# C/M Sant Ravidas Primary Pathshala, Azamgarh & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 12 ILRA 615
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-10-01
- **Case number:** Special Appeal (D) No. 389 of 2020
- **Bench:** Govind Mathur, C.J. Siddharth Varma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/c-m-sant-ravidas-primary-pathshala-azamgarh-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-45474
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

The law of no statutory limitation is not
applicable for invoking writ jurisdiction. Doctrine
of delay and laches are certainly applicable ad
required to be looked into while entertaining a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The objections pertaining to delay,
laches, alternative remedy, conduct of the
party, etc. are self-evolved restrictions
and
these
are
to
be
asserted
and
examined by the Court and not by its
ministerial
staff
including
Stamp
Reporters. (Para 7)
Delay and laches are two different concepts.
Laches certainly posses an essence of delay but
every delay does not reflect laches also. Laches
is an equitable defence available to a defendant
ad it should include certain other factors in
addition to delay in agitating the equitable relief.
(Para 8)
The first instance copy of the order dated
13.12.2017 was supplied to the appellantpetitioner
on
22.11.2018.
The
appellantpetitioner thereafter filed a writ petition in the
month of April, 2019. Such period looking to the
facts of the case even cannot be treated
sufficient to dismiss the writ petition on the
count of delay. (Para 10)
Writ Petition allowed. (E-10)

## Text

12 All. C/M Sant Ravidas Primary Pathshala, Azamgarh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
615
within a period of two months from the
date
of
production
of
the
computerized/certified copy of this order.

21. With this observation, the appeal
stands finally disposed of.

22. The parties shall bear their own
costs.
----------
(2020)12ILR A615
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.10.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE GOVIND MATHUR, C.J.
THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTH VARMA, J.

Special Appeal (D) No. 389 of 2020

C/M Sant Ravidas Primary Pathshala,
Azamgarh & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Gautam Baghel

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Practice & Procedure - Delay & Laches -
The law of no statutory limitation is not
applicable for invoking writ jurisdiction. Doctrine
of delay and laches are certainly applicable ad
required to be looked into while entertaining a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The objections pertaining to delay,
laches, alternative remedy, conduct of the
party, etc. are self-evolved restrictions
and
these
are
to
be
asserted
and
examined by the Court and not by its
ministerial
staff
including
Stamp
Reporters. (Para 7)
Delay and laches are two different concepts.
Laches certainly posses an essence of delay but
every delay does not reflect laches also. Laches
is an equitable defence available to a defendant
ad it should include certain other factors in
addition to delay in agitating the equitable relief.
(Para 8)
The first instance copy of the order dated
13.12.2017 was supplied to the appellantpetitioner
on
22.11.2018.
The
appellantpetitioner thereafter filed a writ petition in the
month of April, 2019. Such period looking to the
facts of the case even cannot be treated
sufficient to dismiss the writ petition on the
count of delay. (Para 10)
Writ Petition allowed. (E-10)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Govind Mathur, C.J. , &
Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma, J.)

1. Testing correctness of the order
passed by learned single Bench dated 7th
November, 2019 in Writ-A No.35379 of
2019, instant appeal has been preferred.

2. Brief facts leading to filing of this
appeal are that the appellant-petitioner, a
society
registered
under
Societies
Registration Act, 1860 mainly involved in
imparting education to the children coming
from
scheduled
castes
submitted
an
application to have grant-in-aid. Acting
upon
the
application,
the
Director,
Department of Social Welfare by a letter
dated 29th May, 2014 directed the District
Social Welfare Officer to enlist the
appellant-petitioner for grant-in-aid as an
institution of scheduled castes. After
necessary inquiry, a detailed report was
also said to be given in this regard by the
District Minority Officer, Azamgarh on
16th April, 2015. Being failed to have any
response the appellant-petitioner preferred
a petition for writ before this Court that
came to be disposed of on 27th October,
2016 with a direction to the authority
competent to decide the issue relating to
grant-in-aid expeditiously. Despite the
616 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order aforesaid, no decision was taken by
the
competent
authority.
Hence,
the
appellant-petitioner
preferred
an
application to initiate proceedings under
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the
competent authority. The contempt petition
aforesaid came to be disposed of on 25th
October, 2017 with a fresh direction to
decide claim of the appellant-petitioner
within a period of six months.

