# Chandra Prakash v. The State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 11 ILRA 77
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-10-31
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 26568 of 2016
- **Bench:** Chandra Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chandra-prakash-v-the-state-of-u-p-ors-47872
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act-Section
186-Petitioner's father was granted lease
for
agricultural
purpose
and
started
cultivation in the alleged land but the
present proceeding after 20 years has
been initiated against the petitioner's
father on the basis of collusive report of
Lekhpal that petitioner's father was not
doing cultivation and the disputed plot
had been vested in the Gaon Sabhaproceeding is liable to be dropped as
petitioner's father filed objection to the
notice issued to him u/s 186 of the UPZA
& LR Act-the provisions of Rule 168 & 169
of the Act prescribes the procedure for
initiation of proceeding if the tenure
holders does not appear in spite of
service or publication or does not contest
the notice, the Tehsildar shall declare the
holdings as abandoned, if the tenure
holder appears and contests the notice,
the Tehsildar shall drop the proceedingsHence, the impugned orders cannot be
sustained in the eye of law and is liable to
be set aside.(Para 1 to 15)

The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
Collector,Land Acquisition Anantnag & anr. Vs
Mst. Kantiji & ors. (1987) AIR SC 1353

## Text

11 All. Chandra Prakash Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
77
already
employed
with
the
State
Government.
Rule
5
of
The
U.P.
Recruitment of Dependants of Government
Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974
shows that compassionate appointment has
to be given in that circumstances where the
other spouse of the deceased is not already
employed in the Central Government or the
State Government or otherwise. Since the
father of the petitioner was already
employed at the time of death of the mother
of the petitioner and is presently receiving
pension from the State Government,
therefore, in view of the clear bar under
Rule-5 of The U.P. Recruitment of
Dependants of Government Servants Dying
in Harness Rules, 1974, I do not find any
illegality in the impugned order dated
21.05.2022.

8. Law in this regard is clear that in
case a government servant dies and his
dependent
applies
for
compassionate
appointment
he
can
only
be
given
compassionate appointment if the other
spouse
of
the
deceased
government
employee is not already employed with the
State Government and Central Government
or any other local body etc. Since in this
case it is admitted between the parties that
at the time of death of the mother of the
petitioner, father of the petitioner was
already
in
government
service
and
presently he is receiving pension.

9. The objective of compassionate
appointment is to provide assistance to the
bereaved family of the deceased employee
who has suffered shock and financial
scarcity due to sudden demise of the sole
bread winner of the family.

10. The compassionate appointment
is an exception to the general rule of the
appointment and it is based on to provide
immediate sustenance and support to the
family of the deceased employee for loss
of the sole bread winner of the family and
to overcome the sudden crises arising out
of the sudden demise of the deceased
employee, however, since in this case, the
deceased
government
employee
was
succeeded by his/her spouse and children
including
the
petitioner
and
the
spouse/husband of the deceased namely
Ram Singh was a government employee
and presently he is receiving pension and
therefore, it cannot be said that the family
of the deceased is facing scarcity due to
the sudden demise of the loss of bread
winner of the family. The mother of the
petitioner was not sole bread winner of
the family, hence, I do not find any
illegality in the impugned order dated
21.05.2022. The order dated 21.05.2022
has been passed in consonance of law and
particularly
Rule
5
of
The
U.P.
Recruitment
of
Dependants
of
Government Servants Dying in Harness
Rules, 1974.

11. The writ petition is devoid of
merits and is accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2022) 11 ILRA 77
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.10.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J.

