# Cantonment Board, Meerut &Anr v. M/S B.K. Das & Sons

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 530
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-07-01
- **Bench:** Saumitra Dayal Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/cantonment-board-meerut-anr-v-m-s-b-k-das-sons-44521
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. The Cantonment Act, 2006: Sections
73(a), 73(b), 76. The choice of method of
valuation
u/s
73(a)
and
73(b)
is
legislatively
predetermined-no
discretion with the assessing authority.
Adjudicatory
procedure
cannot
be
adopted to create law.
The two methods of valuation provided under
Sections 73(a) and (b) are mutually exclusive.
The choice of method to be adopted is
legislatively pre-determined. There is no
discretion or choice in that regard with the
assessing
authority.
(Para
19)
1 All. Cantonment Board, Meerut & Anr. Vs. M/S B.K. Das & Sons
531
B. Interpretation of S.73(a) - "any other
building". Intention of legislature to
identity and subject to similarly tax all
buildings in class of buildings, on the
basis of their identity emerging from use
and not otherwise.

The words "any other building" appearing in
S.73(a), appear after the words "hotels,
colleges, schools, hospitals and factories".
These preceding words clearly bring out the
intention of legislature to identity and subject
to tax certain buildings, on the basis of their
user such as boarding accommodation for
students
etc.;
educational
institutions;
hospitals and factories. (Para 22)

C. Notice issued u/s.73(a) is only a
proposal and not a decision. Decision
must precede and exist independent of
the procedure for revision of assessment
list. Adjudicatory procedure cannot be
adopted to create a law. Otherwise, it
would confer powers to pick and choose,
and also deprive the owner/occupier of
its right to file objections (u/s 76) to the
revision. (Para 25-27, 29, 31-33)

D. In a case where CEO had not accepted
the method of valuation proposed by
respondent, it would have been proper
for the Appellate Authority to remit the
case to the CEO, to pass fresh order as
per S.73(b). (Para 35) (E-4)

## Text

530 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Constitution of India in view of the
facts that have transpired and the
proceedings that the petitioner had
already availed. Also, substantially the
claim of the petitioner is found to be
lacking on merit. Once the cancellation
order has been accepted on merits, the
petitioner lost all rights to deal with
lawful or unlawful stock of liquor.

36. Insofar as the decision in the
case of Chandra Pal Singh Vs. State
of U.P. & 4 Ors. (supra) is concerned
from a bare perusal of the order dated
27.05.2014, it appears that the State
could not point out any provision of
law to resist that petition. Though the
SLP against that decision has been
dismissed, the submissions similar to
those advanced by the learned Standing
Counsel, in the present case, appear to
have been raised (in that case), only
upon review petition being filed. It
came to be rejected on a technical plea
that the same would fall outside the
scope of review. Thus since the
decision in Chandra Pal Singh Vs.
State of U.P.& 4 Ors. (supra) was
based, practically on the concession
made by the State, the further fact that
the SLP therefrom may have been
dismissed would not amount to any
declaration of law, that may bind the
Court. That decision would remain a
decision on facts.

37. However, there is no provision
of law which the learned Standing
Counsel could refer to as may enable the
excise authorities or the Collector to
confiscate any amount of cash that may
have been found at the time of inspection
or survey. The cash found is clearly not
excisable goods and there is no allegation
or finding against the petitioner that the
same were proceeds of unlawful trade in
liquor. In view of the above, the amount
of Rs. 17,530/- is liable to be refunded to
the petitioner forthwith, in accordance
with law. To that extent, the petition must
succeed. It is declared that the excise
authorities or the Collector had no
authority to confiscate the cash Rs.
17,530/-.

38. Accordingly, the petition is
partly allowed.
-------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.07.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.

CIVIL MISC. WRIT (TAX) PETITION NO. 311
of 2016

Cantonment Board, Meerut &Anr.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
M/S B.K. Das & Sons. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Udit Chandra

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Sri Kiran Kumar Arora, Miss
Priyanka Arora.

