# C/M Shahid Akshayvar Mall Mahila Mahavidyalay & Ors v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2016) 5 ILRA 684
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-05-20
- **Bench:** Manoj Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/c-m-shahid-akshayvar-mall-mahila-mahavidyalay-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-43907
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

C.S.C., Vivek Verma

The challenge in this batch of writ petitions is to the enhancement of the examination fees of different
courses in Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur.

In most of the writ petitions, the educational institutions affiliated to the University are before this Court,
barring few writ petitions in which students are also parties. The relief claimed in the writ petitions is for
quashing the decision of the University enhancing the fee and to permit the students to appear in the
examination without depositing the enhanced amount of fees. During the pendency of the writ petitions, the
examinations had been held and the students who are before this Court must have deposited the enhanced
fees to enable them to appear in the examinations. However, in view of the declaration made above, these
petitioners are entitled to refund of the enhanced amount.

Held: Para-

Case Law discussed:
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and another Vs. Friends Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. And another;
M.J.P. Rohilkhand University Vs. Self Financed Colleges Welfare Association;

## Text

684 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
29. Let a copy of this order be forwarded to the Director General of Police, U.P.,
Lucknow, who is required to ensure that F.I.R. is registered at the earliest and investigation
is undertaken, when an order is passed by a Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Writ C No.- 5520 Of 2016

C/M Shahid Akshayvar Mall Mahila Mahavidyalay & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sanjeev Singh, Ashok Khare, Awadhesh Kumar Malviya

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Vivek Verma

The challenge in this batch of writ petitions is to the enhancement of the examination fees of different
courses in Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur.

In most of the writ petitions, the educational institutions affiliated to the University are before this Court,
barring few writ petitions in which students are also parties. The relief claimed in the writ petitions is for
quashing the decision of the University enhancing the fee and to permit the students to appear in the
examination without depositing the enhanced amount of fees. During the pendency of the writ petitions, the
examinations had been held and the students who are before this Court must have deposited the enhanced
fees to enable them to appear in the examinations. However, in view of the declaration made above, these
petitioners are entitled to refund of the enhanced amount.

Held: Para-

Case Law discussed:
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and another Vs. Friends Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. And another;
M.J.P. Rohilkhand University Vs. Self Financed Colleges Welfare Association;

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.)

1. The challenge in this batch of writ petitions is to the enhancement of the examination
fees of different courses in Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur. Since common
questions of fact and law are involved and therefore, with consent of learned counsel for the
parties, these writ petitions were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.
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685

2. Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur1 is a State University governed by
the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 19732. On 5.4.2013, the Finance Committee of the
University passed a resolution proposing to enhance examination fee from Rs.950/- to Rs.1400/-
for B.A., B.Sc., B.Com., B.Sc. (Agriculture) and likewise similar proportionate enhancement for
other courses since the academic session 2013-14. The Executive Council of the University on
23.4.2013 approved the proposal of the Finance Committee. The University notified the
enhancement of the examination fees on its official website on 9.7.2013 and started charging the
same. The petitioners, who are mostly self financed institutions affiliated to the University and in
some of the writ petitions, the students studying in these institutions, have preferred these petitions
questioning the enhancement of the fees.

3. The contention of the petitioners is that without framing a valid Ordinance as provided
by Sections 51 and 52 of the Act, the action of the University in seeking to realise enhanced
examination fees is without the authority of law. It is submitted that the enhancement of fee can
only be made by framing an Ordinance under Section 51 (2) (j) of the Act. According to the
petitioners, such an Ordinance could only be made with the approval of the State Government,
which in the instant case has not been obtained. Consequently, the decision of the Executive
Council on basis of which the University is seeking to realise enhanced examination fee cannot
amount to a valid Ordinance having been framed as per the procedure prescribed under Section 52
nor could the same be enforced.

