# C/m, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College, Hapur & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 1 ILRA 792
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-12-08
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 25856 of 2023
- **Bench:** Kshitij Shailendra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/c-m-lala-babu-baijal-memorial-inter-college-hapur-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-50963
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

C.S.C., Sri Navin Kumar Srivastava, Sri Ritesh
Upadhyay, Sri Sukrampal

A. Educational Institutions - Jurisdiction
of District Inspector of Schools Under U.P.
Educational Institutions (Prevention of
Dissipation
of
Assets)
Act,
1974
-
Petitioners challenged a notice dated 31.07.2023
issued by the District Inspector of Schools,
Hapur, alleging it was beyond his jurisdiction
under the Act - Held, the notice seeking details
of immovable properties and compensation from
land acquisition was within the scope of "assets"
and "property" as defined under Sections 2(d)
and 8 of the Act, 1974, and the District
Inspector of Schools was competent to issue it
under the notification dated 07.05.1975, which
delegates authority to obtain asset details, and
the Government Order dated 06.06.2023. (Paras
5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23)

B. Statutory Interpretation - Purposive
Approach to "Assets" and "Property" -
Petitioners argued that the notice exceeded the
scope of "assets" as defined in the table under
Section 8 of the Act, 1974 - Held, applying
purposive interpretation, the term "assets" must
be read with the definition of "property" under
Section 2(d), which includes rights and interests
arising from immovable properties, such as
compensation from land acquisition - The
notice's demand for such details was covered
under "special details" in the Section 8 table,
aligning with the Act's objective to prevent
1 All. C/m, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College, Hapur & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
793
dissipation of institutional assets, as supported
by
Central
India
Spinning
Vs
Municipal
Committee, Girdhari Lal Vs Balbir Nath Mathur,
and other Supreme Court precedents. (Paras 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21)

C. Writ Jurisdiction
- Maintainability
Against a Show-Cause Notice - Petitioners
contended that the notice was ultra vires and
warranted interference under Article 226 - Held,
a writ petition against a notice seeking
information is generally not maintainable unless
it is issued without jurisdiction or violates
statutory provisions - The notice was within the
District Inspector's delegated authority under
the 1975 notification and 2023 Government
Order, and no substantive action under Section
4 of the Act, 1974 had been initiated, rendering
the challenge premature. (Paras 9, 12, 22, 23,
24)

D. Delegation of Powers - Scope Under
Notification and Government Order -
Petitioners argued that the District Inspector's
authority was limited to obtaining asset details
as per the 1975 notification and did not extend
to seeking compensation details - Held, the
notification dated 07.05.1975 authorizes the
District Inspector to obtain "details of assets,"
which,
read
with
Section
2(d),
includes
compensation from land acquisition - The
Government Order dated 06.06.2023 further
supports the District Inspector's role, even as
part of a six-member committee, and no
adjudication by the committee was involved at
this stage. (Paras 4, 5, 7, 12, 22)

E. Precedent and Administrative Authority
- Petitioners relied on C/M Rashtriya Kanya
Inter College Vs St. of U.P. and Supreme Court
decisions in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs
Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and M/s Cannon India Vs
Commissioner of Customs to argue lack of
jurisdiction
-
Held,
the
prior
case
was
distinguishable as it involved a notice by the
Joint Director, not the District Inspector, and
predated the 2023 Government Order - The
Supreme Court precedents emphasize that
powers must be exercised as per statute, but
the District Inspector's notice complied with
delegated authority, and an officer's affidavit in
another
case
does
not
divest
statutory
competence. (Paras 7, 8, 23)
Writ Petition Dismissed.

List of Cases cited:

## Text

792 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1. Mr. Rakesh Pathak, learned counsel
for the petitioners, Mr. Sanjay Srivastava,
State Law Officer and Mr. Sher Bahadur
Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-
Land Management Committee.

2.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners submitted that the lease
granted in favour of petitioners has been
cancelled in arbitrary manner. He further
submitted that the revision has been also
dismissed without summoning the record
of the proceedings.

3. Matter requires consideration.

4. Issue notice to respondent nos. 5
to 11 returnable at an early date.

5. Steps be taken within two weeks.

6. Respondent nos.12 to 15 are
stated to be proforma respondents, as
such, notices to respondent nos.12 to 15
are dispensed with.

