Section 6 of
Poisons Act, 1919, so far as confiscation is
concerned, is absolutely misconceived and,
hence, rejected.

14. In the present case, it is not in
dispute that the petitioner has purchased the
methyl alcohol from a supplier based
within the State who does not have an
M.A.-1, M.A.-2 or M.A.-3 license and also
procured methyl alcohol from a supplier
based outside the State without having
M.A.-2 license. Therefore, prima facie,
there is a violation of provisions of Rules
1921 and for reason there appears to be no
illegality in show cause notice/order.
However, the impugned order is simply a
show cause notice by which the license of
the petitioner has been suspended. The
petitioner can file an objection against that
show cause notice or appeal under Rule 17I.

15. Given the above, the present
writ petition is disposed of with liberty to
the petitioner to file an objection or appeal
against the show cause notice within 15
days. In case such objection or appeal is
filed by the petitioner against the impugned
show cause notice, the same shall be
considered and decided by the District
Magistrate within the next one month
without
being
influenced
by
the
observation made hereinabove.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 784
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ C No. 16710 of 2015

C/M Janta Prasar Samiti & Anr.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Yogish Kumar Saxena

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Vineet Kumar Singh

Civil Law - U.P. Societies Registration Act,
1860 - Sections 4 & 25(1) - Petitioner
after
death
of
his
father
claimed
appointment to post of Manager on basis
of addition in Clause 8(ि) in bye-laws of
3 All. C/M Janta Prasar Samiti & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
785
Society - Prescribed Authority rejected
claim
of
petitioner
-
Validity
of
-
Impugned order - Once specific rider was
put by Clause 10, no amendment or
addition in Clause 8(ि) could be made by
General
Body
of
Committee
of
Management
exercising
power
under
Clause 10 - Any addition or amendment in
Clause 8(क)(ि)(ि) of bye-laws of Society
could be made after amendment in Clause
10 in accordance with bye-laws of Society
by removing rider which stipulated that it
would not affect Clause 8 (क)(ि)(ि) -
Therefore, amendment/addition in Clause
8(ि) was invalid, and there was no waiver
of right by respondent no.4 for being
appointed as Manager, being senior most
legal
heir,
he
claimed
his
right
immediately after death of his father.
(Para 15, 30, 31, 34)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-13)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Saral Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Y.K. Saxena, learned
counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing
Counsels for the State, and Sri H.N. Singh,
learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri
Abhishek Dwivedi, learned counsel for the
respondent.

2. The petitioners through the
present writ petition have assailed the order
dated 16.02.2015 passed by respondent no.2Sub-Divisional Magistrate-Derapur, Kanpur
Dehat whereby the Prescribed Authority has
rejected
the
claim
of
petitioners
for
continuing as Manager of the Society namely
Sri Janta Prasar Samiti Sadaramau Manepur,
Post Jhinjak, District Kanpur Dehat.

3. There is a society registered in the
name of Sri Janta Prasar Samiti Sadaramau
Manepur, Post Jhinjak, District Kanpur Dehat
(hereafter referred to as 'Society') under the
provisions of U.P. Societies Registration Act,
1860. According to Clause 8(ख) of the byelaws of the Society, the senior most successor
of life long Manager Sri Harishchandra Singh
shall be nominated as Manager of the
Society.

4. It appears that during the life long
of Harishchandra Singh, the petitioner who
was the fifth son of Harishchandra Singh,
was appointed as Manager of the Society and
he continued to work as Manager till the
demise of Harishchandra Singh who died on
11.03.2009.

5. After the death of Harishchandra
Singh, respondent no.4-Arvind Kumar Singh
who is the second son and the senior most
successor of late Harishchandra Singh,
claimed his right to be appointed as Manager
on 09.06.2009 on the ground that under the
bye-laws of the Society, he being the senior
most
legal
heir/successor
of
late
Harishchandra Singh is entitled to be
appointed as Manager.

6. The claim of respondent no.4 was
contested by the petitioner on the ground that
an addition after the word 'Or (अथवा)' has been
made in the main Clause 8(ख) of the bye-laws
of the Society by adding "or the persons Sri
Abhishek Kumar Singh, Smt. Uma Singh and
Sri Virendra Singh Bhadauria who have been
inducted as life members of the Society may
appoint any person as Manager of the Society
who has shown devotion, sincerity, and
dedication in carrying out the objects of the
Society." Accordingly, the petitioner claimed
that he had been appointed as Manager on the
basis of the aforesaid addition in Clause 8(ख)
in the bye-laws of the Society.

