# Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 8 ILRA 263
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-08-21
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 453 of 2024
- **Bench:** Arun Bhansali, C.J. Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chandra-prakash-tiwari-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52311
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Sri
Pratul
Kumar Srivastava
Standing
Counsel

A. Special Law- Allahabad High Court
Rules, 1952-Ch.VIII, Rule 5-The appellant
challenged the dismissal of his writ
petition which had sought relief from a
disciplinary punishment imposed in 2013the appellant failed to provide explanation
for the delay of 9 years in filing appeal-For
an appeal to be considered the party must
provide
a
sufficient
and
credible
explanation for any delay in filing-In this
case, the court held that an appellant
cannot simply shift blame to their counsel
without
adequate
proof-The
court
emphasized that a failure to monitor the
status of the case, especially when
information is publicly available, weakens
the justification for delay-Thus, the court
reaffirmed that the exercise of writ
jurisdiction
under
Article
226
is
discretionary-while the limitation act does
not strictly apply to the writ petitions
courts have developed the doctrine of
laches to prevent unreasonable delays in
seeking
judicial
remedies-The
court
264 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
emphasized that sufficient cause must be
shown to condone delays, regardless of
their length.(Para 1 to 17)

The petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

8 All. Chandra Prakash Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
263
Governor of the United Provinces,
appoint :

Provided that unless Governor of
the United Provinces with the concurrence
of the Chief Justice, otherwise directs, such
Judges of the new High Court, not less
than two in nubmer, as the Chief Justice,
may, from time to time nominate, shall sit
at Lucknow, in order to exercise in respect
of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as
the
Chief
Justice
may
direct,
the
jurisdiction and power for the time being
vested in the new High Court.

Provided further that the Chief
Justice may in his discretion order that any
case or class of cases arising in the said
areas shall be heard at Allahabad."

(emphasis added)

44. We also find that the findings
given by the Full Bench of this Court in
Nirmal Dass Kathuria v. State Transport
(Appellate)
Tribunal,
U.P.,
Lucknow
(Supra) qua the jurisdiction of the High
Court have been affirmed by Hon'ble Apex
Court in Nasiruddin (Supra). The relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment have
already been quoted earlier.

CONCLUSION

45. In view of the above discussion
and settled law on the subject, we find that
the dispute in the writ petition clearly falls
within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Lucknow Bench of this Court. We are of
the considered opinion that the writ petition
was wrongly entertained and decided by
the writ Court. Therefore, the impugned
judgment passed by learned Single Judge is
liable to be set aside and the same is
accordingly set aside.

46. The special appeal is accordingly
allowed with liberty to respondent no.1petitioner to file the writ petition, if so
advised, at Lucknow Bench of this Court
for appropriate remedy.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 263
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 21.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 453 of 2024

Chandra Prakash Tiwari ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Shrikant Mishra, Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri
Pratul
Kumar Srivastava
Standing
Counsel

A. Special Law- Allahabad High Court
Rules, 1952-Ch.VIII, Rule 5-The appellant
challenged the dismissal of his writ
petition which had sought relief from a
disciplinary punishment imposed in 2013the appellant failed to provide explanation
for the delay of 9 years in filing appeal-For
an appeal to be considered the party must
provide
a
sufficient
and
credible
explanation for any delay in filing-In this
case, the court held that an appellant
cannot simply shift blame to their counsel
without
adequate
proof-The
court
emphasized that a failure to monitor the
status of the case, especially when
information is publicly available, weakens
the justification for delay-Thus, the court
reaffirmed that the exercise of writ
jurisdiction
under
Article
226
is
discretionary-while the limitation act does
not strictly apply to the writ petitions
courts have developed the doctrine of
laches to prevent unreasonable delays in
seeking
judicial
remedies-The
court
264 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
emphasized that sufficient cause must be
shown to condone delays, regardless of
their length.(Para 1 to 17)

The petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Printers Mysore Ltd. Vs M.A. Rasheed &
ors.(2004) 4 SCC 460

2. Northern India Glass Indus. Vs Jaswant Singh
& ors.(2003)AIR SC 234.

3. C/M Distt Coop. Bank Ltd. Vs UP Coop.
Institutional Service Board & anr.. (2019) SCC
Online, All 4646

4. Constable (Civil Police) Sandeep Kuamr Vs
U.P. Public Service Tribunal, Lko & ors.
MANU/UP/2268/2023

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Bhansali, C.J.
&
Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Shrikant Mishra, learned
counsel for the appellant and Sri Pratul
Kumar
Srivastava,
learned
Standing
Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. The instant special appeal has been
filed against the order dated 13.12.2022
passed by the learned Single Judge in WritA No.8305 of 2022 (Chandra Prakash
Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. & others) whereby
the writ petition filed by the appellant was
dismissed noticing that the order impugned
in the writ petition was of the year 2013
and no cogent explanation was given by the
appellant for filing the writ petition after
nine years.

3. Learned Single Judge also noticed
that there was sufficient material on the
basis of which the impugned order of
punishment had been passed after affording
an opportunity of hearing hence it declined
to interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.

4. The instant appeal is also
accompanied by an application seeking
condonation of delay of 583 days bearing
I.A.No.1 of 2024.

5. Submission of the learned counsel
for the appellant is that his erstwhile counsel
Sri Ranjit Singh had assured the appellant of
filing his special appeal against the judgment
of the learned Single Judge and since
30.01.2023 he kept informing the appellant
that his appeal had been filed and would be
taken up soon after the Holi Vacation.
Thereafter similar response was given by his
counsel that his appeal would be taken up in
the forthcoming month and this went on
through the entire year of 2023 and even till
the month of May 2024. It is only thereafter
the appellant suspected that perhaps his
counsel was not guiding him appropriately
and he then made a complaint against his
erstwhile counsel and engaged the present
counsel who has filed the instant appeal and
in the aforesaid context it has been urged that
the delay in filing the appeal be condoned.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant
has further urged that the impugned order
of punishment which was affirmed by the
Appellate Authority is bad as it does not
meet the basic standard of compliance with
the principles of natural justice; inasmuch
as the orders are without any reason, hence
were liable to be set aside but this aspect
has not been taken note of by the learned
Single Judge while dismissing the writ
petition. Accordingly, the instant appeal be
heard on merits.

7. The Court has considered the
submissions of the learned counsel for the
8 All. Chandra Prakash Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
265
parties and from the perusal of the material
on record, it appears that the reason as
indicated by the appellant for seeking
condonation of delay of 583 days is not
adequately explained as the blame has been
put on the counsel allegedly engaged by the
appellant who kept giving him incorrect
information regarding filing of the special
appeal.

8. The explanation does not inspire
confidence for more than one reason.

Firstly, the present appellant has
been engaged in several litigation and he is
not new to it. He had filed three writ
petitions since 2017 and it cannot be
assumed that he did not know about the
legal requirements and that he could not
gain information of the status of his case
which otherwise is available in public
domain and could be ascertained easily
from the website of the Court.

Secondly, in this affidavit seeking
condonation of delay, it has not been
disclosed on which date the appellant had
got his affidavit sworn at the time when he
had handed over the papers to his erstwhile
counsel. Had there been some truth to his
alleged allegation then he could have
indicated the date he got his affidavit sworn
in the first instance as without it his special
appeal could not have been filed by his
erstwhile counsel.

