# Chandra Choor Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 3 ILRA 293
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-03-11
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 12693 of 2024
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur, Amitabh Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chandra-choor-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54349
- **Pages:** 12

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3 All. Chandra Choor Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
293
appointment only after issuance of advertisement, in the considered opinion of this Court, the
relevant condition of vacancy having occurred prior to the cut-off date of 1st April 2005 stands
satisfied.

21. Taking recourse to the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court cited herein above, it being
evident that appointment of petitioner subsequent to the cut-off date of 1st April 2005 was a
variable at the instance of opposite parties who have not furnished any cogent explanation for not
issuing appointment letter to the petitioner prior to the cut-off date when the application for
appointment was made admittedly prior to the said cut-off date, no such benefit can be granted to
the opposite parties for their own delay.

22. In view of aforesaid discussion, in the considered opinion of this court, the fixed date i.e.
date of death of petitioner's father would have precedence over the variable date of appointment of
petitioner as per law enunciated in the judgments cited herein above and therefore it is held that
petitioner would be covered by the Old Pension Scheme.

23. In view of aforesaid, the impugned order dated 2nd June 2025 is hereby quashed by
issuance of writ in the nature of Certiorari. Further a writ in the nature of Mandamus is issued
commanding the opposite parties to allow the benefit of Old Pension Scheme under provisions of
U.P. Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961 and the General Provident Fund (Uttar Pradesh) Rules 1985 to
the petitioner. The opposite parties are also directed to adjust the amount deducted from salary for
New Pension Scheme to be adjusted in the Old Pension Scheme in terms of Rules of 1961 and
1985.

24. Consequential orders for compliance of the judgment shall be issued by the concerned
authority expeditiously within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order
is served upon concerned authority.

25. Resultantly, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.
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(2026) 3 ILRA 293
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 11.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.
THE HON'BLE AMITABH KUMAR RAI, J.

Writ A No. 12693 of 2024

Chandra Choor Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue(s) for consideration
294 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 (a) Whether Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 can be read so as to include within its ambit the submission of claims
by legal heirs of the beneficiary in cases where the beneficiary dies or becomes incapacitated during the
course of treatment and there is no other surviving beneficiary who can submit the reimbursement claim?
(b) Whether there is a requirement of obtaining a succession certificate from a court of competent jurisdiction
even if there exists no dispute regarding the legal heirs of the deceased government servant and sufficient
material is available on record before the competent authority indicating that the claimant is the legal heir of
the deceased?

Headnotes
A. Service Law - The facts in the present case are not disputed inasmuch as the father of the petitioner,
namely Rudra Pratap Singh, was a government servant who had superannuated from the post of Deputy
Registrar (II), Gorakhpur, in January 1994. After his superannuation, he was under medical treatment from
30.07.2017 to 26.08.2017 in two different hospitals and ultimately succumbed to his illness on 28.08.2017.
(Para 14)

In the present case, the medical reimbursement claim pertains to the period from 30.07.2017 to 26.08.2017.
The ground on which the claim of the petitioner has been rejected is that he does not fall within the category
of beneficiary, while a claim can be made only by the beneficiary. (Para 15)

A bare perusal of Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 shows that the provision, on the face of it, is
unreasonable and arbitrary inasmuch as it restricts submission of claim only by the beneficiary.
It appears that while promulgating the aforesaid rules, the government did not take into account the fact that
during treatment, in case a government servant dies, and there is no other surviving beneficiary, then
certainly no claim can be filed by the beneficiary as defined in rule 3(b) and in such a situtation a claim can be
filed only by the legal heirs. Similarly, in another scenario, if the government servant during his treatment or
due to his illness is incapacitated from making any claim, for example if he is in a vegetative state or totally
paralysed, it cannot be said that the medical expenses would not be liable to be reimbursed. (Para 16)

Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 creates two classes of persons who are entitled to reimbursement of
medical expenses: one class where the 'beneficiary' survives and is able to file his claim for
reimbursement and the other class comprising those 'beneficiaries' who do not survive the
medical treatment or are incapacitated from preferring such a claim. In case of second category, the
other surviving beneficiaries as defined in Rule 3(b) can file claim, but where there is no surviving beneficiary;
then certainly, in such a situtation, it is the legal heirs taking care of treatment of the deceased or the
incapacitated beneficiary should be allowed to file claim which has not been provided u/Rule 16 of the Rules,
2011. (Para 17)

