# Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 1162
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-11
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 738 of 2024
- **Bench:** Madan Pal Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/charanjeet-kaur-manpreet-kumar-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-53871
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

complaint filed under Section 12 of the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, based on the alleged last
cause of action arising in a district.

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections - 127 - Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
- Section 2, 2(a), 29f), 2(s), 3, 12, 19, 27,
27(a), 27(b), 27(c) - Criminal Revision -
challenging the judgment and order passed by
the Additions Sessions Judge - under section 12
of the DV Act, - whether district courts had
jurisdiction under Section 12 of the DV Act, in a
case where revisionist alleged harassment,
9 All. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1163
dowry demands, and denial of maintenance by
her husband and in-laws - Trial court granted
her relief - the appellate court set aside the
order citing lack of jurisdiction, since the
marriage and earlier incidents occurred in
Uttarakhand and Rajasthan - The revisionist
argued that the last cause of action arose in
district (Bareilly) during a Panchayat meeting
where dowry demands were reiterated, thereby
conferring jurisdiction under Section 27(c) - The
Court observed that the D.V. Act provides broad
protection to women in domestic relationships,
recognizes shared households lived in "at any
point of time," and allows jurisdiction based on
cause
of
action,
not
just
residence
or
employment - Court held that, the appellate
court wrongly set aside the trial court's order by
ignoring
the
distinction
between
Section
27(a)/(b) and Section 27(c) of the DV Act -
Since the last cause of action arose in Bareilly,
the Civil Judge there had jurisdiction to
entertain the complaint - Accordingly, the
appellate court's order is quashed, and the trial
court's order is affirmed - further, court clarified
that court is not expressing any other opinion on
the other issues - accordingly, criminal revision
is allowed. (Para - 25, 26, 27, 28, 29)
Application Allowed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Prabha
Tyagi
Vs.
Kamlesh
Devi
-
MANU/SC/0631/2022.

LIST OF ACTS
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Criminal Revision - Jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint - revisional Jurisdiction - Domestic
Violence - Shared Household - Domestic
Relationship - Cause of Action - Dowry Demand
- Maintenance - Ex-parte Order - Panchayat
Meeting - at any point of time - domestic
relationships - recognizes shared households -
appellate court - trial court - fast track court -
specific finding - other issues.

CASE ARISING FROM
Criminal Revision against appellate order dated
16th November 2023 (Criminal Appeal No. 17 of
2022, Surendra Singh vs. State of U.P. &
Another) - Original complaint filed under Section
12 of D.V. Act (Complaint Case No. 984 of 2016,
Smt. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manjeet Kaur vs.
Sardar Rao Virendra Singh @ Bhola Singh &
Others) - Trial court order dated 8th September
2022 granting relief to revisionist.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Mr. Shyam Narayan
Verma and Ms. Shobha Wati
Counsel for Respondent(s): G.A., Mr. Upendra
Kumar Singh.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,975 of 40,647. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39975 for what follows._

1162 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
for the respondent, nor should it be so
meagre that it drives the wife to penury.

29. Keeping in view of the income of
revisionist as well as guidelines issued by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajnesh v.
Neha and Kulbhushan Kumar (Dr)
(Supras), this court is of the considered
opinion
that
the
total
amount
of
maintenance allowance awarded by the trial
court i.e. Rs. 5,000/-+Rs.4,000/- per month
(total
Rs.9,000/- per
month)
is not
commensurate as per the law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid
cases. 25% of the total monthly amount i.e.
Rs. 18,000 as quantified by this Court
herein-above
would
be
Rs.4,500/-.
Therefore, the same is reduced to Rs.
2,500/- per month to opposite party no.2
(wife) and Rs. 2,000/- per month to
opposite party no.3 (minor daughter) and
the same shall be payable from the date
when the revisionist attained the age of
majority i.e. 1st January, 2021.

