# Cantonment Board Meerut & Anr v. Anuj Singh & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 7 ILRA 178
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-07-17
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 337 of 2023
- **Bench:** Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, Om Prakash Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/cantonment-board-meerut-anr-v-anuj-singh-ors-50399
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Dismissal - Cantonment
Fund
Servants
Rules,
1937
-
Rule
11(2)(vi) - Judicial review is not an appeal
from a decision but a review of the
manner in which the decision is made -
Interference by the Court in exercise of its
power u/Article 226 of the Constitution of
India
in
disciplinary
proceedings
is
permissible
in
case
there
is
some
perversity in the findings recorded by the
disciplinary authority. (Para 6, 19)

In the matter of disciplinary inquiry against an
employee
if
the
disciplinary/appellate
authority arrives at a conclusion which is
based on the material available on record
and if the view taken by the authority
concerned is a plausible view, interference
in such findings by this Court in exercise of its
power
conferred
by
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India should be minimal. (Para
19)

In present case, there is no finding recorded by
the learned Single Judge that the disciplinary
proceedings were not conducted in accordance
with any rule or law. Learned Single Judge has
also not found any flaw or illegality or
irregularity in the procedure followed during the
course of disciplinary proceedings against
respondent No. 1/petitioner. Findings as regards
non-observance of principles of natural justice
have also not been returned by the learned
Single Judge. (Para 20)

B. The adequacy of evidence or even
reliability
of
evidence
will
not
be
permissible for this Court to go into in
exercise of its jurisdiction u/Article 226 of
the Constitution of India if the findings
recorded by the disciplinary authority or
the appellate authority are based on some
legal evidence on which findings can be
based. (Para 21)

Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court will not re-appreciate the
evidence neither will it interfere with the
conclusions in the inquiry if it has been
conducted in accordance with law and the
applicable rules. The High Court will not
interfere if there be some legal evidence on
which findings can be based. The principle of
proportionality of punishment can be
taken recourse to only if the punishment
inflicted upon the employee shocks the
conscience of the Court. (Para 19)

There is nothing on record which can even
remotely point out that there has been any
7 All. Cantonment Board Meerut & Anr. Vs. Anuj Singh & Ors.
179
procedural lapse or any irregularity or illegality
or infringement or violation of any rule while the
disciplinary proceedings were conducted in this
case against respondent No. 1/petitioner. In
absence of any such lapse emerging from the
record, learned Single Judge ought not to have
entered into the findings recorded by the
disciplinary and appellate authorities to the
extent of substituting its own findings. (Para 21)

The judgment and order dated 27.04.2023
passed in Writ-A No. 14919 of 2021 is set aside.

Special appeal allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

178 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
if
the
legislative
endeavour
is
not
encouraged, the likelihood of the practice
surviving and the legislation remaining a
dead letter, is imminent. That this Court
will not permit to happen.

8. In the circumstances above noticed,
there no good ground to interfere with the
impugned proceedings. The prayer to quash
the impugned proceedings is, consequently,
declined.

9. In the result, this application under
Section 482 of the Code fails and stands
rejected.
----------
(2023) 7 ILRA 178
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DEVENDRA KUMAR
UPADHYAYA, J
THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

Special Appeal No. 337 of 2023

Cantonment Board Meerut & Anr.
 ...Appellants
Versus
Anuj Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sanjeev Singh, Ajay Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Gaurav Mehrotra, A.S.G.I., Anant Khanna,
Chinmay Mishra, Lalta Prasad Misra

A. Service Law - Dismissal - Cantonment
Fund
Servants
Rules,
1937
-
Rule
11(2)(vi) - Judicial review is not an appeal
from a decision but a review of the
manner in which the decision is made -
Interference by the Court in exercise of its
power u/Article 226 of the Constitution of
India
in
disciplinary
proceedings
is
permissible
in
case
there
is
some
perversity in the findings recorded by the
disciplinary authority. (Para 6, 19)

In the matter of disciplinary inquiry against an
employee
if
the
disciplinary/appellate
authority arrives at a conclusion which is
based on the material available on record
and if the view taken by the authority
concerned is a plausible view, interference
in such findings by this Court in exercise of its
power
conferred
by
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India should be minimal. (Para
19)