A.(a) A classification u/Article-14 of the constitution can be held to be a reasonable
classification, if it follows the twin test of reasonableness. In order to pass the test, two
conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others, and (2) that that
differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Mere
classification, however, is not enough to get over the inhibition of the article. The classification must not be
arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics
which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those
qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. (Para 18)

The constitutional standards laid down by the Court u/Article 14 can be summarized as follows.
(1) First, the Constitution permits classification if there is intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus with the
object sought.
(2) Second, the classification test cannot be merely applied as a mathematical formula to reach a conclusion.
A challenge u/Article 14 has to take into account the substantive content of equality which mandates fair
treatment of an individual.
3 All. Chandra Choor Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
295
(3) Third, in undertaking classification, a legislation or subordinate legislation cannot be manifestly arbitrary,
i.e. courts must adjudicate whether the legislature or executive acted capriciously, irrationally and/or without
adequate determining principle, or did something which is excessive and disproportionate.
(4) ...
(5) ... (Para 19)

According to the above-mentioned tests, there is no reasonable classification to exclude the 2nd category of
beneficiaries from claiming the expenses towards treatment. The object and aim of Rules, 2011 providing for
medical treatment to government employees/ retired government servants and their family members which is
a beneficial legislation would stand frustrated if the benefit is not extended to a retired government servant/
beneficiary who dies or becomes incapacitated during the course of treatment and has no other surviving
beneficiary as defined in Rule 3(b) of Rules, 2011. (Para 20)

Thus, the Rule 16 of Rules, 2011 as it stands is clearly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
constitution.

B. It has been a settled principle of law that a beneficial legislation should be given a liberal and
expansive view and it must be interpreted in the favour of the beneficiaries. (Para 22)

The term 'beneficiary' appearing in Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011, for the purpose of claiming
expenses towards treatment, should be given a more liberal and expansive meaning to make it
workable by applying the principle of 'reading down' [sic], so as to include within its ambit 'legal
heirs' in a situation where there is no other surviving beneficiary who may file the claim and the beneficiary
undergoing treatment has died or is in an incapacitated state. (Para 21, 23)

The principle of "reading down" a provision refers to a legal interpretation approach where a
court, while examining the validity of a statute, attempts to give a narrowed or restricted
meaning to a particular provision in order to uphold its constitutionality. This principle is rooted in
the idea that courts should make every effort to preserve the validity of legislation and should only declare a
law invalid as a last resort. (Para 22)

C. A person should not be forced to obtain a succession certificate declaring him to be a legal
heir in a situation where no such dispute exists. In case there is a dispute regarding the legal heirs of
the deceased government servant, then certainly there would be a requirement of obtaining a succession
certificate from a court of competent jurisdiction. However, where no such dispute exists and sufficient
material is available on record before the competent authority indicating that the claimant is in fact the legal
heir of the deceased government servant, then his claim should be processed in accordance with law. (Para
24)

The second aspect of the matter relates to the limitation provided in the succession certificate issued by the
Tehsildar limiting the claim to Rs. 5,000/-. In the present case, a succession certificate was issued in favour of
the petitioner indicating that he is a legal heir of the deceased government servant. Once it has been
certified after inspection that the claimant is in fact the legal heir, merely because there is a
clause in the certificate limiting the claim to Rs. 5,000/- will not disentitle the petitioner from
receiving the reimbursement even if the claim exceeds that limit. (Para 25)

The impugned order dated 10.01.2023 is quashed. Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 shall be read so as to include
within its ambit the submission of claims by legal heirs of the beneficiary in cases where the beneficiary dies
or becomes incapacitated during the course of treatment and there is no other surviving beneficiary who can
submit the reimbursement claim. (Para 26)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)
296 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Case Law Cited
1. The State of West Bengal Vs. Anwal Ali Sarkar and another, (1952) 1 SCC 1 (Para 18)
2. Sukanya Shantha Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2024) 15 SCC 535 (Para 19)
3. Central Bank of India Vs. Shanmugavelu, (2024) 6 SCC 641 (Para 22)
4. Urmila Dixit Vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit and Ors., (2025) 2 SCC 787 (Para 22)

List of Acts
 Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Medical Attendance) Rules, 2011.