7. All the respondents including State
& Gaon Sabha shall file counter affidavit
within six weeks.

8. Petitioner will file rejoinder
affidavit within two weeks thereafter.

9. List this case in the additional
cause list on 5.2.2024.

10. The application for interim relief
shall be considered on the next date fixed
in the matter."

Order Date :- 30.11.2023

3. In view of above, the aforesaid
wrong particulars appearing in the fourth
line of sub-para no.4 of paragraph no.3
(page no.4) of the judgment dated
28.11.2023 stand deleted.

4. This order shall form part of the
earlier judgment dated 28.11.2023.

5. Office to do the needful.
----------
(2024) 1 ILRA 792
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.12.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Writ-C No. 25856 of 2023

C/m, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter
College, Hapur & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Gautam Baghel, SriBabboo Ram

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Navin Kumar Srivastava, Sri Ritesh
Upadhyay, Sri Sukrampal

A. Educational Institutions - Jurisdiction
of District Inspector of Schools Under U.P.
Educational Institutions (Prevention of
Dissipation
of
Assets)
Act,
1974
-
Petitioners challenged a notice dated 31.07.2023
issued by the District Inspector of Schools,
Hapur, alleging it was beyond his jurisdiction
under the Act - Held, the notice seeking details
of immovable properties and compensation from
land acquisition was within the scope of "assets"
and "property" as defined under Sections 2(d)
and 8 of the Act, 1974, and the District
Inspector of Schools was competent to issue it
under the notification dated 07.05.1975, which
delegates authority to obtain asset details, and
the Government Order dated 06.06.2023. (Paras
5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23)

B. Statutory Interpretation - Purposive
Approach to "Assets" and "Property" -
Petitioners argued that the notice exceeded the
scope of "assets" as defined in the table under
Section 8 of the Act, 1974 - Held, applying
purposive interpretation, the term "assets" must
be read with the definition of "property" under
Section 2(d), which includes rights and interests
arising from immovable properties, such as
compensation from land acquisition - The
notice's demand for such details was covered
under "special details" in the Section 8 table,
aligning with the Act's objective to prevent
1 All. C/m, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College, Hapur & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
793
dissipation of institutional assets, as supported
by
Central
India
Spinning
Vs
Municipal
Committee, Girdhari Lal Vs Balbir Nath Mathur,
and other Supreme Court precedents. (Paras 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21)

C. Writ Jurisdiction
- Maintainability
Against a Show-Cause Notice - Petitioners
contended that the notice was ultra vires and
warranted interference under Article 226 - Held,
a writ petition against a notice seeking
information is generally not maintainable unless
it is issued without jurisdiction or violates
statutory provisions - The notice was within the
District Inspector's delegated authority under
the 1975 notification and 2023 Government
Order, and no substantive action under Section
4 of the Act, 1974 had been initiated, rendering
the challenge premature. (Paras 9, 12, 22, 23,
24)

D. Delegation of Powers - Scope Under
Notification and Government Order -
Petitioners argued that the District Inspector's
authority was limited to obtaining asset details
as per the 1975 notification and did not extend
to seeking compensation details - Held, the
notification dated 07.05.1975 authorizes the
District Inspector to obtain "details of assets,"
which,
read
with
Section
2(d),
includes
compensation from land acquisition - The
Government Order dated 06.06.2023 further
supports the District Inspector's role, even as
part of a six-member committee, and no
adjudication by the committee was involved at
this stage. (Paras 4, 5, 7, 12, 22)

E. Precedent and Administrative Authority
- Petitioners relied on C/M Rashtriya Kanya
Inter College Vs St. of U.P. and Supreme Court
decisions in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs
Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and M/s Cannon India Vs
Commissioner of Customs to argue lack of
jurisdiction
-
Held,
the
prior
case
was
distinguishable as it involved a notice by the
Joint Director, not the District Inspector, and
predated the 2023 Government Order - The
Supreme Court precedents emphasize that
powers must be exercised as per statute, but
the District Inspector's notice complied with
delegated authority, and an officer's affidavit in
another
case
does
not
divest
statutory
competence. (Paras 7, 8, 23)
Writ Petition Dismissed.

