# C/M Ram Bharose Maikulal Inter College, Lko v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 4 ILRA 99
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-04-30
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 2603 of 2025
- **Bench:** Rajesh Singh Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/c-m-ram-bharose-maikulal-inter-college-lko-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54605
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Civil Law - U.P. Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 - Section 16-G - By order dated
11.02.2025
DIOS
disapproved
suspension order dated 04.01.2025
issued against opposite party no. 5 -
As per law, suspension order remains
valid for a maximum of 60 days unless
approved by DIOS within that period -
In instant case, opposite party no. 5
was suspended on 04.01.2025 - On
09.01.2025, DIOS directed that he
continue to function as Officiating
Principal during suspension, pending a
decision - No provision under relevant
Act, 2021, allowing suspended teacher
to
perform
official
duties
during
suspension - Order dated 09.01.2025
passed in violation of legal provisions -
Petitioner objected to order dated
09.01.2025 by filing representation on
11.01.2025 - DIOS withdrew said order
on 20.01.2025 - Impugned order shows
opposite party no. 5 was heard, but no
such
opportunity
was
given
to
petitioner, matter remanded to pass
fresh order, after providing opportunity
of hearing to concerned parties. (Para 2,
7, 8, 12, 13)

Petition allowed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

4 All. C/M Ram Bharose Maikulal Inter College Lko. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
99
Serial No.55 of Appendix-A of
the Regulations, which is also relevant to
be considered, prescribed that out of four
subjects i.e. History, Political Science,
Geography and Economics, an Assistant
Teacher (Social Science), L.T. Grade
must possess B.A. Degree with two
subjects out of the aforesaid four
subjects. However, the record shows that
petitioner has only possessed the B.A.
Degree with Economics out of the
aforesaid
four
subjects.
Thus,
the
petitioner was not essentially qualified to
be appointed as Assistant Teacher (Social
Science), L.T. Grade and there is no error
apparent in the action of the opposite
parties for not allowing the petitioner to
work or to pay salary to him.

10. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, I find no good ground to
interfere
in
the
writ
petition
while
exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

11. Writ petition is devoid of merit.
It is accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 99
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 30.04.2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.

Writ A No. 2603 of 2025

C/M Ram Bharose Maikulal Inter College,
Lko. ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Mahendra Bahadur Singh, Vikas Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Hari Prasad Gupta, Hari Ram Gupta

Civil Law - U.P. Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 - Section 16-G - By order dated
11.02.2025
DIOS
disapproved
suspension order dated 04.01.2025
issued against opposite party no. 5 -
As per law, suspension order remains
valid for a maximum of 60 days unless
approved by DIOS within that period -
In instant case, opposite party no. 5
was suspended on 04.01.2025 - On
09.01.2025, DIOS directed that he
continue to function as Officiating
Principal during suspension, pending a
decision - No provision under relevant
Act, 2021, allowing suspended teacher
to
perform
official
duties
during
suspension - Order dated 09.01.2025
passed in violation of legal provisions -
Petitioner objected to order dated
09.01.2025 by filing representation on
11.01.2025 - DIOS withdrew said order
on 20.01.2025 - Impugned order shows
opposite party no. 5 was heard, but no
such
opportunity
was
given
to
petitioner, matter remanded to pass
fresh order, after providing opportunity
of hearing to concerned parties. (Para 2,
7, 8, 12, 13)

Petition allowed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Satya Pal Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2006
SCC OnLine All 602, (Para 12)

2. Committee of Management, Maharajganj
Inter College & anr. Vs District Inspector of
Schools, Maharajganj & anr., 1999, SCC
OnLine All 693, (Para 4)

3. C/M of Janta Inter College & anr. Vs St. of
U.P. & ors., Writ-A No.909 of 2020, order
dated 06.05.2020, (Para 20)

4. Committee of Management, D.P.S.N. Inter
College, Kanpur & anr. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
2018 (2) ADJ 840

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Singh
Chauhan, J.)
100 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1. Heard Sri M.B. Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner, Sri Vivek
Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel for opposite party nos. 1, 2, 3 and
6 and Sri H.P. Gupta, learned counsel for
the opposite party no. 5.

2. Application for dismissal of the
writ petition filed by Sri Hari Prasad Gupta,
learned counsel for the opposite party no. 5
and application for taking short rejoinder
affidavit filed by Sri Vikas Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner is taken on
record.