List of Keywords
 reading down, beneficial legislation, medical, heir, beneficiary, succession certificate, government, servant.

Appearances for Parties
For Petitioner(s): Sumeet Tahilramani, Aahuti Agarwal
For Respondent(s): C.S.C.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J. &
Hon'ble Amitabh Kumar Rai, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sumeet Tahilramani as well as Ms. Aahuti Agarwal, learned counsel for the
petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. The grievance raised by the petitioner in the present case is with regard to the rejection of
the medical reimbursement claim made by the petitioner for the treatment given to his father,
namely Rudra Pratap Singh, who was superannuated from the post of Deputy Registrar (II),
Gorakhpur, in January 1994.

3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the father of the petitioner
was under treatment from 30.07.2017 to 16.08.2017 at Mayo Medical Centre Private Limited,
Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, and thereafter from 16.08.2017 to 26.08.2017 at Midland Health Care and
Research Center, Mahanagar, Lucknow. Due to his prolonged and serious illness, he passed away
on 28.08.2017.

4. The petitioner, after collecting all the papers as required, made an application for
reimbursement of the amount spent on the treatment of his father by submitting an application on
17.11.2017/18.11.2017 in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Medical
Attendance) Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules, 2011") before the Assistant
Inspector General of Registration, Lucknow.

5. The claim of the petitioner remained unattended, due to which he submitted various
reminders. It has further been stated that the papers submitted by the petitioner were forwarded to
the Chief Medical Officer, Gorakhpur, for verification and technical inspection, who accepted the
claim by means of his letter dated 28.02.2018 to the extent of Rs. 6,06,397/- and further for an
amount of Rs. 6,12,500/- by means of another letter dated 28.02.2018.

6. It has further been stated that since the claim made by the petitioner was for an amount
exceeding Rs.2 lakhs, as per the provisions of Rule 20 of the Rules, 2011, the papers were
forwarded to the Inspector General of Registration for approval. Certain further documents were
3 All. Chandra Choor Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
297
required to be submitted by the petitioner, which were duly submitted. However, by means of a
letter dated 09.05.2019, the Deputy Inspector General of Registration, Camp Office, Lucknow,
rejected the claim preferred by the petitioner on the ground that the claim could be made only by
the beneficiary and not by the petitioner. It was further stated that the petitioner was not covered
under the definition of beneficiary and that the succession certificate submitted by the petitioner,
which was prepared by the Tehsildar, was only for a monetary limit of Rs. 5,000/-, which was
beyond the claim made by the petitioner.

7. In the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner approached the U.P. State Public Services
Tribunal by filing Claim Petition No. 1953 of 2020, Chandra Choor Singh vs. State of U.P. and
Others, assailing the rejection order dated 09.05.2019. The U.P. State Public Services Tribunal, by
means of order dated 31.08.2022, disposed of the claim petition with a direction to the Principal
Secretary, Stamp & Registration Department, Government of U.P., Civil Secretariat, Lucknow, to
decide the representation dated 22.06.2019 by passing a reasoned and speaking order within a
period of four months.

8. Pursuant to the directions of the Tribunal dated 31.08.2022, the claim of the petitioner was
reviewed by the Inspector General of Registration. However, by means of the impugned order
dated 10.01.2023, the claim of the petitioner was again rejected on the same grounds, namely that
the petitioner was not competent to claim the medical reimbursement with regard to his father as he
did not fall within the definition of beneficiary. It was further stated that, as per the succession
certificate issued in favour of the petitioner, a monetary limit of Rs.5,000/- had been imposed and
the claim of the petitioner being beyond the said limit disentitled him from receiving the
reimbursement amount.