Thirdly, it appears that deliberate
allegations have been levelled against his
erstwhile counsel only to cover the period
of delay. In paragraph-12 of the affidavit
seeking condonation of delay, it has been
stated that the appellant had made a
complaint against the said counsel with the
Bar council but from the perusal of the
complaint which has been brought on record
as Annexure-A-1, there is no detail of the
said counsel mentioned in the said complaint
as neither his address nor his enrollment
number or his mobile number has been
mentioned. Moreover, it has not been
indicated as to how the complaint was sent to
the Bar Council as there is no postal receipt
nor any receiving is on record nor any update
or status of the complaint has been mentioned
which clearly indicates that the said
complaint is merely an eye-wash and has
been deliberately introduced for seeking
condonation of delay. The alleged complaint
made against his lawyer being bereft of
necessary details does not inspire confidence.

Fourthly, there is another reason
why the explanation as tendered by the
appellant does not inspire confidence and that
is the fact that the appellant himself has been
in the police service and it cannot be said that
he is not well versed with the court
proceedings especially when he had already
filed three petitions earlier relating to his
service matter and has also been involved in
certain criminal cases where he has been
acquitted. Hence the explanation as tendered
does not appear to be bonafide.

9.

Significantly,
for
seeking
condonation of delay it is not the length of
delay which is material but the sufficiency of
cause. A long delay if sufficiently explained
can be condoned whereas in case if the cause
shown is not sufficient then even a short
delay may not be condoned. In the instant
case, the cause shown for the aforesaid
reason does not inspire confidence to
persuade this Court to condone the delay of
583 days.

10. Another fact which is reflected
from the record is the that the appellant had
filed his writ petition assailing the order of
the year 2013 in the month of December
2022 almost after nine years and in the
entire petition, there is not a single whisper
regarding the latches.
266 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11. There is a difference between a
matter being barred by limitation and the
petition which suffers from the vice of
latches. In a writ petition the provisions of
the Limitation Act do not apply, however,
the Courts have evolved the concept of
latches to ensure that a person who
approaches the Court must do so promptly
while
invoking
the
extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226/227 of the Constitution of India.

12. A writ court exercises powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, which is a purely discretionary.
Thus, the issue of latches assumes
significance as it guides the Court to
determine whether the 'lis' before it
deserves the indulgence in order to exercise
its discretion in befitting matters. This is
quite different from a proceedings which is
governed by the Limitation Act and in
terms of Section 3 of the Limitation Act,
even if at all, a party does not raise the
issue of limitation yet it is incumbent upon
the Court to look into this aspect.

13. In the aforesaid circumstances,
though the issue of limitation is not
attracted to a writ petition but taking an
overall scenario, the Court would be
well justified in refusing to entertain a
petition on the ground of latches. This
has been noticed by the Apex Court in
Printers Mysore Ltd. Vs. M.A. Rasheed
and others (2004) 4 SCC 460 and
Northern India Glass Industries Vs.
Jaswant Singh and others AIR 2003 SC
234.

14. This aspect has been taken note of
by
the
learned
Single
Judge
while
dismissing the petition as it did not find any
cogent reason for interfering with the order
of punishment and that too after nine years.

15. The two decisions cited by the
learned counsel for the appellant in C/M
Distt Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs. U.P.
Cooperative Institutional Service Board &
another, 2019 SCC OnLine All 4646 and
Constable (Civil Police) Sandeep Kumar
Vs. U.P. Public Service Tribunal, Lko &
others, MANU/UP/2268/2023 are of no
consequence at this stage as the delay in
filing the appeal is under consideration and
only if the delay is condoned and the
latches in filing the petition is found
satisfactory only then the merits can be
examined.

16. In light of the aforesaid
discussions, this Court does not find that
there is any adequate explanation tendered
to seek condonation of delay in filing this
appeal and moreover the petition itself
suffered from latches as the petition was
filed after nine years.

17. In light of the aforesaid, this Court
does not find any palpable error committed
by the learned Single Judge in exercise of
its jurisdiction while dismissing the writ
petition. Accordingly, the application for
condonation of delay is dismissed and
consequently appeal too is dismissed. Costs
are made easy.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 266
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 30.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ-A No. 2440 of 2022

Shobh Nath Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents