# Chabila v. Ramawater

- **Citation:** (2022) 10 ILRA 1155
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-08-23
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 417 of 2022
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chabila-v-ramawater-47679
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law
-
Suit
for
Specific
Performance - Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 - Order XLI Rule 11; Specific Relief
Act, 1963 - Sections 16, 18, 20, 21 &
20(2)(b) r/w Explanation II of the Act - A
plea of non-est factum is different from
fraud. In case of a plea of fraud, the case
has to be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Here, a plea of fraud was raised and an
issue about it was framed at the defendant's
instance. So far as a rustic villager is concerned,
the burden of proof, in case of either plea of
fraud or non-est factum, be reversed, but that
1156 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
has not been done in this case. There is no
pleading to the effect that the defendant is an
illiterate and rustic villager, unacquainted with
the ways of the world. This submission appears
to have been inspired by the stand taken during
arguments before the Trial Court, which the
Trial Court has rightly rejected in the absence of
requisite pleadings. (Para 13)

B. The suit agreement is a registered
document,
wherein,
there
is
a
presumption of correctness about the
Registrar's endorsement. The presumption
is rebuttable, but there is no evidence led
to offset the strong presumption that
attaches. The said finding has been affirmed
by the Lower Appellate Court also. (Para 15)

C. Defendant's case of hardship - Mere
fact that the defendant has made a bad
bargain is no ground to refuse specific
performance. It has been noticed that the
defendant has a total of 30 bighas of
agricultural land located in more than one
village. It has been remarked that it is not the
defendant's case that in the event specific
performance being granted, he would become
landless, or that his livelihood would be effaced.
It has been opined that if a decree of specific
performance is passed, the defendant
would not face that kind of hardship as
envisaged under Section 20(2)(b), read
with Explanation II of the Act of 1963. It
must be remarked that this position of the law is
about the way it stood before its amendment
vide The Specific Relief (Amendment) Act,

## Text

10 All. Chabila Vs. Ramawater
1155

21. In Dilawar Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2015) 1 SCC 737, the Supreme
Court reiterated the same in paragraphs 36
and 37 as under :

"36. The court of appeal would
not ordinarily interfere with the order of
acquittal unless the approach is vitiated by
manifest illegality. In an appeal against
acquittal, this Court will not interfere with
an order of acquittal merely because on the
evaluation of the evidence, a different
plausible view may arise and views taken
by the courts below is not correct. In other
words, this Court must come to the
conclusion that the views taken by the
learned courts below, while acquitting,
cannot be the views of a reasonable person
on the material on record.

37. In Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka, the scope of power of
appellate court dealing with an appeal
against acquittal has been considered
and this Court held as under: (SCC p.432
para 42) "42....(4) An appellate court,
however, must bear in mind that in case
of acquittal, there is double presumption
in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless
he is proved guilty by a competent court
of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of
his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court."

Unless there are substantial and
compelling reasons, the order of acquittal
is not required to be reversed in appeal. It
has been so stated in State of Rajasthan v.
Shera Ram."

22. Considering the above legal
position and the factual aspects of the case,
I am of the view that the trial Judge was
justified
in
acquitting
the
accusedrespondent.

23. The Appeal is, accordingly,
dismissed.
----------
(2022) 10 ILRA 1155
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.08.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Second Appeal No. 417 of 2022

Chabila ...Appellant
Versus
Ramawater ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Mridul Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Jitendra Kumar Ravat

A.
Civil
Law
-
Suit
for
Specific
Performance - Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 - Order XLI Rule 11; Specific Relief
Act, 1963 - Sections 16, 18, 20, 21 &
20(2)(b) r/w Explanation II of the Act - A
plea of non-est factum is different from
fraud. In case of a plea of fraud, the case
has to be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Here, a plea of fraud was raised and an
issue about it was framed at the defendant's
instance. So far as a rustic villager is concerned,
the burden of proof, in case of either plea of
fraud or non-est factum, be reversed, but that
1156 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
has not been done in this case. There is no
pleading to the effect that the defendant is an
illiterate and rustic villager, unacquainted with
the ways of the world. This submission appears
to have been inspired by the stand taken during
arguments before the Trial Court, which the
Trial Court has rightly rejected in the absence of
requisite pleadings. (Para 13)