7. According to the petitioner, after
the addition in Clause 8(ख) of the bye-laws
of the Society, the petitioner was elected as
Manager on 28.02.2006 and the list of
786 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
office bearers was registered for the year
2005-06 on 28.02.2006. Consequently, he
pleaded that his appointment as Manager is
valid and is in accordance with the byelaws of the Society.

8. The objection of respondent
no.4 against the appointment of the
petitioner was rejected by the Sub-Registrar
vide order dated 06.11.2009. Respondent
no.4
preferred
a
Writ
Petition
No.70071/2009 challenging the order of
Sub-Registrar dated 06.11.2009 which was
allowed by this Court by judgment and
order
dated
02.04.2013
permitting
respondent no.4 to approach the Prescribed
Authority. This Court further directed the
Prescribed Authority to decide the claim of
the parties in the light of the observation
made in the judgment and order dated
02.04.2013
in
Writ
Petition
No.70071/2009.

9. The record further reveals that
against the judgment of this Court dated
02.04.2013, the petitioner preferred Special
Appeal
No.672/2013
which
remains
pending,
and
in
the
meantime,
the
Prescribed
Authority
decided
the
application
of
respondent
no.4
in
compliance with the judgment and order of
this Court dated 02.04.2013 in Writ Petition
No.70071/2009.

10. The Prescribed Authority by
the impugned order held that the addition
or amendment in Sub-Clause (ख) of Clause
8 of the bye-laws of the Society could not
be made because of Clause 10 of the byelaws of the Society. He further held that for
the said reason, the petitioner has no right
to continue as Manager. He further
recorded in the order that the petitioner
neither submitted any objection nor replied
to the objection of the respondent.
Accordingly,
he
concluded
that
the
petitioner cannot continue as Manager.

11. Challenging the aforesaid
order, learned counsel for the petitioners
has submitted that the Prescribed Authority
has erred in law in holding that there
cannot be any amendment in Clause 8(ख) of
the bye-laws of the Society inasmuch as the
incorporation in Clause 8(ख) of the byelaws of the Society is only an alternative
mode
for
providing
appointment
of
Manager, in a contingency if there is no
senior legal heir or successor of late
Harishchandra Singh. Accordingly, he
submits that the finding returned by the
Prescribed Authority that there can be no
amendment in Clause 8(ख) of the bye-laws
of the Society is perverse and based upon
the misrepresentation of Clause 10 of the
bye-laws of the Society.

12. He further submits that this
Court while remanding the matter has
directed the Prescribed Authority to decide
the issue as to whether respondent no.4 has
waived his right to continue as Manager,
but the Prescribed Authority has failed to
return any finding on the said issue. In such
view of the fact, the impugned order cannot
be sustained in law.

13. Per-contra, Sri H.N. Singh,
learned Senior Counsel for the respondent
contends that it is evident from Clause 10
of the bye-laws of the Society that no
amendment in Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग) can be
made. It is submitted that the petitioner
might have some case in case Clause 10 of
the bye-laws of the Society had been
amended in accordance with bye laws of
the Society by deleting in Clause-10 that
"no amendment in Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग) in the
bye-laws of the Society can be made", only
3 All. C/M Janta Prasar Samiti & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
787
thereafter any amendment in Clause
(क)(ख)(ग) could be made.

14. It is submitted that since under
the
bye-laws
of
the
Society,
it
is
categorically stated in Clause 10 of byelaws of the Society that no amendment in
Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग) can be made, therefore,
neither any amendment nor any addition in
Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग) could be made because
of rider put by Clause 10 of the bye laws
of the Society. Therefore, the amendment
in the bye-laws of Clause 8 (ख) is per se
illegal and is void given rider of Clause 10
of
the
bye-laws
of
the
Society.
Accordingly, it is contended that in such
view of the fact, the petitioner has no right
to continue as Manager of the Society and
the question of waving his client's right to
be appointed as Manager by respondent
no.4 does not arise.