A. The Cantonment Act, 2006: Sections
73(a), 73(b), 76. The choice of method of
valuation
u/s
73(a)
and
73(b)
is
legislatively
predetermined-no
discretion with the assessing authority.
Adjudicatory
procedure
cannot
be
adopted to create law.
The two methods of valuation provided under
Sections 73(a) and (b) are mutually exclusive.
The choice of method to be adopted is
legislatively pre-determined. There is no
discretion or choice in that regard with the
assessing
authority.
(Para
19)
1 All. Cantonment Board, Meerut & Anr. Vs. M/S B.K. Das & Sons
531
B. Interpretation of S.73(a) - "any other
building". Intention of legislature to
identity and subject to similarly tax all
buildings in class of buildings, on the
basis of their identity emerging from use
and not otherwise.

The words "any other building" appearing in
S.73(a), appear after the words "hotels,
colleges, schools, hospitals and factories".
These preceding words clearly bring out the
intention of legislature to identity and subject
to tax certain buildings, on the basis of their
user such as boarding accommodation for
students
etc.;
educational
institutions;
hospitals and factories. (Para 22)

C. Notice issued u/s.73(a) is only a
proposal and not a decision. Decision
must precede and exist independent of
the procedure for revision of assessment
list. Adjudicatory procedure cannot be
adopted to create a law. Otherwise, it
would confer powers to pick and choose,
and also deprive the owner/occupier of
its right to file objections (u/s 76) to the
revision. (Para 25-27, 29, 31-33)

D. In a case where CEO had not accepted
the method of valuation proposed by
respondent, it would have been proper
for the Appellate Authority to remit the
case to the CEO, to pass fresh order as
per S.73(b). (Para 35) (E-4)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal
Singh J.)

1. Supplementary counter affidavit
titled 'Supplementary affidavit' has been
filed today by the respondent. Taken on
record. Learned counsel for the petitioner
does not propose to file any response to
the same. Accordingly, the matter has
been heard.

2. Heard Sri Udit Chandra, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Kiran
Kumar Arora, learned counsel for the
respondent.

3. The present writ petition has been
filed by the Cantonment Board, Meerut
against the judgement and order dated
23.11.2015 passed by learned Additional
District Judge, Court no.2, Meerut in Tax
Appeal No. 06 of 2010. By that order, the
learned court below has allowed the
appeal filed by the respondent and set
aside the revision of the assessment list
made by the Cantonment Board, by its
order dated 26.03.2009 passed under
Section 73(a) of the Cantonment Act,
2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Thereafter, the learned court below has
itself revised the assessment list of the
respondent under Section 73(b) of the Act
and thereby fixed the Annual Rateable
Value (ARV in short) of the buildings of
the respondent, at Rs. 4,96,000/- for the
period 2008 to 2011. Accordingly, the
demand of tax has been directed to be
taken out against the said respondent.

4. Admittedly, the respondent is the
holder of the occupancy rights in
Bungalow Nos. 170 & 170-A, Abu Lane,
Kabari Bazar, Meerut Cantt. He appears
to have let out part of those premises for
commercial use while the remaining part
of those premises is under his selfoccupation. Portions of those buildings
that have been let out are being used for
running a car showroom, a bank and a
shoe showroom.

5. By a notice dated 21.2.2009
issued by the Chief Executive Officer,
Meerut Cantt, it was proposed to revise
the ARV of the aforesaid properties being
Bungalow Nos. 170 & 170-A. In the
calculation
sheet
appended
to
the
aforesaid notice, the method of proposed
532 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
revision was disclosed - Cost of Land =
(Area x STR x 40 x 2) / 10. Thereafter,
the cost of construction was disclosed at
rate applicable to the constructed area and
the Annual Rateable Value (ARV) was
proposed to be calculated applying the
formula - ARV = (Cost of land + Cost of
Construction) / 20. The respondent filed
his objections to the aforesaid notice and
disputed the proposed computation. He
relied on the annual rent received by him
from letting out all parts of the premises.
Thus, the method of computation of ARV
proposed by the Cantonment Board was
disputed.

