# Chandrawati Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 1 ILRA 818
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-12-15
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 9927 of 2020
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chandrawati-devi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46129
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Constitution of India - Article 23 -
Minimum
Wages
Act,
1948
-
Remuneration - Less than minimum wage
- 'Other form of Forced Labour' - Ambit
and Scope - Where a person provides
labour
or
service
to
another
for
remuneration which is less than the
minimum wage, the labour or service
provided by him clearly falls within the
scope and ambit of the words 'forced
labour' under Article 23 - Rs. 1000/- paid
to lady-cook in Primary School for more
than 14 years - Petitioner was never in a
position to bargain with the might of the
State and continued to suffer the violation
of a rights - Held, the State has misused
its dominant position in fixing the wages
as
have
been
fixed
by
the
two
Government Orders to be paid to the
cooks employed for providing mid-daymeal - General mandamus issued to
remedy the ill. (Para 8, 10, 14 and 15)
B. Constitution of India - Part III -
Violation of Fundamental Rights -Role of
the Court - Court as custodian - Socio
economic equality - Held, this Court being
a custodian of the fundamental rights
cannot shut its eyes to the injustice
carried out against the petitioner and the
persons, who are similarly placed by an
act of the State, which claims to achieve
socio economic equality as the cherished
dreams of the Constitution. (Para 12)
Writ Petition allowed. (E-1)
Cases relied on :-

## Text

818 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2021)01ILR A818
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.12.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Writ A No. 9927 of 2020

Chandrawati Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ram Lalit Chaudhary

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Awadhesh Kumar, Sri Bhupendra
Kumar Tripathi

A. Constitution of India - Article 23 -
Minimum
Wages
Act,
1948
-
Remuneration - Less than minimum wage
- 'Other form of Forced Labour' - Ambit
and Scope - Where a person provides
labour
or
service
to
another
for
remuneration which is less than the
minimum wage, the labour or service
provided by him clearly falls within the
scope and ambit of the words 'forced
labour' under Article 23 - Rs. 1000/- paid
to lady-cook in Primary School for more
than 14 years - Petitioner was never in a
position to bargain with the might of the
State and continued to suffer the violation
of a rights - Held, the State has misused
its dominant position in fixing the wages
as
have
been
fixed
by
the
two
Government Orders to be paid to the
cooks employed for providing mid-daymeal - General mandamus issued to
remedy the ill. (Para 8, 10, 14 and 15)
B. Constitution of India - Part III -
Violation of Fundamental Rights -Role of
the Court - Court as custodian - Socio
economic equality - Held, this Court being
a custodian of the fundamental rights
cannot shut its eyes to the injustice
carried out against the petitioner and the
persons, who are similarly placed by an
act of the State, which claims to achieve
socio economic equality as the cherished
dreams of the Constitution. (Para 12)
Writ Petition allowed. (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. People's Union For Democratic Rights & ors.
Vs U.O.I. & ors., (1982) 3 SCC 235

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

1. The present writ petition has been
filed
alleging
that
the
petitioner
is
continuously working as a cook for making
mid-day-meal in Basic Primary School
Pinesar, Basti since 2005 and petitioner is
also a member of Mandhyan Bhojan
Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh. The petitioner has
approached this Court alleging that despite
the fact that the petitioner is working since
2005, the petitioner has been removed
without any opportunity from 01.08.2019.
It is also alleged that since the appointment
of the petitioner was made in the year 2005,
the petitioner was paid monthly wages of
Rs. 1000/- per month and, despite the
petitioner having worked for more than 14
years, she has been removed. The petitioner
claims to be a very poor lady and has no
other source of income, however, somehow
she managed resources to approach this
Court for highlighting the exploitation of
the petitioner at the hands of the
government and the authorities which are
State, within the meaning of Article 12.

2. This Court had expressed its
displeasure in the manner in which the
amount of Rs. 1000/- was being paid to the
poor lady for more than 14 years and,
looking into the exploitation of the
petitioner, had called the respondents to file
1 All. Chandrawati Devi & State of U.P. & Ors.
819
a counter affidavit explaining as to why and
how the petitioner was being exploited for
such a long time by paying a meager
amount of Rs. 1000/- per month.

