# Chandra Bhan Pratap Singh v. Executive Engineer, Deoria and others

- **Citation:** (2010) 3 ILRA 1291
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2010-09-01
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 78 of 2003
- **Bench:** F.I. Rebello, C.J. A.P. Sahi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chandra-bhan-pratap-singh-v-executive-engineer-deoria-and-others-41776
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

C.S.C.

U.P.
Govt.
Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal) Rules 1999- Rule 9-Punishment
without following procedure provided in
Rule 9-suggestion of previous enquiry
officer
regarding
warning-ignored
without recording any reason-change of
enquiry
officer
by
D.M.
(Incharge)
subsequent enquiry report-quantify huge
amount
of
recovery-without
giving
opportunity to the appellant deniei of
enquiry report being confidential recordheld-such approach not only unlawful
but malice in law-Single Judge ignored
this material aspect committed great
error-enquiry
Report
along
with
punishment
quashed-direction
to
conclude fresh enquiry within specified
period given.

Held: Para 25 and 26

Lastly the disagreement appears to be
not recorded in accordance with Rule 9
of the 1999 Rules, inasmuch as, it is
founded on surmises, namely that if the
schemes have been implemented by the
appellant after his suspension then the
guilt is established. There is nothing
indicated in the impugned order about
1292 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010
any such implementation having been
carried out after the suspension as
alleged,
and
which
also
stands
corroborated as the order was passed in
the absence of the original file. The
conclusion drawn that if a thief is caught
with stolen goods, then subsequent
return of the goods, does not absolve
him of the guilt, is an expression of a
rhetoric
which
cannot
supplant
or
substitute
the
reasons,
which
are
required for holding of a re-inquiry.

In our opinion, the order dated 24th
October, 2001 does not pass the test of
Wednsebury reasonableness, which is
inbuilt and expressly provided for in Rule
9 of the Rules. The order, therefore, is
unsustainable in law.
Case law discussed:
JT 1993 (6) SC 1, (2003) 4 SCC 739

Delivered by Hon'ble F.I. Rebello, C.J.)

## Text

3 All] Chandra Bhan Pratap Singh V. Executive Engineer, Deoria and others
1291
 being in force? In this connection it is
necessary to point out that under the
provisions of Order XIV, Rule 2 (2), C.P.C.
where the issue of law relates to the
jurisdiction of the Court or to a bar to the
suit created by law for instituting the
claim, the same shall be tried as
preliminary issue. Thus the issue of res
judicata must have some material bearing
with the jurisdiction of the court to try
subsequent suit or issue in a subsequent
suit
which
has
been
directly
and
substantially in issue in former suit and
has been heard and finally decided by the
Court having competence to decide such
suit or issue. Therefore, in this manner, the
issue of res judicata, in my considered
opinion, must relate to the jurisdiction of
the Court and also create a bar by law for
time being in force to try a subsequent suit
and thus satisfies the essential ingredients
of Order XIV, Rule 2 (2), C.P.C."

18. In view of the abovesaid facts
and legal position which has been stated in
the preceding paragraphs, and from a
perusal of sub- Rule 2 Order 14 it is clear
that an issue of law may be tried as a
preliminary issue provided it relates to the
jurisdiction of the Court or to a bar to the
suit created by law for the time being in
force.

19. For the foregoing reasons, the
revision is allowed, the impugned order
dated 11.01.2001 passed by trial court is
set aside and the matter is remanded back
to the trial court to decided the issue Nos. 5
and 6 as a preliminary issue after giving
opportunity of hearing of the parties
expeditiously preferably within a period of
three months from the date of receiving of
the certified copy of this order.
---------

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.09.2010

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE F.I. REBELLO, C.J.
THE HON'BLE A.P. SAHI, J.

Special Appeal No. 78 of 2003

Chandra Bhan Pratap Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Executive
Engineer,
Deoria
and
others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Surendra Tewari
Sri Vikas Kumar Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

U.P.
Govt.
Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal) Rules 1999- Rule 9-Punishment
without following procedure provided in
Rule 9-suggestion of previous enquiry
officer
regarding
warning-ignored
without recording any reason-change of
enquiry
officer
by
D.M.
(Incharge)
subsequent enquiry report-quantify huge
amount
of
recovery-without
giving
opportunity to the appellant deniei of
enquiry report being confidential recordheld-such approach not only unlawful
but malice in law-Single Judge ignored
this material aspect committed great
error-enquiry
Report
along
with
punishment
quashed-direction
to
conclude fresh enquiry within specified
period given.

