# C/M Narpati Singh Inter College Hardoi v. Vipin Kumar & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 9 ILRA 686
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-09-02
- **Case number:** Writ A No.182 of 2021
- **Bench:** Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, Shree Prakash Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/c-m-narpati-singh-inter-college-hardoi-v-vipin-kumar-ors-49103
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Appointment - Arrears
of Salary - Regulations framed under
U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 -
Regulation 101 of Chapter III - There is
a
prohibition
for
the
appointing
authority to fill up any vacancy on a
non-teaching
post
without
prior
approval of the District Inspector of
Schools. The appointing authority, in fact,
has been injuncted by the said provisions not
to fill up any vacancy on a non-teaching post
except with the prior approval of the District
Inspector of Schools. The said provision
simply construed would mean that before
issuing appointment order, approval of the
District Inspector of
Schools (DIOS) is
needed. (Para 13)

Recruitment to a class IV post in a recognized
aided institution in the State of U.P. is
governed by Regulation 101 of Chapter III of
the
Regulations
framed
under
U.P.
Intermediate
Education
Act.
The
said
Regulations having been framed under
the aforesaid Act are statutory in nature
and
hence,
binding.
Any
process
of
appointment in deviation of such statutory
provisions cannot be justified and will in fact
not confer any right on any such person, of
either being appointed or continued or paid
salary of the post concerned. (Para 11, 15)

In the entire writ petition, no document or
any other material has been annexed whereby
it can be inferred that before issuance of
appointment order, any prior approval to the
selection/appointment of the respondent Nos.
1 and 2 was accorded by the DIOS. (Para 10,
17)

B. No finding has been returned in the
judgment
under
appeal,
passed
by
learned
Single
Judge
about
noncompliance/compliance of the statutory
provisions of Regulation 101. (Para 20)

At the time of filing of writ petition learned
Single Judge had passed the interim order on
23.09.2002 directing therein the respondents
in the writ petition shall pay the salary to
respondent Nos. 1 and 2-petitioners and
further that they shall be allowed to continue
till the next date of listing. (Para 18)

C. There lies a difference between
permission/approval
required
for
initiating the process of recruitment/
appointment/selection
and
prior
approval required for appointment. In
the first case, approval shall precede the
selection process whereas in the second case
the approval has to follow the selection
process, that is say, prior approval is needed
before issuance of the appointment order or
before actual appointment is made. (Para 21)

The DIOS passed the order on 19.07.2010 for
ensuring compliance of the interim order passed
by learned Single Judge on 14.09.2009 coupled
with the earlier interim order dated 23.09.2002.
In compliance of the said order, the DIOS
accorded his approval to the appointment of
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 against the vacancies
which
had
occurred
on
account
of
superannuation of earlier regular class IV
employees, namely, Sunder Lal and Sarwan Lal
(on 31.08.2006 and 31.08.2009, respectively).
Thus, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 will be entitled
9 All. C/M Narpati Singh Inter College Hardoi Vs. Vipin Kumar & Ors.
687
to salary and all other service related benefits
with effect from the said date i.e. with effect
from 19.07.2010 and not from any prior date.
(Para 19, 24)

Therefore, the judgment and order passed by
learned Single Judge dated 08.01.2020 passed
in WP No. 5223 (S/S) of 2002 is modified by
providing that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall be
entitled to payment of salary with effect from
19.07.2010 i.e. w.e.f. date the DIOS accorded
his approval to their appointment. They shall
also be entitled to all service benefits only w.e.f.
19.07.2010 and not with effect from any
retrospective date. (Para 25)

D. Words and Phrases - 'prior approval' -
Prior approval for appointment as required by
Regulation 101 as quoted above, connotes a
different meaning and it covers a different
exigency. Such prior approval is required to be
obtained from the DIOS before the appointment
order is issued, meaning thereby before
selected person is actually appointed. Such prior
a

## Text

686 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 686
APPALLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DEVENDRA KUMAR
UPADHYAYA, J.
THE HON'BLE SHREE PRAKASH SINGH, J.