6. The Chief Executive Officer,
rejected that objection by his order dated
30.03.2009. In that order, the Chief
Executive Officer referred to Section
73(a)
of
the
Act
and
proceeded
accordingly. Inasmuch as the notice for
revision of the assessment had been
issued disclosing the basis for that as
provided under Section 73(a) of the Act,
the actual rent received by the respondent
was found not relevant, hence not
considered.

7. In the appeal before the
Additional
District
Judge,
specific
objections were raised that the procedure
adopted under Section 73(a) of the Act
was not applicable. The said objections
found favour with the learned Additional
District Judge, who has reasoned that
there was no prior decision of the Chief
Executive Officer to adopt the method
provided under Section 73(a) of the Act,
before proceeding to revise the ARV of
the
buildings
of
the
respondent.
Thereafter, the learned Additional District
Judge has set-aside the revision to the
assessment as made. Further, he has
himself
proceeded
to
consider
the
material on record and made a revision to
the assessment on the basis of rent
received i.e. he has proceeded to revise
the ARV under section 73(b) of the Act.

8. Assailing the above order, learned
counsel for the petitioner submits, in the
first place, the notice dated 21.2.2009
read with the calculation sheet clearly
disclosed the decision of the Chief
Executive Officer to proceed to revise the
ARV of the respondent under Section
73(a) of the Act. That notice was also
acted upon and the respondent furnished
his reply disclosing the computation
under Section 73(a) of the Act at Rs.
95,00,000/-. Therefore, it has been
submitted, there was no error in the
assessment made by the Chief Executive
Officer
and
the
learned
Additional
District Judge has erred in setting aside
that assessment.

9. Once the notice itself disclosed
the decision made by the Chief Executive
Officer to proceed under Section 73(a) of
the Act, there was no further or other
decision required to be taken or disclosed
by him. Further, referring to the language
of Section 76 of the Act, it has been
submitted, learned Additional District
Judge has completely erred in reaching
the conclusion that there was no decision
to proceed under Section 73(a) of the Act.

10. In that regard, it has also been
submitted, no other interpretation can be
given to the language of Section 73(a) of
the Act inasmuch as if any other or
separate decision were to be made,
another step or condition would have been
introduced before a notice for assessment
may be issued. Neither there is such
suggestion arising from a plain reading of
the language of Section 73 of the Act nor
1 All. Cantonment Board, Meerut & Anr. Vs. M/S B.K. Das & Sons
533
there is any procedure provided therefor.
Therefore, the order passed by the learned
Additional District Judge is patently
erroneous. On the other hand a complete
opportunity to rebut the proposed revision
of assessment was available to the
respondent under Section 76 of the Act,
which had also been availed.

11. Alternatively, it has been
submitted, in any case, the Cantonment
Board had never made any assessment
under Section 73(b) of the Act and that
course should have been left open to the
Cantonment Board to be adopted if the
assessment made under Section 73(a) of
the Act was being set-aside but no final
assessment could have been made at the
hands of the appellate authority.

12. Responding to the above, Shri
Arora submits, Section 73 of the Act
provides
for
definition
of
"Annual
Rateable Value" (ARV in short) of
different premises. It reads:

"73. Definition of "annual
rateable value"- For the purposes of this
chapter, "annual rateable value" means-

(a) in the case of hotels,
colleges, schools, hospitals, factories and
any other buildings which the Chief
Executive Officer decides to assess under
this clause, one-twentieth of the sum
obtained by adding the estimated present
cost of erecting the building to the
estimated value of the land appertaining
thereto; and

(b) in the case of building or
land not assessed under clause (a), the
gross annual rent for which such building
exclusive of furniture or machinery
therein or such land is actually let or,
where the building or land is not let or in
the opinion of the Chief Executive Officer
is let for a sum less than its fair letting
value, might reasonably be expected to let
from year to year:

Provided that, where the annual
rateable value of any building is, by
reason of exceptional circumstances, in
the opinion of the President Cantonment
Board, excessive if calculated in the
aforesaid
manner,
the
President
Cantonment Board may fix the annual
rateable value at any less amount which
appears to him to be just".