3. As per the averments contained in
the petition for writ, no decision at all was
communicated to the appellant-petitioner,
which is said to be taken in compliance of
the directions given on 25th October, 2017.
An application thus was filed under Right
to Information Act, 2005 and in pursuance
thereto
on
12th
October,
2018
the
appellant-petitioner received copy of a
communication dated 13th December, 2017
declining the claim for grant-in-aid. Being
aggrieved
by
the
order
dated
13th
December, 2017 that was received by the
appellant on 12th October, 2018, a petition
for writ was filed on 12th April, 2019.

4. On filing the writ petition, the
Stamp Reporter made a note to the effect
that the petition suffers from laches of 589
days. Learned single Judge by the order
dated 7th November, 2019 dismissed the
writ petition on the ground of laches. The
relevant part of the order aforesaid reads as
under:-

"The stamp reporter has reported a laches
of 589 days in filing the present petition.

Present petition has been filed with
following prayers:-

(a) a writ, order, rule or direction in
the nature of Certiorari quashing the
impugned order dated 13.12.2017 passed
by respondent no. 2 (Annexure no. 15 to the
writ petition).

(b) any other suitable writ, order or
direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the circumstances of the present case.

(c) award the cost of petition in favour
of the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the petitioners by
drawing
attention
to
paragraph
28
submitted that the petitioners came to know
about the impugned order on 22.11.2018
thereafter, they came to this Court after
arranging money on 17.10.2019 and the
present petition has been filed.

Paragraph 28 of the writ petition is
quoted as under:-

"That the petitioner no.6 was aware
with regard to the impugned order dated
13.12.2017
on
22.11.2018,
thereafter,
petitioner came to this Hon'ble Court for
filing the Writ Petition on 17.04.2019 and
obtained the photo identification card, but
in lack of money, he could not file the writ
petition before this Hon'ble Court. The
petitioner no. 6 came this Hon'ble Court.
The petitioner no. 6 came to this Hon'ble
Court before his counsel after arranging
the money on 17.10.2019 and thereafter he
is filing the same before this Hon'ble Court.

In the present case, petitioners are
Committee
of
Management
of
five
institutions and petitioner no. 6 is the
alleged manager of all the institutions,
therefore, paragraph 28 of the petition does
not inspire confidence that five Committee
of Management and the alleged manager
thereof, took six months' time to collect the
money for the purpose of filing of the
present petition. Admittedly, even as per
allegations of the petitioners, petitioners
came to know about the impugned order
passed
on
13.12.2017
at
least
by
22.11.2018. Even the photo verification
affixed on the affidavit is dated 14.8.2019.

Accordingly, petition stands dismissed
on the ground of laches in filing the present
petition."
12 All. C/M Sant Ravidas Primary Pathshala, Azamgarh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
617

5. In appeal, the argument advanced
by learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant-petitioner is that there was no
laches in filing the petition for writ and,
therefore, learned single Bench erred in
dismissing the petition for writ without
examining merits. Learned counsel also
tried to explain the delay in filing the
petition for writ.

6. As already stated, learned single
Bench dismissed the petition for writ on the
ground of laches and, therefore, the issue
under consideration is that whether any
laches exist that may be sufficient to
dismiss the petition for writ.

7. At the threshold, it would be
appropriate to state that the law of no
statutory limitation is not applicable for
invoking writ jurisdiction. Doctrine of
delay and laches are certainly applicable
and required to be looked into while
entertaining a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. The objections
pertaining to delay, laches, alternative
remedy, conduct of the party, etc. are self
evolved restrictions and these are to be
asserted and examined by the Court and not
by its ministerial staff including Stamp
Reporters. We failed to understand as to
why in the instant matter Stamp Reporter
made a note about "laches" in filing the
writ petition. Such reporting is absolutely
unwarranted being a question that is to be
decided by the Court.