3. A counter affidavit has been filed
before this Court on 09.12.2020, wherein in
para 16 the factum of the petitioner's
working since 2005 has not been denied. In
respect of the amount paid to the petitioner,
reliance
has
been
placed
on
the
Government Order dated 24th April, 2010,
wherein the wages for the cook, providing
mid-day-meal, is fixed as Rs. 1000/- per
month, out of which 75% is to be borne by
the Central Government and rest 25% is to
be borne by the State Government.

4. The counsel for the respondents
states that w.e.f. 09th March, 2019 the
amount payable to the cooks has been
enhanced from Rs. 1000/- to Rs. 1500/- per
month. He has also brought on record a
Government Order dated 14th August,
2019 to the effect that new incumbents are
to be appointed as cook for providing midday-meal and preference would be given to
the persons whose one of the child is
studying in the school in question, and thus
argues that as the petitioner's child is not
studying in the school, she could not be
considered for fresh appointment.

5. The present case highlights the
manner in which the practice of Forced
Labour is prevalent in the country even
after 70 years of independence and the
helpless people similar to the petitioner
continue
to
suffer
the
exploitation
willingly.

6. Part III of the Constitution of India
provides for the freedoms to which are
guaranteed to every citizen of this country .
The present case is specifically concerned
with Article 14, Article 21 and Article 23
of
the
Constitution
of
India,
more
particularly Article 23 .In the context of the
facts of the present case what is to be
considered is that whether the payment of
wages at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month
is an other form of Forced Labour as
barred by virtue of Article 23 of the
Constitution of India or not.

7. The question of "other forms of
Forced Labour" as finds place in Article 23
of the Constitution of India came up for
consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court for the first time in the case of
People's Union For Democratic Rights
and Others v. Union of India and Others;
(1982) 3 SCC 235, wherein in the form of
Public Interest Litigation, the plight of the
workers engaged in the construction for the
Asian Games, was highlighted before the
Supreme Court. The contention before the
Supreme Court was that the workers
employed for constructions were being paid
wages which were less than the minimum
wages prescribed. The Supreme Court
specifically considered the scope of Article
23 and recorded as under:-

"12. Article 23 enacts a very important
fundamental right in the following terms:

"23. Prohibition of traffic in human
beings and forced labour.--(1) Traffic in
human beings and begar and other similar
forms of forced labour are prohibited and
any contravention of this provision shall be
an offence punishable in accordance with
law.