Writ A No.182 of 2021

C/M Narpati Singh Inter College Hardoi
 ...Appellant
Versus
Vipin Kumar & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
SriSantosh Kr. Yadav Warsi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Amit Kumar Gupta,Sri Surendra
Pratap Singh

A. Service Law - Appointment - Arrears
of Salary - Regulations framed under
U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 -
Regulation 101 of Chapter III - There is
a
prohibition
for
the
appointing
authority to fill up any vacancy on a
non-teaching
post
without
prior
approval of the District Inspector of
Schools. The appointing authority, in fact,
has been injuncted by the said provisions not
to fill up any vacancy on a non-teaching post
except with the prior approval of the District
Inspector of Schools. The said provision
simply construed would mean that before
issuing appointment order, approval of the
District Inspector of
Schools (DIOS) is
needed. (Para 13)

Recruitment to a class IV post in a recognized
aided institution in the State of U.P. is
governed by Regulation 101 of Chapter III of
the
Regulations
framed
under
U.P.
Intermediate
Education
Act.
The
said
Regulations having been framed under
the aforesaid Act are statutory in nature
and
hence,
binding.
Any
process
of
appointment in deviation of such statutory
provisions cannot be justified and will in fact
not confer any right on any such person, of
either being appointed or continued or paid
salary of the post concerned. (Para 11, 15)

In the entire writ petition, no document or
any other material has been annexed whereby
it can be inferred that before issuance of
appointment order, any prior approval to the
selection/appointment of the respondent Nos.
1 and 2 was accorded by the DIOS. (Para 10,
17)

B. No finding has been returned in the
judgment
under
appeal,
passed
by
learned
Single
Judge
about
noncompliance/compliance of the statutory
provisions of Regulation 101. (Para 20)

At the time of filing of writ petition learned
Single Judge had passed the interim order on
23.09.2002 directing therein the respondents
in the writ petition shall pay the salary to
respondent Nos. 1 and 2-petitioners and
further that they shall be allowed to continue
till the next date of listing. (Para 18)

C. There lies a difference between
permission/approval
required
for
initiating the process of recruitment/
appointment/selection
and
prior
approval required for appointment. In
the first case, approval shall precede the
selection process whereas in the second case
the approval has to follow the selection
process, that is say, prior approval is needed
before issuance of the appointment order or
before actual appointment is made. (Para 21)

The DIOS passed the order on 19.07.2010 for
ensuring compliance of the interim order passed
by learned Single Judge on 14.09.2009 coupled
with the earlier interim order dated 23.09.2002.
In compliance of the said order, the DIOS
accorded his approval to the appointment of
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 against the vacancies
which
had
occurred
on
account
of
superannuation of earlier regular class IV
employees, namely, Sunder Lal and Sarwan Lal
(on 31.08.2006 and 31.08.2009, respectively).
Thus, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 will be entitled
9 All. C/M Narpati Singh Inter College Hardoi Vs. Vipin Kumar & Ors.
687
to salary and all other service related benefits
with effect from the said date i.e. with effect
from 19.07.2010 and not from any prior date.
(Para 19, 24)

Therefore, the judgment and order passed by
learned Single Judge dated 08.01.2020 passed
in WP No. 5223 (S/S) of 2002 is modified by
providing that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall be
entitled to payment of salary with effect from
19.07.2010 i.e. w.e.f. date the DIOS accorded
his approval to their appointment. They shall
also be entitled to all service benefits only w.e.f.
19.07.2010 and not with effect from any
retrospective date. (Para 25)

D. Words and Phrases - 'prior approval' -
Prior approval for appointment as required by
Regulation 101 as quoted above, connotes a
different meaning and it covers a different
exigency. Such prior approval is required to be
obtained from the DIOS before the appointment
order is issued, meaning thereby before
selected person is actually appointed. Such prior
approval
follows
completion
of
appointment/recruitment/selection
process.
(Para 16)