15. He further submits that it is not
the case where respondent no.4 has waived
his right inasmuch as it was only late
Harishchandra Singh, who could work as
Manager, and only after his death,
respondent no.4 could be appointed as
Manager under the bye-laws of the Society.
In
the
instant
case,
the
petitioner
immediately
after
the
death
of
Harishchandra Singh raised an objection
and claimed appointment to the post of
Manager. Therefore, there was no waiver of
the right on the part of the petitioner in
claiming the post of Manager of the
Society.

16. Heard Sri Y.K. Saxena, learned
counsel for the petitioners, and Sri H.N.
Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent, and perused the record.

17. Before dealing with the
controversy, it would be apt to reproduce
unamended Clause 8(अ) of the Society:-

"(8) प्रबन्धकाररणी सदमदतः-
(अ) गठनः-
(क) प्रबन्धक पद पर वतजमान पदासीन
व्यदक्त आजीवन प्रबन्धक रहेगा और िदवष्य में प्रबन्धक
पद पर कोई दनवाजचन नही होगा।
(ख) वतजमान प्रबन्धक का पद ररक्त होने
की दशा त्याग पत्र/मृत्यु से / में उसका वैधादनक ययेष्ठ
उिरादधकारी ही वैध प्रबन्धक माना जायेगा दजसकी
दस्थदत एवां शदक्त पूणजतया (8-क) के अनुसार होगी।"

18. It would also be apposite to
reproduce amended Clause 8 of the byelaws of the Society:

"8- प्रबन्धकाररणी सदमदतः-
(अ) गठनः-
(क) प्रन्धक पद पर वतजमान पदासीन व्यदक्त
आजीवन प्रबन्धक रहेगा और िदवष्य में प्रबन्धक पद
पर कोई दनवाजचन नही होगा।
(ख) वतजमान प्रबन्धक का पद ररक्त होने
की दशा त्याग पत्र या मृत्यु से / में उसका वैधादनक
ययेष्ठ उिरादधकारी ही वैध प्रबन्धक माना जायेगा
दजसकी दस्थदत एवां शदक्त पूणजतया 8-क के अनुसार
होगी अथवा सदमदत ने सवज सम्मदत से श्री अदििेक
कुमार दसांह श्रीमती उमा दसांह तथा श्री वीरेन्र दसांह
िदौररया को उनके सांस्था के प्रदत अटूट श्रद्धा, दनष्ठा एवां
िवन मरम्मत में दवशेि आदथजक योगदान एवां महत्वपूणज
कायों के आधार पर आजीवन दवदशष्ठ सदस्य बनाया है
िदवष्य में यदद यह तीनों सदस्य अन्य दकसी व्यदक्त को
उसके सांस्था के प्रदत दवशेि योगदान पर बहुमत या सवज
सम्मदत से आजीवन दवदशष्ठ सदस्य बनाना चाहेगें तो
बना सकेंगे। यही आजीवन दवदशष्ट सदस्य िदवष्य में
प्रबन्धक का पद ररक्त होने की दशा में अपने में से
बहुमत या सवज सम्मदत से प्रबन्धक चुनेगे और इस प्रकार
चुना हुआ व्यदक्त ही प्रबन्धक होगा, शेि प्रबन्ध सदमदत
का चुनाव यथादस्थदत के अनुसार सांपन्न होगा।"
788 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
19. Clause 10 of the bye laws of
the Society reads as under:

"सांस्था के दनयमों व दवदनयमों में सांशोधन
साधारण सिा के 2/3 सदस्यो के बहुमत से दकया जा
सकेगा परन्तु धारा-8,क,ख,ग पर इसका कोई प्रिाव
नही पड़ सकेगा।"

20. According to the unamended
Clause 8 (अ)(क) of the bye-laws of the
Society, the person appointed as Manager
shall continue to be Manager for the life
and no election of the Manager shall take
place.

21. According to the unamended
Clause 8 (अ)(ख), on the vacancy of the
Manager by way of resignation/death, the
senior most legal heir of the Manager shall
be appointed as Manager, and he shall
exercise all the powers and carry on all the
duties of the Manager.

22.