(2) Nothing in this article shall
prevent
the
State
from
imposing
compulsory service for public purposes,
and in imposing such service the State shall
not make any discrimination on grounds
only of religion, race, caste or class or any
of them."
820 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Now many of the fundamental rights
enacted in Part III operate as limitations
on the power of the State and impose
negative obligations on the State not to
encroach on individual liberty and they are
enforceable only against the State. But
there are certain fundamental rights
conferred by the Constitution which are
enforceable against the whole world and
they are to be found inter alia in Articles
17, 23 and 24. We have already discussed
the true scope and ambit of Article 24 in an
earlier portion of this judgment and hence
we do not propose to say anything more
about it. So also we need not expatiate on
the proper meaning and effect of the
fundamental right enshrined in Article 17
since we are not concerned with that article
in the present writ petition. It is Article 23
with which we are concerned and that
article is clearly designed to protect the
individual not only against the State but
also against other private citizens. Article
23 is not limited in its application against
the State but it prohibits "traffic in human
being and begar and other similar forms of
forced labour" practised by anyone else.
The sweep of Article 23 is wide and
unlimited and it strikes at "traffic in human
beings and begar and other similar forms
of forced labour" wherever they are found.
The reason for enacting this provision in
the Chapter on Fundamental Rights is to be
found in the socio-economic condition of
the
people
at
the
time
when
the
Constitution came to be enacted. The
Constitution-makers, when they set out to
frame the Constitution, found that they had
the enormous task before them of changing
the socio-economic structure of the country
and
bringing
about
socio-economic
regeneration with a view to reaching social
and economic justice to the common man.
Large masses of people, bled white by
wellnigh two centuries of foreign rule, were
living in abject poverty and destitution,
with ignorance and illiteracy accentuating
their helplessness and despair. The society
had degenerated into a status-oriented
hierarchical society with little respect for
the dignity of the individual who was in the
lower rungs of the social ladder or in an
economically impoverished condition. The
political revolution was completed and it
had succeeded in bringing freedom to the
country but freedom was not an end in
itself, it was only a means to an end, the
end being the raising of the people to
higher levels of achievement and bringing
about their total advancement and welfare.
Political freedom had no meaning unless it
was accompanied by social and economic
freedom and it was therefore necessary to
carry forward the social and economic
revolution with a view to creating socioeconomic conditions in which every one
would be able to enjoy basic human rights
and participate in the fruits of freedom and
liberty in an egalitarian social and
economic framework. It was with this end
in view that the Constitution-makers
enacted the directive principles of state
policy in Part IV of the Constitution setting
out the constitutional goal of a new socioeconomic order. Now there was one feature
of our national life which was ugly and
shameful and which cried for urgent
attention and that was the existence of
bonded or forced labour in large parts of
the country. This evil was the relic of a
feudal exploitative society and it was
totally
incompatible
with
the
new
egalitarian socio-economic order which
"we the people of India" were determined
to build and constituted a gross and most
revolting denial of basic human dignity. It
was therefore necessary to eradicate this
pernicious practice and wipe it out
altogether from the national scene and this
had to be done immediately because with
1 All. Chandrawati Devi & State of U.P. & Ors.
821
the advent of freedom, such practice could
not be allowed to continue to blight the
national life any longer. Obviously, it
would not have been enough merely to
include abolition of forced labour in the
directive principles of state policy, because
then the outlawing of this practice would
not have been legally enforceable and it
would have continued to plague our
national life in violation of the basic
constitutional norms and values until some
appropriate legislation could be brought by
the legislature forbidding such practice.
The Constitution-makers therefore decided
to give teeth to their resolve to obliterate
and wipe out this evil practice by enacting
constitutional prohibition against it in the
Chapter on Fundamental Rights, so that the
abolition of such practice may become
enforceable and effective as soon as the
Constitution came into force. This is the
reason why the provision enacted in Article
23 was included in the Chapter on
Fundamental
Rights.
The
prohibition
against "traffic in human beings and begar
and other similar forms of forced labour" is
clearly
intended
to
be
a
general
prohibition, total in its effect and all
pervasive in its range and it is enforceable
not only against the State but also against
any other person indulging in any such
practice."