In present case, there is no finding recorded by
the learned Single Judge that the disciplinary
proceedings were not conducted in accordance
with any rule or law. Learned Single Judge has
also not found any flaw or illegality or
irregularity in the procedure followed during the
course of disciplinary proceedings against
respondent No. 1/petitioner. Findings as regards
non-observance of principles of natural justice
have also not been returned by the learned
Single Judge. (Para 20)

B. The adequacy of evidence or even
reliability
of
evidence
will
not
be
permissible for this Court to go into in
exercise of its jurisdiction u/Article 226 of
the Constitution of India if the findings
recorded by the disciplinary authority or
the appellate authority are based on some
legal evidence on which findings can be
based. (Para 21)

Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court will not re-appreciate the
evidence neither will it interfere with the
conclusions in the inquiry if it has been
conducted in accordance with law and the
applicable rules. The High Court will not
interfere if there be some legal evidence on
which findings can be based. The principle of
proportionality of punishment can be
taken recourse to only if the punishment
inflicted upon the employee shocks the
conscience of the Court. (Para 19)

There is nothing on record which can even
remotely point out that there has been any
7 All. Cantonment Board Meerut & Anr. Vs. Anuj Singh & Ors.
179
procedural lapse or any irregularity or illegality
or infringement or violation of any rule while the
disciplinary proceedings were conducted in this
case against respondent No. 1/petitioner. In
absence of any such lapse emerging from the
record, learned Single Judge ought not to have
entered into the findings recorded by the
disciplinary and appellate authorities to the
extent of substituting its own findings. (Para 21)

The judgment and order dated 27.04.2023
passed in Writ-A No. 14919 of 2021 is set aside.

Special appeal allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. U.O.i. Vs P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610
(Para 6)

2. Bhagat Ram Vs St. of H.. P. & ors., (1983) 2
SCC 422 (Para 6)

3. S.R. Tewari Vs U.O.i. & anr., (2013) 6 SCC
602 (Para 6)

4. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Bodupalli Gopalaswami,
(2011) 13 SCC 553 (Para 6)

5. Charanjit Lamba Vs Commanding Officer,
Army Southern Command & ors., (2010) 11 SCC
314 (Para 6)

6. B.C. Chaturvedi Vs U.O.I. & ors., (1985) 6
SCC 749 (Para 6)

7. Ranjit Thakur Vs U.O.I. & ors., (1987) 4 SCC
611 (Para 6)

8. Roop Singh Negi Vs Punjab National Bank &
ors., (2009) 2 SCC 570 (Para 6)

9. St. of Karn. & ors. Vs N. Gangaraj,
MANU/SC/0187/2020 (Para 19)

Present petition assails judgment and order
dated 27.04.2023, passed by the learned
Single Judge whereby petition filed by the
respondent
No.
1/petitioner
has
been
allowed and the order of punishment of
dismissal from service dated 14.08.2019
and the resolution of the Cantonment Board
dated 14.08.2019 as also the order passed
by the appellate authority rejecting the
appeal against the punishment order, dated
01.06.2021 have been quashed.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Devendra Kumar
Upadhyaya, J.
&
Hon'ble Om Prakash Shukla, J.)

(1) Heard Sri Satish Chandra Mishra,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Sanjeev Singh, Sri Ajai Kumar Singh and
Ms. Shataxi Shukla, Advocates for the
appellants, Dr. L. P. Misra, Sri Gaurav
Mehrotra, Sri Rohit Agarwal, Sri Chinmay
Mishra and Sri Anant Khanna for the
respondent No.1 and Sri Nishant Shukla,
learned Counsel representing respondent
No.2 and 3 and perused the records available
before us on this Special Appeal.