There
is
an
addition/amendment in Clause 8(ख) and by
addition, another mode of appointment of
Manager is provided that "the three persons
namely Abhishek Kumar Singh, Smt. Uma
Singh and Sri Virendra Singh Bhadauria
who have been inducted life members of
the Society can also nominate/appoint a
person as Manager who has shown
allegiance, sincerity, and dedication in
carrying out the work and object of the
Society."

23. According to the petitioner, the
addition in Clause 8 (अ)(ख) has been made
only to provide an alternative mode to fill
up the vacancy of Manager in case no
senior most legal heir of the Manager is
available or in case he refuses to accept the
post of Manager. Therefore, this is not an
amendment and only an addition which
provides to fill up the vacancy in a
particular contingency.

24. At this stage, it would be apt to
refer to Clause 10 of the bye-laws of the
Society which has already been extracted
above, which states that amendment in the
bye-laws of the Society can be made only
by 2/3 Members of the General Body of the
Society by majority. However, this clause
will not affect Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग) of the
bye-laws of the Society.

25. At this stage, it would be apt to
refer to the earlier judgment of this Court
whereby this Court vide judgment and
order
dated
02.04.2013
permitted
respondent no.4 to file an application
before the Prescribed Authority to decide
the dispute which reads as under:

"The aforesaid aspect of the
matter has completely been ignored
by the Deputy Registrar while
passing
the
order
impugned.
Further the issue as to whether
resolution had been passed in any
valid meeting of the general body
convened for the purpose has also
not
been
finally
adjudicated.
Merely because amendments have
been signed by certain office
bearers cannot ipso facto lead to a
conclusion that a valid meeting of
the general body has taken place. It
had to be examined as to whether
agenda for such meeting was
circulated in accordance with the
bye-laws among members and that
a valid meeting for the purpose did
take place frog amongst the valid
members. A finding had to be
returned as to Whether any valid
amendment has been made in Class
8 (kha) as well as could the Clause
3 All. C/M Janta Prasar Samiti & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
789
B (kha) be amended in view of
Clause 10.
Even otherwise on simple
reading of amended Clause 8 (kha),
this Court finds that said clause is
in two parts, (a) which declares that
senior-most legal heir of the
present
manager
would
automatically be treated to be
manager, if the earlier manager
tenders his resignation or expires,
thereafter there is the other clause
starting from the word "अथवा" (b)
which confers a power upon three
persons named, namely, Abhishek
Kumar Singh, Smt. Uma Singh and
Virendra Singh Bhadauriya to elect
a new manager in case of vacancy
from among themselves.
In the opinion of the Court
for harmonizing the two clauses it
is but necessary to hold that it is
only when the senior-most legal
heir of outgoing manager becomes
incapacitated or otherwise refuse
act as the secretary/manager then
that three persons mentioned in the
Clause can exercise their power to
elect the manager from among
themselves. The first preference for
being treated to be manager is
therefore, with the senior-most
legal heir of the outgoing manager.

In the facts of the case it is
not in dispute that eldest son of
Harish Chandra Singh namely,
Ashok Kumar had expired during
his life time. Petitioner is the
second
eldest
son
of
Harish
Chandra
Singh,
the
earlier
manager/secretary. Therefore, he
has a preferential right to be treated
as
the
manager
after
the
resignation/death
of
Harish
Chandra Singh in terms of the
amended clause also.
However,
the
question
remains as to whether the petitioner
had waived his right in view of
respondent no.4 being elected as
the manager in 2006 and thereafter
the list of office bearers being
registered, with respondent no.4, as
the manager under Section 4 of
Act, 1860.
For determining the said
issue, it is but necessary to examine
amongst others as to whether
respondent no.4 ever exercised
powers of the manager/secretary of
the society subsequent to his
alleged election as manager in 2006
or
not,
which
requires
consideration
of
the
relevant
documents of the society and the
accounts etc. maintained in that
respect. Waiver of a right is
essentially an issue of fact which is
to be culled out from the evidence
to be produced by the parties and
their conduct.
In the totality of the facts
on record this Court is of the
opinion that the present writ
petition
be
disposed
of
by
permitting the petitioner to file a
reference petition under Section 25
(1) of the Societies Registration
Act, 1860 before the Prescribed
Authority within two weeks from
today, along with a certified copy
of this order challenging the order
of acceptance of respondent no.3 as
the
manager/secretary
of
the
society and his continuance as
such. If such petition is filed, the
Prescribed Authority shall enter
into the dispute and shall decide the
same in light of the observations
790 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
made above, preferably within two
months from the date of receipt of
the
reference
petition
after
affording opportunity of hearing to
the petitioner and respondent nos. 3
to 5 and after examining the
original records of the society. He
shall pass a reasoned speaking
order. Order Impugned passed by
the Deputy Registrar shall abide by
the orders to be passed by the
Prescribed Authority as indicated
above. All consequential action
shall
be
taken
Immediately
thereafter in terms of the order
passed by the Prescribed Authority
as indicated above.
With
the
aforesaid
direction/observations, the present
writ petition is disposed of."