13. The question then is as to what is
the true scope and meaning of the
expression "traffic in human beings and
begar and other similar forms of forced
labour" in Article 23? What are the forms
of "forced labour" prohibited by that
article and what kind of labour provided
by a person can be regarded as "forced
labour"
so
as
to
fall
within
this
prohibition? When the Constitution-makers
enacted Article 23 they had before them
Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of
Human
Rights
but
they
deliberately
departed from its language and employed
words which would make the reach and
content of Article 23 much wider than that
of Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. They banned "traffic in
human beings" which is an expression of
much larger amplitude than "slave trade"
and they also interdicted "begar and other
similar forms of forced labour". The
question is what is the scope and ambit of
the expression "begar" and other similar
forms of forced labour'? Is this expression
wide enough to include every conceivable
form of forced labour and what is the true
scope and meaning of the words "forced
labour"? The word "begar" in this article is
not a word of common use in English
language. It is a word of Indian origin
which like many other words has found its
way in the English vocabulary. It is very
difficult to formulate a precise definition of
the word "begar", but there can be no
doubt that it is a form of forced labour
under which a person is compelled to work
without
receiving
any
remuneration.
Molesworth describes 'begar' as "labour or
service exacted by a Government or person
in power without giving remuneration for
it". Wilson's Glossary of Judicial and
Revenue Termsgives the following meaning
of the word "begar": "a forced labourer,
one
pressed
to
carry
burthens
for
individuals or the public. Under the old
system, when pressed for public service, no
pay was given. The begari, though still
liable to be pressed for public objects, now
receives pay. Forced labour for private
service is, prohibited." "Begar" may
therefore be loosely described as labour or
service which a person is forced to give
without receiving any remuneration for it.
That was the meaning of the word "begar"
accepted by a Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan v.
S.D. Mital [AIR 1962 Bom 53 : 63 Bom LR
822 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
774 : (1961-62) 21 FJR 441] . "Begar" is
thus clearly a form of forced labour. Now
it is not merely "begar" which is
unconstitutionally
(sic)
prohibited
by
Article 23 but also all other similar forms
of forced labour. This Article strikes at
forced labour in whatever form it may
manifest itself, because it is violative of
human dignity and is contrary to basic
human values. The practice of forced
labour is condemned in almost every
international
instrument
dealing
with
human rights. It is interesting to find that
as far back as 1930 long before the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
came into being, International Labour
Organisation adopted Convention No. 29
laying down that every member of the
International Labour Organisation which
ratifies this convention shall "suppress the
use of forced or compulsory labour in all
its forms" and this prohibition was
elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted
by the International Labour Organisation
in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory
labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course
a limited meaning but that was so on
account of the restricted definition of these
words given in Article 2 of the Convention.
Article 4 of the European Convention of
Human Rights and Article 8 of the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights also prohibit forced or
compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the
same strain and it enacts a prohibition
against forced labour in whatever form it
may be found. The learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents laid
some emphasis on the word "similar" and
contended that it is not every form of forced
labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but
only such form of forced labour as is
similar to "begar" and since "begar" means
labour or service which a person is forced
to give without receiving any remuneration
for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited
only to those forms of forced labour where
labour or service is exacted from a person
without paying any remuneration at all and
if some remuneration is paid, though it be
inadequate, it would not fall within the
words "other similar forms of forced
labour". This contention seeks to unduly
restrict the amplitude of the prohibition
against forced labour enacted in Article 23
and is in our opinion not well founded. It
does not accord with the principle
enunciated by this Court in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC
248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : (1978) 2 SCR
621] that when interpreting the provisions
of the Constitution conferring fundamental
rights, the attempt of the court should be to
expand the reach and ambit of the
fundamental rights rather than to attenuate
their meaning and content. It is difficult to
imagine
that
the
Constitution-makers
should have intended to strike only at
certain forms of forced labour leaving it
open to the socially or economically
powerful sections of the community to
exploit the poor and weaker sections by
resorting to other forms of forced labour.
Could there be any logic or reason in
enacting that if a person is forced to give
labour or service to another without
receiving any remuneration at all, it should
be regarded as a pernicious practice
sufficient to attract the condemnation of
Article 23, but if some remuneration is paid
for it, then it should be outside the
inhibition of that article? If this were the
true interpretation, Article 23 would be
reduced to a mere rope of sand, for it
would then be the easiest thing in an
exploitative society for a person belonging
to a socially or economically dominant
class to exact labour or service from a
person belonging to the deprived and
vulnerable section of the community by
1 All. Chandrawati Devi & State of U.P. & Ors.
823
paying
a
negligible
amount
of
remuneration and thus escape the rigour of
Article 23. We do not think it would be
right to place on the language of Article 23
an interpretation which would emasculate
its beneficent provisions and defeat the
very purpose of enacting them. We are
clearly of the view that Article 23 is
intended to abolish every form of forced
labour. The words "other similar forms of
forced labour" are used in Article 23 not
with a view to importing the particular
characteristic of "begar" that labour or
service should be exacted without payment
of any remuneration but with a view to
bringing within the scope and ambit of that
article all other forms of forced labour and
since "begar" is one form of forced labour,
the Constitution-makers used the words
"other similar forms of forced labour". If
the requirement that labour or work should
be exacted without any remuneration were
imported in other forms of forced labour,
they would straightaway come within the
meaning of the word "begar" and in that
event there would be no need to have the
additional words "other similar forms of
forced labour". These words would be
rendered futile and meaningless and it is a
well-recognised rule of interpretation that
the court should avoid a construction
which has the effect of rendering any words
used by the legislature superfluous or
redundant. The object of adding these
words was clearly to expand the reach and
content of Article 23 by including, in
addition to "begar", other forms of forced
labour within the prohibition of that article.
Every form of forced labour, "begar" or
otherwise, is within the inhibition of Article
23 and it makes no difference whether the
person who is forced to give his labour or
service to another is remunerated or not.
Even if remuneration is paid, labour
supplied by a person would be hit by this
article if it is forced labour, that is, labour
supplied not willingly but as a result of
force or compulsion."