(2) Invoking the jurisdiction of this Court
under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the
Court, this intra-Court appeal questions the
judgment and order dated 27.04.2023 passed by
the learned Single Judge whereby Writ-A No.
14919 of 2021 filed by the respondent
No.1/petitioner has been allowed and the order
of punishment of dismissal from service dated
14.08.2019
and
the
resolution
of
the
Cantonment Board dated 14.08.2019 as also the
order passed by the appellate authority rejecting
the appeal against the punishment order, dated
01.06.2021 have been quashed. Learned Single
Judge while allowing the writ petition has also
directed the appellants-Cantonment Board,
Meerut
to
re-instate
the
respondent
No.1/petitioner
in
service
alongwith
all
consequential benefits on the post on which he
was working prior to his dismissal.

(3)

Learned
Senior
Advocate
representing the appellants-respondents has
vehemently argued that the order under
appeal passed by the learned Single Judge
180 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
dated 27.04.2023 is not sustainable for the
reason that the learned Single Judge has
apparently
exercised
his
jurisdiction
beyond the scope of judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India in
respect of an order of dismissal from
service passed after conclusion of fullfledged departmental inquiry. It has further
been argued on behalf of the appellantsrespondents that the learned Single Judge
has acted as an appellate authority over the
decision taken by the disciplinary authority
inasmuch as that the learned Single Judge
has substituted his own findings to the
findings recorded by the disciplinary
authority by appreciating the evidence
afresh which is not permissible so far as
judicial review of matters relating to
disciplinary proceedings is concerned.

(4) It has also been argued that in
absence of any finding returned by the
learned Single Judge regarding any flaw in
the procedure followed during the course of
conducting the inquiry, punishment order
could not have been set aside. He has thus
argued that the disciplinary proceedings
against the respondent No.1/petitioner were
conducted in terms of the provisions
contained in the Rules regulating the
disciplinary proceedings and since no
irregularity or infringement of any legal
provisions have been pointed out by the
learned Single Judge, the order under
appeal is not sustainable.

(5) Sri Mishra has also contended that
once the evidence available on record has
been accepted by the disciplinary authority
and
the
findings
returned
by
the
disciplinary
authority
in
respect
of
'misconduct' are supported by the evidence
available on record, the judgment passed by
the learned Single Judge setting aside the
order of dismissal from service cannot be
justified. It has also been contended by the
learned Senior Advocate representing the
appellants-petitioners that the findings
recorded by the learned Single Judge are
not supported by evidence available on
record and thus the judgment under appeal
cannot be sustained specially for the reason
that different acts complained of against the
respondent
No.1/petitioner
clearly
amounted to misconduct in terms of the
provisions of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
In this view, the submission is that the
order under appeal is not sustainable and
accordingly the appeal deserves to be
allowed.

(6) Per contra, Dr. L.P. Misra assisted
by other learned counsel representing
respondent No.1/petitioner has argued that
the learned Single Judge was conscious of
the legal position that judicial review
cannot be a substitute of an appellate
jurisdiction and has thus proceeded to
consider the submissions of the parties and
has arrived at a conclusion that it was a
case where findings recorded by the
disciplinary authority as also by the Inquiry
Officer suffered from the vice of perversity.
He has also argued that it is well settled
principle of law as enunciated by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case Union of India
(UOI) vs. P. Gunasekaran [2015 (2) SCC
610] that interference by this Court in
exercise of its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India in disciplinary
proceedings is permissible in case there is
some perversity in the findings recorded by
the disciplinary authority. In support of his
submission, Dr. Misra has relied upon various
judgments which are (i) Bhagat Ram vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh and others
[(1983) 2 SCC 442], (ii) S.R.Tewari v.
Union of India and another [(2013) 6 SCC
602], (iii) Union of India and others vs.
Bodupalli Gopalaswami [(2011) 13 SCC
7 All. Cantonment Board Meerut & Anr. Vs. Anuj Singh & Ors.
181
553],
(iv)
Charanjit
Lamba
vs.
Commanding Officer, Army Southern
Command and others [(2010) 11 SCC 314].
(v) B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and
others [(1995) 6 SCC 749], (vi) Ranjit
Thakur vs. Union of India and others
[(1987) 4 SCC 611] and (vii) Roop Singh
Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and others
[(2009) 2 SCC 570].