26. The extracted portion of the
judgment of this Court reveals that this
Court has permitted the petitioner to submit
an
application
before
the
Prescribed
Authority with a direction to the Prescribed
Authority to decide the issue as to whether
any valid amendment has been made in
Clause 8(ख) of the bye-laws of the Society
as well as could the Clause 8(ख) be
amended in view of Clause 10. This Court
further directed the Prescribed Authority to
return the finding as to whether the
petitioner in the writ petition (respondent
no.4 in the present writ petition) had
waived his right in view of respondent no.4
(petitioner no.2 in the present writ petition)
being elected as Manager in the year 2006
and thereafter, the list of office bearers
being registered with respondent no.4
under the provisions of U.P. Societies
Registration Act, 1860.

27. Now the Court proceeds to
analyse in the present case as to whether
the Prescribed Authority while deciding the
application of respondent no.4 returned the
finding on the aforesaid two issues or not.

28. So far as the question as to
whether the amendment could be made in
Clause 8(ख) of the bye-laws of the Society
in view of Clause 10 is concerned, the
impugned order reveals that a finding has
been returned by the Prescribed Authority
on the issue. Though the finding may not
be elaborate, but the Prescribed Authority
recorded a finding that no amendment
could be made in Clause 8(ख) of the byelaws of the Society.

29. The Prescribed Authority has
not returned any finding on the issue
whether respondent no.4 has waived his
right to continue as Manager of the Society.

30. This Court could have remitted
the matter in the absence of any finding
returned by the Prescribed Authority on the
issue whether respondent no.4 has waived
his right or not. In the present case, the
dispute has been pending for long and the
main question for consideration in the
present
case
is
whether
any
valid
amendment or addition could be made in
Clause 8 (ख) of the bye laws of the Society
in view of Clause 10 of the bye-laws
Society. In case the answer to the said
question is 'affirmative', this Court is of the
view that no further finding with respect to
the question whether respondent no.4 has
waived his right needs to be recorded by
the Prescribed Authority, and if the answer
of the said question is in 'negative' then it is
a case of remand.

31. In the instant case, this Court
has already extracted Clause 10 of the bye
laws of the Society which stipulates that
any amendment in the bye-laws can be
3 All. C/M Janta Prasar Samiti & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
791
made by 2/3 Members of the Society on a
majority basis. However, this clause would
not affect Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग) of the byelaws of the Society. Clause 10 is specific
and unambiguous and stipulates that the
said Clause of the bye-laws of the Society
would not affect Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग) of the
bye-laws of the Society which means that
Clause 10 puts rider on the power of the
General Body of the Society to amend
Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग) of the bye-laws of the
Society. Once a specific rider is put by
Clause 10 of the bye-laws of the Society,
this Court is of the view that no amendment
or addition in Clause 8(क) could be made
by the General Body of the Committee of
Management exercising the power under
Clause 10 of the bye-laws of the Society.
Any addition or amendment in Clause
8(क)(ख)(ग) of the bye-laws of the Society
could be made only after the amendment in
Clause 10 in accordance with bye-laws of
the Society by removing the rider placed by
Clause 10 in the bye-laws of the Society
that "it would not affect or impact Clause 8
(क)(ख)(ग) of the bye-laws of the Society."

32. In the instant case, there is
nothing on record to indicate that any
amendment in Clause 10 of the bye-laws of
the Society has been made and the rider put
by Clause 10 that it would not affect Clause
8 (क)(ख)(ग) of the bye laws of the Society
has been removed.

