# C/M S.M. National Inter College, Machhati Ghazipur & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 11 ILRA 688
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-09-22
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 5235 of 2021
- **Bench:** Ashwani Kumar Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/c-m-s-m-national-inter-college-machhati-ghazipur-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46631
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Suspension - Payment of
Salary - Intermediate Education Act, 1921 -
Section 16G - It is apparent that power to
place a Head of institution or teacher under
suspension is with the Management and not
the Manager. Unless a resolution is passed by
the
Managing
Committee
an
order
of
suspension cannot be passed. In the present
case, Inspector has admitted that at the time when
he considered the question of approval to the order of
suspension a resolution dated 03.01.2021 of the
Managing Committee had been placed before him.
This resolution will have the effect of ratifying the
decision of Manager to place the private respondent
under suspension. Since the Inspector has failed
to take into consideration the subsequent
ratification of Manager's decision by the
Management of the Institution, nor the law
relating ratification has been examined as such
the finding in the order of Inspector that
suspension order is without jurisdiction cannot
be sustained. (Para 8)

Intermediate Education Act, 1921 - Regulation
39 in Chapter 3 - This provision does not interfere
with the right of minority institution to place a teacher
under suspension but merely regulates the exercise of
such power in such a manner so as to protect the
right of teacher from arbitrary exercise of power by
the management. (Para 10)

Minority Institution in the name of discipline
and fundamental right of administration and
management cannot be given right to hire and
fire of its teachers and that conferring of
regulatory
power
with
the
educational
authorities for ensuring guarantee of freedom
from arbitrariness to teachers would not
amount to violating the right of minority
institution to manage its institution. (Para 13)

Impugned order quashed. Matter remitted.
Private respondent was allowed to continue at
work as well as held entitled to payment of
salary. (E-4)
11 All. C/M S.M. National Inter College, Machhati Ghazipur & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
689
Precedent followed:

## Text

688 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
otherwise
settled
that
unless
candidate
demonstrates that the key answers are patently
wrong, on the face of it, the Court ought not to
enter into academic field by weighing the pros
and cons of the arguments advanced by both
sides and then come to the conclusion as to
which of the answers is better or more correct.
This caution gets clearly attracted in the facts of
the present case inasmuch as opinion of experts
is based on credible material and cannot be said
to be absolutely without any basis. Which author
is correct on the subject is not for the Court to
determine, at the first instance. Unless the
answers relied upon by the Board are found to
be patently erroneous or without any basis the
interference on part of the Court would clearly
not be warranted.

30. In such circumstances, this Court is not
inclined to evaluate merits of the respective
arguments advanced by counsels for the parties,
with reference to the literature placed on the
subject so as to determine whether or not the
model answer key contains correct answers.

31. In view of the deliberations and
discussions made above, all the writ petitions
fail and are dismissed. No order is passed as to
costs.
----------
(2021)11ILR A688
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.09.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.

Writ A No. 5235 of 2021

C/M S.M. National Inter College, Machhati
Ghazipur & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Hritudhwaj Pratap Sahi, Sri Samarath Singh,
Sri Sankalp Narayan, Sri Awanish Kumar Rai, Sri
B.K. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Kushmondeya Shahi

A. Service Law - Suspension - Payment of
Salary - Intermediate Education Act, 1921 -
Section 16G - It is apparent that power to
place a Head of institution or teacher under
suspension is with the Management and not
the Manager. Unless a resolution is passed by
the
Managing
Committee
an
order
of
suspension cannot be passed. In the present
case, Inspector has admitted that at the time when
he considered the question of approval to the order of
suspension a resolution dated 03.01.2021 of the
Managing Committee had been placed before him.
This resolution will have the effect of ratifying the
decision of Manager to place the private respondent
under suspension. Since the Inspector has failed
to take into consideration the subsequent
ratification of Manager's decision by the
Management of the Institution, nor the law
relating ratification has been examined as such
the finding in the order of Inspector that
suspension order is without jurisdiction cannot
be sustained. (Para 8)

Intermediate Education Act, 1921 - Regulation
39 in Chapter 3 - This provision does not interfere
with the right of minority institution to place a teacher
under suspension but merely regulates the exercise of
such power in such a manner so as to protect the
right of teacher from arbitrary exercise of power by
the management. (Para 10)