B. The suit agreement is a registered
document,
wherein,
there
is
a
presumption of correctness about the
Registrar's endorsement. The presumption
is rebuttable, but there is no evidence led
to offset the strong presumption that
attaches. The said finding has been affirmed
by the Lower Appellate Court also. (Para 15)

C. Defendant's case of hardship - Mere
fact that the defendant has made a bad
bargain is no ground to refuse specific
performance. It has been noticed that the
defendant has a total of 30 bighas of
agricultural land located in more than one
village. It has been remarked that it is not the
defendant's case that in the event specific
performance being granted, he would become
landless, or that his livelihood would be effaced.
It has been opined that if a decree of specific
performance is passed, the defendant
would not face that kind of hardship as
envisaged under Section 20(2)(b), read
with Explanation II of the Act of 1963. It
must be remarked that this position of the law is
about the way it stood before its amendment
vide The Specific Relief (Amendment) Act,
20183. (Para 16)

D. Though the plaintiff has to prove and
establish a case that discretion ought to
be exercised in his favour, but where the
defendant does not come with clean
hands and suppresses material facts, the
discretion should not be exercised against
specific performance. The defendant's case
has been condemned by the Trial Court as false
about his defences of fraud and the defendant
being a moneylender, who had lent him money,
but misused his papers. It is on all these
premises that the learned Trial Judge has
exercised discretion also to grant specific
performance. The Appellate Court has gone
through the evidence and affirmed all these
findings. (Para 18)

The plaintiff's case is well established on the
foot of a registered document, i.e., the suit
agreement, which he has proved to the hilt on
the strength of evidence that he had led, both
oral and documentary. There is absolutely no
flaw in the findings returned by the two
Courts below concurrently, worth scrutiny
under Section 100 of the Code. There is no
substantial question of law involved in this
appeal, which is concluded by well considered
findings of fact.

Second appeal dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Om Prakash Vs Pooran Chand & anr., 2012
(1) CAR 79 (All) (Para 17)

2. Zarina Siddiqui Vs A. Ramalingam @ A.
Amarnathan, AIR 2015 SC 580 (Para 18)

Second appeal against the judgment and
decree
dated
07.03.2022
passed
by
Learned Additional District Court, Jalaun
at Orai.

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This is a defendant's second appeal,
arising
out
of
a
suit
for
specific
performance, which has been decreed by
both the Courts below.

2. Heard Mr. Mridul Kumar, learned
Counsel for the appellant in support of the
motion under Order XLI Rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 19081 and Mr.
Jitendra Kumar Ravat, learned Counsel,
who appears on caveat, on behalf of the
plaintiff-respondent.

3.

The
plaintiff-respondent,
Ramawatar, who shall hereinafter be
referred to as "the plantiff" instituted
Original Suit No. 210 of 2002, Ramawatar
10 All. Chabila Vs. Ramawater
1157
v. Chabila, before the Court of the Civil
Judge (Junior Division), Jalaun at Orai
claiming
specific
performance
of
a
registered
agreement
to
sell
dated
13.11.1998, executed in the plaintiff's
favour by Chabila, the sole defendantappellant.
The
defendant-appellant
aforesaid shall hereinafter be referred to as
"the defendant".

4. It is the plaintiff's case that the
defendant is the recorded bhumidhar-inpossession of an agricultural land bearing
Khasra No. 194 ad-measuring 1.165
hectares, situate in Mauja Dharguva,
Pargana Orai, Jalaun. It was asserted by the
plaintiff that the defendant was in need of
money and decided to sell-off his land
aforesaid to the plaintiff for a total sale
consideration
of
₹70,000/-.
For
the
purpose,
the
defendant
executed
a
registered agreement to sell in favour of the
plaintiff on 13.11.1998. At the time of
execution of the agreement, the plaintiff
paid, out of the agreed consideration, a sum
of ₹65,000/-. It was agreed between parties
that the plaintiff shall pay the remainder of
₹5,000/- within a period of one year and
thereupon, the defendant shall execute a
registered sale deed in favour of the
plaintiff, transferring the land subject
matter of the suit agreement. The land
aforesaid shall hereinafter be called as "the
suit property".