3. Since, DIOS has been impleaded
by name as opposite party no. 4, and no
notice was issued to him, therefore, no one
has appeared on behalf of opposite party
no. 4, though, in the present writ petition
malafide has been alleged against the
opposite party no. 4 vide paragraph no. 29
but without adverting to those allegations
of malafide, I am testing the impugned
order only in the light of Section 16-G of
the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921
(hereinafter referred as 'Act, 1921') and
also in the light of the judgements rendered
by this court interpreting the relevant
provisions of Section 16-G of the Act 1921.
By means of impugned order dated
11.02.2025, the DIOS, Lucknow has
disapproved the suspension order dated
04.01.2025 passed against the opposite
party no. 5. The relevant provision for the
controversy in question would be subSection 7 and 8 of Section 16- G of the Act,
1921, which reads as under:-

 "(7) No such order of suspension
shall, unless approved in writing by the
Inspector, remain in force more than sixty
days form the date of commencement of the
Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1975, or as the case may
be, from the date of such order, and the
order of the Inspector shall be final and
shall not be questioned in any Court.

(8) If, at any time, the Inspector is
satisfied that disciplinary proceedings
against the Head of Institution or teacher
are being delayed, for no fault of the Head
of Institution or the teacher, the Inspector
may, after affording opportunity to the
Management
to
make
representation
revoke an order of suspension passed
under this section."

4.
The
decisions
of
the
constitutional Courts clearly mandate that if
any Teacher or Head of the institution, as
the case may be, has been placed under
suspension, it shall be approved or
disapproved by the DIOS within time
frame and if the suspension order is
disapproved, an opportunity of hearing
should be given to the Committee of
Management and the charged employee,
failing which that disapproval order would
vitiate. This Court in para 12 in re:- Satya
Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others,
2006 SCC OnLine All 602 has observed as
under:-

"12. Under Clause (5) of section
16-G, the Committee of Management could
suspend a teacher or a Head of the
Institution on certain grounds mentioned
therein. The order was forwarded under
Clause
(6)
along
with
the
papers
prescribed
under
Regulation
39
of
Chapter-III. These papers were required to
be considered and the Inspector was
required to apply his mind and was
required to give the reasons while
according approval or disapproval of the
suspension order. In the present case, no
reasons have been recorded and, therefore,
it is clear, that the Inspector did not apply
his mind to the facts and the circumstances
4 All. C/M Ram Bharose Maikulal Inter College Lko. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
101
of the case. There is another aspect of the
matter. The Committee of Management
while issuing the suspension order is not
required to given an opportunity of hearing
to the teacher or the head of the institution.
Therefore, at the stage when the order of
suspension is being approved and the
Inspector is required to apply his mind, it is
at that stage, a bare minimum opportunity
of hearing is required to be given to the
suspended teacher or the Principal, as the
case may be. This is the bare minimum
requirement of the principles of natural
justice, which is required to be given at that
time, by the Inspector, while approving or
disapproving the suspension order. This is
on account of the fact, that the papers
forwarded
by
the
Committee
of
Management under Regulation 39 of
Chapter III may contain the reasons, which
are only one sided. The other side of the
coin should also be considered and that is
when the suspended teacher or the
Principal would come into the picture.
Consequently, in the opinion of the Court,
the Inspector is also required to give an
opportunity of hearing and hear the version
of the suspended teacher or the principal
before approving or disapproving the order
of suspension. In the present case, no
opportunity of hearing was provided to the
petitioner."

5. Division Bench of this Court in
para 4 in re:- Committee of Management,
Maharajganj Inter College and another
Vs.
District
Inspector
of
Schools,
Maharajganj and another, 1999, SCC
OnLine All 693 has observed as under:-