(7) Certain other judgments have also
been
relied
by
the
learned
counsel
representing respondent No.1/petitioner to
buttress the submission that it is well within
the scope of power of judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India for
this Court to interfere even in the findings of
fact
in
the
matters
of
departmental
proceedings recorded by the disciplinary
authority if the findings are based on no
evidence or they are based on misreading of
evidence or they are perverse. These
judgments have also been cited to emphasize
that doctrine of proportionality can be a
ground for challenging a punishment order
before this Court while scrutinizing such an
order passed in departmental proceedings.

(8) The submission on behalf of learned
counsel for respondent No.1/petitioner thus is
that the learned Single Judge has given a
categorical finding in respect of the charges
levelled
against
the
respondent
No.1/petitioner which is based on the correct
appreciation of evidence available on record
and thus the order of punishment of dismissal
from service has also been quashed by the
learned Single Judge. In this view, the
submission on behalf of the respondent
No.1/petitioner is that no interference in this
special appeal ought to be made and that the
special appeal is liable to be dismissed.

(9) We have given our thoughtful
consideration to the submissions made by
the learned counsel representing the
respective parties.

(10) For appropriate adjudication of
the issue involved in this appeal, we find it
apt to notice certain facts. Respondent
No.1/petitioner, at the relevant point of
time, was posted on the post of Cantonment
Executive Engineer and was Head of the
Engineering Section. It is the case of the
appellants-respondents
that
respondent
No.1/petitioner having served for 24 long
years in the Engineering Section of the
Cantonment Board, Meerut was well aware
of the facts and circumstances of Meerut
Cantonment,
however,
the
omissions
attributable
to
him
had
resulted
in
unauthorized
construction
and
encroachment to the extent that the
geographical picture of Meerut Cantonment
was altered. In respect of certain charges, a
charge sheet was issued to the respondent
No.1/petitioner
on
20.12.2013
which
contained
seven
articles
of
charges
alongwith statement of imputation of
misconduct in support of each article of
charge.
Respondent
No.1/petitioner
submitted his written statement of defence
on 27.01.2014. He, however, remained in
jail in pursuance of a criminal case lodged
vide
F.I.R.,
dated
09.07.2016
under
Sections 147, 302/34 I.P.C. Since he was in
jail, an order of deemed suspension was
passed against him on 27.07.2016 and the
said
suspension
order
continued
till
11.01.2018 when it was revoked.

(11)

Respondent
No.1/petitioner
submitted a detailed written statement of
defence to the charge sheet on 30.06.2017.
He also submitted written brief dated
18.08.2018 before the Inquiry Officer in
respect of each article of charge. The
Inquiry Officer after conducting inquiry
submitted the Inquiry Report on 13.03.2019
182 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
finding the respondent No.1/petitioner
guilty of misconduct in respect of charge
Nos.1 to 5. Charge No.6 was found to be
partially proved, whereas charge No.7 was
not found proved. The Inquiry Report was
served upon the respondent No.1/petitioner
who
submitted
his
explanation/comments/written submission
to the Inquiry Report on 17.06.2019.

(12) In terms of the provisions of the
Cantonments Act, 2006 and the relevant
Rules,
Cantonment
Board
being
the
disciplinary authority considered the Inquiry
Report and the reply/representation made by the
respondent No.1/petitioner to the Inquiry
Report and unanimously resolved that the
respondent No.1/petitioner be dismissed from
service. Against the said decision of the
dismissal from service, an appeal was preferred
before the appellate authority under the relevant
provisions of the Rules, however, the appellate
authority found that the first charge was not
proved against the respondent No.1/petitioner,
whereas charge Nos.2 to 5 were found proved
by the appellate authority as well. The appellate
authority also concurred with the disciplinary
authority in respect of charge No.6 where he
found respondent No.1/petitioner to be partially
guilty. The appellate authority thus reduced the
major penalty of dismissal from service to the
punishment of compulsory retirement as per
Rule 11(2)(vi) of the Cantonment Fund
Servants Rules, 1937.

(13) The said decision of the
Cantonment Board as also the order of
appellate authority were challenged by the
respondent No.1/petitioner by filing Writ-A
No. 14919 of 2021 which has been allowed
by the judgment and order which is under
appeal before us.