Minority Institution in the name of discipline
and fundamental right of administration and
management cannot be given right to hire and
fire of its teachers and that conferring of
regulatory
power
with
the
educational
authorities for ensuring guarantee of freedom
from arbitrariness to teachers would not
amount to violating the right of minority
institution to manage its institution. (Para 13)

Impugned order quashed. Matter remitted.
Private respondent was allowed to continue at
work as well as held entitled to payment of
salary. (E-4)
11 All. C/M S.M. National Inter College, Machhati Ghazipur & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
689
Precedent followed:

1. National Institute of Technology & ors. Vs Pannalal
Chaudhary, AIR 2015 SC 2846 (Para 3)

2. All Saints High School, Hyderabad & ors. Vs St.of
A.P. & ors., AIR 1980 SC 1042 (Para 11)

3. Frank Public School Employees' Association Vs
U.O.I. & ors., 1986 (4) SCC 707 (Para 12)

4. Y Theclamma Vs U.O.I. & ors., 1987 (2) SCC 516
(Para 12)

Precedent distinguished:

1. C/M Clancy Intermediate College Vs St. of U.P. &
ors. (Writ Petition No. 15765 of 2016) (Para 2)

Precedent cited:

1. Ms. G. Vallikumari Vs Andhra Education Society &
ors., 2010 (2) SCC 497 (Para 4)

Present petition assails order dated 16.03.2021
(disapproving proposed suspension), passed by
District Inspector of Schools as well as orders
dated 28.01.2021 and 22.02.2021 (which direct
payment of salary).

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.)

1. This petition is by the minority
institution challenging an order of the District
Inspector of Schools, Ghazipur dated 16.03.2021
disapproving the proposed suspension of private
respondent as also the orders dated 28.01.2021
and 22.02.2021, which direct payment of salary
to be released to the private respondent. The
order
disapproving
the
suspension
dated
16.03.2021 records that the Manager of the
institution had placed the private respondent
under suspension on 31.12.2020, whereas the
resolution of the Managing Committee to place
him
under
suspension
was
passed
on
03.01.2021. The Inspector, therefore, has
observed that on the date of passing of the order
of suspension there was no valid resolution by
the Managing Committee and, therefore, the
order of Manager was without jurisdiction.

2. The aforesaid order is assailed on
various grounds. It is urged that being a minority
institution the Inspector has no authority to
disapprove the resolution for placing private
respondent under suspension as the right of
minority institution to manage its affairs are
infringed. Reliance is placed upon a judgment of
this Court in C/M Clancy Intermediate College
Vs. State of U.P. and others (Writ Petition No.
15765 of 2016). Learned counsel for the
petitioner further submits that after the order of
suspension was passed by the Manager a valid
resolution was passed by the Managing
Committee on 03.01.2021, which has the effect
of ratifying the earlier order of Manager. This
resolution was also on record before the
Inspector.

3. In support of plea of ratification Sri
Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgement
of Supreme Court in National Institute of
Technology and others Vs. Pannalal Chaudhary,
AIR 2015 SC 2846, in which Supreme Court has
observed as under in para 34 to 40:-

"34. That apart, the issue in question
could be examined from yet another angle by
applying the law relating to "Ratification" which
was not taken note of by the High Court.

35. The expression ?Ratification?
means ?the making valid of an act already
done?. This principle is derived from the Latin
maxim ?ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur?
meaning thereby ?a subsequent ratification of
an act is equivalent to a prior authority to
perform such act.? It is for this reason; the
ratification assumes an invalid act, which is
retrospectively validated.

36. The expression ?ratification? was
succinctly defined by the English Court in one
690 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
old case, Hartman Vs. Hornsby reported in 142
Mo 368 44 SW 242, 244 as under:

?Ratification? is the approval by act,
word, or conduct, of that which was attempted (of
accomplishment), but which was improperly or
unauthorisedly performed in the first instance.'