Held: Para 25 and 26

Lastly the disagreement appears to be
not recorded in accordance with Rule 9
of the 1999 Rules, inasmuch as, it is
founded on surmises, namely that if the
schemes have been implemented by the
appellant after his suspension then the
guilt is established. There is nothing
indicated in the impugned order about
1292 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010
any such implementation having been
carried out after the suspension as
alleged,
and
which
also
stands
corroborated as the order was passed in
the absence of the original file. The
conclusion drawn that if a thief is caught
with stolen goods, then subsequent
return of the goods, does not absolve
him of the guilt, is an expression of a
rhetoric
which
cannot
supplant
or
substitute
the
reasons,
which
are
required for holding of a re-inquiry.

In our opinion, the order dated 24th
October, 2001 does not pass the test of
Wednsebury reasonableness, which is
inbuilt and expressly provided for in Rule
9 of the Rules. The order, therefore, is
unsustainable in law.
Case law discussed:
JT 1993 (6) SC 1, (2003) 4 SCC 739

Delivered by Hon'ble F.I. Rebello, C.J.)

1. This appeal questions the
correctness of the decision of a learned
Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the
appellant challenging the imposition of
recovery of a certain amount on alleged
charges
of
misappropriation
and
embezzlement. The petition failed upon a
finding that it was devoid of merits, hence
this appeal.

2. The appellant is a tube-well
operator working under the authority of
the
Executive
Engineer,
Tube-well
Division-II,
Head
Office
Salempur,
District
Deoria.
The
appellant
was
suspended on three charges, vide order
dated 6th January, 2001. The suspension
order recites that under the Maternity
Benefit Scheme, a sum of Rs. 12,700/-had
not been distributed and had been
misappropriated. Similarly an amount of
Rs.
1,49,500/-for
the
Girl
Child
Development
Scheme
was
also
misappropriated. The third allegation was
that under the Jawahar Rojgar Scheme,
the proposed construction to certain
extent were not carried out and an amount
of Rs.2,44,000/-for the said purpose was
embezzled.

3.

The
suspension
order
simultaneously
appoints
Mr.
K.P.
Dwivedi, the District Agricultural Officer,
Deoria as an Enquiry Officer to conduct
the enquiry.

4. The appellant appears to have
moved an application on 22nd January,
2001 for change of the Enquiry Officer on
certain allegations. The petitioner was
served with a charge sheet dated 25th
January, 2001 calling upon him to submit
his reply.

5. During the pendency of this
appeal, we had directed the learned
Standing Counsel to produce the original
records, which has been placed before us.

`
6. From a letter dated 27th June,
2001 available in the records, it appears
that Mr. K.P. Dwivedi, Enquiry Officer,
had been transferred and consequently,
the Executive Engineer sent the said
letter,
calling
upon
the
District
Agricultural Officer to proceed with the
enquiry against the appellant and the
appellant was called upon to submit his
reply to the charges to the said authority.

7. The enquiry report was submitted
by the succeeding Enquiry Officer Mr.
Amar Deo Singh on 18th July, 2001 and
the appellant was found guilty of the
charges of having misappropriated a sum
of Rs. 2,300/- only. The Enquiry Officer
further suggested that the appellant should
be issued an warning. The said enquiry
report was submitted before the Executive
3 All] Chandra Bhan Pratap Singh V. Executive Engineer, Deoria and others
1293
Engineer, who forwarded the same to the
Chief Development Officer, Deoria for
approval and appropriate action.

8. The report appears to have been
placed before the then District Magistrate
(In-charge) who passed an order on 24th
October, 2001 that the enquiry had been
entrusted to Mr.K.P. Dwivedi and,
therefore, the report submitted by Sri
Amar Deo Singh, District Agricultural
Officer was sheer nonsense and is a
concocted story. He further opined that
the original documents are not appended
to the file. It was also stated therein that
there are no details as to when the
Maternity Benefit Scheme or the Girl
Child
Development
Scheme
were
implemented,
and
in
case
the
implementation has been carried out after
the suspension of the appellant, then the
guilt is established. The logic given in
support of this conclusion is that, if a thief
is caught and he then returns back the
stolen property, he cannot absolve himself
of the guilt. He, therefore, directed that
Mr. Vijay Nath Mishra, Assistant Director
(Savings), who is an honest officer should
be asked to conduct the enquiry against
the appellant.