(14) In the aforesaid background
facts, if we consider the judgment and
order passed by the learned Single Judge,
what we find is that after noticing the facts,
the contents of charge sheet and the
documents relied upon in support of the
charges, learned Single Judge has also
noticed the arguments made by the
respective parties and has further noticed
and observed the principle relating to scope
of
judicial
review
in
disciplinary
proceedings. Learned Single Judge has thus
observed that the judicial review in such
matters is concerned with the decision-
making process and to see whether the
same is perverse, illegal or it fails to satisfy
the test of non-arbitrariness as enshrined
under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.

(15) However, having observed the
aforesaid principles governing the scope of
judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution
of
India
in
disciplinary
matters, learned Single Judge has thereafter
analyzed the inquiry report in respect of
each charge and has also considered the
proceedings before the Inquiry Officer,
Disciplinary Authority as also the Appellate
Authority.

(16) The inquiry report is on record as
also the order of punishment of dismissal
from service. The Inquiry Officer has
considered in detail the evidence available
on record in respect of each charge and the
reply
submitted
by
the
respondent
No.1/petitioner and has arrived at the
conclusions
mentioned
therein.
The
disciplinary authority has also considered
the entire matter and has given its findings
based on the documents and evidence
available on record. Similarly, the appellate
authority has also proceeded to consider the
entire evidence available on record in
respect of each charge and thus has arrived
at the conclusion different than the
7 All. Cantonment Board Meerut & Anr. Vs. Anuj Singh & Ors.
183
conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary
authority in respect of some of the charges.
The appellate authority has, in its final
conclusion, reduced the punishment of
dismissal
into
the
punishment
of
compulsory retirement.

(17) Learned Single Judge has
recorded a finding that the disciplinary
authority
in
this
case
has
drawn
conclusions only on the basis of the
submission of the Inquiry Officer and that
there is no application of mind in respect of
the defence taken by the respondent
No.1/petitioner. This conclusion, however,
in our considered opinion goes against the
record inasmuch as that the disciplinary
authority has clearly discussed the material
available
on
record
of
the
inquiry
proceedings including the inquiry report
and the reply submitted by the respondent
No.1/petitioner. We also noticed that the
learned Single Judge has also recorded a
finding in respect of the order passed by the
appellate authority that while dealing with
second to fifth charge, the appellate
authority concluded that any kind of minor
deviation from the duty of supervision is to
be viewed seriously and further that the
appellate authority has further held that
ineffective execution of duties by the
subordinate/technical
staff
does
not
exculpate the respondent No.1/petitioner
for non-performance of his duties. In the
judgment under appeal passed by the
learned Single Judge it has been observed
that the appellate authority concluded its
finding on the basis of dictionary meaning
of the word 'supervisor' or 'to supervise' and
that he has nowhere held that the
respondent No.1/petitioner was in any way
actively
involved
either
in
illegal
constructions or illegal cultivation of crops.
Learned Single Judge has opined that the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are
erroneous inasmuch as the dictionary
meaning of the word 'supervise' or 'to
supervise' can be taken aid of only when
the supervisory role and the supervisory
duties are not specified, whereas in the
present case nature of duties was clearly
specified and elaborated where such no role
for illegal construction is assigned to the
respondent No.1/petitioner and the role of
reporting was rather specifically assigned
to the Junior Engineer Sri K.A. Gupta, Sri
Piyush Gautam and Sri Vinod Gupta as also
to Sri Roshan Zamir, Draftsman. Learned
Single Judge has thus found that the order
passed by the appellate authority is
erroneous and perverse.

(18) For any finding recorded by the
disciplinary
authority
or
the
appellate
authority in disciplinary proceedings to be
termed as perverse or erroneous, in our
opinion, this Court in exercise of its power of
judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India cannot take upon itself
the role of an appellate authority over the
decision made by the disciplinary authority or
even the appellate authority. Perversity, as is
well known, in findings of fact, arises only in
case any finding returned by any authority or
Court or Tribunal is based on no evidence or
misreading of evidence or acceptance of
inadmissible evidence or ignorance of any
evidence having bearing on the matter in
issue. In respect of disciplinary proceedings,
as is well established, the strict rule of
evidence does not have any application.
Accordingly, for this reason alone this Court
while exercising the power of judicial review
or judicial scrutiny under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India has to be extra cautious
in the sense that the Court may not enter into
the finding of facts.

