# Chandra Shekhar Srivastava v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 12 ILRA 618
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-11-02
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 422 of 2020
- **Bench:** Govind Mathur, C.J. Siddhartha Varma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chandra-shekhar-srivastava-v-state-of-u-p-ors-45475
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Baroda Uttar Pradesh
Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees)
Service Regulations, 2010: Regulation
48(2)

Regulation 48(2) itself provides the competent
authority to consider and pass appropriate
orders treating the period of suspension as
either one which has been spent on duty or
otherwise. This implies that the Regulation
48(2) can be invoked only where no penalty of
dismissal or removal is imposed. In other words,
the competent authority must not invoke this
power if a penalty of removal or dismissal is
inflicted. The learned Single Judge erred in
treating the period of suspension as not a
period spent on duty and further disentitling him
from the payment of any difference of salary
except the subsistence allowance. The provision
in unambiguous terms mandates that the period
of suspension is always to be treated as the
period spent on duty. The other part having the
phrase "or otherwise" implies that if the
employee has suffered a penalty of removal or
dismissal the competent authority may pass
appropriate directions. (Para 12, 13 & 15)

Special Appeal allowed. (E-10)

## Text

618 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2019 is set aside. The writ petition is
restored to its original number and is
remitted to learned single Bench for its
adjudication on merits. The other just
objections shall be available to the
respondents while contesting the petition.
----------
(2020)12ILR A618
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.11.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE GOVIND MATHUR, C.J.
THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.

Special Appeal No. 422 of 2020

Chandra Shekhar Srivastava ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Poonam Mishra, Radha Kant Ojha

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ram Prakash Shukla

A. Service Law - Baroda Uttar Pradesh
Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees)
Service Regulations, 2010: Regulation
48(2)

Regulation 48(2) itself provides the competent
authority to consider and pass appropriate
orders treating the period of suspension as
either one which has been spent on duty or
otherwise. This implies that the Regulation
48(2) can be invoked only where no penalty of
dismissal or removal is imposed. In other words,
the competent authority must not invoke this
power if a penalty of removal or dismissal is
inflicted. The learned Single Judge erred in
treating the period of suspension as not a
period spent on duty and further disentitling him
from the payment of any difference of salary
except the subsistence allowance. The provision
in unambiguous terms mandates that the period
of suspension is always to be treated as the
period spent on duty. The other part having the
phrase "or otherwise" implies that if the
employee has suffered a penalty of removal or
dismissal the competent authority may pass
appropriate directions. (Para 12, 13 & 15)

Special Appeal allowed. (E-10)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Govind Mathur, C.J.
& Hon'ble Siddharth Varma, J.)

1. As a consequence to a disciplinary
action, the petitioner (appellant herein) was
subjected to a punishment in the following
terms:-

"Reduction to a lower stage in his time
scale of pay by -01- stage for a period of -
03- months without cumulative effect'

And

Further, the period of suspension of
Mr. Chandra Shekhar Srivastava will be
treated as period not spent on duty. Hence,
no difference of salary will be payable to
him except subsistence allowance, which he
has already received."

2. Aggrieved by the same, he
preferred a petition for writ with a ground,
inter alia, that second part of punishment
relating to period of suspension is bad
being without jurisdiction. Learned Single
Bench dismissed the petition for writ
relying upon clause (2) of Regulation 48 of
the Baroda Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank
(Officers
and
Employees)
Service
Regulations, 2010 that reads as under:-

"48. Treatment of suspension period
and allied matters-

(1) The Competent Authority may,
while imposing penalty, direct whether the
other or employee shall be paid the
difference
between
the
subsistence
allowance and the emoluments which he
would
have
received
but
for
such
12 All. Chandra Shekhar Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
619
suspension or the period he was under
suspension and that, if the Competent
Authority decides otherwise, no order shall
be passed which shall have effect of
compelling the officer or employee to
refund such subsistence allowance.

(2) The period during which an officer
or employee is under suspension shall, if he
is not removed or dismissed from the
service, be treated as period spent on duty
or otherwise as the Competent Authority
may direct."