9. The petitioner has assailed the validity of the order dated 10.01.2023 and has further
challenged the validity of Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 to the extent that the definition of beneficiary
is illegal and arbitrary, inasmuch as it permits only the beneficiary to submit a claim for medical
reimbursement and not any legal heir in the eventuality where the government servant dies during
his treatment.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no dispute with regard to the fact
that his father was duly entitled under the service rules to medical treatment during his service as
well as after his superannuation. He further submitted that there is no dispute regarding the fact that
his father was under treatment from 30.07.2017 to 16.08.2017 at Mayo Medical Centre Private
Limited, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, and thereafter from 16.08.2017 to 26.08.2017 at Midland Health
Care and Research Center, Mahanagar, Lucknow, and died on 28.08.2017.

11. He has submitted that in the eventuality that a government servant dies during treatment,
then according to Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 no claim for reimbursement can be lodged inasmuch
as such a claim can be lodged only by a beneficiary. He submits that no provision has been made in
the aforesaid Rules, 2011 for submission of claims relating to a government servant who dies
during his medical treatment. It is further submitted that, ex facie, Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 is
clearly illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as it
limits the submission of reimbursement claims only to the beneficiary and not to the legal heirs of
298 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the beneficiary in the eventuality that either the government servant is incapacitated from
submitting his medical reimbursement claim or dies during treatment.

12. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, has supported the impugned order and
submitted that the claims with regard to reimbursement of medical expenses have been provided
for under the Rules, 2011. As per the aforesaid rules, the beneficiary is defined under Rule 3(b) of
the Rules, 2011, which reads as under :-

3. Definitions

(a) .....................

(b) "Beneficiary" means Government Servants and their families, retired Government
Servants and their families and in case of deceased Government Servants such meinbers of their
family as are eligible for family pension.

The Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 reads as hereunder-

16. Claim within three months-

The beneficiary shall submit the reimbursement claim in prescribed proforma as given in
Appendix "C" to the sanctioning authority as soon as possible but not later than three months after
the completion of the treatment:

Provided that the reimbursement claim of a pensioner shall be submitted to the Head of
Office of the, district from where he/she is drawing pension or place of residence. Where there is
no such office, the District Magistrate of the concerned district shall be the Head of Office and also
the Head of Department for this purpose.

13. He submits that there is no dispute that all persons who are beneficiaries as defined under
Rule 3(b) of the Rules, 2011 are entitled to medical treatment. He has further stated that Rule 16 of
the Rules, 2011 provides the manner in which the claim has to be made for reimbursement, wherein
it has been provided that such a claim can be submitted only by the beneficiary. Accordingly, he
submits that the State authorities have correctly interpreted the provisions of Rule 16 of the Rules,
2011 as it stands and since the petitioner does not fall within the definition of beneficiary, he was
not entitled to submit the reimbursement claim with regard to medical expenses incurred for the
treatment of his father and therefore his application has rightly been rejected.

14. We have heard the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the
records. The facts in the present case are not disputed inasmuch as the father of the petitioner,
namely Rudra Pratap Singh, was a government servant who had superannuated from the post of
Deputy Registrar (II), Gorakhpur, in January 1994. After his superannuation, he was under medical
treatment from 30.07.2017 to 26.08.2017 in two different hospitals and ultimately succumbed to his
illness on 28.08.2017.

15. In the present case, the medical reimbursement claim pertains to the period from
30.07.2017 to 26.08.2017. The ground on which the claim of the petitioner has been rejected is that
he does not fall within the category of beneficiary, while a claim can be made only by the
beneficiary.
3 All. Chandra Choor Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
299

16. A bare perusal of Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 shows that the provision, on the face of it, is
unreasonable and arbitrary inasmuch as it restricts submission of claim only by the beneficiary. It
appears that while promulgating the aforesaid rules, the government did not take into account the
fact that during treatment, in case a government servant dies, and there is no other surviving
beneficiary, then certainly no claim can be filed by the beneficiary as defined in rule 3(b) and in
such a situtation a claim can be filed only by the legal heirs. Similarly, in another scenario, if the
government servant during his treatment or due to his illness is incapacitated from making any
claim, for example if he is in a vegetative state or totally paralysed, it cannot be said that the
medical expenses would not be liable to be reimbursed.