4. On the other hand, the University in the counter affidavit has tried to justify its action in
enhancing the examination fee. It is pointed out that over a period of time, the University had
initiated various measures to upgrade the facilities by embarking on computerization of various
services, making them more student friendly, resulting in heavy expenditure. The University further
proposes to implement the recommendations of the Seventh Pay Commission, which is likely to
result in additional financial burden on it. The Government by order dated 29.3.2011 has enhanced
the remuneration of the teaching and non-teaching staff for various services rendered by them, thus
adding to the expenditure. For all these reasons, the Finance Committee recommended for increase
in the examination fees of different courses in its meeting held on 5.4.2013 and the Executive
Council, which is the principal executive body, had approved the same on 23.4.2013. The
amendment approved by the Executive Council in Chapter X-A of the First Ordinances had been
forwarded to the Chancellor for his approval vide letter dated 30.9.2013. The stand taken in the
counter affidavit is that the amendment approved by the Executive Council became effective from
the date it was submitted to the Chancellor for his approval. For such purpose, reliance has been
placed on Section 52 (5) of the Act which provides that all Ordinances made by the Executive
Council shall have effect from such date as it may direct and shall be submitted as soon as may be
to the Chancellor. It is further submitted that an Ordinance relating to enhancement of examination
fee does not require the approval of the State Government and even if approval is required, it can
be obtained subsequently, as the Statute does not contemplate obtaining of prior approval. In
support of the said contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the
686 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and another Vs. Friends Cooperative Housing Society
Ltd. And another3.

5. Per contra, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that an Ordinance
amending the existing fee structure is an Ordinance referable to clause (c) of the proviso to subsection (3) of Section 52 and it thus requires approval of the State Government before it becomes
effective. It is urged that the provision contemplates the approval of the draft Ordinance and it thus
presupposes that before the Ordinance is made by the Executive Council, its draft should have been
approved by the State Government. In other words, it is sought to be urged that the Ordinance
seeking to amend the existing fee structure requires prior approval of the State Government.

6. These rival submissions fall for consideration in the instant batch of writ petitions.

7. In order to appreciate the controversy, certain provisions of the Act which have
relevance are being reproduced for convenience of reference. Section 51 which deals with the
Ordinances reads as under:-

"51. Ordinances.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes the
Ordinances may provide for any matter which by this Act or the Statutes is to be or may be
provided for by the Ordinances.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the
Ordinance shall provide for the following matters, namely-

(a) the admission of students to the University and their enrolment and
continuance as such;

(b) the courses of study to be laid down for all degrees, diplomas and other
academic distinctions of the University;

(c) the conditions under which students shall be admitted to the examinations,
degrees and diplomas of the University and shall be eligible for the award of such degrees and
diplomas;
(d) the conditions of the award of scholarships, fellowships, studentships,
bursaries, medals and prizes;

(e) the conditions of residence of students at the University and the management
of halls and hostels maintained by the University;

(f) the recognition and management of halls and hostels not maintained by the
University;

(g) the maintenance of discipline among the students of the University;
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687

(h) all matters relating to correspondence courses and private candidates;

(i) the formation of parent-teachers association;

(j) the fees which may be charged by the University or by an affiliated or
associated college for any purpose;

(k) the conditions subject to which persons may be recognised as qualified to give
instructions in halls and hostels;

(l) the conditions and mode of appointment and the duties of examining bodies,
examiners, moderators, invigilators and tabulators;

(m) the conduct of examinations;

(n) the remuneration and allowances including travelling any daily allowances to
be paid to persons employed on the business of the University;

(o) all other matters which by this Act or the Statutes are to be or may be
provided for by the Ordinances."

8. The manner in which an Ordinance is to be made is provided for by Section 52. The
relevant part whereof is as under:-

"52. Ordinance how made:- ......... ...............................

(3) Save as otherwise provided in this section, the Executive Council may, from
time to time, make new or additional Ordinances or may amend or repeal the Ordinances referred
to in sub-sections (1) and (2):

Provided that no Ordinance shall be made-

(a) affecting the admission of students, or prescribing examinations to be
recognized as equivalent to the University examinations or the further qualifications mentioned in
sub-section (1) of Section 45 for admission to the degree courses of the University, unless a draft of
the same has been proposed by the Academic Council; or

(b) effecting the conditions and mode of appointment and duties of examiners and
the conduct or standard of examinations or any course of study except in accordance with a
proposal of the Faculty or Faculties concerned and unless a draft of such Ordinance has been
proposed by the Academic Council; or
688 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(c) effecting the number, qualifications and emoluments of teachers of the
University or the income or expenditure of the University, unless a draft of the same has been
approved by the State Government.

(4) The Executive Council shall not have power to amend any draft proposed by
the Academic council under sub-section (3) but may reject it or return to the Academic Council for
reconsideration either in whole or in part together with any amendments which the Executive
Council may suggest.

(5) All Ordinances made by the Executive Council shall have effect from such date
as it may direct and shall be submitted as soon as may be to the Chancellor.