8. Thereafter, the Supreme Court
proceeded to consider as to whether a
person is said to be providing Forced
Labour if he is paid less than the minimum
wages for it and recorded as under:-

"14.Now the next question that arises
for consideration is whether there is any
breach of Article 23 when a person
provides labour or service to the State or to
any other person and is paid less than the
minimum wage for it. It is obvious that
ordinarily no one would willingly supply
labour or service to another for less than
the minimum wage, when he knows that
under the law he is entitled to get minimum
wage for the labour or service provided by
him. It may therefore be legitimately
presumed that when a person provides
labour or service to another against receipt
of remuneration which is less than the
minimum wage, he is acting under the force
of some compulsion which drives him to
work though he is paid less than what he is
entitled under law to receive. What Article
23 prohibits is "forced labour" that is
labour or service which a person is forced
to provide and "force" which would make
such labour or service "forced labour" may
arise in several ways. It may be physical
force which may compel a person to
provide labour or service to another or it
may be force exerted through a legal
provision
such
as
a
provision
for
imprisonment or fine in case the employee
fails to provide labour or service or it may
even be compulsion arising from hunger
and poverty, want and destitution. Any
factor which deprives a person of a choice
of alternatives and compels him to adopt
one particular course of action may
824 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
properly be regarded as "force" and if
labour or service is compelled as a result
of such "force", it would be "forced
labour". Where a person is suffering from
hunger or starvation, when he has no
resources at all to fight disease or to feed
his wife and children or even to hide their
nakedness, where utter grinding poverty
has broken his back and reduced him to a
state of helplessness and despair and where
no other employment is available to
alleviate the rigour of his poverty, he would
have no choice but to accept any work that
comes his way, even if the remuneration
offered to him is less than the minimum
wage. He would be in no position to
bargain with the employer; he would have
to accept what is offered to him. And in
doing so he would be acting not as a free
agent with a choice between alternatives
but under the compulsion of economic
circumstances and the labour or service
provided by him would be clearly "forced
labour". There is no reason why the word
"forced" should be read in a narrow and
restricted manner so as to be confined only
to physical or legal "force" particularly
when the national charter, its fundamental
document has promised to build a new
socialist republic where there will be socioeconomic justice for all and everyone shall
have the right to work, to education and to
adequate
means
of
livelihood.
The
Constitution-makers have given us one of
the most remarkable documents in history
for ushering in a new socio-economic order
and the Constitution which they have
forged for us has a social purpose and an
economic mission and therefore every word
or phrase in the Constitution must be
interpreted in a manner which would
advance the socio-economic objective of
the Constitution. It is not unoften that in a
capitalist society economic circumstances
exert much greater pressure on an
individual in driving him to a particular
course of action than physical compulsion
or force of legislative provision. The word
"force" must therefore be construed to
include not only physical or legal force but
also force arising from the compulsion of
economic circumstances which leaves no
choice of alternatives to a person in want
and compels him to provide labour or
service even though the remuneration
received for it is less than the minimum
wage. Of course, if a person provides
labour or service to another against receipt
of the minimum wage, it would not be
possible to say that the labour or service
provided by him is "forced labour" because
he gets what he is entitled under law to
receive. No inference can reasonably be
drawn in such a case that he is forced to
provide labour or service for the simple
reason that he would be providing labour
or service against receipt of what is
lawfully payable to him just like any other
person who is not under the force of any
compulsion. We are therefore of the view
that where a person provides labour or
service to another for remuneration which
is less than the minimum wage, the labour
or service provided by him clearly falls
within the scope and ambit of the words
"forced labour" under Article 23. Such a
person would be entitled to come to the
court for enforcement of his fundamental
right under Article 23 by asking the court
to direct payment of the minimum wage to
him so that the labour or service provided
by him ceases to be "forced labour" and
the breach of Article 23 is remedied. It is
therefore clear that when the petitioners
alleged that minimum wage was not paid to
the workmen employed by the contractors,
the complaint was really in effect and
substance a complaint against violation of
the fundamental right of the workmen
under Article 23."
1 All. Chandrawati Devi & State of U.P. & Ors.
825