9. The appellant filed Civil Misc.
Writ Petition N, 35581 of 2001 for
quashing of the suspension order dated 6th
January, 2001, which was disposed of 0n
8th November, 2001, with a direction to
the Executive Engineer to complete the
departmental proceedings.

10. A notice was issued to the
appellant on 07.02.2002 calling upon him
to show cause and to submit a reply. The
said show cause notice recites that the
District Magistrate/Chief Development
Officer vide note dated 24.10.2001 had
disagreed with the earlier enquiry report
whereafter an enquiry was got conducted
through Sri Vijay Nath Mishra. The
appellant on 15th February, 2002 wrote a
letter to the disciplinary authority namely
the Executive Engineer that the said show
cause notice cannot be replied unless the
appellant is provided opportunity to
inspect the entire file as he was not aware
of the second enquiry having been set up
and conducted through Dr. Vijay Nath
Mishra.

11. The reply was submitted on 19th
February, 2002 whereafter the Executive
Engineer passed the order dated 29th
April, 2002 holding that the appellant was
guilty of having misappropriated an
amount of Rs.4,77,325, hence the same
should be realized from him @ Rs.3,500/-
per month to be deducted from his salary
in installments. This order was assailed by
the appellant in the writ petition giving
rise to the present appeal and an interim
order was passed on 14.06.2002 staying
the recovery proceedings.

12. The respondents filed a counter
affidavit through the Executive Engineer.
The stand taken by the respondents is that
the reply to the show cause notice given
by the petitioner was not found to be
satisfactory and the subsequent enquiry
which was conducted established that the
appellant was guilty of misappropriation,
In paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit, it
was categorically stated that in view of
the reply submitted by the appellant to the
enquiry proceedings conducted earlier,
and the reply to the show cause notice, it
was not necessary to associate the
appellant with the subsequent enquiry
proceedings. It has further been averred
therein that the enquiry report and the
evidence in support thereof is confidential
1294 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010
and, therefore, there was no obligation to
disclose the same to the appellant.

13. The writ petition was dismissed
holding that since the appellant had been
given an opportunity to show cause and,
therefore, the argument that the appellant
was not given any opportunity is not
correct.

14. Learned counsel for the
appellant submits that the learned Single
Judge committed a manifest error in
disposing of the matter without adverting
to the facts in relation to the second
enquiry that was conducted and has,
therefore, misdirected himself on the said
issue resulting in miscarriage of justice.
He submits that the impugned judgement
having
proceeded
on
erroneous
assumptions deserves to be set aside.

15. He further submits that Rule 9 of
the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999
(hereinafter referred to as 'the 1999
Rules') has not been followed and the
entire subsequent enquiry proceedings are
vitiated. It is urged that the subsequent
enquiry proceedings are an outcome of
malafides of the then District Magistrate
(In-charge), who for no valid reason got
another
enquiry
conducted
without
associating the appellant with the same,
and relying on the subsequent enquiry
report, the impugned order has been
passed, which is in violation of principles
of natural justice.

16. Learned counsel for the
appellant submits that the copy of the
enquiry report was not given to the
appellant and apart from thet, in view of
there being a substantive departure from
the rules and procedure, the entite action
smacks of arbitrariness, He submits that
there was no occasion for any re-enquiry
in the circumstances as indicated in the
order dated 24th October, 2001. The
learned Single Judge did not appreciate
the controversy in correct perspective and
has wrongly applied the ratio of the
decisions referred to in the judgement.