(6) The Chancellor may, at any time signify to the Executive Council his
disallowance of such Ordinances other than those referred to in clause (c) of the proviso to subsection (3) and from the date of receipt by the Executive Council of intimation of such
disallowance, such Ordinances shall become void.

(7) The Chancellor may direct that the operation of any Ordinance other than
those referred to in clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (3) shall be suspended until he has an
opportunity of exercising his power of disallowance. An order of suspension under this sub-section
shall cease to have effect on the expiration of one month from the date of such order."

9. A Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No.5 of 2015 M.J.P. Rohilkhand
University Vs. Self Financed Colleges Welfare Association decided on 3.8.2015 has held that a
development fee by a University governed by the Act could only be imposed by framing an
Ordinance. The law laid down in this regard in the said judgment is as under:-

"In the present case, the Development fee which is being charged from the
students of self financed institutions clearly does not fulfill the description of a fee of an examiner
under clause (viii) of Section 21 (1). While undoubtedly the Executive Council has the power to
regulate and determine all other matters concerning the University and its constituent and
affiliated colleges, this power has to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Act,
Statutes and Ordinances. Under Section 51 (1) subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes,
the Ordinances may provide for any matter which by the Act or the Statutes is to be or may be
provided for by the Ordinances. Without prejudice to the generality of that power in sub-section
(1), clauses (a) to (o) to sub-section (2) of Section 51 provide for the matters in respect of which
Ordinances can be framed. Clause (j) to sub-section (2) of Section 51 covers the fees which may be
charged by the University or by an affiliated or associated college for any purpose. Hence, fees
which can be charged by the University or, for that matter, by affiliated or associated colleges have
to be regulated by Ordinances under Section 51 (2) (j). The proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 52
stipulates that no Ordinance can be made effecting the income or expenditure of the University,
unless a draft thereof has been approved by the State Government. A draft Ordinance proposing to
enhance the fees of the University would therefore require the approval of the State Government
5 All. C/M Shahid Akshayvar Mall Mahila Mahavidyalay & Ors. Vs State Of U.P. & Ors.

689
before the Ordinance is made effective. Admittedly no Ordinance has been made for the levy of a
Development fee. Hence, having adverted to the legal position which was expounded by the learned
Single Judge, we see no reason to differ with the view which has been taken."
(emphasis supplied)

10. Even the respondents do not dispute that the enhancement of examination fee could
only be made by amending the existing Ordinance, but the main controversy is in regard to the
manner in which such amendment is to be carried out.

11. A similar controversy as on hand had arisen in the matter relating to Chhatrapati Sahu
Ji Maharaj University, Kanpur also governed by the provisions of the Act. The Finance Committee
of the University proposed to enhance the examination fee from Rs.250/- to Rs.685/-. The proposal
of the Finance Committee was approved by the Executive Council on 30.3.2012. The same was
questioned before this Court in a batch of writ petitions. On behalf of the University, it was urged
that an Ordinance relating to enhancement of examination fee is not covered by the phrase "income
or expenditure of the University" as employed in Section 52(3) and thus, does not require prior
approval of the State Government. It was urged that holding of examinations is integral part of the
duties of a University and demand of fees in that regard does not amount to an income of the
University. In order to fortify the said submission, reliance was placed on clause (14) of Section 7,
which empowers the University to demand and receive fees and other charges. It was urged that in
respect of matters which require prior sanction or approval of the State Government, the same is
specifically provided under sub-sections (2), (3), (3-A) and (4) of Section 21. However, for
enhancing the fees or for imposing an additional fees, no approval is required to be obtained from
the State Government.

12. The submission made by the University was repelled and it was held that an Ordinance
seeking to enhance the examination fee is covered by clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (3) of
Section 52 and would require prior approval of the State Government for being made enforceable.
It is held as under:-