13. In the first place, under subsection (a), a method has been provided to
compute the ARV. By very nature, such a
method would lead to the computation of
the highest ARV as the value of the land
and the present value of the construction
form the basis for such computation,
which value is bound to escalate with
time while actual rent payable for such
premises may or may not increase,
correspondingly or proportionately.

14. The Act has prescribed that
method for assessment of the ARV of
buildings where hostels, colleges, schools,
hospitals and factories are being run.
Admittedly, the present buildings do not
fall under that description. Then, "any
other building" that may be subjected to
that highest ARV would have to be first
included or notified by a decision made
by the Chief Executive Officer. Inasmuch
there was no prior decision of the Chief
Executive Officer to apply the provisions
of Section 73(a) of the Act to the class of
buildings, namely, banks, car or other
showrooms, section 73(a) of the Act
could not have been applied for the
purpose of making the revision to the
ARV of such building/s.
534 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

15. Even at the stage of the original
assessment,
in
his
objection,
the
respondent had clearly relied on the actual
rental value of the premises in question as
the basis to determine their ARV and had
thereby relied on section 73(b) of the Act.
Only in the alternative, by way of
argument, it had offered valuation in
accordance with Section 73(a) of the Act.

16. As to the assessment made by
the Appellate Authority, it has been
submitted, the actual rental value of the
premises, as disclosed by the respondent,
was never disputed by the Cantonment
Board and, therefore, the Appellate
Authority has not erred in accepting the
same in the interest of bringing a closure
to an old dispute. Even in the present
petition, the computation offered by the
respondent has not been disputed on facts.
Therefore, the present writ petition
deserves to be dismissed.

17. Having heard learned counsel
for the parties and having perused the
record, in the first place, it cannot be said
that the respondent had not objected to the
method of assessment proposed in the
notice dated 21.02.2009. While the ARV
was proposed to be revised solely on the
basis of method provided under Section
73(a) of the Act, the respondent clearly
objected to the same and offered the
properties for assessment on the basis of
actual rent received. Therefore, the
respondent had clearly invoked the
provision under Section 73(b) of the Act
as the correct basis for making the
assessment.

18. Then, the statutory intendment is
clear. ARV of "all other buildings",
falling outside the description of buildings
used to run hostels, colleges, schools,
hospitals and factories may, in the first
place may be determined under Section
73(b) of the Act, i.e. on the basis of the
gross annual rent for which such building
is actually let. That value may be much
lower and in any case would be different
from the value determined under Section
73(a) of the Act owing to difference in
method of computation. Besides the fact
that the value of the land appurtenant and
current value of construction of such
building are not to be included in the
ARV, in any case, the actual rent received
may have too far fetched and/or no direct
or proportionate or rationale connection
with the total value of the property in
question.

19. Also, it plainly emerges from a
reading of section 73 of the Act that the
two methods provided thereuder are
mutually exclusive. The choice of the
method to be adopted to estimate the
ARV of any particular building is
legislatively pre-determined. Under the
mandatory prescription made by the
legislature, the ARV of the types of
buildings classified under sub-clause (a)
of section 73 of the Act, alone has to be
determined in the manner prescribed
under that provision of law. Similarly, all
other buildings have to be subjected to
determination of ARV under section
73(b) of the Act, according to the method
prescribed
thereunder.
There
is
no
discretion or choice in that regard with the
assessing authority to choose one or the
other method. That choice is legislatively
governed.