List of Cases cited:

1.
Central
India
Spinning
and
Weaving
Manufacturing Comp. Vs Municipal Committee,
AIR 1958 SC 341

2. Girdhari Lal & Sons Vs Balbir Nath Mathur,
(1986) 2 SCC 237

3. K.P. Varghese Vs ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173

4. State Bank of Travancore Vs Mohd. M. Khan,
(1981) 4 SCC 82

5. Som Prakash Rekhi Vs U.O.I., (1981) 1 SCC
449

6. Ravula Subba Rao Vs CIT, AIR 1956 SC 604

7. Govindlal Vs Agricultural Produce Market
Committee, (1975) 2 SCC 482

8. Babaji Kondaji Vs Nasik Merchants Co-op
Bank Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 50

9. Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. Vs St. of
Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 279

10. Eera (through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf) Vs
St. (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133

11. Swedish Match AB Vs Securities & Exchange
Board, India, (2004) 11 SCC 641

12. Reserve Bank of India Vs Peerless General
Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC
424

13. S. Gopal Reddy Vs St. of Andhra Pradesh,
(1996) 4 SCC 596

14. Prakash Kumar Vs St. of Guj., (2005) 2 SCC
409

15. Anwar Hasan Khan Vs Mohd. Shafi, (2001) 8
SCC 540

16. U.O.I. Vs Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem
Vasco De Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277

17. N. K. Jain Vs C. K. Shah, (1991) 2 SCC 495
794 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
18. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai Vs
Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, (2002) 1 SCC 633

19. M/s Cannon India Private Limited Vs
Commissioner of Customs, 2021 AIR (SC) 1699

20. C/M Rashtriya Kanya Inter College Vs St. of
U.P., Writ-C No. 3867 of 2023

(Delivered by Hon'ble Hon'ble Kshitij
Shailendra, J.)

1. Heard Shri Gautam Baghel, learned
counsel for the petitioners, Shri Jitendra
Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel for respondent nos.1, 2 and 3, Shri
Ritesh Upadhyay, learned counsel for
respondent no.4 and perused the record.

THE CHALLENGE

2. This writ petition has been filed
challenging a notice dated 31.07.2023,
whereby the District Inspector of Schools,
Hapur has called upon the petitioners'
Management to produce evidence in
relation to seven points.

PREVIOUS ORDER IN THIS PETITION

3. This Court, raising prima facie
doubts upon maintainability of the writ
petition in view of objections raised by Shri
Ritesh Upadhyay based upon notifications
dated 07.05.1975 and 06.06.2023 (wrongly
typed as 09.06.2023 in the order) passed
following order on 22.11.2023:-

"1. This petition has been filed
challenging
notice
dated
31.7.2023,
whereby the District Inspector of Schools,
Hapur has called upon the petitioners'
Management to produce evidence in
relation to seven points.

2. Sri Gautam Baghel, learned
counsel for the petitioners submits that the
show-cause notice is without jurisdiction
and it has been issued in purported exercise
of powers under The Uttar Pradesh
Educational Institutions (Prevention of
Dissipation of Assets) Act, 1974, whereas
the power to undertake such an exercise is
vested in Director of Education alone.

3. Sri Ritesh Upadhyay, learned
counsel for the contesting respondent has,
however, placed before this Court the
notifications dated 7.5.1975 and 9.6.2023
and he submits that by virtue of these
notifications, the power to issue such notice
has been conferred and delegated upon the
District Inspector of Schools also and,
therefore, the petition has no merit and
same be dismissed.

4. At this stage, learned counsel
for the petitioner seeks time to go through
the said notifications.

5.
Sri
Ritesh
Upadhyay
is
directed to serve a copy of aforesaid
notifications upon Sri Gautam Baghel,
learned counsel for the petitioner during
course of the day.