"12. An Ordinance effecting the number, qualifications and emoluments of teachers
of the University or the income or expenditure of the University could only be made after a draft of
the same has been approved by the State Government. All these subjects, except qualifications of
teachers, have financial implications. In these matters, the State Government has reserved the
power to approve the draft Ordinance before it is taken up for deliberation by the Executive
Council. It is clear from the scheme of the Act that the State Government has reserved with it the
power to accord sanction/approval to the University in discharge of some of its important
functions. Under sub-section (2) of Section 21, no immovable property of the University could be
transferred except with the prior sanction of the State Government. Similarly, no money could be
borrowed or advance taken on security except as a condition of receipt of any grant-in-aid without
the previous sanction of the State Government. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 forbids expenditure in
respect of which approval of State Government is required under the Act, the Statutes or the
Ordinances. It also forbids creation of any post in the University or constituent college except with
690 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the prior approval of the State Government. The pay and allowances of various categories of the
employees of the University or any Institute or constituent college or affiliated or associated
college shall be such as would be approved by the State Government. Sub-section (5) of Section 21
forbids the Executive Council from exceeding the limits of recurring and non-recurring expenditure
to be incurred in each financial year fixed by the Finance Committee.

13. Sub-section (4) of Section 26 places a restriction on the power of the Executive
Council to take any decision in matters having financial implication without there being a
recommendation by the Finance Committee. In case of difference of opinion, the matter has to be
sent back to the Finance Committee and if Executive Council again disagrees with the
recommendations of the Finance Committee, the matter has to be referred to the Chancellor, whose
decision thereon is final. The Finance Committee, by virtue of Section 26, comprises of two
representatives of the State Government namely, the Secretary to the State Government in the
Higher Education Department and the Secretary to the State Government in the Finance
Department. Thus, it is amply borne out from the scheme of the Act that in all matters having
financial implications, the State Government exercises control over the authorities of the University
either directly or through its representatives in the Finance Committee.

14. Concededly, in the instant case, the proposal for enhancement of fees emanated
from the Finance Committee in its meeting dated 11.2.2010, whereby it proposed to enhance
examination fees of students pursuing self financed courses in affiliated colleges. Subsequently, in
view of challenge laid to the enhancement in Writ-C No.46324 of 2011, the matter was once again
sent for reconsideration by the Finance Committee. This was definitely for the reason that
enhancement of fee or imposition of any new fees had financial implications affecting the income
and expenditure of the University. Although, the examination fees realised by the University may
not have an element of profit but nonetheless it constitutes a part of the income of the University.
The mere use of the word 'fees and other charges' in clause (14) of Section 7 does not lend support
to the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that fees has been used in contradistinction
to the phrase 'income'. In fact, such argument may be true in respect of 'other charges' which the
University can impose apart from fees but in the opinion of the Court, both these impost constitute
part of the income of the University. They both have financial implications and thus, for framing an
Ordinance touching upon these subjects, the recommendation has to emanate from the Finance
Committee as provided under Section 26 (4) and the draft Ordinance should have prior approval of
the State Government by virtue of clause (c) of the Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 52 of the
Act. The phrase "income or expenditure" is wide enough to take within its ambit all sources of
income including the income derived from fees. There is nothing in the Scheme of the Act which
could lead to the inference that "fees" is a separate category, not covered by the phrase "income
or expenditure".

(emphasis supplied)
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691
13. In view of the exposition of law made in the said judgment, this Court is unable to
accept the contention of learned senior counsel for the University that the Ordinance relating to
enhancement of fees does not fall under clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 52.

14. In the instant case, concededly, the draft Ordinance nor the Ordinance as framed by the
Executive Council has the approval of the State Government. The aforesaid difficulty in the way of
the respondent University is sought to be overcome by contending that the provision does not
contemplate for seeking prior approval of the State Government and that it can be obtained even at
a later stage. It is submitted that the Ordinance framed by the Executive Council would become
effective from the date it was sent to the Chancellor in view of sub-section (5) of Section 52.

15. In support of the aforesaid contention, Sri Ravi Kant, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the University has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and another Vs. Friends Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. And
another (supra). The judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 59
(1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, which contemplates that the
provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 are to remain
suspended in a development area except in relation to certain categories of housing schemes
enumerated under the said provision. One of such schemes which has to be enforced despite
declaration under Section 3 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, is a scheme
which is initiated after issuance of declaration under Section 3 with the approval of the State
Government. The declaration under Section 3 was published on 3.9.1977. The notification under
Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published on 7.6.1982 and soon thereafter the Parishad sought
approval of the Government through letter dated 27.7.1982. The Government approved the scheme
on 24.8.1982. The declaration under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam was published on 28.2.1987. The
Supreme Court repelled the contention that the scheme framed by the Adhiniyam was invalid and
inoperative in the development area, as prior approval of the State Government was not obtained.
The Supreme Court placing reliance on its previous decision in the case of Life Insurance
Corporation of India Vs. Escorts Ltd.5 and Lord Krishna Textiles Mills Ltd. Vs. Workmen6 held
that the provision does not contemplate obtaining of prior approval. It is held that until approval is
not given, the Board may not be in a position to implement the Scheme effectively, but once the
approval is given, all previous actions taken get validated. It is held as under:-