17. Mr. M.S. Peparsenia, learned
Standing
Counsel
submits
that
the
appellant had been given full opportunity
to contest the charges and the District
Magistrate (In-charge) was justified in
ordering a reenquiry keeping in view the
fact that the enquiry report submitted
earlier was not found to be credit worthy.
He submits that on merits, it is evident
that the appellant was guilty of the
charges even on the basis of the earlier
report and hence, the appellant deserved
to be punished. His contention is that the
subsequent enquiry is not vitiated and is
founded on the same material, which
existed at the time of the first enquiry.
The appellant having failed to give any
satisfactory reply to the conclusions
arrived at by the authority the order of
recovery cannot be faulted with.

18. Having heard learned counsel
for the parties, it would be apt to quote
Rule 9 of the 1999 Rules to reflect the
procedure applicable to an enquiry against
a Government servant:

"9. Action on Inquiry Report.- (1)
The disciplinary authority may, for
reasons to be recorded in writing, remit
the case for re-inquiry to the same or any
other Inquiry Officer under intimation to
the charged Government servant. The
Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed
to hold the inquiry from such stage as
3 All] Chandra Bhan Pratap Singh V. Executive Engineer, Deoria and others
1295
directed by the disciplinary authority,
according to the provisions of Rule 7.

(2) The disciplinary authority, if it
disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry
Officer on any charge, record its own
findings thereon for reasons to be
recorded.

(3) In case the charges are not
proved, the charged Government servant
shalll be exonerated by the disciplinary
authority of the charges and inform him
accordingly;

(4) If the disciplinary authority
having regard to its findings on all or any
of charges is of the opinion that any
penalty specified in Rule 3 should be
imposed on the charged Government
servant, he shall give a copy of the
inquiry report and his findings recorded
under sub-rule (2) to the charged
Government servant and require him to
submit his representation if he so desires,
within a reasonable specified time. The
disciplinary
authority
shall,
having
regard to all the relevant records relating
to the inquiry and representation of the
charged Government servant, if any, and
subject to the provisions of Rule 16 of
these rules, pass a reasoned order
imposing
one
or
more
penalties
mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules and
communicate the same to the charged
Government servant.

19. The facts I this case disclose that
the
appellant
was
subjected
to
a
disciplinary enquiry under the suspension
order dated 6th January, 2001 and Mr.
K.P. Dwivedi was appointed as an
Enquiry
Officer.
From
the
records
produced by the learned Standing Counsel
and the letter dated 27th June, 2001, it is
clear that the appointment of the said
Enquiry Officer was objected to by the
appellant with a request to appoint
somebody else as an Enquiry Officer.
However, before the said application
could be disposed of, Mr. K.P. Dwivedi,
Enquiry
Officer
had
already
been
transferred and Mr. Amar Deo Singh had
taken
over
charge
as
the
District
Agricultural Officer.

20. A perusal of the said letter
further indicates that the appellant was
directed to submit his reply before the
District
Agricultural
Officer
as
his
application for change of Enquiry Officer
became
Mr.
K.P.
Dwivedi.
This
document, therefore, establishes that the
District
Agricultural
Officer
was
appointed as an Enquiry officer to
proceed with the matter and the same also
stands corroborated by the averments
contained in Para 5 of the counter
affidavit to the writ petition.

21. Upon submission of the reply,
the enquiry was completed by Mr. Amar
Deo
Singh,
Enquiry
Officer
who
submitted his report on 18th July, 2001
and recommended a recovery of Rs.
2,300/- with a warning to be issued to the
appellant in order to avoid any further
repetition of such acts. The said report
appears to have been placed before the
Executive
Engineer,
who
is
the
disciplinary authority and in stead of
proceeding on the same, the said report
was forwarded to the Chief Development
Officer for approval and appropriate
action. The matter travelled up to the
District
Magistrate(In-charge)
who
expressed his anguish in the order dated
24th October, 2001 as noted above and
ordered a fresh enquiry.
1296 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010