6. Put up this case on 8.12.2023
as fresh so as to enable the learned counsel
for the petitioners to satisfy the Court on
maintainability of the writ petition against
a show-cause notice. "

THE NOTIFICATION OF DELEGATION
OF POWER

4. The notification dated 07.05.1975,
being germane to the controversy involved,
is reproduced as below:-

"र्शिा र्नदेशालर् (माध्यर्मक) उत्तर प्रदेश

आदेश संख्या वश० िु०/ 4200-466,
िखनऊः वदनांकः 7 िई, 1975

अर्धसूचना
1 All. C/m, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College, Hapur & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
795

उत्तर प्रदेश शैवक्षक संस्थायें (अक्तस्तय ं के
अपव्यय का वनिारण) अवर्वनयि 1974 (उत्तर
प्रदेश अवर्वनयि संख्या 3. 1975) की र्ारा
2(क) के उपबि ं के अनुसार वशक्षा वनदेशक
(िाध्यविक वशक्षा) वनम्नविक्तखत अवर्काररय ं क
उनके सम्मुख अंवकत कृत्य ं क सम्पावदत करने
के विए प्रावर्कृत करते हैः-

(क) मण्डलीर् उप र्शिा र्नदेशक-
अपने िण्डि के सिस्त बािक वशक्षा संस्थाओं
द्वारा अवर्वनयि की र्ारा 4(4) तथा 5(1) के
अर्ीन प्रस्तुत प्रत्यािेदन। आिेदन प्राप्त करना
तथा उन पर आदेश देना।

(ख)
मण्डलीर्
बार्लका
र्िद्यालर्
र्नरीर्िका- अपने िण्डि के सिस्त बाविक
वशक्षा संस्थाओं से सिस्त अक्तस्तय ं क वििरण
प्राप्त करना तथा अवर्वनयि की र्ारा 4(4) तथा
5(1) के अर्ीन के उनके द्वारा प्रस्तुत प्रत्यािेदन/
आिेदन ं क प्राप्त करना और उन पर आदेश
देना।

(ग) र्जला र्िद्यालर् र्नरीिक- अपने
जनपद की सिस्त बािक ं की वशक्षा संस्थाओं से
अक्तस्तय ं का वििरण प्राप्त करना।

ह० श्याि नारायण िेहर िा

वशक्षा वनदेशक (िाध्यविक वशक्षा)

उत्तर प्रदेश।"

SUBMISSION OF PETITIONERS

5. The submission of Shri Gautam Baghel
is that the said notification deals with the
delegation made under Section 2(a) of the
Uttar Pradesh Educational Institutions
(Prevention of Dissipation of Assets) Act,
1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act,
1974'), and he submits that all the powers
under the Act have not been delegated upon
anyone but delegation of power upon the
Regional Deputy Director of Education is
restricted only to power under Section 4(4)
and 5(1) of the Act, 1974 and insofar as the
District Inspector of Schools is concerned,
the delegation is only to the extent of
obtaining instructions from all Institutions
in the district in relation to "DETAILS OF
ASSETS". Shri Baghel has referred to
Section 8 of the Act, 1974 and submits that
"ASSETS" have been described in a table
contained at the end of the said provision
which reads as follows:-

"संस्था के सिस्त आक्तस्तय ं (Assets) का वििरण

प्रपि (क)

संस्था का नाि......................

वजिा.............................

क्र०
सं०
भूवि
का
प्रकार
बडे
क
क्ष ं
की
सं
ख्या
छ िे
कक्ष ं
की
संख्या
400
िगण
फीि
से कि
के
क्षेिफ
ि िािे
य ग स्ति 5 िें वदखाये गये
किर ं का प्रकार

विंिि
छत
िािे
किर ं
की
संख्या
विन
की
छत
िािे
किर ं
की
संख्या
छप्पर/
छपरै
ि की
छत
िािे
किर ं
की
संख्या
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1. विद्यािय का िुख्य भिन
2. छािािास
3. आिासीय भिन
4. दुकानें
5. अन्य (पशुओं का शेड, ट्यूबिेि तथा सम्बद्ध कक्ष
पुनणव्यिस्था य जना कक्ष आवद)
796 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
भिन वकराये का है
अथिा वनजी
भिन
का
ितणिान
अनुिावनत
िूल्य
िावषणक
आय
यवद क ई ह
विशेष
वििर
ण
9
10
11
12

 प्रबिक के हस्ताक्षर

न ि- भिन का िानवचि संिग्न वकया जाये
वजसिें किर ं ि बरािद ं की नाप ि वकस प्रय ग
िें आ रहा है, अंवकत वकया जाये।