"6. This Court in Life Insurance Corpn. Of India v. Escorts Ltd. & Ors, 1986 (1)
SCC 264, considering the distinction between "special permission" and "general permission",
"previous approval" or "prior approval" in paragraph 63 held that "we are conscious that the
word "prior" or "previous" may be implied if the contextual situation or the object and design of
the legislation demands it, we find no such compelling circumstances justifying reading any such
implication into Section 29 (1) of the Act". Ordinarily, the difference between approval and
permission is that in the first case the action holds good until it is disapproved, while in the other
case it does not become effective until permission is obtained. But permission subsequently granted
may validate the previous act. As to the word "approval" in Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, it was stated in Lord Krishna Textiles Mills Ltd. V. Workmen, 1961 (1) L.L.J. 211 at
692 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
215-16 that the management need not obtain the previous consent before taking any action. The
requirement that the management must obtain approval was distinguished from the requirement
that it must obtain permission, of which mention is made in Section 33 (1).

7. It is seen that the approval envisaged under Exception (iii) of Section 59 (1) (a),
is to enable the Parishad to proceed further in implementation of the scheme framed by the Board.
Until approval is given by the Government, the Board may not effectively implement the scheme.
Nevertheless, once the approval is given, all the previous acts done or actions taken in anticipation
of the approval get validated and the publications made under the Act thereby become valid."

16. Section 52 prescribes different procedures for making the Ordinances. The procedure to
be adopted is dependent on the subject matter of the Ordinance. An Ordinance affecting the
admission of students or prescribing examinations to be recognised as equivalent to the University
examination or further qualifications mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 45 for admission to
degree courses of the University, those effecting the conditions and mode of appointment and
duties of examiners and the conduct or standard of examinations or of any course of study should
emanate from the Academic Council. It interalia comprises of the Vice Chancellor, Dean of all
Faculties, Head of Departments of the University, Professors of the University, Principals of
constituent colleges, affiliated colleges, associated colleges, Dean of Student Welfare, Librarian of
the University, 15 teachers to be selected in the manner prescribed and five persons of academic
eminence. The Academic Council is thus an expert body of the University conferred with the
power to control and regulate the standard of instruction, education and research. Consequently,
matters touching upon these subjects should emanate from the Academic Council in the shape of a
draft Ordinance and then only the Executive Council can deliberate over it and give shape of
Ordinance to it.

17. An Ordinance effecting the number, qualification and enrolments of teachers of the
University or the income or expenditure of the University, covered by clause (c) could not be made
unless a draft of the same has been approved by the State Government. Thus, whereas in case of an
Ordinance covered by clause (a) and (b), the proposal has to be mooted by the Academic Council
before it is given shape of an Ordinance by the Executive Council, but in case of an Ordinance
covered by clause (c), its draft should have been approved by the State Government. The approval
of the State Government, which is to be obtained, is not of the Ordinance framed by the Executive
Council but of a draft thereof. This evinces a clear legislative intent that before an Ordinance
covered by clause (c) becomes effective, its draft should have the approval of the State
Government. The use of the word "draft" in describing the ordinance in contradistinction to the
word "Ordinance" used in the same provision of the Statute unequivocally conveys the legislative
intent of obtaining approval from the State Government before the Ordinance could be made
effective. Thus, even if the argument of learned Senior Counsel of the University is accepted to the
extent that the Executive Council can frame an Ordinance and can seek its approval from the State
Government at a later point of time but in no eventuality could an Ordinance of such nature be
enforced unless the approval of the State Government is obtained.
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693
18. Even in the case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Friends Cooperative Housing
Society Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court has held that a prior or previous approval may be implied if
the contextual situation or the object and design of the legislature demands it. Sub-section (5) of
Section 52 only provides that an Ordinance made by the Executive Council shall have effect from
such date as it may direct and shall be submitted as soon as may be to the Chancellor. The said
provision is the final stage in the exercise undertaken in framing an Ordinance. All Ordinances
framed by the Executive Council are to be submitted to the Chancellor. In case of an Ordinance not
covered by clause (c), although the Ordinance becomes effective from the date as the Executive
Council may direct but the Chancellor has been conferred with a power to signify his disallowance
thereto and it becomes void from the date of intimation of such disallowance to the Executive
Council. The Chancellor is further invested with the power to suspend the operation of an
Ordinance not covered by clause (c) until he has an opportunity of exercising his power of
disallowance. Thus, the scheme of the Act reveals that although the Executive Council is the
principal executive body of the University invested with the power to frame Ordinances but the
said power is hedged by a mechanism of check and balance. Even in case of an Ordinance
proposed by the Academic Council covered by clause (a) and (b) or in case of any other Ordinance
not covered by clause (c), the Chancellor has been given a power to disagree with the decision of
the Executive Council. However, in case of an Ordinance covered by clause (c), the Chancellor
does not have any power to disallow the same or to stay its operation, apparently for the reason that
an Ordinance covered under clause (c), before it is enforced, had been scrutinised by the State
Government while according approval thereto. Thus, the contextual interpretation of the provision
also leads to the conclusion that an Ordinance covered by clause (c) cannot become effective unless
a draft of the same has been approved by the State Government. In the instant case, since
admittedly the approval of the State Government has not been obtained so far, the decision of the
Executive Council seeking to amend the existing fee structure could not be enforced. In
consequence, it is declared that the decision of the Executive Council amending the existing fee
structure relating to examination fee of various courses is unenforceable in the absence of approval
from the State Government.