17. We find force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that Rule 16 of
the Rules, 2011 creates two classes of persons who are entitled to reimbursement of medical
expenses: one class where the 'beneficiary' survives and is able to file his claim for reimbursement
and the other class comprising those 'beneficiaries' who do not survive the medical treatment or are
incapacitated from preferring such a claim. In case of second category, the other surviivng
beneficiaries as defined in Rule-3(b) can file claim, but where there is no surviving beneficiary;
then certainly, in such a situtation, it is the legal heirs taking care of treatment of the deceased or
the incapicated beneficairy should be allowed to file claim which has not been provided under Rule
16 of the Rules, 2011.

18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The State of West Bengal v. Anwal Ali
Sarkar and another (1952) 1 SCC 1 has held that a classification under Article-14 of the
constitution can be held to be a reasonable classification, if it follows the twin test of
reasonableness. The paragrapgh No.86 of the judgment is of particular relevance here; which is
reproduced hereunder-

"85. It is now well established that while Article 14 is designed to prevent a person or
class of persons from being singled out from others similarly situated for the purpose of being
specially subjected to discriminating and hostile legislation, it does not insist on an "abstract
symmetry" in the sense that every piece of legislation must have universal application. All persons
are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances, equal and the varying needs of different classes of
persons often require separate treatment and, therefore, the protecting clause has been construed
as a guarantee against discrimination amongst equals only and not as taking away from the State
the power to classify persons for the purpose of legislation. This classification may be on different
bases. It may be geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like. Mere
classification, however, is not enough to get over the inhibition of the article. The classification
must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some
qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in
others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to
the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1)
that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those
that are grouped together from others, and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the
classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must
be a nexus between them. In short, while the article forbids class legislation in the sense of making
300 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
improper discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily
selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges
sought to be conferred or the liability proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for
the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense I have just
explained. The doctrine, as expounded by this Court in the two cases I have mentioned, leaves a
considerable latitude to the Court in the matter of the application of Article 14 and consequently
has the merit of flexibility."

(emphasis supplied)

19. In the recent judgment of Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India & Ors. (2024) 15 SCC
535, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered various precedents concerning the standards
embodied under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and has succinctly summarised the
principles governing the same in paragraph 42 of the judgment.

"42 The constitutional standards laid down by the Court under Article 14 can be
summarized as follows. First, the Constitution permits classification if there is intelligible
differentia and reasonable nexus with the object sought. Second, the classification test cannot be
merely applied as a mathematical formula to reach a conclusion. A challenge under Article 14 has
to take into account the substantive content of equality which mandates fair treatment of an
individual. Third, in undertaking classification, a legislation or subordinate legislation cannot be
manifestly arbitrary, i.e. courts must adjudicate whether the legislature or executive acted
capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle, or did something which is
excessive and disproportionate. In applying this constitutional standard, courts must identify the
"real purpose" of the statute rather than the "ostensible purpose" presented by the State, as
summarized in ADR. Fourth, a provision can be found manifestly arbitrary even if it does not make
a classification. Fifth, different constitutional standards have to be applied when testing the validity
of legislation as compared to subordinate legislation."

20. When we apply the above-mentioned tests carved out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
present case, we find that there is no reasonable classification to exclude the 2nd category of
beneficiaries from claiming the expenses towards treatment where there is no other surviving
beneficiary in case of death or incapicitation of beneficiary during the course of treatment. The
object and aim of Rules, 2011 providing for medical treatment to governemt employees/ retired
government servants and their family members which is a beneficial legislation would stand
frustated if the benefit is not extended to a retired governemt servant/ beneficairy who dies or
becomes incapicitated during the course of treatment and has no other surviving beneficairy as
defined in Rule 3(b) of Rules, 2011. Thus, the Rule 16 of Rules, 2011 as it stands is clearly
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the constitution.

21. After giving anxious consideration to the matter, we are of the view that the term
'beneficiary' appearing in Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011, for the purpose of claiming expenses towards
treatment, should be given a more liberal and expansive meaning to make it workable by applying
the principle of 'reading down', so as to include within its ambit 'legal heirs' in a situation where
3 All. Chandra Choor Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
301
there is no other surviving beneficiary who may file the claim and the beneficiary undergoing
treatment has died or is in an incapacitated state.