"4. Having heard learned counsel
for the parties, we are of the view that the
order passed by the District Inspector of
Schools cannot be sustained in law. A
Division Bench of this Court in Committee
of Management S.M.R.K. Inter College v.
District Inspector of Schools, Ballia, has
clearly held that order approving or
disapproving resolution of Committee of
Management to suspend Principal or
teacher must contain reasons and further
that absence of reasons would vitiate the
order. Admittedly, the District Inspector of
Schools did not address himself to relevant
papers forwarded alongwith the letter
seeking approval of the suspension and
declined
to
accord
approval
on
consideration of the representation made
by the respondent-teacher. Section 16-G(5)
of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act,
1921 provides that no head of institution or
teacher
shall
be
suspended
by
the
Management, unless in the opinion of the
Management-(a) the charges against him
are serious enough to merit his dismissal or
removal or reduction in rank; or (b) his
continuance in office is likely to hamper or
prejudice the conduct of the disciplinary
proceedings against him; or (c) any
criminal case for an offence involving
criminal turpitude against him is under
investigation, inquiry or trial. Sub-section
(6) requires that where any head of the
institution or teacher is suspended by the
Committee of Management, it shall be
reported to the Inspector within a period
stipulated therein and it further provides
that
the
report
shall
contain
such
particulars as may be prescribed and be
accompanied by all relevant documents.
Regulation 39 of Chapter III of the Act
provides the particulars, which the report
regarding suspension of the head of
institution or of the teacher to be submitted
to the Inspector is to contain and also
provides the documents, which are to
accompany the report. Sub-section (7) of
Section 16 clearly provides that no order of
suspension shall, unless approved in
writing by the Inspector, remain in force
102 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
for more than 60 days. Section 16-G
empowers the District Inspector of Schools
to revoke an order of suspension after
affording opportunity to the management in
case he is satisfied that the disciplinary
proceedings against the head of the
institution or the teacher are being delayed
for no fault of the concerned teacher. These
provisions
clearly
demonstrate
that
approval or disapproval of suspension of a
teacher including the Principal is not an
empty formality. The Inspector is required
to address himself to the grounds on which
the order of suspension is founded as also
the documents,
if
any,
prima
facie
supporting the charges levelled against the
Head of the Institution or the teacher, as
the case may be. In case the charges of the
nature referred to in sub-section (5) of
Section 16-G are prima facie supported by
evidence then in that event the Inspector
can not withhold approval. On the other
hand in case the charges are of trivial
nature and are not covered by the charges
mentioned in sub-section (5) of Section 16G and/or there are no prima facie
documents or material in support of the
charges then the Inspector may disapprove
of the suspension of the Principal or the
teacher as the case may be. In the instant
case the District Inspector of Schools
appears to have failed to discharge his
statutory duty and given no reasons in
support of the order. In the circumstances,
therefore, the order passed by the District
Inspector of Schools was liable to be
quashed and the learned Single Judge
erred in law in dismissing the writ petition.
In fact the question was not examined by
the learned Single Judge in the above
perspective and instead the learned Single
Judge dismissed the writ petition holding
that while considering the approval or
disapproval
of
suspension
order
no
opportunity of hearing was required to be
given by the District Inspector of Schools.
It is true that a Division Bench of this
Court has held in the case of Managing
Committee, Dayanand Inter College v.
District Inspector of Schools, that at the
stage of approval or disapproval of the
suspension order the Inspector is not
required to afford any opportunity of
hearing to the management and that he is
only to consider the relevant material
referred to in Regulation No. 39 of Chapter
III of the Regulations. The said decision, in
our opinion, is of no avail. In the instant
case, however, as pointed out above, the
District Inspector of Schools did not
address himself to the charges and the
relevant documents and disapproved the
suspension order on the basis of the
representation
made
by
the
teacher
concerned. If the suspension is to be
disapproved on consideration of any defect
pointed out by the concerned teacher by
means of a representation, opportunity has
to be afforded to the Management before
disapproving of the suspension on any such
defect in the proceedings."

6. This Court in re:- C/M of Janta
Inter College and Another Vs. State of
U.P. and 3 Others, Writ-A No.909 of
2020, vide judgment and order dated
06.05.2020 in para 20 observed as under:-