(19) In the same breath, we also
observe that in the matter of disciplinary
184 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
inquiry
against
an
employee
if
the
disciplinary/appellate authority arrives at a
conclusion which is based on the material
available on record and if the view taken by
the authority concerned is a plausible view,
interference in such findings by this Court
in exercise of its power conferred by
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
should be minimal. Reference in this regard
may be made to the judgment of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of
Karnataka and others vs. N. Gangaraj
[MANU/SC/0187/2020].
In
the
said
judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court has
reviewed the entire law relating to scope of
judicial
review
in
the
matters
of
disciplinary proceedings and has clearly
held that judicial review is not an appeal
from a decision but a review of the manner
in which the decision is made. Referring to
another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran (supra), it has been observed
that under Article 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, the High Court will not re-appreciate
the evidence neither will it interfere with the
conclusions in the inquiry if it has been
conducted in accordance with law and the
applicable rules. Hon'ble Supreme Court
further goes on to observe that the High Court
will not go even into the adequacy of evidence
or its reliability. Further observations made by
Hon'ble Supreme Court are that the High
Court will not interfere if there is some legal
evidence on which findings can be based. It
has also been observed that the principle of
proportionality of punishment can be taken
recourse to only if the punishment inflicted
upon the employee shocks the conscience of
the Court. Paragraphs 6 to 13 of the judgment
in the case of N. Gangaraj (supra) are
extracted here-in-below:-

"6. The disciplinary authority
has taken into consideration the evidence
led before the IO to return a finding that
the
charges
levelled
against
the
respondent stand proved.

7. We find that the interference
in the order of punishment by the
Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court
suffers from patent error. The power of
judicial review is confined to the
decision-making process. The power of
judicial
review
conferred
on
the
constitutional court or on the Tribunal is
not that of an appellate authority.

8. In State of Andhra Pradesh
and
Ors.
v.
S.
Sree
Rama
Rao
MANU/SC/0222/1963:AIR 1963 SC 1723,
a three-Judge Bench of this Court has
held that the High Court is not a court of
appeal
over
the
decision
of
the
authorities
holding
a
departmental
enquiry against a public servant. It is
concerned to determine whether the
enquiry
is
held
by
an
authority
competent in that behalf, and according
to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. The Court held
as under :

"7. ... The High Court is not
constituted in a proceeding under Article
226 of the Constitution a court of appeal
over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against
a public servant: it is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by
an authority competent in that behalf,
and
according
to
the
procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether
the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted
and which evidence may reasonably
support
the
conclusion
that
the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge,
it is not the function of the High Court in
7 All. Cantonment Board Meerut & Anr. Vs. Anuj Singh & Ors.
185
a petition for a writ under Article 226 to
review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence."

9. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union
of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0118/1996 :
(1995) 6 SCC 749, again, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court has held that power
of judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in
which the decision is made. Power of
judicial review is meant to ensure that
the individual receives fair treatment
and not to ensure that the conclusion
which
the
authority
reaches
is
necessarily correct in the eyes of the
court. The court/tribunal in its power of
judicial review does not act as an
appellate authority to reappreciate the
evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. It
was held as under :