22. In our considered opinion and
keeping in view the provisions of Rule 9
of the 1999 Rules, the reasons to be
recorded for holding a re-enquiry have to
be founded on some valid criteria. In the
instant case, the District Magistrate (Incharge) has opinionated that the enquiry
had been entrusted to Mr. K.P. Dwivedi
and, therefore, no other officer should
have conducted the enquiry. He described
the enquiry report of fMr. Amar Deo
Singh dated 18th July, 2001 as sheer
nonsense tailored to suit the appellant and
that it is a piece of story writing. To our
mind the first reason given that the
enquiry had been entrusted to Mr. K.P.
Dwivedi and not to Mr. Amar Deo Singh
is against records. From the letter dated
27th June, 2001, it is more than clear that
the appellant had objected to Mr. K.P.
Dwivedi being appointed as an Enquiry
Officer and a request had been made to
change him. Before the said application
could be disposed of, Mr. Dwivedi had
already
been
transferred
without
submitting any enquiry report and by the
same order dated 27th June, 2001 of the
Executive Engineer, the then District
Agricultural Officte, Mr. Amar Deo
Singh, was directed to conclude the
enquiry after receiving the reply of the
appellant. Thus, Mr. Amar Deo Singh was
fully authorized under a valid order to
proceed to hold the enquiry, which aspect
has been completely overlooked by the
then District Magistrate (In-charge) while
passing the order on 24th October,
2001.The disagreement on this count is
therefore, without any basis.

23. The second reason given is that
the file did not contain the original
records. It is surprising as to why, without
looking to the original records the District
Magistrate (In-charge) proceeded to order
a
re-enquiry
which
reflects
nonapplication of mind.

24. The third reason given that the
enquiry report of Mr. Amar Deo Singh is
sheer nonsense and is a story to set up to
shield the appellant, is also an irrational
conclusion without referring to any part of
the enquiry report. To describe the
document as sheer nonsense, appears to
be a rash decision, which reflects nonapplication of mind and is founded on
mere anguish and anger. It is well said
that the anger is the enemy of reason.

25. Lastly the disagreement appears
to be not recorded in accordance with
Rule 9 of the 1999 Rules, inasmuch as, it
is founded on surmises, namely that if the
schemes have been implemented by the
appellant after his suspension then the
guilt is established.There is nothing
indicated in the impugned order about any
such implementation having been carried
out after the suspension as alleged, and
which also stands corroborated as the
order was passed in the absence of the
original file. The conclusion drawn that if
a thief is caught with stolen goods, then
subsequent return of the goods, does not
absolve him of the guilt, is an expression
of a rhetoric which cannot supplant or
substitute the reasons, which are required
for holding of a re-inquiry.

26. In our opinion, the order dated
24th October, 2001 does not pass the test
of Wednsebury reasonableness, which is
inbuilt and expressly provided for in Rule
9 of the Rules. The order, therefore, is
unsustainable in law.

27. Apart from this, we have our
reservations about the authority of the
District Magistrate ( In-charge) top pass
3 All] Chandra Bhan Pratap Singh V. Executive Engineer, Deoria and others
1297
such order in relation to the disciplinary
proceedings
where
the
Executive
Engineer is the disciplinary authority, It
appears that the District Magistrate was
annoyed with the enquiry report and the
order was issued in sheer disgust by the
authority.

28. Having held so, even the so
called second enquiry was held without
participation of the appellant and without
associating him with the proceedings and
apprising him of the contents of the
enquiry report. This issue need not detain
us for long in view of the specific
averment contained in paragraph 15 of the
counter affidavit of Mr. Sunil Kumar filed
before the learned Single Judge. The
entire enquiry proceedings, subsequently
conducted, has been indicated to be a
secret affair and it has been adverted
therin that it was not obligatory in law for
the respondents to associate the appellant
in the subsequent enquiry as all such
proceedings and the documents including
the enquiry report were confidential. The
aforesaid approach is not only unlawful
but also appears to be suffering from
malice in law.

29. Learned counsel for the
appellant has, therefore, rightly relied on
the decision in the case of Managing
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B.
Karunakar reported in JT 1993 (6) SC 1.
The non supply f the enquiry report and
not allowing the appellant to be associated
with the second enquiry is clearly
violative of principles of natural justice
and all the provision of fair play. It is also
in violative of Rule 9 of 1999 Rules
which specifically requires that an order
shall be passed only after service of the
enquiry
report
on
the
delinquent
employee.

30. The appellant has ben prejudiced
as is evident from a perusal of the
impugned order inasmuch as the previous
enquiry report indicated the appellant in
an altogether different manner as noticed
above whereas the subsequent enquiry
report quantities a huge amount of
recovery from the appellant, which has
been imposed without giving him any
opportunity to rebut the same. The second
enquiry report, which has been filed along
with the counter affidavit before this
Court dated 15.01.2002 records its
conclusion on the basis of the material
which had been collected earlier but all
conclusions run counter to the earlier
report.