Special appeal disposed off. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Dhruv Kumar Pandey & anr. Vs St. of U.P. &
ors., 2020 (4) ADJ 599 (Para 21)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Preet Kumar Srivastava Vs St. of U.P. thru'
Secondary Edu. & others, 2011 (9) ADJ 591
(Para 6)

2.
Kunda
Motiram
Bodalkar
Vs
Swami
Vivemanand Shikshan Sanstha & ors., (2010) 6
SCC 712 (Para 6)

Present special appeal assails judgment
and order dated 08.01.2020, passed by
learned Single Judge in Writ Petition
No.5223 (S/S) of 2002.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Devendra Kumar
Upadhyaya, J.
&
Hon'ble Shree Prakash Singh, J.)

(Order on application for Condonation of
Delay)

1. Having heard learned counsel for
respective parties and having gone through
the contents of the affidavit filed in support
of the application seeking condonation of
delay, we are satisfied that delay has
sufficiently been explained.

2. Accordingly, application is allowed
and the delay in preferring the special
appeal is hereby condoned.

(Order on memo of appeal)

3. Heard Sri Santosh Kumar Yadav
"Warsi"
learned counsel
for
appellantCommittee of Management of the Institution
in question, Sri Surendra Pratap Singh, learned
counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2, and
learned Standing Counsel for the Staterespondents.

4. Under challenge in this intra-court
appeal filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the
Rules is the judgment and order dated
08.01.2020 passed by learned Single Judge in
Writ Petition No.5223 (S/S) of 2002 whereby
learned Single Judge has directed that
appointment of respondent nos.1 and 2petitioners shall be treated to have been
approved and further that they shall be given
arrears of their salary with effect from the date
they were given appointment. Learned Single
Judge has also observed that all consequential
benefits of seniority and promotion shall also
be extended to respondent nos.1 and 2 from
the date of their appointment.

5. It has been argued by learned
counsel
for
appellant-Committee
of
688 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Management of the Institution that in
absence of any material to arrive at a
conclusion that the very initial appointment
of respondent nos.1 and 2-petitioners was
made in conformity with the statutory
requirement of the then existing Regulation
101 of Chapter III of Regulations framed
under U.P. Intermediate Education Act,
1921, the directions issued by learned
Single Judge in the judgment and order
under appeal are erroneous. He has further
argued that non-fulfillment of statutory
requirement in the matter of appointment
where payment of salary of the incumbent
is charged with the State Exchequer, has to
be necessarily in conformity with the Rules
regulating the conditions of service which
will include the recruitment. In this view,
submission is that since the very initial
appointment of respondent nos.1 and 2 was
not lawful, hence the directions issued by
learned Single Judge cannot be permitted to
be sustained.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel
for respondent nos.1 and 2 has submitted that
there is no error in the judgment rendered by
learned Single Judge for the reason that the
same is based on pronouncement of law
made by this Court in the case of Preet
Kumar Srivastava vs. State of U.P. thru'
Secondary Edu. & others, reported in 2011
(9) ADJ 591. He has further stated that once
this Court passed interim order on 14.09.2009
which was complied with by the District
Inspector of Schools by passing the order
dated
19.07.2010,
prior
approval
of
appointment of respondent nos.1 and 2petitioners will be deemed to have been
accorded. He has also relied in this regard
upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Kunda
Motiram Bodalkar vs. Swami Vivemanand
Shikshan Sanstha and others, reported in
(2010) 6 SCC 712 and has submitted that
once the post is created after sanction by the
competent authority, the permission to fill up
the same is intrinsic in such sanction/creation
of the post. It has, thus, been argued that there
was no illegality so far as the appointment of
respondent nos.1 and 2 is concerned and
accordingly it has been submitted by learned
counsel for respondents that the special
appeal needs to be dismissed.