19. The question which still remains to be considered is the relief to which the petitioners
are entitled to. In most of the writ petitions, the educational institutions affiliated to the University
are before this Court, barring few writ petitions in which students are also parties. The relief
claimed in the writ petitions is for quashing the decision of the University enhancing the fee and to
permit the students to appear in the examination without depositing the enhanced amount of fees.
During the pendency of the writ petitions, the examinations had been held and the students who are
before this Court must have deposited the enhanced fees to enable them to appear in the
examinations. However, in view of the declaration made above, these petitioners are entitled to
 refund of the enhanced amount. In the counter affidavit filed in some of the cases, a factual
dispute has been raised to the effect that no evidence has been brought on record to indicate that the
institutions are affiliated to the University or that the students are bonafide students of educational
institutions. In the opinion of the Court, these factual issues are required to be ascertained by the
University before the fees is refunded.
694 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
20. In view of the above, this Court leaves it open to the University to ascertain these
factual aspects before refunding the enhanced examination fee, if deposited by the students, who
are petitioners before this Court.

21. The writ petitions stand allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE V.K. SHUKLA, J.
THE HON'BLE UMESH CHANDRA SRIVASTAVA, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.- 6363 Of 2016

Om Prakash Srivastava @ Babloo ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Vinay Saran, Sri K.T.S. Tulsi

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., A.S.G.I., Sri Kailash Prakash Pathak

.................................

Prayer for Direction to Dispose of Form-A Application for Remission - Disposed of with
Directions - Delay Not Attributable to State - Proceedings Lawfully Stayed by Apex Court's
Interim Order -Petitioner, convicted by Designated Judge (TADA), Kanpur for conspiracy to commit murder
of one L.D. Arora under Sections 120-B/302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life - conviction upheld
by Apex Court; extradited from Singapore in 1995 after arrest pursuant to Red Corner Notice; moved
application (Form-A) dated 14.09.2013 before State Government for remission of sentence claiming actual
imprisonment of 21 years; counter affidavit revealed Form-A duly processed through prescribed channels -
Central Jail, Bareilly sent Form-A to District Magistrate, Lucknow on 24.12.2013; Apex Court in Union of India
vs. B. Shriharan @ Murugan, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 48 of 2014, restrained State Governments by interim
order dated 09.07.2014 from exercising power of remission of life convicts; said interim order modified on
23.07.2015 and matter finally decided on 02.12.2015; errors in earlier report necessitated fresh report, sought
by Headquarter (Prison) Lucknow vide D.O. Letter dated 22.04.2016 from District Magistrate, Lucknow for
expeditious disposal; Held, delay not attributable to State - proceedings were lawfully stayed by Apex Court's
interim order; as case was investigated by CBI, without consultation of Central Government under Section 435
Cr.P.C., no remission order could be passed; State directed to complete record within two months and
transfer papers to Central Government for consultation; Central Government directed to deal with matter
preferably within next two months thereafter. (Paras 1-11)