22. The law regarding 'reading down' has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, (2024) 6 SCC 641, paragraph no. 94-100 are of
particular relevance here which is reproduced hereunder-

94. The principle of "reading down" a provision refers to a legal interpretation approach
where a court, while examining the validity of a statute, attempts to give a narrowed or restricted
meaning to a particular provision in order to uphold its constitutionality. This principle is rooted in
the idea that courts should make every effort to preserve the validity of legislation and should only
declare a law invalid as a last resort.

95. When a court encounters a provision that, if interpreted according to its plain and
literal meaning, might lead to constitutional or legal issues, the court may opt to read down the
provision. Reading down involves construing the language of the provision in a manner that limits
its scope or application, making it consistent with constitutional or legal principles.

96. The rationale behind the principle of reading down is to avoid striking down an entire
legislation. Courts generally prefer to preserve the intent of the legislature and the overall validity
of a law by adopting an interpretation that addresses the specific constitutional concerns without
invalidating the entire statute.

97. It is a judicial tool used to salvage the constitutionality of a statute by giving a
provision a narrowed or limited interpretation, thereby mitigating potential conflicts with
constitutional or legal principles.

98. In B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. [B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC
700] , this Court observed that the principles such as "Reading Down" emerge from the concern of
the courts towards salvaging a legislation to ensure that its intended objectives are achieved. The
relevant observations read as under : (SCC pp. 764-65, para 81)

"81. ? It is also well settled that first attempt should be made by the courts to uphold the
charged provision and not to invalidate it merely because one of the possible interpretations leads
to such a result, howsoever attractive it may be. Thus, where there are two possible interpretations,
one invalidating the law and the other upholding, the latter should be adopted. For this, the courts
have been endeavouring, sometimes to give restrictive or expansive meaning keeping in view the
nature of legislation, maybe beneficial, penal or fiscal, etc. Cumulatively it is to subserve the object
of the legislation. Old golden rule is of respecting the wisdom of legislature that they are aware of
the law and would never have intended for an invalid legislation. This also keeps courts within
their track and checks individual zeal of going wayward. Yet in spite of this, if the impugned
legislation cannot be saved the courts shall not hesitate to strike it down. Similarly, for upholding
any provision, if it could be saved by reading it down, it should be done, unless plain words are so
clear to be in defiance of the Constitution. These interpretations spring out because of concern of
the courts to salvage a legislation to achieve its objective and not to let it fall merely because of a
possible ingenious interpretation. The words are not static but dynamic. This infuses fertility in the
field of interpretation. This equally helps to save an Act but also the cause of attack on the Act.
Here the courts have to play a cautious role of weeding out the wild from the crop, of course,
without infringing the Constitution. For doing this, the courts have taken help from the Preamble,
302 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Objects, the scheme of the Act, its historical background, the purpose for enacting such a
provision, the mischief, if any which existed, which is sought to be eliminated."

(emphasis supplied)

99. A similar view was reiterated by this Court in its decision in Calcutta Gujarati
Education Society v. Calcutta Municipal Corpn. [Calcutta Gujarati Education Society v. Calcutta
Municipal Corpn., (2003) 10 SCC 533] , wherein this Court observed that the rule of "Reading
Down" is only for the limited purpose of making a provision workable so as to fulfil the purpose
and object of the statute. The relevant observations read as under : (SCC p. 552, para 35)

"35. The rule of "reading down" a provision of law is now well recognised. It is a rule of
harmonious construction in a different name. It is resorted to smoothen the crudities or ironing out
the creases found in a statute to make it workable. In the garb of "reading down", however, it is not
open to read words and expressions not found in it and thus venture into a kind of judicial
legislation. The rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular
provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. It is to be used
keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfil its purposes."

(emphasis supplied)

100. Thus, the principle of "Reading Down" a provision emanates from a very wellsettled canon of law, that is, the courts while examining the validity of a particular statute should
always endeavour towards upholding its validity, and striking down a legislation should always be
the last resort. "Reading Down" a provision is one of the many methods, the court may turn to
when it finds that a particular provision if for its plain meaning cannot be saved from invalidation
and so by restricting or reading it down, the court makes it workable so as to salvage and save the
provision from invalidation. Rule of "Reading Down" is only for the limited purpose of making a
provision workable and its objective achievable.

