# Chandra Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P. & others

- **Citation:** (2001) 1 ILRA 93
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2001
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chandra-prakash-gupta-v-state-of-u-p-others-39634
- **Pages:** 4

## Text

1All] Chandra Prakash Gupta V. State of U.P. & others
93
the Board to withdraw the same in its own
discretion.

37. Consequently it must be held that
the twin aspects highlighted by this Court
in Shrijee Sales Corpn. on the basis of
which the authority promising a particular
course of conduct on its part to the
prospective promisee can resile from the
promise even prematurely are not found
established on the facts of these cases.
Consequently the ratio of the said
decision can not be of any avail to the
respondent-Board"

13. Applying the principles laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
the aforesaid case, we find that the
respondents have not placed any material
on record before the Court nor have
shown that by reducing the amount of
grant
in
aid
from
100%
of
the
entertainment
tax
to
75%
of
the
entertainment tax for the first 2 years, it is
possible for the petitioner to restore the
status quo ante.

14. Thus, the respondents are bound
by the incentives announced by the State
Government in the Government Order
dated 18.7.1989. The changed rates of the
grant in aid as per G.O. dated 14.7.1992
would be applicable only where a person
decides to construct new cinema building
on or after 14.7.1992 and applies for grant
of permission under Rules 3 of the Rules
on or after that date. The decisions relied
upon by the learned Standing Counsel,
have all been considered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Pawan
Aoooys & Casting Pvt. Ltd. (supra)and
after considering the same the Hon'ble
Supreme Court had laid down the above
principles.

15. It may be mentioned that the
decision in the case of M/s Pankaj Jain
Agencies (supra) relied upon by the
learned Standing Counsel is not at all
concerned with the issue of promissory
estoppel and has no bearing to the issues
involved in the present petition.

16. In view of the foregoing
discussions, the writ petition succeeds and
is allowed. It is held that the Government
Order dated 14.7.1992 would not be
applicable to the petitioner. The condition
mentioned in the order dated 16.7.1993
(filed as annexure 9 to the petition) in so
far as it grants the benefit of grant in aid
to the extent of 75% of the entertainment
tax in the first 2 years is quashed and we
hold that the petitioner is entitled for grant
in aid of 100% of the amount of
entertainment tax in the first 2 years. The
various which are impugned, namely
22.7.1993, and cannot be sustained and
are hereby quashed.

17. However, there shall be no order
as to cost.
Petition Allowed.

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By the Court

1. The appellant belongs the U.P.
Palika Centralised Service and was
working as Sanitary & Food Inspector in
City Board, Hapur, District Ghaziabad in
the year 1992. He was placed under
suspension by the State Government on
May 11, 2000. The order recites that the
applicant had been prima facie found to
be guilty of having committed forgery in
the records and illegal and un-authorised
withdrawal of Rs.17,49,000/- in the name
of
583
fictitious
beneficiaries
from
Jawahar
Rojgar
Yojana
funds.
A
disciplinary enquiry was ordered to be
held
against
him
and
Additional
Commissioner (Administration) Meerut
was appointed as Enquiry Officer. This
order was challenged by the appellant by
filing
a
writ
petition
which
was
summarily dismissed by a learned Single
Judge on 4.8.2000. However, the learned
Single Judge directed that the disciplinary
enquiry may be completed within six
months. Feeling aggrieved by the said
order, the appellant has preferred the
present special appeal.

2. Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior
counsel appearing for the appellant has
contended that two other employees of
City Board, Hapur, namely, Khursheed
Ahmad Faridi, who was working as
Executive
Office
clerk
and
Sudhir
Kumarn Sharma, who was working as
Water Works Engineer, had also been
placed under suspension for the same
charge on the same date and they
preferred Writ Petition No. 821 (SB) of
2000 before the Lucknow Bench where
the operation of the suspension order
passed against them on 11.5.2000 was
stayed on 21.7.2000. The learned counsel
has submitted that since the identical
suspension order has been stayed by a
Division Bench at Lucknow, therefore,
the learned Single Judge was in error in
dismissing the writ petition. We have
given our careful consideration to the
submission made by the learned counsel
for the appellant. The order passed in writ
petition no. 781(SB) of 2000 (Khursheed
Ahmad Faridi vs. State) by Lucknow
Bench reads as follows:

"Time
was
granted
to
learned
Standing Counsel to seek instructions but
he
has
not
been
able
to
obtain
instructions. Six weeks" time is granted to
1All] Chandra Prakash Gupta V. State of U.P. & others
95
learned
Standing
Counsel
to
seek
instructions. List thereafter.

