# Chandra Pal Singh v. Prescribed Authority/Ist A.C.J. and others

- **Citation:** (2000) 3 ILRA 31
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2000
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chandra-pal-singh-v-prescribed-authority-ist-a-c-j-and-others-39520
- **Pages:** 4

## Text

3All] Chandra Pal Singh V. Prescribed Authority/Ist A.C.J. and others
31

12. Let the appeal be treated as to
have been filed before the said authority
who may pass appropriate order with
regard
to
the
jurisdiction
and
maintainability of the appeal before him
after giving opportunity to the petitioner as
directed above within one month from the
date of production of a certified copy of
this order. The appeal shall be treated to
have been restored until the decision in
terms of this order is arrived at by the
Appellate Authority concerned.

With these observations, this writ
petition is disposed of. However, there
will be no order as to costs.

13. Let a certified copy of this order
be given to the learned counsel for the
parties on payment of usual charges.
Petition disposed of.

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By the Court

1. This writ petition is directed
against the order dated 22.7.1996 passed
by the Prescribed authority, respondent
No. 1 allowing the application filed by the
landlord-respondent No. 2 for delivery of
possession of the disputed shop.

2. Priya Dutt, respondent No. 2 the
landlord of the shop in dispute filed an
application under section 21 (1) (a) of U.P.
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short the
Act) for release of the disputed shop
against the petitioner tenant with the
allegations that the required the disputed
shop bona fide. The petitioner entered into
compromise on 16.2.1985 wherein he
admitted that the landlord-respondent no.2
bona fide needs the disputed shop for the
purpose of business but he stated that he
INDIAN LAW REPOSTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000
32
may be permitted to continue to carry on
business for life as he was aged about 62
years and was a patient of diabetes and
blood pressure. There was a further clause
in the compromise that in case the tenant
sub-lets it or accepts any person as a
partner, it will be open to the landlord to
take immediate possession of the shop in
question.

The
Prescribed
Authority
decided the application in terms of the
compromise on 26.7.1985.

3. Respondent no. 2 filed application
under section 23 of the Act on 29.9.1993
with the allegations that the petitioner had
sub let the shop in question to respondent
no. 3. And he was entitled to obtain
possession from him in terms of the
compromise as accepted by the Court vide
its order dated 16.2.1985. The petitionersubmitted objection taking the plea that the
application was not maintainable. He
further denied that he had sub let the shop
in question to respondent no. 3. The
application has been allowed by the
Prescribed Authority by the impugned
order
dated
22.7.1996
directing
the
petitioner to hand over the possession on
the finding that the petitioner had passed
on possession of the disputed shop to
respondent no. 3 exclusively.

Sri S.U. Khan, learned counsel for the
petitioner has made three submissions
challenging the said order passed by the
Prescribed Authority.

4. His first submission is that the
order passed by the Prescribed Authority
releasing the disputed accommodation in
favour of respondent no. 2 on the basis of
the compromise between the parties was
invalid and void under law. It is
contended that the application under
section 21(1)(a) of the Act can be allowed
only when the Prescribed Authority finds
that the need of the landlord is bona fide
and genuine. He has placed reliance upon
the decision K.N. Bhargave Vs. District
Judge. Kanpur and others, 1984 (2) ARC
588 wherein it was held that it is the duty
of the Prescribed Authority to consider the
question of bona fide need before deciding
the
application
on
the
basis
of
compromise. If the tenant himself admits
in the compromise that the need of the
landlord of the premises in question bona
fide, it shall be taken that the Prescribed
authority has accepted the version of the
parties. A fact which is admitted by the
parties is not to be proved. Section 58 of
the Evidence Act provides that no fact
need be proved in any proceeding which
the parties thereto or their agents agree to
admit at the hearing, or which, before the
hearing, they agree to admit by any writing
under their hands, or which by any rule or
pleading in force at the time they are
deemed
to
have
admitted
by
their
pleadings. The petitioner had admitted
that the need of the landlord-respondent
no. 2 was bona fide and genuine. In these
circumstances, it shall be taken that the
Prescribed Authority applied its mind in
respect to the pleadings of the parties and
allowed the application for release on the
ground that need of the landlord was bona
fide and genuine. The petitioner only
wanted time to vacate the premises and
that time was granted to him. In Rama
Shankar Tewari Vs. Ram Raghubir Jaiswal
and others 1993(2) ARC 548 it has been
held that if by a compromise a tenant was
permitted about two years time for
searching accommodation and thereafter
vacating the premises, he cannot turnround after taking advantage of the
compromise and challenge the order of
compromise when it was sought to be
executed by the landlord on tenant's
3All] Chandra Pal Singh V. Prescribed Authority/Ist A.C.J. and others
33
regusal to vacate. The petitioner having
taken advantage under the compromise
and
continued
to
occupy
the
accommodation accepted for about 10
years, now cannot urge that the order
passed on the compromise was invalid .