37. The law of ratification was applied
by this Court in Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta Vs.
U.O.I (1973) 2 SCC 543. In that case, the
Chairman of the Board of Directors had
terminated the services of the General Manager of
a Company pursuant to a resolution taken by the
Board at a meeting. It was not in dispute that the
meeting
had
been
improperly
held
and
consequently the resolution passed in the said
meeting terminating the services of General
Manager was invalid. However, the Board of
Directors then convened subsequent meeting and
in this meeting affirmed the earlier resolution,
which had been passed in improper meeting. On
these facts, the Court held,

Even if it be assumed that the telegram
and the letter terminating the services of the
appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance of the
invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed
on 16-12-1953 to terminate his services, it would
not follow that the action of the Chairman could
not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting of
the Board of Directors. The point is that even
assuming that the Chairman was not legally
authorised to terminate the services of the
appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company
in doing so, because, he purported to act in
pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it
was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the
Board of Directors to ratify that action which,
though unauthorised, was done on behalf of the
Company. Ratification would always relate back to
the date of the act ratified and so it must be held
that the services of the appellant were validly
terminated on 17-12-1953.

38. This view was approved by this
Court in High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan
Vs. P.P. Singh & Anr. (2003) 4 SCC 239.

39. The aforesaid principle of law of
ratification was again applied by this Court in
Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. Vs. Sunil
(2006) 5 SCC 96. In this case, the respondent
was an employee of the appellant Corporation.
Consequent to a departmental enquiry, he was
dismissed by the Managing Director of the
appellant. The respondent then filed a writ
petition before the High Court. During the
pendency of the writ petition, the Board of
Directors of the appellant Corporation passed a
resolution ratifying the impugned action of the
Managing Director and also empowering him to
take decision in respect of the officers and staff
in the grade of pay the maximum of which did
not exceed Rs. 4700 p.m. Earlier, the Managing
Director had powers only in respect of those
posts where the maximum pay did not exceed
Rs.1900 p.m. The respondent at the relevant
time was drawing more than Rs.1800 p.m.
Therefore, at the relevant time, the Managing
Director was incompetent to dismiss the
respondent. Accordingly, the High Court held
the order of dismissal to be invalid. The High
Court further held that the said defect could not
be rectified subsequently by the resolution of the
Board of Directors. The High Court set aside
the dismissal order and granted consequential
relief. The appellant then filed the appeal in this
Court by special leave. Justice Ruma Pal,
speaking for three- Judge Bench, while allowing
the appeal and setting aside of the Court held as
under :

The High Court rightly held that an
act by a legally incompetent authority is invalid.
But it was entirely wrong in holding that such an
invalid act could not be subsequently ?rectified?
by ratification of the competent authority.
Ratification by definition means the making
valid of an act already done. The principle is
derived from the Latin maxim ratihabitio
mandato aequiparatur, namely, ?a subsequent
ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior
authority to perform such act.? Therefore,
11 All. C/M S.M. National Inter College, Machhati Ghazipur & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
691
ratification assumes an invalid act which is
retrospectively validated.

In the present case, the Managing
Director?s order dismissing the respondent from
service was admittedly ratified by the Board of
Directors unquestionably had the power to
terminate the services of the respondent. Since
the order of the Managing Director had been
ratified by the Board of Directors such
ratification related back to the date of the order
and validated it.

40. Applying the aforementioned law
of ratification to the facts at hand, even if we
assume for the sake of argument that the order
of dismissal dated 16.08.1996 was passed by the
Principal & Secretary who had neither any
authority to pass such order under the Rules nor
there was any authorization given by the BOG in
his favour to pass such order yet in our
considered view when the BOG in their meeting
held on 22.08.1996 approved the previous
actions of the Principal & Secretary in passing
the
respondent's
dismissal
order
dated
16.08.1996, all the irregularities complained of
by the respondent in the proceedings including
the authority exercised by the Principal &
Secretary to dismiss him stood ratified by the
Competent Authority (Board of Governors)
themselves
with
retrospective
effect
from
16.8.1996 thereby making an invalid act a
lawful one in conformity with the procedure
prescribed in Rules."

4. Per contra, Sri Kushmondeya Shahi,
learned counsel for the respondents in support of
his plea that Inspector has jurisdiction to
disapprove the suspension has placed reliance
upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Ms.
G. Vallikumari Vs. Andhra Education Society
and others 2010 (2) SCC 497. Delhi School
Education Act fell for consideration before the
Court and is reproduced hereinafter:-

"8(4). Where the managing committee of
a recognised private school intends to suspend any
of its employees, such intention shall be
communicated to the Director and no such
suspension shall be made except with the prior
approval of the Director:

Provided that the managing committee
may suspend an employee with immediate effect
and without the prior approval of the Director if it
is satisfied that such immediate suspension is
necessary by reason of the gross misconduct
within the meaning of the Code of Conduct
prescribed under section 9, of the employee:

Provided further that no such immediate
suspension shall remain in force for more than a
period of fifteen days from the date of suspension
unless it has been communicated to the Director
and approved by him before the expiry of the said
period."