 "20. Scope of consideration under
Section 16G(7) read with Regulation 39 is
very limited as has also been explained in
the case of Ram Autar Verma (supra).
Thus, a conjoint reading of the afore-noted
four judgments reveal that if all the
required papers and informations as
prescribed under sub-section (7) of Section
16G of the Act, 1921 and Regulation 39
have been submitted by the Management to
the District Inspector of Schools to obtain
approval of suspension, then opportunity of
4 All. C/M Ram Bharose Maikulal Inter College Lko. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
103
hearing at the stage of granting approval
or disapproval is not required to be
afforded to the Management or the
employee. But if the employee has
submitted any representation or objection
against the order of suspension, then the
District Inspector of Schools shall afford
an
opportunity
of
hearing
to
the
Management and the concerned employee
while passing the order of approval or
disapproval which must contain brief
reasons. This view is further supported by
the provisions of sub-Section (8) of Section
16G, which specifically provides for an
opportunity of hearing at the subsequent
stage to the Management by the District
Inspector of Schools while considering to
revoke an order of suspension passed
under sub-section (7) when the Inspector is
satisfied that the disciplinary proceedings
against the head of the Institution or
teacher, is being delayed for no fault of the
head of the Institution or the teacher."

7.
Perusal
of
the
aforesaid
provisions and case laws makes it crystal
clear that the life of the suspension order
would be maximum 60 days unless it is
approved by the DIOS within a period of
60 days. However, in the present case, the
opposite party no. 5 was kept under
suspension on 04.01.2025, but the DIOS
has passed an order dated 09.01.2025
(Annexure No. 8), directing the petitioner
to permit the opposite party no. 5 to
discharge his duties as Officiating Principal
during the period of suspension until the
decision is taken on his suspension order.
There is no provision under Section 16-G
of the Act, 2021 to permit any suspended
Teacher or Head of the Institution to
discharge his duties as Officiating Principal
during his period of suspension pending
required exercises of approval/disapproval
of the suspension order.
8. Therefore, the order dated
09.01.2025 (supra) has been passed in utter
violation of provisions of the law. Though
the suspension order has been disapproved
by the impugned order dated 11.02.2025
(Annexure No. 1). Notably, against the
order dated 09.01.2025 (Annexure No. 8),
the petitioner preferred a representation on
11.01.2025 (Annexure No. 9), raising
objection on such order and the DIOS
thereafter passed an order dated 20.01.2025
(Annexure No. 10) withdrawing its earlier
order dated 09.01.2025.

9. I am unable to understand or
comprehend as to why the DIOS has passed
the order dated 09.01.2025, whereas, he
was having power under the Act to
disapprove the suspension order, but
without disapproving this suspension order,
he circumvent the provision of law
authorising the opposite party no. 5 to
discharge his duties as Officiating Principal
till any appropriate order is passed
regarding
approval/disapproval
of
the
suspension.
After
the
order
dated
09.01.2025
having
been
passed,
the
suspension order had lost its efficacy for all
practical purposes, though the suspension
order lost its efficacy after passing the
impugned order dated 11.02.2025. There is
a trite law in the light of various
judgements of this Court on the point that if
the suspension order of any Teacher or
Headmaster
of
the
Institution
is
disapproved by the DIOS, an opportunity
of hearing would be given to the
Committee of Management as well as to
the charged Teacher/Head of Institution.
The purpose of this settled provision of law
is that if the order of Committee of
Management suspending any Teacher or
any Headmaster is disapproved, it must be
passed by affording an opportunity of
hearing
so
that
the
Committee
of
104 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Management
could
know
about
the
shortcomings of the suspension order. In
the impugned order dated 11.02.2025,
whereby, the suspension order of opposite
party no. 5 has been disapproved, it has
been indicated that the petitioner appeared
before the DIOS along with charged
employee on 10.02.2025, but what has been
stated by the petitioner before the DIOS
defending suspension order has not been
indicated in the order dated 11.02.2025.
Though this fact has been improved in the
short counter affidavit of the opposite party
no. 6 by submitting that on 10.02.2025, the
petitioner was present before the DIOS, but
he has stated that the matter be placed
before any other DIOS as he has preferred
an application to the Director (Education)
for seeking transfer of the issue placing the
same before any other DIOS levelling
allegations against him.

10.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner has stated that in more or less
similar facts and circumstances, this Court
in Committee of Management, D.P.S.N.
Inter College, Kanpur and Another Vs.
State of U.P. and Others, 2018 (2) ADJ
840 has observed that if the Committee of
Management
approaches
any
higher
authority seeking transfer of the issue
before any other authority to decide the
issue,
the
same
exercises
may
be
undertaken and in that case no decision
should be taken by the DIOS till any
decision is taken by the authority before
whom any application has been preferred.