3. A challenge is given to the judgment
impugned with submission that learned single
Bench failed to appreciate and interpret
provisions of Regulation 48 in correct
perspective and that ultimately resulted into
miscarriage of justice. It is submitted that clause
(2) of Regulation 48 pertains to two different
eventualities which are:-

(i) When the employee is under
suspension but is not subjected to the
penalty of removal or dismissal from
service, and

(ii) When the petitioner or employee is
under suspension and is subjected to a
penalty otherwise to first eventuality,
meaning thereby, he has been either
removed or dismissed from service.

4. Learned single Bench, as per the
appellant, failed to appreciate these two
different eventualities by treating only one
circumstance of not imposing the penalty
of
removal
or
dismissal
and
this
interpretation leads to an absurdity, asmuch
as even in a case of subjecting an employee
by a minor punishment, the competent
authority
may
treat
the
period
of
suspension as break in service, which is
having effect of removal from service.

5. It is asserted that, in the case in
hand, the disciplinary authority though
subjected
the
appellant
to
a
minor
punishment being the appellant would not
be treated in service during the period of
suspension but the direction given under
Regulation 48(2) imposes an additional
major punishment.

6. While defending the judgment
impugned on behalf of respondent-bank it is
stated that clause (2) of Regulation 48 is quite
specific and that extends a broad power for the
competent authority to deal with the issues
relating to period of suspension in the event of
imposing a punishment that is not removal or
dismissal.

7. Under the provision aforesaid, absolute
discretion is available with the competent
authority either to treat the period of suspension
as part of service or to take a view otherwise.
Such discretion is not at all dependent to nature
of the punishment imposed.

8. Heard learned counsels.

9. Precisely, the issue that needs
consideration in this appeal is the intent of
clause (2) of Regulation 48 of the
Regulations of 2010.

10. Before touching merits of the
case, it would be appropriate to state that
every word and/or phrase in a statute
carries
a
specific
meaning.
While
interpreting such statute workability of it
must be ensured. No interpretation of a
statute is required to be made that reduces
its functionality or that leads to absurdity.

11. In light of this general principle,
we have examined the intent of Regulation
48 of the Regulations of 2010.

12. As already stated, learned single
Bench while dismissing the petition for
620 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
writ held that Regulation 48 (2) itself
provides
for
competent
authority
to
consider and pass appropriate orders
treating the period of suspension as either
one which has been spent on duty or
otherwise and the competent authority as
per clause (2) of Regulation 48 is well
within its jurisdiction to treat the period of
suspension spent on duty or not.

13. In light of the view taken by
learned
single
Bench
power
under
Regulation 48(2) of Regulations of 2010
can be invoked only where no penalty of
dismissal or removal is imposed. In other
words the competent authority must not
invoke this power if a penalty of removal
or dismissal is inflicted.

14. In our considered opinion, learned
single Bench while concluding as above,
failed to understand very purpose of the
Regulation concerned.

15. It is well settled that suspension is
an interim disciplinary action, if not
otherwise provided as punishment. Such
interim disciplinary action is required to be
taken by the authority empowered in
various eventualities including to have a
fair inquiry by preventing the delinquent to
be with any official power that may
impress or tamper with the evidence
against him and further to ensure general
confidence in services. The interim action
taken, during the course of disciplinary
proceedings, is supposed to be settled by
the competent authority on conclusion of
the inquiry. In an inquiry, the delinquent
Officer/employee may be held guilty of the
alleged charges or may be acquitted from
the same. On being held guilty, the
delinquent
Officer/employee
may
be
subjected to a major punishment or a minor
punishment. The penalty of dismissal and
removal are major punishments and while
imposing such penalties the competent
authority is required to take a definite
decision as to whether suspension of the
employee is to be treated as a part of
service or otherwise. The competent
authority
while
doing
so
examines
justification of placing the incumbent under
suspension.

16. In normal course, while imposing
a minor punishment most of the employers
do treat the period of suspension as the
period spent on duty and it is quite obvious
as the eventuality otherwise would amount
to
break
in
service
depriving
the
Officer/employee
from
continuity
of
service.