7. Learned Standing Counsel has also
made his submission and has argued that
requirement of Regulation 101 of Chapter III
of the Regulations as referred to herein above
is a mandatory requirement and in absence of
fulfillment of said statutory requirement, the
very initial appointment of respondent nos.1
and 2-petitioners cannot be said to be lawful.
He has further stated that the order dated
19.07.2010 passed by the District Inspector
of Schools was only to ensure the compliance
of the order dated 14.09.2009 passed by this
Court, however, such compliance, in fact,
was subject to final decision of the writ
petition and thus learned Single Judge has fell
in error in not considering the issue as to
whether the appointment of respondent nos.1
and 2 was in accordance with the provisions
contained in Regulation 101 or not. His
submission is that in fact, since the very
initial appointment of respondent nos.1 and 2
was unlawful, the direction issued by the
learned Single Judge to treat the said
appointment to have been approved, is
erroneous.

8. We have considered the submissions
made by learned counsel representing the
respective parties and have also perused the
records available before us on this special
appeal.

9. The case put up by learned counsel
for respondent nos.1 and 2 before the
learned Single Judge by filing Writ Petition
9 All. C/M Narpati Singh Inter College Hardoi Vs. Vipin Kumar & Ors.
689
No. 5223 (S/S) of 2002 was that they were
appointed on the posts of Orderly and Lab
Assistant which are class IV posts, in the
institution, namely, Narpati Singh Inter
College, Madhoganj, Hardoi. It was also
the case of respondent nos. 1 and 2 before
the
learned
Single
Judge
that
after
following due process, they were appointed
by means of an order dated 20.04.2002,
however, since their appointment was not
being approved and they were not being
paid salary, they instituted writ petition
which has been decided by the learned
Single Judge by means of the judgment and
order which is under appeal before us.

10. In the entire writ petition, no
document or any other material has been
annexed whereby it can be inferred that
before issuance of appointment order, any
prior approval to the selection/appointment
of the respondent nos.1 and 2 was accorded
by the District Inspector of Schools.

11. Recruitment to a class IV post in a
recognized aided institution in the State of
U.P. is governed by Regulation 101 of
Chapter III of the Regulations framed
under U.P. Intermediate Education Act.
The said Regulations having been framed
under the aforesaid Act are statutory in
nature and hence, binding. Any process of
appointment in deviation of such statutory
provisions cannot be justified and will in
fact not confer any right on any such
person, of either being appointed or
continued or paid salary of the post
concerned.

12. Regulation 101 of Chapter III of
the Regulations as it existed at the relevant
point of time is quoted herein:-

101."The appointing authority
shall not fill up any vacancy on a nonteaching staff of a recognized aided
institution
except
with
the
prior
approval of the Inspector".

13. From a perusal of the
aforequoted provisions of Regulation 101,
it is clear that there is a prohibition for the
appointing authority to fill up any vacancy
on a non-teaching post without prior
approval of the District Inspector of
Schools. The appointing authority, in fact,
has been injuncted by the said provisions
not to fill up any vacancy on a nonteaching post except with the prior
approval of the District Inspector of
Schools.
The
said
provision
simply
construed would mean that before issuing
appointment order, approval of the District
Inspector of Schools is needed.

14. In case any vacancy against a
non-teaching
post
in
a
recognized
institution occurs, since the Principal is the
appointing authority against a class IV
posts, he needs to initiate the selection
process in conformity with the Regulations.
The said Regulations which existed at the
relevant point of time in this case did not
require the appointing authority to seek any
permission or approval for initiating the
process
of
recruitment/selection/appointment,
meaning thereby on occurrence of vacancy
against a class IV posts, the Principal could
have initiated the process of recruitment by
advertising the post, inviting applications
etc. and could have proceeded with the
selection. The only requirement under
Regulation 101 is that before making
appointment, approval of the District
Inspector of Schools is required.