20. Therefore, in such fact and in
such position of law, the objections are
found to clearly bring out that the
respondent had taken a categorical stand
that the property be assessed under
1 All. Cantonment Board, Meerut & Anr. Vs. M/S B.K. Das & Sons
535
Section 73(b) of the Act on the basis of
actual rent received and not on the basis
of value of the land and the current value
of erection of all construction existing
thereon. By way of an alternative stand,
the respondent had disclosed the value for
the purposes of Section 73(a) of the Act.
It would not, in any way, dilute the
objection that the properties could not be
assessed under Section 73(a) of the Act.
In view of the mandatory legislative intent
noted above, there is no room to consider
acquisence or estoppel, contrary to law.
Thus, it has to be accepted that the
respondent had objected to the method
adopted by the Chief Executive Officer
under Section 73(a) of the Act.

21. Coming to the core issue,
whether the properties could have been
assessed under Section 73(a) of the Act,
that provision of law provides a special
method for computation of the ARV with
respect to class of buildings namely
hostels, colleges, schools, hospitals and
factories. While generally, all buildings
(irrespective of their use), are subjected to
tax on the basis of their ARV assessed
under section 73(b) of the Act, certain
specified categories or class of buildings
have been excluded from applicability of
the general method provided under
Section 73(b) of the Act, on the basis of
their user. They must necessarily be
assessed to tax by the Cantonment Board
by applying the method provided under
section 73(a) of the Act i.e. one-twentieth
of the sum total of the value of the land
and the estimated present cost of
construction of the building standing
thereon.

22. The car and other showroom and
bank being run in the buildings of the
respondent clearly and admitedly do not
fall in the description of buildings
specifically given in section 73(a) of the
Act. They are neither hostels nor colleges
nor schools nor hospitals nor factories.
Then coming to the power delegated by
the legislature upon the Chief Executive
Officer of the Cantonment Board, to
include "any other building" to which the
method
of
determination
of
ARV
provided under section 73(a) may be
applied, in the first place the power
delegated is legislative not executive.
Then, the words "any other building"
appearing in section 73(a) of the Act,
appear after the words "hostels, colleges,
schools, hospitals and factories". These
preceeding words clearly suggest or bring
out the intention of the legislature to
identify and subject to tax certain
buildings (by following the method
specified therein), on the basis of their
user such as boarding accomodation for
students etc.; educational institutions;
hospitals and factories.

23. Therefore reading the entire
provision of section 73(a) consistently the
phrase "any other building" may be also
read as referring to any building identified
as a class/type of buildings, chosen on the
basis of general use to which it is put and
not on the basis of its ownership or
individual sub-identity. Just as all hostels
or all colleges or all schools or all
hospitals or all factories, without any
exception
would
be
subjected
to
assessment in accordance with provisions
of section 73(a) of the Act, so also, "any
other building" that may be included by
delegated legislative action would have to
belong to a class of building identified by
its user such that all buildings being put to
similar
use
would
necessarily
be
simultaneously subjected to the same
method of valuation of ARV.
536 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

24. The legislature has clearly chosen
to first specify certain class/type of buildings,
on the basis of their user as the basis to apply
the exceptional or special method of
valuation of their ARV. In absence of other
any statutory indication to the contrary, the
language in the later part of the sub-section
must be read in consonance with that
inherent/underlying legislative intent or
guideline. The same basis or criteria must
bind the delegate of the legislature in
exercise of his powers, to include and thus
subject to tax "any other building" in
accordance with the method contained in
section 73(a) of the Act.

25.

Even
otherwise,
if
the
submission being advanced by learned
counsel for the petitioner is to be
accepted, though in the first place, Section
73(a) of the Act would apply to a class of
buildings
namely
hostels,
colleges,
schools, hospitals and factories but the
Chief Executive Officer could chose to
adopt the method provided under that subsection
to
one
particular
building
belonging to any other class and leave out
the remaining buildings of the same class.