31. In our opinion, this seriously
prejudices the rights of the appellants and
hence the proceedings are clearly vitiated.
If the authority has been conferred with a
power, the said exercise of power has to
be for the purpose for which it has been
conferred and not for any oblique
purpose. In the instant case, the anguish
of the District Magistrate (In-charge) was
made the basis of the material available
on record and, therefore, the action suffers
from malice in law enunciated by the
Apex Court in the case of State of A.P.
And others Vs. Goverdhanlal Pitti
reported in (2003) 4 SCC 739 (Paragraph
12).

32. The order impugned in the
petition records only conclusions and no
cogent reasons. It does not objectively
deal with the defence of the appellant and
is therefore vitiated.

33.

For
the
reasons
given
hereinabove,
the
subsequent
enquiry
proceedings and the punishment order are
unsustainable and, therefore, the learned
1298 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010
Single Judge committed an error by
dismissing the writ petition.

34. Accordingly, the subsequent
enquiry proceedings under the order of
the District Magistrate (In-charge) dated
24.10.2001 and the impugned order date
29th April, 2002 are quashed. The
judgement of the learned Single Judge
dated 14.01.2003 is set aside. The appeal
is allowed and the matter stands remitted
to the Disciplinary Authority in terms of
Rule 9 of the 1999 Rules leaving it open
to the Disciplinary Authority to proceed
from the stage of the submission of the
first enquiry report. It shall be open to the
Disciplinary Authority to conclude the
proceedings as expeditiously as possible
preferably within a period of three months
from the date of production of a certified
copy of this order.
---------

SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 09.12.2010

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Misc. Writ Petition No. 719(M/S) of 2002

Ram Pal

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Board of Revenue U.P. and others

 ...Respondents

U.P. Land Revenue Act-readwith U.P.
Land
laws
(Amendment)
Act
1997
Section-219-Second
Revision
before
Board
of
Revenue-held
not
maintainable-keeping
in
view
of
amended
provision
by
which
the
provision
of
Section
218
omittedamended
provision
enforcible
w.e.f.
18.08.1997-revision itself decided by
Addl. Commissioner in 2001-against
that order of remand by Board of
Revenue
itself
without
jurisdictionprotection of section 10 not available.

Held: Para 12

Thus what was been protected under
Section 10 is the reference made under
Section 218 of U.P.Land Revenue Act,
1901, which was pending before the
Board on 18th August, 1997 i.e. the date
of
commencement
of
the
said
amendment. Such pending reference shall
continue to be heard and decided by the
Board as the Act has not been enacted. It
is not the case of the parties before this
Court, in the case in hand, that any such
reference was pending before the Board
and that has been answered after 18th
August, 1997. The revision decided by the
Addl.
Commissioner
obviously
was
pending before him since no reference
was made to the Board. Atleast this is
evident from the record. Hence the
question of attracting Section 10 of U.P.
Act 20 of 1997 would not arise. The said
revision having been decided in 2001, no
further
revision
was
liable
to
be
entertained under Section 219 by the
Board as there was no other provision
except 219 wherein a revision could have
been decided by the Commissioner or the
Board, as the case may be, but not one
after the other as if the subsequent
authority is deciding the second revision.
In Shri Ram (supra) it appears that a
reference was made under Section 218 to
the Board before 18th August, 1997 and
after the amendment of the Act, Board of
Revenue remanded the matter to Addl.
Commissioner for deciding the matter as
a revision. This Court took the view that
such reference could not have been
remanded since it was not protected
under Section 10 of the Amendment Act
and ought to have been decided by the
Board itself.
Case law discussed:
1990 (90) RD 467, 2000 (18) LCD 1401, 1974
ALJ (72) 295, 1983 All. L.J. NOC 1, AIR 1957
All. 205, 1980 All. L.J. 904, Writ Petition No.
25961 of 2008(Smt. Anisa Khan Vs. State of
U.P. and others), 1996 (87) RD 569, 2004 (96)
RD 656, 2007 (102) RD 20