33. This Court is of the view that
no amendment in Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग) can be
made so long as the rider stipulated in
Clause 10 of the bye laws of the Society
that it would not affect Clause 8 (क)(ख)(ग)
of the bye laws of the Society remains in
existence. In such view of the fact, this
Court
is
of
the
view
that
the
amendment/addition in Clause 8 (ख) of the
bye-laws of the Society could not be made
by the Committee of the Management or
General Body of the Society in the exercise
of power in Clause 10 of the bye laws of
the
Society.
Therefore,
an
addition/amendment in Clause 8 (ख) of the
bye laws of the Society is per se illegal and
against the spirit of the bye-laws of the
Society. Thus, the argument of the learned
counsel for the respondent with regard to
the fact that it is only an addition to meet
out certain exigencies in Clause 8(ख) does
not stand to merit and is rejected.

34. Since this Court has held that
no amendment/addition in Clause 8 (ख)
could be made by the Committee of
Management or General Body of the
Society in the exercise of power in Clause
10 of the bye-laws of the Society therefore,
the amendment/addition in Clause 8(ख) is
invalid, and it is only the original clause
that remains in existence. Therefore, it is
only respondent no.4 who could be
appointed as Manager being the senior
most legal heir of the Manager.

35. Since the petitioner has been
claiming his appointment by virtue of
amendment in Clause 8 (ख) and that has
been declared by this Court to be invalid,
therefore, the appointment of the petitioner
as Manager was against bye laws of the
Society. In such view of fact, the question
of waiver of the right of respondent no.4
does not arise.

36. At this juncture, it is also
pertinent to note that under the bye-laws of
the Society, the right of respondent no.4 to
be appointed as Manager accrues only after
the
death
of
Harishchandra
Singh.
Therefore, in such view of the fact, there
792 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
was no waiver of the right by the
respondent no.4 for being appointed as
Manager as respondent no.4 claimed his
right
to
be
appointed
as
Manager
immediately
after
the
death
of
Harishchandra Singh.

37. Thus, for the reasons given
above, the writ petition lacks merit and is
dismissed without any order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 792
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIKRAM D. CHAUHAN, J.

Writ C No. 23088 of 2018

Satyaveer ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Bharat Singh, Sri Bheshaj Puri, Ms. Priti
Chaudhary

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 147, 323, 504, 506 & 171C -
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 -
Section 7 - Petitioner was granted firearm
licence with respect to .32 Bore Revolver,
cancelled by D.M. on account of pendency
of criminal case - Held, no material has
been relied to demonstrate as to how
petitioner was a threat to public peace
and
tranquility
-
Mere
pendency
of
criminal case cannot ipso facto amount to
cancellation of arms licence - Only report
of SSP has been relied upon, which
contains
details
of
criminal
case
-
Prosecution failed to demonstrate that
petitioner has in any manner misuse his
firearm and there was no conviction
against petitioner - Thus, impugned order
quashed and authorities are directed to
restore firearm licence. (Para 8, 9, 12)

Writ petition allowed. (E-13)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vikram D. Chauhan, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Priti Chaudhary,
Advocate holding brief of Sri Bheshaj Puri,
learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
for the State-respondents.

2. It is submitted by learned
counsel for the petitioner that the initially
the petitioner was granted two firearm
licence. One being .32 Bore Revolver and
the other being 12 Bore Rifle. The present
matter is in respect of the cancellation of
arms licence pertaining to .32 Bore
Revolver. By means of the impugned order
dated 7.12.2012 the firearm licence of the
petitioner has been cancelled on the ground
of pendency of a criminal case being Case
Crime No.1056 of 2010, under Sections
147, 323, 504, 506, 171C I.P.C. and Section
7 Criminal Law Amendment Act. The
licence of other 12 Bore Rifle has already
been restored on the similar facts by this
Court by order dated 23.7.2013, which has
been
accepted
by
the
respondents.
Thereafter, the licence in respect of the .12
Bore Rifle has been restored. The order
dated
23.7.2013 passed
in Writ
CNo.32621 of 2012 is extracted hereunder:-

"An arms license of the
petitioner has been cancelled on
the ground of pendency of a
criminal case, quite apart from the
fact that the case, which has been
registered relates to a minor
dispute and in any case, the
weapon of the petitioner was not
misused.