5. It is the plaintiff's case that the suit
agreement was executed in the SubRegistrar's Office and the earnest was also
paid there. The plaintiff has always been
ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract. It is also the plaintiff's case that
the defendant is bound under the suit
agreement to receive the remainder of the
sale consideration i.e. the sum of Rs.
₹5,000/- and execute a sale deed in his
favour. It is the plaintiff's further case that
he requested the defendant to execute the
sale deed in his favour, but the defendant
did no more than assure the plaintiff that he
would abide by his covenant. In fact, he did
not. The plaintiff, accordingly, caused a
notice dated 01.03.2022 to be served upon
the defendant, asking him to receive the
remainder of the consideration and execute
the requisite sale deed in his favour. The
said notice was never replied by the
defendant. The plaintiff then caused a
notice to be sent to the defendant's correct
address, asking the latter to remain present
in
the
Sub-Registrar's
Office
on
17.10.2002, for the purpose of executing
the covenanted sale deed upon receipt of
the balance sale consideration, in terms of
the suit agreement. He was present at the
Sub-Registrar's Office on 17.10.2002, but
the defendant did not turn up. Broadly on
this cause of action, the suit was instituted.

6. The defendant put in his written
statement, also carrying his counterclaim.
He admitted his ownership of the suit
property, but denied the plaintiff's case
almost about everything else. Most of the
defendant's case is carried in the additional
pleas, where it is averred that he was ailing
and needed a sum of ₹3,10,000/-. The
defendant approached one Ram Prakash, an
attesting witness of the suit agreement,
requesting a loan. Ram Prakash is alleged
to have assured the defendant that he would
secure him a loan of ₹30,000/-, which
would carry interest at the usual bank rate.
It is pleaded that the defendant being in
need of money, received a sum of
₹30,000/- from Ram Prakash at his home,
in
the
presence
of
witnesses,
on
13.01.1998. Ram Prakash said that the
defendant would have to execute some
papers to serve as security for the loan. It is
averred that Ram Prakash never disclosed
1158 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
what property he would have to encumber
as security. He is said to have made the
defendant thumb-mark blank stamp papers
and also supply his photographs. Ram
Prakash was alleged by the defendant to
have assured the latter that he would take
care of the paperwork. The defendant was
assured that as soon as he repays the loan,
the document would be returned to him.
The defendant has averred that he did not
know the plaintiff when the suit agreement
was executed. The defendant repaid a sum
of Rs. 30,000/- to Ram Prakash and asked
him to give back the document, to which
Ram Prakash is claimed to have responded,
telling the defendant that the document was
missing somewhere, and as soon as the
same was found, it would be returned to the
defendant. The defendant claims that he
demanded of Ram Prakash to return the
document, but Ram Prakash assured that he
would not ask the defendant to repay the
loan that he had already received. The
defendant came to know later on that the
plaintiff had brought a suit for specific
performance on the basis of the suit
agreement and secured an ex-parte decree
behind his back. The defendant moved to
set aside the ex-parte decree, which was
allowed. It is the defendant's case that on a
perusal of records, he came to know that
Ram Prakash had, in fact, caused an
agreement to sell to be scribed on those
blank stamp papers. It is also the
defendant's
case
the
plaintiff
is
a
moneylender and Ram Prakash would, on
his behalf, disburse loans to persons in
need. The plaintiff and the defendant never
entered into any bargain relating to sale of
the suit property that embodies the suit
agreement. The defendant never received
any notice from the plaintiff. It is the
defendant's case that the suit property is
very valuable and the defendant was never
in need to sell his land. The suit property, at
the relevant time, had a market value of at
least ₹10 lacs. The defendant is dependent
on the suit property for his livelihood.
There is no question of selling the said
property. If the defendant is made to part
with the suit property, he would suffer
great hardship. The defendant denied
execution of the suit agreement and
pleaded that it was the product of a fraud
played upon him. In the counterclaim, it
was prayed that a decree of declaration be
passed, adjudging the suit agreement void.
The defendant demanded that the suit be
dismissed with special costs.