15. We may indicate at this juncture
that there is a rationale for seeking prior
approval of appointment from the District
690 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Inspector of Schools. While the District
Inspector of Schools accords his prior
approval for appointment against any class
IV post in a recognized institution, he is
supposed to examine the relevant factors
like existence of vacancy, application of
rule
of
reservation,
whether
person
proposed to be appointed possessed the
requisite qualification, whether process of
selection has been fair and all other
relevant factors. It is also to be noticed that
in the State of U.P. in a recognized
government aided institution there is a
provision for making appointment on
compassionate grounds on the death of an
employee working in the institution and as
per the said provision in case no vacancy in
the
institution
where
the
deceased
employee used to work exists, it is the
District Inspector of Schools who has to
explore
the
possibility
of
making
compassionate appointment of one member
of the family of the deceased employee in
any other institution. Thus, the provision
for prior approval to be accorded by the
District
Inspector
of
Schools
for
appointment has the purpose and in case no
prior approval from the District Inspector
of Schools is obtained or accorded, the
same in our considered opinion, will vitiate
the appointment.

16. We have come across various
cases where we have found that in the
minds of the authorities, management of
the institutions and all other concerned
there exists a confusion regarding prior
approval or permission for initiating the
process
of
appointment
and
prior
approval for appointment. There may be a
situation where requirement as given in
the Regulations/ Rules may be for
seeking prior approval or permission of
the authority concerned for initiating the
very
process
of
appointment/
selection/recruitment. This would mean
that
once
a
vacancy
occurs,
the
appropriate authority concerned needs to
be
approached
seeking
its
approval/permission to initiate the very
process
of
recruitment/appointment/selection.
This
prior approval precedes the initiation of
process of selection/appointment etc.
However, prior approval for appointment
as required by Regulation 101 as quoted
above, connotes a different meaning and
it covers a different exigency. Such prior
approval is required to be obtained from
the District Inspector of Schools before
the appointment order is issued, meaning
thereby before selected person is actually
appointed. Such prior approval follows
completion
of
appointment/recruitment/selection
process.

17. In the instant case, as already
noticed above, there is no material to
show
that
prior
approval
as
per
requirement of Regulation 101 was
accorded by the District Inspector of
Schools to the alleged appointment of
respondent nos.1 and 2.

18. Having observed as above, we
may also notice that at the time of filing of
writ petition learned Single Judge had
passed the interim order on 23.09.2002
directing therein the respondents in the writ
petition shall pay the salary to respondent
nos.1 and 2-petitioners and further that they
shall be allowed to continue till the next
date of listing. However, pursuant to the
said order dated 23.09.2002 they were not
paid salary and subsequently learned Single
Judge passed another interim order on
14.09.2009 expressing his expectation that
the respondents in the writ petition shall
ensure compliance of the earlier order
9 All. C/M Narpati Singh Inter College Hardoi Vs. Vipin Kumar & Ors.
691
dated 23.09.2002 as during last seven years
some vacancies might have arisen on
account
of
death/resignation/retirement/
promotion of the employee.

19. In compliance of the said order
dated 14.09.2009, an order has been passed
by the District Inspector of Schools on
19.07.2010 wherein he has accorded his
approval to the appointment of respondent
nos.1
and
2-petitioners
against
the
vacancies which had occurred on account
of retirement of the regular incumbents,
namely, Sunder Lal and Sarwan Lal, who
are said to have retired on 31.08.2006 and
31.08.2009, respectively.

20. When we peruse the judgment
under appeal passed by learned Single
Judge, what we find is that no finding has
been returned in the said judgment about
non-compliance/compliance
of
the
statutory provisions of Regulation 101.
Learned Single Judge has relied upon a
judgment in the case of Preet Kumar
Srivastava (supra). However, when we
peruse the said judgment, we are of the
considered opinion that the said judgment
in the case of Preet Kumar Srivastava does
not have any application to the facts of the
present case and the same does not come to
the rescue of respondent nos.1 and 2 for the
reason that the said judgment deals with the
approval/permission required for filling up
the vacancies, as already clarified above.

21. The view taken by us is supported
by a Division Bench judgment rendered by
this Court in the case of Dhruv Kumar
Pandey and another vs. State of U.P. and
others, reported in 2020 (4) ADJ 599.
There
lies
a
difference
between
permission/approval required for initiating
the process of recruitment/appointment/
selection and prior approval required for
appointment. In the first case, approval
shall precede the selection process whereas
in the second case the approval has to
follow the selection process, that is say,
prior approval is needed before issuance of
the appointment order or before actual
appointment is made. Thus, we are of the
opinion that reliance placed by learned
Single Judge in the case of Preet Kumar
Srivastava (supra) is misplaced.