प्रर्ानाचायण के हस्ताक्षर

प्रपि (ख)

क्र०
सं०
भूवि
का
प्रकार
प्ला
ि
नं
०
क्षेिफि
(एकड)
भूवि
ितणिान
अनुिा
वनत
भूवि
वकस
प्रकार
की है
भूवि वकस प्रय ग

कृवष
कृवष के
विए
कृ
वष

ब
िा
ई
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1. सन्दान की भूवि
2. कृवष िगण की भूवि
3. पुनणव्यिस्था य जना की भूवि
4. अन्य भूवि
 (क) विद्यािय भिन से संिग्न
 (ख) बागिानी
 (ग) खेि का िैदान
 (घ) अन्य
िें आ रही
भूवि विद्यािय के नाि
दाक्तखि खाररज ह गई है
अथिा नहीं
भूवि
पर
कक्ष ं
का
वििरण
विशेष वििरण
वकरा
ये पर
वबना
प्रय ग
की
संख्या
िागत

10
11
12
13
14
15

हस्ताक्षर प्रबिक

न ि- (1) भूवि का एक िानवचि वजसिें
च हद्दी ि प्लाि नम्बर का क्षेिफि वदखाया गया
ह , संिग्न वकया जाये।

(2) खसरा ि खतौनी की प्रिावणत
प्रवतविवप भी संिग्न की जाये।

हस्ताक्षर प्रर्ानाचायण"

6. It is, therefore, contended by Shri
Baghel that, even if, the District Inspector
of Schools proceeds to call upon any
Institution to furnish information, such
information cannot go beyond those aspects
which are enumerated in the table, whereas,
in the present case, by the impugned notice,
the petitioner-Institution has been called
upon to furnish details with respect to the
entire immovable properties as well as
amount of compensation received by the
Institution arising out of land acquisition
proceedings, its utilization as well as
deposit in the concerned bank accounts etc.
etc.

GOVERNMENT ORDER DATED
06.06.2023

7. Insofar as the second Government
Order dated 06.06.2023 relied upon by Shri
Upadhyay is concerned, it is contended by
Shri Baghel that the role of District
Inspector of Schools has been defined as
one of the members of a six-member
Committee described in Clause 3(8) of the
said Government Order which should be
read alongwith other sub-clauses and is
meant only for holding proceedings in
relation to utilization of income received by
the Institution and, therefore, even if, the
said Clause is read, the action can be taken
strictly in accordance with law, by a sixmembers Committee and not by the District
Inspector of Schools alone. Shri Baghel has
also referred to 'Annexure 10' to the writ
1 All. C/m, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College, Hapur & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
797
petition which is a copy of the order dated
10.04.2023 passed by this Court in Writ C
No.3867 of 2023 (C/M Rashtriya Kanya
Inter College And Another v. State of U.P.
And 4 Others) and submits that the said
writ petition had arisen out of a notice
dated 31.12.2022 issued by the Joint
Director
of
Education,
Moradabad
Region, Moradabad and the Director of
Education (Secondary), on his personal
appearance, filed his affidavit before this
Court stating that the impugned notice
dated 31.12.2022 had been issued by the
Joint Director in excess of the jurisdiction
conferred by law. The submission is that
taking note of the admission made by the
Director,
this
Court
quashed
the
impugned notice and allowed the writ
petition giving liberty to the Director of
Education to proceed in accordance with
law.

8. He has also placed reliance upon a
decision of Apex Court in the case of
Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v.
Anjum M.H. Ghaswala And Others,
(2002) 1 SCC 633 and submits that the
normal rule of construction is that when a
Statute
vests
certain
power
in
an
authority to be exercised in a particular
manner, the said power has to be
exercised only in the manner provided in
the Statute itself. It is further argued that
the Apex Court in M/s Cannon India
Private Limited v. Commissioner of
Customs, 2021 AIR (SC) 1699 has held
that if notice is issued by the Officer who
does not have any authority of law, the
same is liable to be set aside.