5. The Supreme Court after consideration all
judgments on the point observed as under in para
12:-

12. The prepositions which can be culled
out from the above noted two judgments are:

(i) Section 8(1), (3), (4) and (5) of the
Act do not violate the right of the minorities to
establish
and
administer
their
educational
institutions. However, Section 8(1) interferes with
the said right of the minorities and is, therefore,
inapplicable to private recognized aided/unaided
minority educational institutions.

(ii) Section 12 of the Act, which makes
the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act
inapplicable to unaided private recognized
minority educational institutions is discriminatory
except to extent of Section 8(2). In other words,
Chapter IV of the Act except Section 8(2) is
applicable to private recognized aided as well as
unaided minority educational institutions and the
concerned authorities of the education department
are bound to enforce the same against all such
institutions."

6. I have heard Sri Sankalp Narain, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Kushmondeya
692 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Shahi, learned counsel for the respondents and
persued the materials placed on records. The
first question that falls for determination in the
facts of the case is as to whether the order of
inspector can be sustained only on the ground
that no resolution was passed by the Managing
committed for placing the private respondent
under suspension when the order of suspension
itself was passed by the Manager.

7. Admittedly the institution herein is
recognized
under
the
provisions
of
the
Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Section 16G
of the Act regulates the conditions of service of
Head of the institution, teacher and other
employees. Sub-section 5 to 7 of the aforesaid
provision are relevant for the present purposes
and are reproduced hereinafter:-

"(5) No Head of Institution or teacher
shall be suspended by the Management, unless
in the opinion of the Management, -

(a) the charges against him are
serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal
or reduction in rank; or

(b) his continuance in office is likely to
hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary
proceedings against him; or

(c) any criminal case for an offence
involving moral turpitude against him is under
investigation, inquiry or trial.

(6) Where any Head of Institution or
teacher is suspended by the Committee of
Management, it shall be reported to the
Inspector within thirty days from the date of the
commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary
Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, in case
the order of suspension was passed before such
commencement, and within seven days from the
date of the order of suspension in any other
case, and the report shall contain such
particulars as may be prescribed and be
accompanied by all relevant documents.

(7) No such order of suspension shall,
unless approved in writing by the Inspector,
remain in force more than sixty days form the
date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh
Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act,
1975, or as the case may be, from the date of
such order, and the order of the Inspector shall
be final and shall not be questioned in any
Court."

8. From the bare provisions quoted above,
it is apparent that power to place a Head of
institution or teacher under suspension is with
the Management and not the Manager. Unless a
resolution is passed by the Managing Committee
an order of suspension cannot be passed. In the
facts of the present case, however, Inspector has
admitted that at the time when he considered the
question of approval to the order of suspension a
resolution dated 03.01.2021 of the Managing
Committee had been placed before him. This
resolution is not disputed. This resolution will
have the effect of ratifying the decision of
Manager
to
place
the
petitioner
under
suspension in light of the law laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of National Institute
of Technology (Supra). Para 40 of the judgment
in National Institute of Technology (Supra)
effectively demolishes the reasoning assigned by
the Inspector for passing his order. Since the
Inspector has failed to take into consideration
the subsequent ratification of Manager's decision
by the Management of the Institution, nor the
law relating ratification has been examined as
such the finding in the order of Inspector that the
suspension order is without jurisdiction cannot
be sustained.