22. So far as the judgment cited by Sri
Surendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for
respondent nos.1 and 2-petitioners in the
case of Kunda Motiram Bodalkar (supra)
is concerned, we may observe that the same
also does not have any application to the
facts of the present case for two reasons;
firstly the said judgment has been rendered
in the facts of the case, and secondly, the
said judgment does not discuss any such
provision akin to the provisions contained
in Regulation 101.

23. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, in our opinion, the judgment
and order dated 08.01.2020 passed by
learned Single Judge cannot be permitted to
be sustained as it is.

24. Having noticed the aforesaid facts
and legal position, we may also note that the
District Inspector of Schools passed the order
on 19.07.2010 for ensuring compliance of the
interim order passed by learned Single Judge
on 14.09.2009 coupled with the earlier
interim
order
dated
23.09.2002.
In
compliance of the said order, the District
Inspector of Schools accorded his approval to
the appointment of respondent nos.1 and 2
against the vacancies which had occurred on
account of superannuation of earlier regular
class IV employees, namely, Sunder Lal and
Sarwan Lal. Thus, in our opinion respondent
nos.1 and 2 will be entitled to salary and all
692 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
other service related benefits with effect from
the said date i.e. with effect from 19.07.2010
and not from any prior date.

25. Accordingly, in view of the
aforesaid discussions made, we modify the
judgment and order passed by learned Single
Judge dated 08.01.2020 passed in Writ
Petition No.5223 (S/S) of 2002 by providing
that respondent nos.1 and 2 shall be entitled
to payment of salary with effect from
19.07.2010 i.e. w.e.f. date the District
Inspector of Schools accorded his approval to
their appointment. They shall also be entitled
to all service benefits only w.e.f. 19.07.2010
and not with effect from any retrospective
date. The judgment and order dated
08.01.2020 passed by learned Single Judge is
modified to the aforesaid extent.

26. The special appeal is disposed of in
the aforesaid terms.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 692
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DEVENDRA KUMAR
UPADHYAYA, J.
THE HON'BLE SHREE PRAKASH SINGH, J.

Special Appeal No.387 of 2022

Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Awadh University
& Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Lalta Prasad Misra, Sri Atul Chander
Dwivedi, Sri Prafulla Tiwari

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Pt. S. Chandra, Sri Sanjay Kumar
Singh

A. Civil Law - U.P. State Universities Act,
1973 - Issue - Whether the University has
the statutory power to debar a college
from acting as an examination center -
Held - Section 29 (2) of the Act empowers
the Examination Committee to supervise
generally
all
examinations
of
the
University & perform various functions as
given in its sub-clauses (a) to (d),
however
functions
assigned
to
the
Examination Committee in Sub-clauses (a)
to (d) of Section 29 (2) of the Act are not
exhaustive - the word 'generally' in S. 29
(2) empowers the Examination Committee
to take all possible actions and steps
which are necessary and required for
supervising
all
examinations
of
the
University - S. 29 madates the University
to ensure fairness in the examinations at
the examination centres - Further Subclause (xvii) of Section 21(1) gives ample
and all encompassing powers to the
Executive Council, the principal executive
body of the University, to regulate and
determine all matters concerning the
Institutes
including
affiliated
and
associated colleges etc - If mass copying
is reported at an examination center, it
becomes
the
statutory
duty
of
the
Examination Committee under Section 29
to debar the college from acting as an
examination center (Para 20, 21, 22 )

B. Civil Law - Administrative Law -
Government order - any Government
Order issued by the State Government has
to be read only in addition to the statutory
authority
or
power

vested
in
the
authorities of the University and not in
derogation
of
the
said
powers
and
authority available to the University under
the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 -
Court declined to accept the argument
that As per Government Order dated
03.01.2020,
it
is
only
the
State
Government,
which
possesses
the
authority to pass an order of debarring
and
not
the
University
authorities