Writ B No. 26568 of 2016

Chandra Prakash ...Petitioner
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Ms. Pratima Singh, Sri Arun Kumar Tiwari,
Sri Agni Pal Singh
78 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Hari Narain Singh, Sri Brij Kumar
Yadav

A. Civil Law - U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act-Section
186-Petitioner's father was granted lease
for
agricultural
purpose
and
started
cultivation in the alleged land but the
present proceeding after 20 years has
been initiated against the petitioner's
father on the basis of collusive report of
Lekhpal that petitioner's father was not
doing cultivation and the disputed plot
had been vested in the Gaon Sabhaproceeding is liable to be dropped as
petitioner's father filed objection to the
notice issued to him u/s 186 of the UPZA
& LR Act-the provisions of Rule 168 & 169
of the Act prescribes the procedure for
initiation of proceeding if the tenure
holders does not appear in spite of
service or publication or does not contest
the notice, the Tehsildar shall declare the
holdings as abandoned, if the tenure
holder appears and contests the notice,
the Tehsildar shall drop the proceedingsHence, the impugned orders cannot be
sustained in the eye of law and is liable to
be set aside.(Para 1 to 15)

The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
Collector,Land Acquisition Anantnag & anr. Vs
Mst. Kantiji & ors. (1987) AIR SC 1353

(Delivered by Hon'ble Chandra Kumar
Rai, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Pratima Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner, learned standing
counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 5 and
Sri Hari Narain Singh, learned counsel for
respondent no.6.

2. The brief facts of the case are that
petitioner
belong
to
scheduled
caste
community. Petitioner's father Mewa Lal
along with sixteen others, was granted lease
for agriculture purpose in the year 1975 in
respect to plot no.107M, area 0.256 hectare
and plot no.232 M, area 0.154 hectare, the
name of petitioner's father has been
recorded
in
the
revenue
records,
accordingly, petitioner father came in
possession of disputed plot and started
agriculture in the same. Petitioner was
paying irrigation charges also as per
provision. In the year 1994, Lekhpal
submitted a report on 3.9.1994 that
petitioner's father is not doing agriculture
for that last two years, accordingly,
recommendation was made for taking
action under Rule 61, under Section 186 of
the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. Petitioner's father
filed his objection on 14.9.1994 to the
proceeding initiated under Section 186 of
the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, stating that he is
doing agriculture in the plot in dispute and
the crops are standing in the same. The
Tahasildar vide order dated 8.2.1995
affirmed the Lekhpal report, cancelled the
lease of petitioner's father and vested the
land in favour of Gaon Sabha. Petitioners
filed Revision before the Board of Revenue
under Section 333 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R.
Act on 6.5.2013 against the order dated
8.2.1995, along with the stay application
and prayer for condonation of delay was
also made. Board of Revenue dismissed the
Revision vide order dated 12.4.2016 on the
ground of limitation as well as on merit and
affirmed the order dated 8.2.1995. Out of
17 allottees, 9 allottees were served notice
for the proceeding under Section 198 of the
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 8 allottees had not
been served notice. Additional Collector
vide order dated 17.2.1995 passed the order
against the lease holders, accordingly, the
lease holders Mani Ram and Others filed
revision before the Commissioner, Kanpur
Region, Kanpur which was dismissed for
non-prosecution vide order dated 12.31996
and restoration application was rejected
11 All. Chandra Prakash Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
79
vide order dated 19.8.1999. Against the
order of the Additional Commissioner,
Mani Ram and Others filed revision before
the Board of Revenue which was allowed
vide order dated 9.8.2004, setting aside the
order dated 12.3.1996 and 19.8.1999 and
matter was remanded back before the
Collector to decide the dispute on merit. In
pursuance of the order dated 27.8.2004,
passed by the Board of Revenue, the matter
was heard by the Collector concerned in
Case No.88 of 2005-06 (State vs. Mani
Ram) in which physical verification was
made and report dated 6.9.2007 was
submitted before the Collector, Kanpur
Dehat. The Collector vide order dated
15.4.2010 set aside the order dated
17.2.1995, dropped the notice, issued to the
lease holders, Mani Ram and Others and
ordered to record the name of lease holders
as bhumidhar with transferable rights, the
finding has been recorded that the crops are
standing in the disputed plot and the lease
was executed long back about 27 years
before, as such, the proceeding for
cancellation of lease is wholly illegal. On
the basis of the order dated 15.4.2010, the
name of the lease holders has been
recorded in the revenue records. Hence,
this petition on behalf of petitioner in
respect of his lease against the order of
Board of Revenue dated 12.4.2016 and
order dated 8.2.1995 passed by Tahasildar.