SUBMISSION OF THE STATE

9. Shri Jitendra Singh, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel, on the
other hand, submits that the writ petition
against a notice calling upon certain
information and documents from the
Management of a recognized Institution is
not maintainable and infact the petitioner is
avoiding to furnish the information sought
for whereas under the Scheme of the Act,
1974, such information must come before
the Authorities and, hence, no interference
is warranted.

SUBMISSION OF THE CONTESTING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT

10. Shri Ritesh Upadhyay, learned
counsel for respondent no.4, submits that
Section 2(d) of the Act, 1974 defines the
"PROPERTY" in the following words:-

"2.(d)- 'property', in relation to an
institution,
includes
all
immovable
properties belonging to or endowed wholly
or purely for the benefit of the institution,
including lands, buildings and all other
rights and interests arising out of such
property as may be in the ownership,
possession, power or control of the
Management."

11. The submission is that not only
the immovable properties but also all other
rights and interests arising out of such
property are included in the description of
"property". He further submits that the
"District Inspector of Schools" is also
included in the definition of Director as per
Section 2(a) of the Act, 1974 and,
therefore,
notice
issued
by
District
Inspector of Schools is well within his
competence.

DISCUSSION OF RIVAL
CONTENTIONS

12. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties, the Court finds that certainly
798 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Regional Deputy Director of Education
can exercise the delegated powers under
Sections 4(4) and 5(1) of the Act, 1974,
however, in the present case, there is no
dispute with respect to any power allegedly
exercised by the Regional Deputy Director
of Education. The issue involved here is as
to whether, either under Clause (ग) of the
notification dated 07.05.1975, or under any
power conferred under the Government
Order dated 06.06.2023 or under any
provision of the Act, 1974, the District
Inspector of Schools is competent to issue
notice which has been impugned in the
present writ petition.

13. The interpretation of the word
"ASSETS", as made by Shri Baghel
referable to the Table described at the end
of Section 8 of the Act, 1974 persuades this
Court to minutely examine the said table.
The Court finds that, apart from the main
building
of
the
institution,
hostel,
residential building, shops etc. described in
Format 'क', there are different clauses in
the table in relation to the aspects as to
whether property is rented or any private
property, the current value of the building,
annual income, if any and "special details"
(विशेष वििरण). There is another Format
(ख) just below it which also describes
different nature and categories of land
including agricultural land and other land
and also other details including "special
details" (विशेष वििरण).

OBJECT OF THE ACT, 1974

14. Before arriving at a conclusion, it
is necessary to refer to the OBJECT with
which the Uttar Pradesh Educational
Institutions (Prevention of Dissipation of
Assets) Act, 1974 was promulgated by the
Legislature. The Act begins with the object
"An Act to provide for measures to prevent
the dissipation of assets of Educational
Institutions."

JUDICIAL
PRONOUNCEMENTS
ON PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION

15.

Jurisprudence
of
statutory
interpretation has moved from literal
interpretation to purposive interpretation,
which advances the purpose and object of a
legislation. The Supreme Court in catena of
judgments has dealt with the issue of literal
interpretation
vis-a-vis
purposive
interpretation. The Apex Court, in Central
India Spinning and Weaving Manufacturing
Comp.
versus
Municipal
Committee,
Wardha, AIR 1958 SC 341 has held that it
is a recognised principle of construction
that general words and phrases however
wide and comprehensive they may be in
their literal sense must usually be construed
as being limited to the actual objects of the
Act.

16. The Supreme Court, in Girdhari
Lal & Sons versus Balbir Nath Mathur);
1986(2) SCC 237, has held that the primary
and foremost task of a Court in interpreting
a statute is to ascertain the intention of the
legislature, actual or imputed. Having
ascertained the intention, the Court must
then strive to so interpret the statute as to
promote and advance the object and
purpose of the enactment. For this purpose,
where necessary the Court may even depart
from the rule that plain words should be
interpreted
according
to
their
plain
meaning. There need no meek and mute
submission
to
the
plainness
of
the
language.
To
avoid
patent
injustice,
anomaly
or
absurdity
or
to
avoid
invalidation of a law, the court would be
well justified in departing from the socalled golden rule of construction so as to
1 All. C/m, Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College, Hapur & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
799
give effect to the object and purpose of the
enactment by supplementing the written
word if necessary. It ent to observe that
ascertainment of legislative intent is a basic
rule of statutory construction and that a rule
of construction should be preferred which
advances the purpose and object of a
legislation and that though a construction,
according
to
plain
language,
should
ordinarily be adopted, such a construction
should not be adopted where it leads to
anomalies, injustices, or absurdities, vide
K.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173,
State Bank of Travancore v. Mohd. M.
Khan, (1981) 4 SCC 82, Som Prakash
Rekhi v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 449,
Ravula Subba Rao v. CIT, AIR 1956 SC
604, Govindlal V Agricultural Produce
Market Committee, (1975) 2 SCC 482 and
Babaji Kondaji v. Nasik Merchants Co-op
Bank Ltd. (1984) 2 SCC 50.