9. Thereafter, the Supreme Court
considered the obligations of the State in
the event of a complaint being made
against violation of fundamental rights
enacted under Article 17 or Article 23 or
Article 24 and recorded as under:-

"15. Before leaving this subject, we
may point out with all the emphasis at our
command that whenever any fundamental
right which is enforceable against private
individuals such as, for example, a
fundamental right enacted in Article 17 or
23 or 24 is being violated, it is the
constitutional obligation of the State to take
the necessary steps for the purpose of
interdicting such violation and ensuring
observance of the fundamental right by the
private individual who is transgressing the
same. Of course, the person whose
fundamental right is violated can always
approach the court for the purpose of
enforcement of his fundamental right, but
that cannot absolve the State from its
constitutional obligation to see that there
is no violation of the fundamental right of
such person, particularly when he belongs
to the weaker section of humanity and is
unable to wage a legal battle against a
strong and powerful opponent who is
exploiting him. The Union of India, the
Delhi
Administration
and
the
Delhi
Development Authority must therefore be
held to be under an obligation to ensure
observance of these various labour laws by
the contractors and if the provisions of any
of these labour laws are violated by the
contractors, the petitioners vindicating the
cause of the workmen are entitled to
enforce this obligation against the Union of
India, the Delhi Administration and the
Delhi Development Authority by filing the
present writ petition. The preliminary
objections
urged
on
behalf
of
the
respondents must accordingly be rejected."

10. Thus, following the said judgment
of the Supreme Court, I am of the firm view
that the payment of wages at the rate of Rs.
1,000/- per month since the year 2005 up to
2019 to the petitioner was clearly a form of
Forced Labour, which is prohibited under
Article 23 of the Constitution of India. The
petitioner was never in a position to bargain
with the might of the State and continued to
suffer the violation of a rights for a period of
14 years.

11. The counsel for the petitioner has
narrated the sorry State of affairs through
which the petitioner is undergoing after her
removal from the service in the year 2019
and in fact states that the petitioner is still
ready and willing to suffer the injustice and
perform her duties even if she is paid Rs.
1,500/- per month, which has been
prescribed
by
the
Government
vide
Government Order dated 9th March, 2019
and requests that this Court may direct the
State to permit the petitioner to continue on
the post of cook at whatever rates, the State
may deem fit to give to the petitioner.

12. This Court being a custodian of
the fundamental rights cannot shut its eyes
to the injustice carried out against the
petitioner and the persons, who are
similarly placed by an act of the State,
which claims to achieve socio economic
equality as the cherished dreams of the
Constitution. Despite the fact that the
petitioner is ready and willing to even work
at the rates prescribed by the State, if this
Court allows the payment of wages as fixed
by the State, that is, Rs. 1,000/- per months
enhanced to Rs. 1,500/- per months in the
year 2019, the Court would be clearly
guilty of perpetuating the violation of the
rights of the petitioner enshrined and
guaranteed under Article 23 of the
Constitution of India.
826 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13. This Court can also not overlook
the fact that the persons employed as cooks
throughout the State of Uttar Pradesh are
being paid such paltry amounts which
clearly qualify as forced labour and they
continue to render their services without
any complaint whatsoever. This Court
cannot comprehend that a person earning
Rs.
1,000/-
per
month
would
be
empowered to approach this Court, more
particularly
because
of
their
socio
economic condition, which forced them to
accept the services on such conditions as
have been imposed by the State.

14. I am of the firm view that the
Government Orders, referred to by the
Standing Counsel being the Government
Order dated 24th April, 2010 prescribing
Rs. 1,000/- per month as wages and the
Government Order dated 9th March, 2019
prescribing the minimum wages at Rs.
1,500/- per month are clearly a form of
"Forced Labour", which is specifically
prohibited
under
Article
23
of
the
Constitution of India. Thus, I have no
hesitation in holding that the State has
misused its dominant position in fixing the
wages as have been fixed by the two
Government Orders to be paid to the cooks
employed for providing mid-day-meal.