26. Thus, the Chief Executive
Officer of the Cantonment Board could
include one car or other showroom or
bank within the scope of Section 73(a) of
the Act while leaving all other similarly
situated car or other showrooms or banks
from the ambit of that provision. It would
lead
to
grossly
different
property
assessments being made within the same
cantonment area, though the nature and
use of all such buildings may be the same
and even though they may be situated in
vicinity and even though they may be
owned by the same person and be
fetching exactly same amount of actual
annual rent.

27. The said interpretation would in
effect allow the Chief Executive Officer
to pick and choose according to his
whims and fancies, some of the buildings
to a higher rate of tax while leaving out
all others in the same class. Besides the
fact that such interpretation would be
plainly arbitrary it would be wholly
contrary to the legislative intent contained
in the first part of the Section 73(a) of the
Act where the legislature itself has chosen
to subject all occupants of same category
of buildings to be treated similarly, based
on the objective criteria of use to which
the buildings have been put. If allowed it
would
necessarily
introduce
plain
arbitrariness and hostile discrimination in
the enforcement of law.

28. Second, in the facts of the
present case, there does not appear to
exist any decision by the Chief Executive
Officer to subject car or other showrooms
or banks to tax or revision of tax under
Section 73(a) of the Act. No decision has
been
brought
on
record
nor
any
communication issued by the Chief
Executive Officer has been brought on
record in that regard. Therefore, that
power is not shown to have been
exercised. Hence, it was not open to the
Chief Executive Officer to apply the
provisions of Section 73(a) of the Act
against the respondent.

29. Still otherwise, if it is assumed
that the power under section 73(a) of the
Act could be applied to subject individual
building/s to the method of determination
of ARV provided therein, the submission
that the notice dated 20.02.2009 itself
contained the decision of the Chief
Executive Officer to invoke Section 73(a)
of the Act also cannot be accepted. That
decision must, by very nature, precede
1 All. Cantonment Board, Meerut & Anr. Vs. M/S B.K. Das & Sons
537
and also be shown to exist independent of
the procedure for the revision of the
assessment list.

30. The proposal to revise the
assessment list is a proposal to which the
owner or occupier has a right to object by
virtue of Section 76 of the Act. Therefore,
normally there would arise objections that
any particular building does not subscribe to
the description of class or type of buildings
specified under section 73(a) of the Act
and/or to the valuation proposed of such a
building,
however,
it
cannot
be
contemplated that in such proceedings it
may be objected and thereafter adjudicated
whether a building be included thereunder
or be subjected to that method of valuation.

31. Whether there exists a decision
to provide for a category specification of
the building (that may be subjected to
such revision under Section 73(a) of the
Act) or not either by plain declaration
made by the principal legislature (or by
his delegate, the Chief Executive Officer),
is a matter of existence or otherwise of
statutory law - whether by way of principal
legislation or delegated legislation. The only
issue that may fall for consideration is the
existence or otherwise of such law or
whether the subject building ascribes to that
law. However, this adjudicatory procedure
cannot be adopted or be utilised to create a
law. It would remain a matter that would fall
outside the scope of the Section 76 of the
Act. Such decision would remain a
legislative action and therefore it must be
shown to exist independent of the notice
containing the proposal to revise the
assessment. Even otherwise, the notice
issued under section 73(a) of the Act is only
a proposal and not a decision, which may or
may not be enforced upon the final order
being passed.

32. In other words, the proposal to
revise the assessment is consequential to
the decision of the Chief Executive
Officer that must precede the issuance of
the notice. Unless a decision is first made
to categorize buildings to be subjected to
the higher/different method of valuation
under section 73(a) of the Act, it cannot
be left open to the Chief Executive
Officer to issue a notice seeking to revise
such assessment.