17. The Supreme Court, in Utkal
Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. versus
State of Orissa; 1987 (3) SCC 279 has
observed that a statute is best understood if
we know the reason for it. The reason for a
statute
is
the
safest
guide
to
its
interpretation. The words of a statute take
their colour from the reason for it. There
are external and internal aids. The external
aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons
when the Bill is presented to Parliament,
the reports of Committees which preceded
the Bill and the reports of Parliamentary
Committees. Occasional excursions into the
debates of Parliament are permitted.
Internal aids are the Preamble, the scheme
and the provisions of the Act. Having
discovered the reason for the statute and so
having set the sail to the wind, the
interpreter
may
proceed
ahead.
No
provision in the statute and no word of the
statute may be construed in isolation. Every
provision and every word must be looked at
generally before any provision or word is
attempted to be construed. The setting and
the pattern are important. It is again
important to remember that Parliament
does not waste its breath unnecessarily. Just
as Parliament is not expected to use
unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also
not expected to express itself unnecessarily.
Even as Parliament does not use any word
without meaning something, Parliament
does not legislate where no legislation is
called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to
legislate for the sake of legislation; nor can
it be assumed to make pointless legislation.
[See-Eera
(through
Dr.
Manjula
Krippendorf) v. State (NCT of Delhi) and
Anr 2017(15) SCC 133].

18. The more stringent the Law, the
less is the discretion of the Court. Stringent
laws are made for the purpose to achieve its
objectives. This being the intendment of the
legislature, the duty of the court is to see
that the intention of the legislature is not
frustrated. If there is any doubt or
ambiguity in the statutes, the rule of
purposive construction should be taken
recourse to, to achieve the objectives. (See
Swedish Match AB & Anr. Securities &
Exchange Board, India & Anr., (2004) 11
SCC 641.

19. The Apex Court, in Reserve Bank
of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC
424, held that Interpretation must depend
on the text and the context. They are the
bases of interpretation. One may well say if
the text is the texture, context is what gives
the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are
important. That interpretation is best which
makes the textual interpretation match the
contextual. A statute is best interpreted
when we know why it was enacted. With
this knowledge, the statute must be read,
800 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
first as a whole and then section by section,
clause by clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word. If a statute is looked at, in
the context of its enactment, with the
glasses of the statute-maker, provided by
such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take
colour and appear different than when the
statute is looked at without the glasses
provided by the context. With these
glasses we must look at the Act as a
whole and discover what each section,
each clause, each phrase and each word is
meant and designed to say as to fit into
the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a
statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation. Statutes have to be
construed so that every word has a place
and everything is in its place.

20. Same view has been reiterated in
S. Gopal Reddy Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (1996) 4 SCC 596, Prakash
Kumar Alias Prakash Bhutto Vs. State of
Gujarat, (2005) 2 SCC 409, Anwar Hasan
Khan Vs. Mohd. Shafi & Ors. (2001) 8
SCC 540, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Filip
Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277, Reserve Bank
of India v. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424:
(AIR 1987 SC 1023) and N. K. Jain v. C.
K. Shah (1991) 2 SCC 495: (AIR 1991
SC1289)