3.

Counsel
for
the
petitioner
submitted that petitioner's father along with
16 others, belonging to scheduled caste
community
was
granted
lease
for
agricultural purpose in the year 1975,
petitioner's father, accordingly, started
cultivation in the alleged land but the
present proceeding after about 20 years has
been initiated against the petitioner's father
under Section 186 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R.
Act, on the basis of the alleged report of
Lekhpal that petitioner's father was not
doing cultivation for the last 2 years,
although petitioners' father was doing
cultivation continuously in the disputed
plot but under impugned order, disputed
plot of the petitioner's father was vested in
the Gaon Sabha and the revision filed by
the petitioner has been arbitrarily dismissed
by passing a cryptic order on limitation as
well as on merit. It is further submitted that
no physical verification was done and on
the basis of the collusive report of the
Lekhpal only the plot in disputed has been
vested in the Gaon Sabha. He further
submitted that according to the provisions
contained under Section 186(5) of the
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, proceeding was liable
to be dropped as petitioner's father filed
objection to the notice issued to him under
Section 186 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act.
He placed reliance upon Section 186 of the
U.P. Z.A. L.R. Act which is as follows:-

" 186. Abandonment. - (1)
Where
a
[bhumidhar
with
nontransferable rights] (other than a minor,
lunatic or idiot) or asami has not used his
holding for a purpose connected with
agriculture,
horticulture
or
animal
husbandry which includes pisciculture
and poultry farming for two consecutive
agricultural years, [the tahsildar may, on
the application of the [Gaon Sabha] or
the landholder or on facts coming to his
notice otherwise, issue a notice] to such
[bhumidhar
with
non-transferable
rights] or asami, as the case may be, to
show cause why the holding be not
treated as abandoned.

(2)
The
application
shall
contain such particulars as may be
prescribed.

(3) If the tahsildar finds that
the application has been duly made he
shall
cause
to be
served
on
the
80 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
[bhumidhar
with
non-transferable
rights] or the asami or publish in the
manner prescribed a notice in the form
to be prescribed requiring him to appear
and show cause on a date to he fixed why
the holding be not held as abandoned.

(4) If the [bhumidhar with nontransferable rights] or the asami does not
appear in answer to the notice or
appears but does not contest it, the
tahsildar shall declare the holding as
abandoned
and
thereupon,
except
provided in [Section 172], the holding
shall be deemed to be vacant land[:]

[Provided that no declaration
under this sub-section shall made in
respect of a holding or any part thereof,
if the same has been mortgaged by the
[bhumidhar
with
non-transferable
rights] under sub-section (2) of Section
153 and the mortgage has not been fully
redeemed, in which case the tahsildar
shall
move
the
Collector
for
the
realization of the loan in such manner as
may be prescribed.]

[(5) If the [bhumidhar with
non-transferable
rights]
or
asami
appears to contest the notice, the
tehsildar shall drop the proceedings.]"

4. He further submitted that petitioner
along with 16 other persons was granted
lease in 1975 and the lease of similarly
situated persons after the remand order
passed by Board of Revenue has been
maintained by the Collector vide order
dated 15.4.2010 /27.8.2010 but in respect
of the petitioner, the land has been vested in
the Gaon Sabha on the ground that the
petitioner was not doing cultivation for the
last 2 years. He further submitted that there
was no discrimination among the similarly
situated
persons
as
the
ground
for
cancellation was same against all the lease
holders. Counsel for the petitioner further
finally submitted that the impugned order
be set aside and lease granted in 1975 be
affirmed. Counsel for the petitioner placed
reliance upon Section 131-B of U.P. Z.A. &
L.R. Act which is as follows:-

"[131-B. Bhumidhar with nontransferable rights to become bhumidhar
with transferable rights after ten years.