17. Looking to this aspect, clause (2)
of Regulation 48 is introduced in the
Regulations of 2010. Its first part clearly
indicates that if an employee is not
subjected to any punishment that is having
effect from termination in service either by
way of removal or dismissal, his period of
suspension shall be treated as the period
spent
on
duty.
This
provision
in
unambiguous terms mandates that the
period of suspension is always to be treated
as the period spent on duty. The other part
having the phrase "or otherwise", as a
matter of fact pertains to the eventuality
when employee is subjected to punishment
of removal or dismissal, meaning thereby,
if the employee has suffered a penalty of
removal
or
dismissal
the
competent
authority may pass appropriate directions.
The interpretation otherwise would make
the clause (2) non-functional for the
Officers or employees, who have suffered
the punishment of dismissal or removal and
at the same time would also lead to
absurdity to the extent that an employee
subjected to minor punishment may suffer
12 All. Hem Nath & Ors. Vs. U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd., Lko. & Ors.
621
with a penalty of break in service which is
having an essence of termination.

18. In view of whatever stated above, in
our opinion, learned single Bench committed a
gross error while interpreting the intent of
clause (2) of Regulation 48. Hence, this appeal
deserves acceptance. Accordingly, the same is
allowed. The judgment impugned dated 10th
February, 2020 passed by learned single Bench
is set aside. The petition for writ is allowed. The
order dated 16th March, 2018 passed by the
competent authority/ General Manager, Baroda
Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank is quashed to the
extent that relates to treating the period of
suspension of the appellant as not a period spent
on duty and further disentitling him from the
payment of any difference of salary except the
subsistence allowance already paid. The period
aforesaid be treated as the period spent by the
appellant on duty.
----------
(2020)12ILR A621
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 16.04.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Service Single No. 1111 of 2002

Hem Nath & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd., Lko. &
Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
S.C. Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:
P.K. Sinha, Brijesh Kumar Shukla, Rajesh
Kumar Verma.

A. Service Law - Payment of Salary -
Schedule II of U.P. Sugar Undertakings
(Acquisition)
Act,
1971;
U.P.
Sugar
Undertakings
(Acquisition)
Act,
1971:
Section
2(h),
3,
7(6)(c),
7(6)(d),
8;
Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952; U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Payment of
Wages Act, 1936-The question raised in this
writ petition is, "whether liability of dues of
petitioners employees of erstwhile employer
i.e. before taking over of Hardoi Mill by
UPSSCL w.e.f. 28.10.1984, would be borne
by
UPSSCL
and/or
Respondent-3
or
petitioners must set up their claim from the
erstwhile Owner/Employer." (Para 10)

A conjoint reading of the provisions of Act,
1971, show that with effect from appointed day
i.e.
28.10.1984,
Scheduled
Undertakings,
specified in Schedule II of Act, 1971 stood
transferred and vested in UPSSCL free from any
debt, charge or encumbrance and any such
debt, charge or encumbrance stood attached to
compensation payable to erstwhile owner of
scheduled undertakings. It was for State
Government to deduct from compensation
payable to erstwhile Employer, the provident
fund or any other dues recoverable under
Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952, in respect
of any person employed in connection with
Scheduled
Undertaking
immediately
before
appointed day. In respect of dues under Act,
1952 recoverable from erstwhile Employer, it
was further open to Employees' Provident Fund
Commissioner to stake a claim before Prescribed
Authority appointed under Act, 1971. (Para 17)

The employees who continued in service on
appointed date and stood transferred to
UPSSCL, all their claims of entire period have to
be borne by UPSSCL and authorities under
Labour
Welfare
Legislation,
like,
EPF
Commissioner or Employees State Insurance
Corporation. It is not open to UPSSCL to dispute
the claim of an employee who was in service on
appointed date and retired while working in
UPSSCL, to suggest, that dues of the period
prior to appointed date must be settled by
employee
with
erstwhile
Owner.
Such
adjustment was permitted to be made from the
compensation payable to erstwhile Owner and it
was the responsibility of UPSSCL or authorities
under Act, 1952 or Employees State Insurance
Act, 1948 but if they had not adjusted the
amount from compensation payable to
erstwhile Owner, it is then-fault, and, they