8. Though, it is a very fundamental
issue but a petition for writ being dismissed
on the count of laches, we would like to
mention that laches must not be confused
with delay in filing writ petition. Delay and
laches are two different concepts. Laches
certainly possess an essence of delay but
every delay does not reflect laches also.
Laches is an equitable defence available to
a defendant and it should include certain
other factors in addition to delay in
agitating
the
equitable
relief.
While
invoking the defence of laches it is to be
asserted that the party claiming relief not
only slept on its rights but non persuasion
on its part has changed the circumstances to
the extent that the grant of relief shall not
be just and proper. No such defence at all
was taken by any of the party and that
could have even not be taken as there was
no circumstance that would have created
any right in favour of the State or against
the appellant-petitioner.

9. Precisely, the issue was regarding
entitlement of the appellant-petitioner for
grant-in-aid
in
accordance
with
the
applicable rules. The legal right of the
appellant-petitioner was supposed to be
decided on the scale of the statute
applicable and for examining that there was
no hurdle what to talk of laches even on
delay as no right otherwise accrued in
favour of the respondents. There was also
no question of losing the evidence.

10. It would also be appropriate to
state that there was no dispute that at the
first instance copy of the order dated 13th
December, 2017 was supplied to the
appellant-petitioner on 22nd November,
2018. The appellant-petitioner thereafter
filed a writ petition in the month of April,
2019. Such a period looking to the facts of
the case even cannot be treated sufficient to
dismiss the writ petition even on the count
of delay.

11. Learned single Bench in light of
the law discussed above and the factual
background noticed, erred in dismissing the
petition for writ. The appeal, hence is
allowed. The order dated 7th November,
618 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2019 is set aside. The writ petition is
restored to its original number and is
remitted to learned single Bench for its
adjudication on merits. The other just
objections shall be available to the
respondents while contesting the petition.
----------
(2020)12ILR A618
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.11.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE GOVIND MATHUR, C.J.
THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.

Special Appeal No. 422 of 2020

Chandra Shekhar Srivastava ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Poonam Mishra, Radha Kant Ojha

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ram Prakash Shukla

A. Service Law - Baroda Uttar Pradesh
Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees)
Service Regulations, 2010: Regulation
48(2)

Regulation 48(2) itself provides the competent
authority to consider and pass appropriate
orders treating the period of suspension as
either one which has been spent on duty or
otherwise. This implies that the Regulation
48(2) can be invoked only where no penalty of
dismissal or removal is imposed. In other words,
the competent authority must not invoke this
power if a penalty of removal or dismissal is
inflicted. The learned Single Judge erred in
treating the period of suspension as not a
period spent on duty and further disentitling him
from the payment of any difference of salary
except the subsistence allowance. The provision
in unambiguous terms mandates that the period
of suspension is always to be treated as the
period spent on duty. The other part having the
phrase "or otherwise" implies that if the
employee has suffered a penalty of removal or
dismissal the competent authority may pass
appropriate directions. (Para 12, 13 & 15)

Special Appeal allowed. (E-10)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Govind Mathur, C.J.
& Hon'ble Siddharth Varma, J.)

1. As a consequence to a disciplinary
action, the petitioner (appellant herein) was
subjected to a punishment in the following
terms:-

"Reduction to a lower stage in his time
scale of pay by -01- stage for a period of -
03- months without cumulative effect'

And

Further, the period of suspension of
Mr. Chandra Shekhar Srivastava will be
treated as period not spent on duty. Hence,
no difference of salary will be payable to
him except subsistence allowance, which he
has already received."

2. Aggrieved by the same, he
preferred a petition for writ with a ground,
inter alia, that second part of punishment
relating to period of suspension is bad
being without jurisdiction. Learned Single
Bench dismissed the petition for writ
relying upon clause (2) of Regulation 48 of
the Baroda Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank
(Officers
and
Employees)
Service
Regulations, 2010 that reads as under:-

"48. Treatment of suspension period
and allied matters-

(1) The Competent Authority may,
while imposing penalty, direct whether the
other or employee shall be paid the
difference
between
the
subsistence
allowance and the emoluments which he
would
have
received
but
for
such