(1) Every person who was a
bhumidhar with non-transferable rights
immediately before the commencement
of
the
Uttar
Pradesh
Zamindari
Abolition
and
Land
Reforms
(Amendment) Act, 1995 and had been
such bhumidhar for a period of ten years
or more, shall become a bhumidhar with
transferable
rights
on
such
commencement.

(2) Every person who is a
bhumidhar with non-transferable rights
on the commencement referred to in subsection (1), or becomes a bhumidhar with
non-transferable
rights
after
such
commencement, shall become bhumidhar
with transferable rights on the expiry of
period of ten years from his becoming a
bhumidhar with non-transferable rights.

(3) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other provision of this
Act, if a person, after becoming a
bhumidhar
with
transferable
rights
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2),
transfers the land by way of sale, he shall
become ineligible for a lease of any land
vested in Gaon Sabha or the State
Government or of surplus land as
defined in he Uttar Pradesh Imposition
of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.]

5.

Counsel
for
the
petitioner
submitted that petitioner's father was
granted lease in the year 1975, as such, due
to operation of law as provided under
Section 131-B of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act,
11 All. Chandra Prakash Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
81
petitioner's father became bhumidhar with
transferable right of the plots in dispute.

6. On the other hand, the learned
standing counsel as well as counsel for
respondent
no.5-
Land
Management
Committee submitted that petitioner was
not doing agricultural work on the land
allotted to him, as such, the proceeding was
rightly initiated against the petitioner and
the land was rightly vested in the State. He
further submitted that the revision filed by
the petitioner against the order of the
Collector was highly time barred, as such,
the revision was rightly dismissed on the
ground of limitation as well as on merit.
They finally submitted that no interference
is required against the impugned order and
the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. I have considered the arguments
advanced by learned counsel for the parties
and perused the record.

8. There is no dispute about the fact
that petitioner along with 16 others
belonging to scheduled casts community
was granted lease for agricultural purposes
in the year 1975 and the proceeding under
Section 186 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act has
been initiated after expiry of about 20
years. On the basis of the report of the
Lekhpal that petitioner is not doing any
cultivation work in the plot in dispute, the
Tahasildar vide order dated 8.2.1995 vested
the land in the Gaon Sabha. The revision
filed by the petitioner against the order
dated 8.2.1995 was dismissed on the
ground of limitation as well as on merits.
Although, in respect of the other least
holders, the lease was affirmed vide order
dated 15.4.2010/27.8.2010.

9. Since petitioner was granted lease
in the year 1975 along with 16 others and
was continuously doing cultivation work in
the alleged land, as such, the vesting of
land in the Gaon Sabha only on the basis of
the report of Lekhpal is arbitrary. In respect
of the other lease holders, the physical
verification was conducted and it was
found that they are cultivating in the lease
land, as such, the lease under the similar
circumstances executed in their favour was
maintained by the Collector but in the case
of the petitioner, no physical verification,
etc. was done and the lease was cancelled
and the land was vested in the Gaon Sabha,
although in view of provisions contained
under Section 186(5) of the U.P. Z.A. &
L.R. Act, the proceedings was liable to be
dropped. After the order dated 8.2.1995
passed against the petitioner, petitioner
filed revision with delay before the Board
of Revenue, praying for condonation of
delay (as petitioner was approaching the
authorities for redressal of his grievance
under advice) but Board of Revenue has
dismissed the revision on the ground of
delay as well as on merit, saying that order
passed by the courts below is in accordance
with law.