33. Keeping in mind that the
decision to be made by the Chief
Executive Officer would be an act of
delegated legislation there cannot be
allowed to exist any ambiguity about its
existence. The decision must be clearly
taken and disclosed to all before any
notice may be been issued to revise the
assessment list on that basis. Any
ambiguity about its pre-existence may
invalidate the exercise of the power itself.

34. The further submission advanced
by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that there is no procedure provided for
making the decision by the Chief
Executive Officer, to include any other
buildings within the scope of Section
73(a) of the Act, does not appeal to
reason. While making such a decision, the
Chief Executive Officer acts as a delegate
of the legislature and not as a quasijudicial authority. Therefore, principally,
there is neither any procedure required to
be followed to exercise that power, nor
rules
of
natural
justice
have
any
application to that exercise.

35. However, the last submission
advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner
does
merit
acceptance,
inasmuch as the Chief Executive Officer
has only made assessment under Section
538 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
73(a) of the Act and had not applied his
mind to the nature of objections raised by
the respondent nor he considered the
material produced with reference to
Section 73(b) of the Act. In such a case,
where the applicability of Section 73(a) of
the Act was in dispute, the CEO had not
accepted
the
method
of
valuation
proposed by the respondent, it would have
been proper for the Appellate Authority to
remit the case to the Chief Executive
Officer, to pass a fresh order in
accordance with Section 73(b) of the Act.

36. Accordingly, the writ petition
succeeds in part. While findings of the
Appellate
Authority
regarding
the
assessment made under Section 73(a) of the
Act being illegal are wholly proper and are
thus sustained, the later part of the order
making quantification/ assessment under
Section 73(b) of the Act is found to be premature and is accordingly set-aside. The
matter is remitted to the Chief Executive
Officer, Cantonment Board, Meerut Cantt, to
pass a fresh order, in light of the observations
made above, as expeditiously as possible,
preferably within a period of three months
from today, after affording reasonable
opportunity of hearing to the respondent.

37. The writ petition is accordingly
partly allowed.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.07.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 78 of 2018

M/s Camphor & Allied Products Ltd.
 ...Petitioner
Versus
Unionof India & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Nishant Mishra, Sri Kartikeya Narain

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Ramesh Chandra Shukla, S.C.

A. Interpretation - Period of limitation to
file rebate claim. General and Special law
- Central Excise Act, 1944: Section 11BCentral Excise Tariff Act, 1985: First
Schedule read with Rule 18 Central
Excise
Rules,
2002;
Central
Excise
Notification
No.
19/2004
dated
06.09.2004 (Clauses (2), 3(b), 3(c)) and;
Central Excise Notification No. 18/2016
dated 01.03.2016. Special law to prevail
over general law.

Notification contains special scheme of
rebate to exporters. It is a self-contained
code. It does not prescribe any limitation
for filing a rebate claim. General period
of limitation provided under Section 11B
of Central Excise Act, does not apply to
such a special case. No time limit to file
rebate claim by exporter.

The petitioner filed claims for rebate of excise
duty more than one year after the actual
shipment of the goods. Adjudicating authority
rejected the claims as barred by time u/s 11B.
The appeals, and further revisions filed against
the orders of the appellateauthority, were also
rejected. Allowing the present petition, the
High Court. Held:- Notification No. 19/2004
provided a special and comprehensive scheme
for
filing
rebate
claims
by
exporters.
Notification No. 19/2004 was a self-contained
code in respect of matters covered under the
Notification. The general provisions in Section
11B of the Central Excise Act, would not apply
while considering the rebate claims covered by
Notification No. 19/2004. No time limit for
filing rebate claims was provided under
Notification No. 19/2004 till its amendment by
Notification No. 18/2016 with effect from
01.03.2016. (Para 34, 35, 36, 37)

Precedent followed: -
1. DCCE Vs. Dorcas Market Makers Pvt. Ltd., 2015
(321) ELT 45 (Mad.) (Para 15, 27, 28, 29, 37, 40)