15. To remedy the ill, I issue a general
mandamus directing the State to ensure the
payment of wages calculating at the rate
prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act
to all the cooks employed for providing
mid-day-meal in the Institutions run by the
Government or Semi-Government bodies.
The said cooks, including the petitioner
shall be paid minimum wages calculated
and payable for every month and year of
services rendered by them w.e.f. 2005 till
date by paying them the difference of the
said amount, which is over and above Rs.
1,000/- per month.

16. The State Government and the
Union of India are further directed to take
steps for issuance of directions fixing the
rate prescribed under the Minimum Wages
Act, as the wages which would be payable
to the cooks employed for providing midday-meal in the Institutions run by the
Government
or
the
Semi-Government
bodies, the respective Governments may
work out their payment obligations in
consultation with each other, however, it
shall be ensured that the cooks are not paid
wages less than the minimum prescribed
under the Minimum Wages Act, in any
case. It is clarified that this order shall
operate to the benefits of all the cooks
employed
who
provide
mid-day-meal
whether they have approached this Court or
not
or
whether
they
approach
the
Government by filing a separate application
or not.

17. The directions given by this Court
shall be carried out by the District
Magistrates in respect of all the cooks, who
are working for providing mid-day-meal in
the Government and Semi-Government
Schools within their Districts. The said
exercise of payment of the difference of the
amount, as directed above, shall be made
within a period of four months from today.

18. As a general mandamus has
been issued, the Registrar General of this
Court is directed to circulate a copy of
the present order to the Chief Secretary,
State of U.P. and the District Magistrates
throughout
the
State
of
U.P.
for
compliance of the directions given by this
Court within the time granted and
indicated hereinabove.
1 All. Devendra Singh Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
827

19. The writ petition deserves to be
allowed and is consequently allowed in
terms of the directions issued hereinabove.

20. Copy of the order downloaded
from the official website of this Court shall
be treated as certified copy of this order.
----------
(2021)01ILR A827
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.12.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ -A No. 10185 of 2020

Devendra Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ravi Pratap Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service law - Termination - No
Disciplinary Inquiry - TET Certificate, 2011
found to be obtained by fraud - Effect -
Held,
no
doubt
if
a
duly
appointed
employee's services that are governed by a
statutory tenure are to be terminated on the
ground
of
misconduct,
disciplinary
proceedings, in accordance with law, are a
sine qua non - But, it may not be so in a
case where the employment is secured
through utter fraud - Fraud vitiates all
solemn transaction - Any transaction that is
the result of a fraud is a nullity - Fraud is
required to be undone, wherever and
whenever it is found - The petitioner's
appointment found nullity. (Para 21 and 22)
Writ Petition dismissed. (E-1)

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. The petitioner, Devendra Singh has
impugned the orders dated 02.11.2019,
15.11.2019 and 31.07.2020, all passed by
the District Inspector of Schools, Basti,
which, in effect, put an end to his services
as an Assistant Teacher (Trained) in the
attached Primary Section of Sri Desh Raj
Narang
Dayanand
Inter
College,
Walterganj, Basti.

2. The impugned orders have come to
be made in the background of facts and
circumstances hereinafter detailed : Sri
Desh Raj Narang Dayanand Inter College,
Walterganj, Basti is a recognized and aided
institution, teaching scholars from Class I
to Class XII. The institution is governed by
the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the
Regulations
framed
thereunder.
The
institution
aforesaid
(for
short,
''the
institution') is in receipt of a permanent
grant-in-aid from the State Government.
Salaries to its teachers and other employees
are paid out of State fund under the Uttar
Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate
Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers
and others Employees) Act, 1971 (for short,
''Act of 1971'). There is no issue about the
fact that the teachers working against
sanctioned posts in the attached primary
section of the institution also receive their
salaries from the State Exchequer, under
the Act of 1971.

3. There were five sanctioned posts of
Assistant Teachers in the attached primary
section of the institution. Shorn of
unnecessary detail, all these posts fell
vacant at the relevant point of time and
were advertised by the Committee of
Management
of
the
institution,
after
necessary permission granted for the
purpose by the District Inspector of
Schools,
Basti
by
his
order
dated