7. A replication was put in on behalf
of
the
plaintiff,
traversing
the
counterclaim and reiterating the plaint
case.

8. On pleadings of parties, the
following issues were framed :

1.
Whether
the
defendant
executed an agreement to sell in favour of
the plaintiff on 13.11.1998 for Rs.
70,000/-? If yes, its effect?

2. Whether the agreement to sell
dated 13.11.1998 was got executed by the
plaintiff for the purpose of securing the
loan? If yes, its effect?

3.
Whether
the
disputed
agreement is based on fraud?

4. Whether the suit of the
plaintiff is barred by Sections 16, 18, 20
and 21 of the Specific Relief Act?

5. Whether the defendant is
entitled through the counterclaim in
paragraph 21 of written statement to get
the disputed document declared void and
illegal?

6. Whether the counterclaim of
the defendant is time barred?

7. Whether insufficient court fee
has been paid on the counterclaim?
10 All. Chabila Vs. Ramawater
1159

8. To what relief, if any, is the
plaintiff entitled?

9. The learned Trial Judge has set out
a summary of the documentary evidence as
well as the description of witnesses
examined by both sides in support of their
respective cases, and the same need not be
listed here again. Of course, reference
would be made to so much of the evidence
as is necessary to dispose of this motion.

10. The Trial Court found on Issue
No. 6 against the defendant, holding the
counterclaim to be time-barred. Issues Nos.
5 and 7 followed the result of the answer to
Issue No. 6, and were answered against the
defendant. Issues Nos. 2 and 3 were taken
up together and answered against the
defendant. Issue No. 1 has been answered
for the plaintiff. Issue No. 4 has been
answered against the defendant. Issue No.
8, that relates to the exercise of discretion
to grant specific performance of contract
under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act,
19632 has been answered in favour of the
plaintiff. The suit has been decreed for the
relief of specific performance, though with
a direction for the costs to go easy.

11. Upon the defendant's appeal to the
learned District Judge, the Additional
District Judge, Court No. 1, Jalaun at Orai,
has reviewed the entire evidence issuewise, and affirmed the Trial Court,
reiterating the Trial Court's decree in
speaking terms. The Lower Appellate
Court too, directed costs to go easy.

12. Aggrieved, the defendant has
instituted the present appeal.

13. Mr. Mridul Kumar,, learned
Counsel for the appellant, has argued
before this Court that his client is a rustic
villager and burden of proof ought to have
been reversed, requiring the plaintiff to
affirmatively prove that the defendant
executed
the
suit
agreement
after
understanding its contents. This Court must
immediately clarify that a plea of non-est
factum is different from fraud. Here, a plea
of fraud was raised and an issue about it
was framed at the defendant's instance. So
far as a rustic villager is concerned, the
burden of proof, in case of either plea of
fraud or non-est factum, be reversed, but
that has not been done in this case. The
submission of the learned Counsel for the
appellant that the burden of proof should
have been reversed in this case, does not
appear to be tenable, because for one, it is
not in every case of an illiterate man - even
a rustic, that the burden of proof has to be
reversed, like a pardanasheen woman or a
certain class of women, unacquainted with
the ways of the world. In the case of a man,
it has to be demonstrated that apart from
being illiterate and rustic, he is absolutely
unacquainted with worldly affairs. The said
question does not remotely arise in this
case, irrespective of the fact that fraud is
pleaded or non-est factum, because there is
no pleading to the effect that the defendant
is
an
illiterate
and
rustic
villager,
unacquainted with the ways of the world.
This submission appears to have been
inspired
by
the
stand
taken
during
arguments before the Trial Court, which the
Trial Court has rightly rejected in the
absence of requisite pleadings.