9. So far as petitioner's plea of interference
in the right of minority institution to manage its
affairs is concerned it would be worth noticing
that the power under the Act is vested with the
Inspector to pass an appropriate order in the
matter of approval to suspension. Such exercise
of power is not unguided. The exercise of power
by the Inspector under Section 16 G (7) is
regulated by Regulation 39 contained in Chapter
11 All. C/M S.M. National Inter College, Machhati Ghazipur & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
693
3 of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921,
which is reproduced hereinafter:-

"39. (a) The report regarding the
suspension of the head of institution or of the
teacher to be submitted to the Inspector under
sub-section (6) of Section 16-G shall contain the
following particulars and be accompanied by
the following document-

(a) the name of the persons suspended
along with, particulars of the (posts including
grades) held by him since the date of his original
appointment till the time of suspension including
particulars as to the nature of tenure held at the
time of suspension, e.g., temporary permanent
or officiating :

(b) a certified copy of the report on the
basis of which such person was last confirmed
or allowed to cross efficiency bar, whicheveiy
later;

(c) details of all the charges on the
basis of which such person was suspended;

(d) certified copies of the complaints,
reports and inquiry report, if any, of the inquiry
officer on the basis of which such person was
suspended;

(e) certified copy of the resolution of
the Committee of Management suspending such
person;

(f) certified copy of the order of
suspension issued to such person;

(g) in case such person was suspended
previously also, details of the charges, on which
and the period for which he was suspended on
previous occasions accompanied by certified
copies of the orders on the basis ot which he was
re-instated.

(2) An employee other than a head of
institution or a teacher may be suspended by the
appointing authority on any of the grounds
specified in Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (5)
of Section 16-G."

10. The above provision does not interfere
with the right of minority institution to place a
teacher under suspension but merely regulates
the exercise of such power in such a manner so
as to protect the right of teacher from arbitrary
exercise of power by the management.

11. Sri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for
the petitioner has fairly placed before the Court
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of All Saints High School, Hyderabad and ors.
Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and ors., AIR 1980
SC 1042, wherein the Supreme Court observed
as under in paragraph 14 and 15:-

"Section 3 (3) (a) provides that no
teacher employed in any private educational
institution shall be placed under suspension
except when an inquiry into the gross
misconduct of such teacher is contemplated.
Section 3 (3) (b) provides that no such
suspension shall remain in force for more than a
period of two months and if the inquiry is not
completed within that period the teacher shall,
without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to
have been restored as a teacher. The proviso to
the sub-section confers upon the competent
authority the power, for reasons to be recorded
in writing, to extend the period of two months
for a further period not exceeding two months if,
in its opinion, the inquiry could not be
completed within the initial period of two
months for reasons directly attributable to the
teacher.

With respect, I find it difficult to agree
with Brother Fazal Ali that these provisions are
violative of article 30(1). The question which
one has to ask oneself is whether in the normal
course of affairs, these provisions are likely to
interfere with the freedom of minorities to
administer and manage educational institutions
of their choice. It is undoubtedly true that no
educational institution can function efficiently
and effectively unless the teachers observe at
least the commonly accepted norms of good
behaviour. Indisciplined teachers can hardly be
expected to impress upon the students the value
694 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of discipline, which is a sine qua non of
educational
excellence.
They
can
cause
incalculable harm not only to the cause of
education but to the society at large by
generating a wrong sense of values in the minds
of young and impressionable students. But
discipline is not to be equated with dictatorial
methods in the treatment of teachers. The
institutional code of discipline must therefore
conform to acceptable norms of fairness and
cannot be arbitrary or fanciful. I do not think
that in the name of discipline and in the
purported exercise of the fundamental right of
administration
and
management,
any
educational institution can be given the right to
'hire and fire' its teachers. After all, though the
management may be left free to evolve
administrative
policies
of
an
institution,
educational instruction has to be imparted
through the instrumentality of the teachers; and
unless, they have a constant assurance of justice,
security and fair play it will be impossible for
them to give of their best which alone can enable
the institution to attain the ideal of educational
excellence. Section 3 (3) (a) contains but an
elementary
guarantee
of
freedom
from
arbitrariness to the teachers. The provision is
regulatory in character since it neither denies to
the management the right to proceed against an
erring teacher nor indeed does it place an
unreasonable restraint on its power to do so. It
assumes the right of the management to suspend
a teacher but regulates that right by directing
that a teacher shall not be suspended unless an
inquiry into his conduct is contemplated and
unless the inquiry is in respect of a charge of
gross misconduct. Fortunately, suspension of
teachers is not the order of the day, for which
reason I do not think that these restraints which
bear a reasonable nexus with the attainment of
educational excellence can be considered to be
violative of the right given by Art.30(1). The
limitation of the period of suspension initially to
two months, which can in appropriate cases be
extended by another two months, partakes of the
same character as the provision contained in
section 3 (3) (a). In the generality of cases, a
domestic inquiry against a teacher ought to be
completed within a period of two months or say,
within another two months. A provision founded
so patently on plain reason is difficult to
construe as an invasion of the right to
administer an institution, unless that right
carried with it the right to maladminister. I
therefore agree with Brother Kailasam that
sections 3 (3) (a) and 3 (3) (b) of the Act do not
offend against the provisions of Art.30(1) and
are valid."