In the mean-time, further operation
of suspension order dated 11.5.2000 as
contained in annexure no. 1 to the writ
petition shall remain stayed. The enquiry
shall,
however,
be
concluded
expeditiously.

 Sd/- Pradeep Kant, J.

 Sd/- M.A. Khan, J.
 21.7.2000

Exactly similar order was passed in
writ petition no. 821 (SB) of 2000 on the
same date.

3. With profound respects we are
unable to agree with the view taken by the
Division Bench in the aforesaid order.
The mere fact that the Standing Counsel
was not able to obtain instructions, can
not be the only ground for passing a stay
order. The stay order does not give any
reason as to why the suspension order
passed by the State Government was
liable to be stayed by the Court. It has
been held by the Apex Court in Empire
Industries Limited Vs. Union of India
AIR 1986 SC 662 (Para-58) that every
Bench hearing matter on facts and
circumstances of each case should have a
the right to grant interim order on such
terms as it considers fit and proper and if
it had granted interim order at one stage it
should have the right to vary or alter such
interim order. No principle of law has
been enunciated in the interim order dated
21.7.2000 nor there is anything to indicate
that any case has been made out for
staying the operation of the suspension
order. We are, therefore, not inclined to
pass a similar order as has been passed in
writ petition no. 781 (SB) of 2000.

4. The learned counsel has next
contended
that
the
alleged
misappropriation of funds took place in the
year 1992 and the impugned suspension
order has been passed after more than 8
years in May, 2000. It has been thus
alleged that the matter had become stale
and, therefore, placing appellant under
suspension was wholly unjustified. In
support
of
this
submission, learned
counsel has placed reliance on Lal
Bahadur Singh Vs. Engineer-in-Chief
2000(1) UPLBEC 515. In our opinion the
mere fact that the suspension order has
been passed after 8 years, cannot be sole
ground for quashing or setting aside the
said order. In a matter of financial
irregularity or misappropriation of funds,
it is quite likely that it may not be
discovered or brought to light forthwith.
Whenever the misappropriation of funds
is revealed or brought to the notice of the
higher authorities they may choose to take
action in accordance with law. The delay
in taking action cannot, in every case,
vitiate the order for holding enquiry or
placing the employee under suspension.

5. The principle on which this Court
can interfere with an order of suspension
has been laid down by the Apex Court in
U.P.
Rajya
Krishi
Utpadan
Mandi
Parishad vs. Vimal Kumar Mohanti 1994
(4) JT 51. It has been held in these cases
that suspension is not a punishment but is
only one of forbidding or disabling an
employee to discharge the duties of his
office or the post held by him. It has been
further held that the Court should not
interfere with an order of suspension
unless they are passed malafide without
there being even a prima facie evidence
on record connecting the employee with
misconduct in question. There is a very
serious allegation of misappropriation of a
96 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
huge amount against the appellant. The
suspension order has been passed by the
Governor and as such, it cannot be urged
that the authority, passing the order, had
no jurisdiction to do so. The allegation is
that fictitious records were prepared and a
big amount was misappropriated. The
Officer to hold enquiry has already been
appointed. The learned Single Judge has
also
directed
that
the
enquiry
be
completed within six months. In these
circumstances, we do not at all consider it
a fit case in which discretion may be
exercised in favour of the appellant under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

6. The appeal lacks merit and is
dismissed at the admission stage.

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By the Court

1. This special appeal has been
preferred
against
the
order
dated
2.12.1999 of a learned Single Judge
passed in writ petition no. 5497 of 1997
(Dilawar Ali and 23 others versus State of
UP and others).

2. Sri Arun Tandon learned counsel
for the appellant has contended that
though the impugned order is an interim
order but it has not only granted a relief
which could be given only at the stage of
final hearing but has also granted such
relief which was not even claimed in the
writ petition. Sri Fauzdar Rai learned
counsel for the contending respondents
has supported the order and has submitted