10. So far as the delay in filing
revision is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case, reported in AIR 1987 SC
1353,
Collector,
Land
Acquisition,
Anantnag and Another vs. Mst. Kantiji
and Others has held that in place of
deciding the dispute on technical grounds
the matter should be adjudicated on merit.
Paragraph no.3 of the judgment are quoted
hereunder:

"The legislature has conferred
the power to condone delay by enacting
Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of
1963 in order to enable the Courts to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing
of matters on 'merits'. The expression
82 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
"sufficient cause" employed by the
legislature is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the
ends of justice that being the life-purpose
for the existence of the institution of
Courts. It is common knowledge that this
Court has been making a justifiably
liberal approach in matters instituted in
this Court. But the message does not
appear to have percolated down to all
the other Courts in the hierarchy. And
such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that:-

"Any
appeal
or
any
application, other than an application
under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
may be admitted after the prescribed
period if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such
period."

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not
stand to benefit by lodging an appeal
late.

2. Refusing to condone delay
can result in a meritorious matter being
thrown out at the very threshold and
cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the
highest that can happen is that a cause
would be decided on merits after hearing
the parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be
explained" does not mean that a
pedantic approach should be made. Why
not every hour's delay, every second's
delay? The doctrine must be applied in a
rational
common
sense
pragmatic
manner.

4. When substantial justice and
technical
considerations
are
pitted
against each other, cause of substantial
justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested
right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that
delay is occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not
stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In
fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that
judiciary is respected not on account of
its
power
to
legalize
injustice
on
technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so.

Making
a
justice-oriented
approach from this perspective, there
was sufficient cause for condoning the
delay in the institution of the appeal. The
fact that it was the 'State' which was
seeking condonation and not a private
party was altogether irrelevant. The
doctrine of equality before law demands
that all litigants, including the State as a
litigant, are accorded the same treatment
and the law is administered in an even
handed manner. There is no warrant for
according a stepmotherly treatment
when the 'State' is the applicant praying
for condonation of delay. In fact
experience shows that on account of an
impersonal machinary (no one in charge
of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the
judgment sought to be subjected to
appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the notemaking, file pushing and passing-on-thebuck ethos, delay on its part is less
difficult to understand though more
difficult to approve. In any event, the
State which represents the collective
cause of the community, does not deserve
a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts
therefore have to be informed with the
11 All. Chandra Prakash Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
83
spirit and philosophy of the provision in
the course of the interpretation of the
expression "sufficient cause". So also the
same approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the
end in view to do even handed justice on
merits in preference to the approach
which scuttles a decision on merits.
Turning to the facts of the matter giving
rise to the present appeal, we are
satisfied that sufficient cause exists for
the delay. The order of the High Court
dismissing the appeal before it as time
barred, is therefore set aside. Delay is
condoned. And the matter is remitted to
the High Court. The High Court will
now dispose of the appeal on merits after
affording reasonable opportunity of
hearing to both the sides."

11. Although in the revision, there
was delay of more than 10 years but the
lease of the other lease holders has been
ultimately maintained on the same ground,
as such, discrimination to the petitioner will
be illegal and will cause irreparable injury
to the petitioner, as such, the interest of
justice requires that petitioner's lease be
also affirmed.

12. Another important aspect of the
case is that Section 186 (5) of U.P.Z.A. &
L.R. Act specifically provides for dropping
of the proceeding under Section 186 of
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act if the bhumidhar with
non transferable rights or asami appears to
contest the proceedings. In the present case
petitioner's father appears and filed his
objection even then the Tahsildar has
passed the impugned order dated 8.2.1995
vesting the disputed plot in favour of Gaon
Sabha. The provisions of Rule 168 & 169
of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Rules prescribes the
procedure for initiation of proceeding under
Section 168 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act as well
as its disposal, Rule 169 (2) of U.P.Z.A. &
L.R. Rules are as follows:-

"169(2) If the tenureholders does
not appear in spite of service or publication
of the notice as laid down in sub-rule (1),
or if the tenureholder appears and does not
contest the notice, the Tahsildar shall,
except where the holding or any part
thereof has been mortgaged under subsection (2) of Section 153 and the mortgage
has not been fully redeemed, declare the
holdings as abandoned and order the
annual
registers
to
be
corrected
accordingly. If the tenureholder appears
and contests the notice, the Tahsildar shall
drop the proceedings."