14. On the other hand, the Trial Court
has dealt with the issue of fraud with a
remarkably fine understanding of the law
and with an equally remarkable marshalling
of evidence. The evidence has rightly been
appreciated in its finest detail. The Trial
Court has held that in case of a plea of
fraud, the case has to be established beyond
1160 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reasonable doubt. He has referred to
binding
authority
on
the
point.
In
appreciating the evidence, the learned Trial
Judge has referred to the testimony of
D.W.-2, about whom it has been very
carefully remarked that he is a brother of
one of the attesting witnesses, Shiv
Narayan. This witness's testimony has been
appreciated
to
remark
that
whereas
according to his pleading in the written
statement, the defendant was made to sign
blank stamp papers, the witness under
reference has said in his cross-examination
that the papers which the defendant signed
in his presence were plain and not stamp
papers. It has also been noticed that the
witness D.W.-2 has said that Ramawatar
(the plaintiff) had not given any loan to
Chabila (the defendant). This witness has
gone on to say that Ramawatar is into the
business of money lending. It is further
stated that he has just heard about this fact.
From these facts, the Trial Court has
remarked that it shows that this witness's
testimony about Ramawatar being into the
business of money lending is hearsay and
negatived the case on its basis. The
evidence of D.W.-3 has also been noticed
with the remark that he has not supported
the case of the defendant at all in the crossexamination and turned hostile. The Trial
Court has remarked that heavy burden lay
upon the defendant to prove the plea of
fraud and two of his witnesses have not at
all supported that case. The finding of the
Trial Court on Issues Nos. 2 and 3 is
absolutely flawless. The Appellate Court
has rightly affirmed the findings.

15. So far as Issue No. 1 goes, the
Trial Court has held that the suit agreement
is a registered document, wherein, there is a
presumption of correctness about the
Registrar's endorsement. The presumption
is rebuttable, but there is no evidence led to
offset the strong presumption that attaches.
The said finding has been affirmed by the
Lower Appellate Court also. In deciding
Issue No. 3, the Trial Court has again held
that there is a plea that the suit is barred by
Sections 16, 18, 20 and 21 of the Act of
1963, but there is no pleading elucidating
how the suit is barred under the said
provisions.

16. The Trial Court has dealt with the
defendant's case of hardship, thoroughly
examining the evidence on record. It has
been noticed that the defendant has a total
of 30 bighas of agricultural land located in
more than one village. It has been remarked
that it is not the defendant's case that in the
event specific performance being granted,
he would become landless, or that his
livelihood would be effaced. It has been
opined that if a decree of specific
performance is passed, the defendant
would not face that kind of hardship as
envisaged under Section 20(2)(b), read
with Explanation II of the Act of 1963. It
must be remarked that this position of the
law is about the way it stood before its
amendment vide The Specific Relief
(Amendment) Act, 20183. The Trial
Court Court has also opined that though
according to prevalent circle rate, the
price of the suit property for the purposes
of stamp duty, would be a sum of ₹1.68
lacs, the sum of ₹70,000/- for which the
bargain has been struck is apparently the
result of circumstances that made the
defendant choose to enter into that
bargain. It is opined by the Trial Court
that the mere fact that the defendant has
made a bad bargain is no ground to refuse
specific performance. This finding too
has
been
affirmed
by
the
Lower
Appellate Court. In our opinion, there is
no perversity about this finding or any
illegality besetting it.
10 All. Chabila Vs. Ramawater
1161

17. In deciding Issue No. 8, the Trial
Court has gone into every possible detail of
relevant evidence that ought to enter
consideration before exercising discretion
to grant specific performance. He has also
considered the issue of directing a higher
price to be paid in terms of the decisions of
this Court in Om Prakash v. Pooran
Chand and another. It has been opined
that the bargain in this case has been
settled, because the defendant was in need
of money and he decided to do it at a lesser
price.

18. There is another reason why the
Trial
Court has
chosen
to
exercise
discretion in favour of the plaintiff, and that
is because the defendant apparently came
up with a false case of fraud and the
transaction being a loan, which he could
not prove. In doing that, the Trial Court has
relied on the principle laid down by the
Supreme Court in Zarina Siddiqui v. A.
Ramalingam
alias
A.
Amarnathan,
where it has been held that though the
plaintiff has to prove and establish a case
that discretion ought to be exercised in his
favour, but where the defendant does not
come with clean hands and suppresses
material facts, the discretion should not be
exercised against specific performance. The
defendant's case has been condemned by
the Trial Court as false about his defences
of fraud and the defendant being a
moneylender, who had lent him money, but
misused his papers. It is on all these
premises that the learned Trial Judge has
exercised discretion also to grant specific
performance. The Appellate Court has gone
through the evidence and affirmed all these
findings.

19. On a wholesome consideration of
the matter, this Court must remark that
there is not the slightest reason in the
present case to interfere with the concurrent
opinion of the two Courts below on any of
the issues involved. To add to it is the fact
that the case that the defendant pleaded was
that he had taken a loan, which he had
returned to the plaintiff's agent Ram
Prakash and asked him to give back his
papers,
which
the
latter
said
were
misplaced and did not return. This story to
the face of it pleaded in defence is enough
to tilt the balance of probability against the
defendant. The reason, to supplement the
reasoning of the Courts below, is that if
indeed the defendant had taken a loan from
the plaintiff through his agent, Ram
Prakash, which he repaid to Ram Prakash,
he would have certainly asked for a receipt.
Once Ram Prakash had made him execute a
registered document that the defendant
believed to be a document to secure the
loan, in the nature of things, repayment of
the loan could not have been without a
receipt.

20. In addition, it is also ex-facie a
preposterous stand because the loan being a
sum of ₹30,000/-, it is not possible that the
sum would have been refunded without
interest. There is nothing said apparently by
the defendant about the interest that he
repaid to Ram Prakash on the sum of
₹30,000/-. The entire story that the
defendant had come up with is laced with
falsehood and the Courts below have
rightly disbelieved the defendant's case.

21. On the other hand, the plaintiff's
case is well established on the foot of a
registered document, that is to say, the suit
agreement, which he has proved to the hilt
on the strength of evidence that he had led,
both oral and documentary. There is
absolutely no flaw in the findings returned
by the two Courts below concurrently,
worth scrutiny under Section 100 of the
1162 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Code. There is no substantial question of
law involved in this appeal, which is
concluded by well considered findings of
fact.

22. Before parting with the matter,
this Court must place on record its
profound appreciation for the very wellconsidered
and
exceptionally
wellstructured judgement written by the learned
Trial Judge Mr. Palash Ganguly. It shows
the finest marshalling of facts and evidence
and understanding of the law, considering
that the Trial Judge is a very junior Judicial
Officer.

23. In this result, this appeal is
dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the
Code.

24. There shall, however, be no order
as to costs.
----------
(2022) 10 ILRA 1162
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED:ALLAHABAD 29.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Matter under Art. 227 (Civil) No. 6339 of 2021

Har Narain Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Ravi Shanker Nigam ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Manoj Kumar Sharma

Counsel for the Respondent:
Ms. Shalini Goel, Mrs. Rama Goel Bansal

A. Civil Law - Tenancy - Eviction - The
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation
of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
(U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) - Sections
20(2)(a) & 20(2)(c); Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 - Section 106.

Requirement of notice - It is well settled
that
the
Rent
Control
Acts
do
not
completely supersede or supplant the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
governing the relationship of landlord and
tenant. Since there is no provision for
determination of tenancy in the Rent Control
Act, one has necessarily to look to the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The
phrase 'after the determination of his
tenancy' occurring in sub-section (2) of
Section 20 refers to the determination of
tenancy in accordance with law, i.e. in the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
This brings in Section 106. (Para 19)

The Revisional Court, therefore, went astray to
look for the duration of notice required to
terminate the tenancy in the provisions of
Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. The said period is to
be determined only with reference to the
provisions of S. 106 of the T.P. Act. To that
extent, the findings of the Revisional Court are
wrong. (Para 20)

B. Statutory period of a valid notice - No
doubt, the period of time required to
determine
a
lease
granted
for
a
manufacturing purpose is six months by
notice, but this statutory period is subject
to a contract, local law or usage to the
contrary. In the facts found here, the tenancy,
in the opinion of this Court, was clearly one for
month-to-month. It could be determined by a
month's notice. The notice to quit, therefore,
cannot be questioned on the said ground. (Para
21, 24)

Here, the Court finds that in the notice to quit
dated 26.09.2014, there is a clear assertion that
the tenant holds the demised premises on a
monthly rent of Rs. 150/-. In the rent receipts
also, there is consistent mention of rent at a
monthly rate. From all these circumstances, it is
evident that the lease always was one from
month-to-month. It was not a lease from yearto-year that S.106 of the T.P. Act postulates. A
contract to the contrary, notwithstanding the
lease being for a manufacturing purpose, is
clearly discernible. Therefore, the tenancy was