"12. Judicial review is not an
appeal from a decision but a review of
the manner in which the decision is
made. Power of judicial review is meant
to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the
conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an inquiry is conducted on charges
of misconduct by a public servant, the
Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine
whether the inquiry was held by a
competent officer or whether rules of
natural justice are complied with. Whether
the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted
with the power to hold inquiry has
jurisdiction, power and authority to reach
a finding of fact or conclusion. But that
finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of the Evidence
Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as
defined therein, apply to disciplinary
proceeding. When the authority accepts
that evidence and conclusion receives
support
therefrom,
the
disciplinary
authority is entitled to hold that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.
The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial
review does not act as appellate authority
to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive
at its own independent findings on the
evidence.
The
Court/Tribunal
may
interfere where the authority held the
proceedings against the delinquent officer
in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of statutory
rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or
where the conclusion or finding reached by
the disciplinary authority is based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be
such as no reasonable person would have
ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may
interfere with the conclusion or the
finding, and mould the relief so as to make
it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is
the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is
presented. The appellate authority has
co-extensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In
a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of
legal evidence and findings on that
evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of
evidence or reliability of evidence cannot
be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C.
Goel [MANU/SC/0271/1963 : (1964) 4
SCR 718], this Court held at page 728
that
if
the
conclusion,
upon
consideration of the evidence, reached by
the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of
the record or based on no evidence at all,
a writ of certiorari could be issued."

10. In High Court of Judicature
at Bombay through its Registrar v.
Shashikant
S.
Patil
and
Anr.
MANU/SC/0603/1999 : (2000) 1 SCC 416,
186 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
this Court held that interference with the
decision of departmental authorities is
permitted if such authority had held
proceedings in violation of the principles
of natural justice or in violation of
statutory regulations prescribing the
mode of such enquiry while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. It was held as under :

"16. The Division Bench of the
High Court seems to have approached
the case as though it was an appeal
against
the
order
of
the
administrative/disciplinary authority of
the High Court. Interference with the
decision of departmental authorities can
be
permitted,
while
exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held
proceedings in violation of the principles
of natural justice or in violation of
statutory regulations prescribing the
mode of such enquiry or if the decision of
the
authority
is
vitiated
by
considerations
extraneous
to
the
evidence and merits of the case, or if the
conclusion made by the authority, on the
very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or
capricious that no reasonable person
could have arrived at such a conclusion,
or grounds very similar to the above. But
we
cannot
overlook
that
the
departmental authority (in this case the
Disciplinary Committee of the High
Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the
enquiry has been properly conducted.
The settled legal position is that if there
is some legal evidence on which the
findings can be based, then adequacy or
even reliability of that evidence is not a
matter for canvassing before the High
Court in a writ petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution."

11. In State Bank of Bikaner and
Jaipur
v.
Nemi
Chand
Nalwaya
MANU/SC/0411/2011 : (2011) 4 SCC 584,
this Court held that the courts will not
act as an appellate court and reassess the
evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor
interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on
record. If the enquiry has been fairly and
properly held and the findings are based
on evidence, the question of adequacy of
the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence
will
not
be
ground
for
interfering
with
the
findings
in
departmental enquiries. The Court held
as under :

"7. It is now well settled that
the courts will not act as an appellate
court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the
ground that another view is possible on
the material on record. If the enquiry
has been fairly and properly held and
the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or
the reliable nature of the evidence will
not be grounds for interfering with the
findings
in
departmental
enquiries.
Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental
enquiries, except where such findings are
based on no evidence or where they are
clearly perverse. The test to find out
perversity is to see whether a tribunal
acting reasonably could have arrived at
such conclusion or finding, on the
material on record. The courts will
however interfere with the findings in
disciplinary matters, if principles of
natural justice or statutory regulations
have been violated or if the order is
found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala
fide
or
based
on
extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India MANU/SC/0118/1996 :
(1995) 6 SCC 749, Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham
MANU/SC/0834/1997
:
7 All. Cantonment Board Meerut & Anr. Vs. Anuj Singh & Ors.
187
(1997) 7 SCC 463 and Bank of India v.
Degala
Suryanarayana
MANU/SC/0399/1999 : (1999) 5 SCC 762,
High Court of Judicature at Bombay v.
Shashikant S. Patil MANU/SC/0603/1999
: (2001) (sic 2000) 1 SCC 416)