 (Emphasis Supplied)

12. Similar view has been expressed by the
Supreme Court in Frank Anthony Public School
Employees' Association Vs. Union of India and
ors., 1986 (4) SCC 707 and again in Y
Theclamma Vs. Union of India and ors., 1987
(2) SCC 516, wherein the Supreme Court
observed as under in para 12:-

"It cannot be doubted that although
disciplinary control over the teachers of a
minority educational institution is with the
management, regulations can be made for
ensuring proper conditions of service for the
teachers and also for ensuring a fair procedure
in the matter of disciplinary action. As the Court
laid down in Frank Anthony Public School's
case, the provision contained in sub-s. (4) of s. 8
of the Act is designed to afford some measure of
protection to the teachers of such institutions
without interfering with the managements' right
to take disciplinary action. Although the Court
in that case had no occasion to deal with the
different ramifications arising out of sub-s. (4)
of s. 8 of the Act, it struck a note of caution that
in a case where the management charged the
employee with gross miscon- duct, the Director
is bound to accord his approval to the
suspension. It would be seen that the endeavour
of the Court in all the cases has been to strike a
balance between the constitutional obligation to
11 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Sadanand
695
protect what is secured to the minorities under
Art.30(1) with the social necessity to protect the
members of the staff against arbitrariness and
victimisation."

13.

In
view
of
the
authoritative
pronouncement by the Supreme Court that
Minority Institution in the name of discipline
and fundamental right of administration and
management cannot be given right to hire and
fire of its teachers and that conferring of
regulatory
power
with
the
educational
authorities for ensuring guarantee of freedom
from arbitrariness to teachers would not amount
to violating the right of minority institution to
manage its institution. The argument that
exercise of power by the Inspector violates the
constitutional guarantee cannot be accepted. So
far as judgment of this Court in Clancy
Intermediate College (Supra) is concerned the
judgment of the Supreme Court in All Saints
High School (Supra) was not considered and the
observations made in the context of dismissal
were made applicable in a case of suspension
also. In view of what has been observed by the
Supreme Court in the case of All Saints High
School (Supra), Frank Anthony Public School
(Supra) and Y. Theclamma (Supra) it is difficult
to accept petitioner's argument that the order of
Inspector violates right of minority institution to
manage its affairs.

14. During the course of hearing it is
otherwise brought to the notice of the Court that
some of the issues relating to validity of the
appointment offered to private respondent, as
also the grant of approval by the competent
authority
were
not
placed
before
the
management which led to various action having
been initiated against the private respondent.
This contention however is disputed on behalf of
the private respondent on the ground that same
Manager had challenge the approval order of the
private respondent and, therefore, his argument
now that theses records were not available
cannot be accepted. These aspects, however,
need not engage this Court any further in view
of the fact that issue relating to legality of
suspension has to be examined by the inspector,
afresh. In such circumstances order passed by
the Inspector dated 16.03.2021 cannot be
sustained and is quashed. The Inspector shall
revisit the matter in light of relevant provisions
and in accordance with law within a period of
two months from the date of presentation of a
copy of this order. Both the parties shall appear
before the Inspector on 05.10.2021 along with
their records and the Inspector shall be at liberty
to fix early date for hearing in the matter. It is
clarified that till a fresh decision is taken in
accordance with law the private respondent shall
be allowed to continue and shall also be entitled
to payment of salary.
----------
(2021)11ILR A695
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.10.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH BINDAL, C.J.
THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 821 of 2021

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Sadanand ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Anand Kumar Ray, Addl. C.S.C.

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Anil Babu

A. Civil Law - Condonation of delay - The law of
limitation
undoubtedly
binds
everybody
including the Government.

In a matter of condonation of delay when there was
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice...The claim on account of