13. Section 168 (5) of U.P.Z.A. &
L.R. Act as well as Rule 169 (2) of of
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Rules very specifically
provides for dropping of the proceedings
under Section 186 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act
but Tahsildar has passed the impugned
order for vesting the land in Gaon Sabha in
spite of the fact that petitioner's father
appears and filed his objection to the
proceeding, as such, impugned orders
cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

14. Considering the entire facts and
circumstances of the case, provisions of
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act/Rules as well as the
ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in
Land
Acquisition,
Anantnag
and
Another (supra), the impugned order dated
12.4.2016 passed by the Board of Revenue,
Allahabad Bench, Allahabad and order
dated 8.2.1995 passed by the Tehsildar,
Kanpur Dehat are liable to be set aside and
the same are hereby set aside.

15. The writ petition stands allowed
and respondent no.2/Collector, Kanpur
Dehat is directed to record the name of
84 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioner in the revenue record in respect
to disputed plots within period of six weeks
from the date of production of the certified
copy of this order.

16. No order as to costs.
----------
(2022) 11 ILRA 84
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.10.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J.

Writ B No. 47327 of 2013

Man Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Board of Revenue & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Abhishek Kumar, Dr. Shrinarayan Singh
Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Arun Kumar, Sri M. Sarwar Khan,
Sri Manoj Kumar Yadav, Sri Ram Sajiwan
Prajapati, Sri Ramakant Tiwari, Sri Umesh
Chandra Tiwari, Sri Alok Sharma

A. Civil Law - U.P. Land Revenue Act,
1901-Section 34-Since jurisdiction u/s 34
of the Act once has been exercised by
trial court on the basis of evidence on
record after affording opportunity of
hearing to the parties as such there
should be no interference against the
order of trial court unless there is any
error in the order but the appellate Court
has illegally allowed the appeal against
the order passed by trial court and
remanded the matter before trial court for
fresh consideration of evidence without
taking into consideration the principles of
merger as the order of trial court has been
merged in the final order of Revisional
Court
by
which
revision
filed
by
respondent no. 4 (daughter of deceased)
has been dismissed and order of trial court
has
been
maintained-Hence,
the
impugned orders are liable to set
aside.(Para 1 to 15)

The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1. Paras Nath & anr. Vs DDC, Varanasi & ors.
(2010) 110 RD pg 595

2. Bih. St. Govt. Sec. School Teachers Assn. Vs
Bih. Edu. Service Assn & ors. (2013) AIR SC 487

3. Bhagwati Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs Peerless
General Finance Investment Co. Ltd. & ors.
(2013) 5 SCC 455

4. Nanhey & anr. Vs DDC, Kanpur & ors. (1975)
AWC 1

5. Shankar Ramchandra Abhyakar Vs Krishnaji
Dattatraya Bapat (1970) AIR Supreme Court 1

6. Bhagwah Developers Pvt Ltd VS Peerless
General Finance Investment Co. Ltd & ors.
(2013) 5 SCC 455

7. Saumya Co-operative Housing Society, Alld.
thru its secy. Vs St. of U.P. & ors. (2012) 115
RD 187

8. Smt. Kalawati Vs the Board of Revenue & ors.
(2022) 0 Supreme All 281

(Delivered by Hon'ble Chandra Kumar
Rai, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Abhishek Kumar,
Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Alok
Sharma, Advocate, holding brief of Mr.
Ram Sajiwan Prajapati and Mr. Rama Kant
Tiwari, Counsel for respondent No.3 as
well as learned Standing Counsel for
respondent Nos.1 and 2.

2. The brief facts of the case are that
Lalla Prasad had three marriages in his life
time.
His
first
wife
was
Dhankali.