5. It is next contended that the
objection
raised
in
the
execution
proceedings involves disputed questions of
fact and the same cannot be decided in an
application filed under section 23 of the
Act. An order passed by the Prescribed
Authoritym under section 21 of the Act
can be enforced by him under section 23 of
the Act. If any person has any objection
he
can
raise
objection
before
the
Prescribed Authority and he is to consider
it judicially after giving opportunity of
hearing and to lead evidence in support of
the objection. The objection may be by
the tenant against whom the order was
passed by the Prescribed authority or by
any third person whose right may be
affected if the order is enforced against
such person. In Chhakki Lal Vs III
Additional District Judge, Mainpuri and
others 1977 (UP) RCC 39 it was held that
the Prescribed Authority has jurisdiction to
make enquiry in respect to the objections
raised before him before he enforces the
order passed by him under section 23 of
the Act.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon the decision
Bibekananda Bhowal (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs.
Satindra Mohan Deb (Dead) by L. Rs. AIR
1996 SC 1985 wherein it was held that
where the compromise decree between the
parties provided that the defendants would
be liable to be evicted from suit land after
expiry of 10 years "by appropriate action
in court of law" the plaintiffs can eject the
defendants from the suit land in their
possession by taking appropriate legal
action by filing a suit for ejectment or in
any other manner as may be permissible in
law but not by applying for execution of
the compromise decree. In this case the
compromise
itself
provided
that
the
eviction can be done by appropriate action
in court of law. Secondly this was a
compromise decree in a suit and if there is
a dispute on the question of facts, the
compromise decree can be decreed only by
filing a fresh suit as non compliance of the
terms of decree gives a fresh cause of
action and the facts stated by a party is to
be decided in the suit. This principle will
not be applicable when the parties enforce
an
order
passed
by
the
Prescribed
Authority under section 21 of the Act by
the filing an application before the said
authority under section 23 of the Act. The
Prescribed Authority will have jurisdiction
to consider the objections raised by the
parties before it.

7. The last submission is that the
respondent no. 2 failed to prove that the
disputed shop was sub-let by the petitioner
to respondent no.3. The Prescribed
Authority,
on
consideration
of
the
evidence on record, came to the conclusion
that the petitioner has given exclusive
possession of the disputed shop to
respondent no. 3 Respondent is carrying
on business in the name of "Kaveri
Emporium". It is registered with the
authority concerned. It was not proved by
the petitioner that it was being run by him.
On the other hand, the documentary
evidence established that it was run by
respondent no. 3. Respondent no. 3 had
deposited requisite fee for registration in
the name of M/s Kaveri Emporium before
the Labour Commissioner. Secondly, in
Suit No. 16 of 1992 (Anand Pal Vs.
Chandra Pal Singh and another) it was
INDIAN LAW REPOSTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000
34
held that Jugul Kishore was sub tenant of
the petitioner. Thirdly the respondent no.
3 filed suit against respondent no. 2 for
injunction alleging that he was tenant of
the shop in question. The contention of the
petitioner was that the said suit was a
collusive one but on examining the entire
fact, it has been found that the petitioner
has transferred possession of the shop in
question to respondent no. 3. It is a finding
based on assessment of evident. I do not
find that there is any legal infirmity in this
finding.

In view of the above, there is no merit
in the writ petition. It is, accordingly,
dismissed.

However,
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, the parties shall
bear their own costs.
Petition dismissed.

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By the Court

1. This writ petition has been filed
praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the
impugned order dated 5.1.2000 Annexure
1 to the writ petition and for a mandamus
directing the respondents to treat the
petitioner's date of birth as 6.7.1948
instead of 6.7.1942 for the purpose of
superannuation and hence not to retire the
petitioner from 31.7.2000.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The petitioner is working as an
Executive
Engineer
in
the
Irrigation
Department in the State of U.P. When he
entered in service his date of birth as
recorded in the High School Certificate
was 6.7.1942. However, he filed a civil
suit being O.S. No. 63 of 1994 Virendra