xx
xx
xx

12. The fact that the criminal
court
subsequently
acquitted
the
respondent by giving him the benefit of
doubt, will not in any way render a
completed
disciplinary
proceedings
invalid nor affect the validity of the
finding
of
guilt
or
consequential
punishment. The standard of proof
required in criminal proceedings being
different from the standard of proof
required in departmental enquiries, the
same charges and evidence may lead to
different results in the two proceedings,
that is, finding of guilt in departmental
proceedings and an acquittal by giving
benefit
of
doubt
in
the
criminal
proceedings. This is more so when the
departmental
proceedings
are
more
proximate to the incident, in point of
time, when compared to the criminal
proceedings.
The
findings
by
the
criminal court will have no effect on
previously concluded domestic enquiry.
An employee who allows the findings in
the enquiry and the punishment by the
disciplinary authority to attain finality
by non-challenge, cannot after several
years, challenge the decision on the
ground that subsequently, the criminal
court has acquitted him."

13.
In
another
judgment
reported as Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran
MANU/SC/1068/2014
:
(2015) 2 SCC 610, this Court held that
while reappreciating evidence the High
Court cannot act as an appellate
authority in the disciplinary proceedings.
The Court held the parameters as to
when the High Court shall not interfere
in the disciplinary proceedings :

13. Under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution of India, the High Court
shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii)
interfere
with
the
conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance
with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the
evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the
evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some
legal evidence on which findings can be
based.

(vi) correct the error of fact
however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality
of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.

13. On the other hand the
learned counsel for the respondent relies
upon
the
judgment
reported
as
Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan
Tewari MANU/SC/0006/2017 : (2017) 2
SCC 308, wherein this Court held that if
the disciplinary authority records a
finding that is not supported by any
evidence whatsoever or a finding which
is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court
could interfere with the finding of the
disciplinary proceedings. We do not find
that even on touchstone of that test, the
Tribunal or the High Court could
interfere with the findings recorded by
the disciplinary authority. It is not the
case of no evidence or that the findings
are perverse. The finding that the
respondent is guilty of misconduct has
been interfered with only on the ground
that there are discrepancies in the
evidence
of
the
Department.
The
discrepancies in the evidence will not
188 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
make it a case of no evidence. The
inquiry officer has appreciated the
evidence and returned a finding that the
respondent is guilty of misconduct."

(20) When we thus analyze the
judgment rendered by the learned Single
Judge in this case in the light of the
aforesaid legal principles, what we find is
that there is no finding recorded by the
learned Single Judge that the disciplinary
proceedings were not conducted in
accordance with any rule or law. Learned
Single Judge has also not found any flaw
or
illegality
or
irregularity
in
the
procedure followed during the course of
disciplinary
proceedings
against
respondent No.1/petitioner. Findings as
regards non-observance of principles of
natural justice have also not been
returned by the learned Single Judge.

(21) To the contrary, there is nothing
on record which can even remotely point
out that there has been any procedural
lapse or any irregularity or illegality or
infringement or violation of any rule
while the disciplinary proceedings were
conducted in this case against respondent
No.1/petitioner. In absence of any such
lapse emerging from the record, in our
considered opinion, learned Single Judge
ought not to have entered into the
findings recorded by the disciplinary and
appellate authorities to the extent of
substituting its own findings. While we
say so, we do not mean to state that in no
such matters relating to disciplinary
proceedings, interference by this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is permissible, however, the scope
is very limited so far as the findings
recorded by the disciplinary authority or
appellate authority are concerned. As
alrady observed above, in the case of P.
Gunasekaran (supra) Hon'ble Supreme
Court has already held that the adequacy
of
evidence
or
even
reliability
of
evidence will not be permissible for this
Court to go into in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India if the findings
recorded by the disciplinary authority or
the appellate authority are based on some
legal evidence on which findings can be
based.

(22) For the reasons aforesaid, we
do not find ourselves in agreement with
the judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge which is under
appeal before us.

(23) Resultantly, the appeal is
allowed and the judgment and order
dated 27.04.2023 passed in Writ-A No.
14919 of 2021 is hereby set aside.

(24) However, there will be no order
as to costs.
----------
(2023) 7 ILRA 188
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J

Writ A No. 2878 of 2014

Usha Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Salik Ram Yadava

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Nadeem Murtaza