22. It has also been a settled principle of law that a beneficial legislation should be given a
liberal and expansive view and it must be interpreted in the favour of the beneficiaries. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the recent case of Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit and Ors. (2025) 2 SCC
787 has discussed the rules of interpretation when it comes to beneficial legislations; parapgraph
no. 8, 9 and 11 are of particular relevance here; which has been reproduced hereunder-

8. To answer the issue at hand, it is imperative for this Court to discuss the rules of
interpretation to be applied when interpreting a beneficial legislation akin to the Act at hand.
While dealing with certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court in Brahampal v.
National Insurance Co. [Brahampal v. National Insurance Co., (2021) 6 SCC 512 : (2021) 3 SCC
(Civ) 693 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 67] , observed that a beneficial legislation must receive a liberal
construction in consonance with the objectives that the Act concerned seeks to serve.

9. This Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob [K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, (2020)
14 SCC 126] reiterated the above expositions and stated that : (SCC pp. 135-36, paras 11 & 13)

"11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed with a purpose-oriented
approach. [Kerala Fishermen's Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food, (1995) 4 SCC 341] The Act
3 All. Chandra Choor Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
303
should receive a liberal construction to promote its objects. [Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v.
ESI Corpn., (2009) 9 SCC 61 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 573 and Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya
Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 813] Also, literal construction of the provisions of
a beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the Court's duty to discern the intention of the
legislature in making the law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute should receive a
purposeful or functional interpretation. [Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, (1986) 2
SCC 614 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 335]

***

13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the statute was designed to
remedy should first be identified, and then a construction that suppresses the problem and
advances the remedy should be adopted. [Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia,
(2015) 10 SCC 161 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 55] It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial
or social welfare legislations should be given strict construction. [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai
Shantram Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] It was observed in Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai
Shantram Kowshik [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] that
the exclusionary provisions in a beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to give a
wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive
grounds. Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land
Council [Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council, 2008
HCA 48 : (2008) 237 CLR 285] , Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing purposive
construction to beneficial legislations mandates that exceptions in such legislations should be
construed narrowly."

(emphasis supplied)

11. While considering the provisions of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, this
Court in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi) [X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433] , reiterated
that interpretation of the provisions of a beneficial legislation must be in line with a purposive
construction, keeping in mind the legislative purpose. Furthermore, it was stated that beneficial
legislation must be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries when it is possible to take two views.

(emphasis supplied)

23. Accordingly, applying the principles of 'reading down' we hold that the provisions of Rule
16 of the Rules, 2011 should be read down so as to include the submission of a claim even by the
legal heirs of the beneficiary where the beneficairy dies or is incapacitated from submitting the
reimbursement claim himself and there is no other surviving beneficiary.

24. The second aspect of the matter relates to the limitation provided in the succession
certificate issued by the Tehsildar limiting the claim to Rs. 5,000/-. This Court is of the considered
view that in case there is a dispute regarding the legal heirs of the deceased government servant,
then certainly there would be a requirement of obtaining a succession certificate from a court of
competent jurisdiction. However, where no such dispute exists and sufficient material is available
304 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
on record before the competent authority indicating that the claimant is in fact the legal heir of the
deceased government servant, then his claim should be processed in accordance with law.

25. In the present case, we have been informed that a succession certificate was issued in
favour of the petitioner indicating that he is a legal heir of the deceased government servant. Once
it has been certified after inspection that the claimant is in fact the legal heir, merely because there
is a clause in the certificate limiting the claim to Rs. 5,000/- will not disentitle the petitioner from
receiving the reimbursement even if the claim exceeds that limit. This Court is also of the view that
a person should not be forced to obtain a succession certificate declaring him to be a legal heir in a
situation where no such dispute exists.

26. Accordingly, for the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order
dated 10.01.2023 is quashed. Rule 16 of the Rules, 2011 shall be read so as to include within its
ambit the submission of claims by legal heirs of the beneficiary in cases where the beneficiary dies
or becomes incapacitated during the course of treatment and there is no other surviving beneficiary
who can submit the reimbursement claim. Accordingly, respondent no.