11. However, at this stage, Sri M.B.
Singh has submitted that since the present
DIOS has not afforded any opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner properly, therefore,
he will not press his request to transfer the
issue before any other authority, but the
issue may be decided a fresh by the same
DIOS
by
affording
him
an
ample
opportunity of hearing.

12.
Having
considered
the
arguments of the learned counsel for the
parties as well as the aforesaid case laws
and having considered the impugned order
dated 11.02.2025, wherein, this fact has not
been
disclosed
as
to
whether
any
opportunity of hearing was provided to the
petitioner before passing the impugned
order
dated
11.02.2025,
and
if the
petitioner
had
denied
to
avail
the
opportunity of hearing by submitting any
other plea, the same fact must have been
indicated and reflected in the impugned
order dated 11.02.2025, I find that the
impugned order has not been properly
issued in terms of Section 16-G of the Act,
1921.
In
the
impugned
order,
the
opportunity of hearing so given to the
employee, i.e., opposite party no. 5 is being
reflected, but no such opportunity is being
reflected so far as the present petitioner is
concerned.

13. Therefore, on the aforesaid
limited grounds, the impugned order dated
11.02.2025 is hereby set aside/quashed,
remanding the same before the DIOS,
Lucknow to pass a fresh order strictly in
accordance
with
law
by
affording
opportunity of hearing to the parties
concerned. The DIOS, after receipt of this
order, may fix any date, providing
opportunity of hearing to the parties within
seven days and any appropriate decision
may be taken approving or disapproving
the suspension order within a further period
of three weeks.

14. It is needless to say that the
parties shall cooperate in the proceedings.
4 All. Simmi Kumari & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
105
15. The writ petition is allowed in
view of the aforesaid terms.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 105
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.04.2025
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

Writ A No. 4118 of 2025

Simmi Kumari & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Rajesh Kumar Dubey

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Anoop Tiwari, Ashutosh Mani
Tripathi, Siddharth Singhal

Civil Law - Life Insurance Corporation of
India (Recruitment of Class-III and ClassIV Staff) Instructions, 1979 - Clause 21 -
Petitioner No.1 is daughter and Petitioner
No.2 is wife of deceased employee, who
died in harness on 19.05.2024 - Petitioner
No.2
applied
for
compassionate
appointment in favour of her daughter,
submitting that her son, employed
with
Punjab
National
Bank,
had
severed ties with family and was living
separately - Both petitioners were
dependants of deceased employee -
Application
Rejected
-
Under
applicable
Rules,
authorities
must
examine whether deceased employee's
gainfully employed son is maintaining
dependants - If he has no connection
with them or fails to provide support,
his
employment
should
not
affect
decision
on
compassionate
appointment
-
Any
contrary
view
defeats purpose of such appointments
- These crucial aspects overlooked in
impugned order - Matter is remitted to
respondent authorities to reconsider
petitioner's claim, taking into account
all relevant factors, including financial
condition of deceased's family. (Para 4, 9,
13)

Petition allowed. (E-13)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot, J.)

1. Heard Shri Rajesh Kumar
Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner,
Shri Ashutosh Mani Tripathi, learned
counsel for the respondent Nos.2 to 3 and
Shri
Anoop
Tiwari,
learned
Central
Counsel for the respondent No.1-Union of
India.

2. By the impugned order dated
18.10.2024 the claim of the petitioner No.1
has been declined. The order dated
18.10.2024 is cryptic and does not disclose
any reasons for invalidating the claim of
the petitioner No.1 for grant of appointment
on compassionate ground.

3. By the impugned order dated
06.12.2024 the application of the petitioner
No.1
for
grant
of
appointment
on
compassionate ground has been rejected
on the footing that the son of the petitioner
No.2 was gainfully employed in a bank.

4. The petitioner No.1 is the
daughter and the petitioner No.2 is the wife
of the deceased-employee respectively who
died in harness on 19.05.2024. The
petitioner No.2 submitted an application for
appointment of her daughter (petitioner
No.1) on compassionate grounds. An
affidavit submitted by the petitioner No.2
in
support
of
the
application
for
appointment on compassionate grounds
asserted that her son was working in the
Punjab National Bank. According to the
said affidavit, after his appointment the son
had severed all connections with the family
and was staying separately. The petitioner