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

21. Following the cardinal rule of
PURPOSIVE
INTERPRETATION,
as
emphasized by the Supreme Court in the
above-cited authorities, in the considered
opinion of this Court, the word "ASSETS"
mentioned in the table contained in section
8 of the Act, 1974, cannot be read in
isolation, rather, it being part of the Statute,
the definition of "PROPERTY" contained
in Section 2(d) of the Act, 1974 has to be
read simultaneously. The impugned notice
seeks information with respect to the entire
immovable properties of the Institution as
per Point No.1 and remaining point Nos. 2
to 7 are in relation to the compensation
received by the Institution arising out of
land acquisition operations and its deposit
as well as utilization etc. and, in the
considered
opinion
of
the
Court,
compensation received by the petitioner
institution
out
of
land
acquisition
proceedings is certainly covered into
"RIGHTS AND INTERESTS ARISING
OUT OF SUCH PROPERTY" and, hence,
the amount of compensation is certainly
included in the definition of 'PROPERTY'
which is referable and relatable to the
description of "ASSETS" contained in the
Table, if not under Clause 1 to 5 of Format
'क', then definitely under "Special Details"
(विशेष वििरण) and income and also in
Format (ख). In this view of the matter, it
cannot be said that the information sought
by the District Inspector of Schools goes
beyond the aforesaid Table.

22. Insofar as the power of the
District Inspector of Schools to seek any
information is concerned, the Government
Order
dated
06.06.2023
is
quite
comprehensive in nature. Various Clauses
and Sub-clauses of the said Government
Order
are
in
consonance
with
the
provisions of the Act, 1974 and the purpose
which the Act seeks to achieve. Merely
because the District Inspector of Schools
forms part and parcel of a six-member
Committee as per Clause 3(8) of the said
Government Order, as of now, there is no
adjudication made by the said Committee
which includes even the Manager and
Principal of the Institution. The present writ
petition has been filed at the stage where
1 All. Smt. Kalpana Karwariya Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
801
only a notice asking certain information has
been issued by the District Inspector of
Schools.
Even
otherwise,
the
U.P.
Intermediate Education Act, 1921 as well as
the aforesaid Act, 1974 prescribe a well
structured procedure to be followed by the
Director of Education in case violation of
provisions of the Act is found to be
committed by the concerned Management.
No such proceedings have been initiated as
of now and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that the Authority who is not empowered
under the Act, 1974 is proceeding to take
substantive action against the Management.

23. As far as the affidavit filed by the
Director of Education before this Court in
Writ-C No.3867 of 2023 is concerned,
neither the affidavit nor notice dated
31.12.2022 impugned in the said case is
before this Court. Even otherwise, the notice
impugned in the present writ petition has not
been issued by the Joint Director of
Education nor can it be said that it is a notice
under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, 1974. The
power of Director of Education under
Section 4(4) of the Act, 1974 is to pass an
order on representation filed by the
Management against the order under SubSection (2) of Section 4 of the Act, 1974 or
upon application for sanction being made to
him under Sub-Section (3) and upon
consideration
of
such
matters
and
"information" as he may consider necessary.
It is not a stage when any action has been
taken under Sub-Section (2) of Section 4 nor
has an application for sanction under SubSection (3) of Section 4 been considered.
Therefore, this Court is of the view that no
action under Section 4 has yet commenced
and the information asked by the District
Inspector of Schools is well within his
competence. Further Writ-C No.3867 of
2023 was decided on 10.04.2023 when the
Government Order dated 06.06.2023 had not
even come into existence and, therefore, this
Court had no occasion to deal with the
competence of the District Inspector of
Schools as per the said Government Order.
Further, the competence of an officer issuing
a notice has to be seen as per statutory
provisions as well as under the sub-ordinate
legislation contained in a Govt. Order etc
and it cannot depend solely upon a stand
taken in an affidavit, as an administrative
power cannot be treated as vested or
divested or conferred merely by an
admission made by an Officer in an affidavit
or otherwise.

24. For all the aforesaid reasons, the
impugned notice is found to be within
jurisdiction and, therefore, the challenge
made to it does not fall within any of the
exceptions under which Writ Jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India can be exercised against a notice.

25. The writ petition fails and is,
accordingly, dismissed.
----------
(2024) 1 ILRA 801
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.12.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.
THE HON'BLE MANOJ BAJAJ, J.

Writ-C No. 28355 of 2021

Smt. Kalpana Karwariya ...Petitioner
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Suraj Singh, Sri Mukesh Prasad (Sr.
Advocate)

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri A.K. Singh