30. Consequently, judgment and order
dated 22nd November, 2023 passed by the
Additional Principal Judge, Family Court
No.1, Bareilly in Criminal Misc. Case No.
1546 of 2019 (Smt. Sheela Devi & Another
Vs. Abhishek Yadav) under Section 125
Cr.P.C.,
Police
Station-Visharatganj,
District-Bareilly, is modified to the extent
that now the revisionist shall pay Rs.
2,500/- per month to opposite party no.2
(wife) and Rs. 2,000/- per month to
opposite party no.3 (minor daughter)
towards maintenance allowance from 1st
January, 2021.

31. It is also clarified that the arrears
of amount towards maintenance allowance
as awarded by the court below shall be
calculated on the basis of amount of
maintenance allowance as fixed by this
Court herein above and after that if it is
found that any amount has been paid in
excess, the same shall be adjusted from the
amount to be paid.

32. The present criminal revision is,
accordingly, partly allowed.

33. There shall be no order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 1162
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MADAN PAL SINGH, J.

Criminal Revision No. 738 of 2024

Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar
 ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Shobha Vati, Shyam Narayan Verma

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Upendra Kumar Singh

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the Civil Judge (Junior Division), F.T.C.,
had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
complaint filed under Section 12 of the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, based on the alleged last
cause of action arising in a district.

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections - 127 - Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
- Section 2, 2(a), 29f), 2(s), 3, 12, 19, 27,
27(a), 27(b), 27(c) - Criminal Revision -
challenging the judgment and order passed by
the Additions Sessions Judge - under section 12
of the DV Act, - whether district courts had
jurisdiction under Section 12 of the DV Act, in a
case where revisionist alleged harassment,
9 All. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1163
dowry demands, and denial of maintenance by
her husband and in-laws - Trial court granted
her relief - the appellate court set aside the
order citing lack of jurisdiction, since the
marriage and earlier incidents occurred in
Uttarakhand and Rajasthan - The revisionist
argued that the last cause of action arose in
district (Bareilly) during a Panchayat meeting
where dowry demands were reiterated, thereby
conferring jurisdiction under Section 27(c) - The
Court observed that the D.V. Act provides broad
protection to women in domestic relationships,
recognizes shared households lived in "at any
point of time," and allows jurisdiction based on
cause
of
action,
not
just
residence
or
employment - Court held that, the appellate
court wrongly set aside the trial court's order by
ignoring
the
distinction
between
Section
27(a)/(b) and Section 27(c) of the DV Act -
Since the last cause of action arose in Bareilly,
the Civil Judge there had jurisdiction to
entertain the complaint - Accordingly, the
appellate court's order is quashed, and the trial
court's order is affirmed - further, court clarified
that court is not expressing any other opinion on
the other issues - accordingly, criminal revision
is allowed. (Para - 25, 26, 27, 28, 29)
Application Allowed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Prabha
Tyagi
Vs.
Kamlesh
Devi
-
MANU/SC/0631/2022.

LIST OF ACTS
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Criminal Revision - Jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint - revisional Jurisdiction - Domestic
Violence - Shared Household - Domestic
Relationship - Cause of Action - Dowry Demand
- Maintenance - Ex-parte Order - Panchayat
Meeting - at any point of time - domestic
relationships - recognizes shared households -
appellate court - trial court - fast track court -
specific finding - other issues.

CASE ARISING FROM
Criminal Revision against appellate order dated
16th November 2023 (Criminal Appeal No. 17 of
2022, Surendra Singh vs. State of U.P. &
Another) - Original complaint filed under Section
12 of D.V. Act (Complaint Case No. 984 of 2016,
Smt. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manjeet Kaur vs.
Sardar Rao Virendra Singh @ Bhola Singh &
Others) - Trial court order dated 8th September
2022 granting relief to revisionist.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Mr. Shyam Narayan
Verma and Ms. Shobha Wati
Counsel for Respondent(s): G.A., Mr. Upendra
Kumar Singh.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Madan Pal Singh, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Shyam Narayan Verma
and Ms. Shobha Wati, learned counsel for
the revisionist, Mr. Upendra Kumar Singh,
learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and
the learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. The present criminal revision has
been preferred by the revisionist with the
prayer to set aside the judgment and order
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Court
No.10,
Bareilly
dated
16th
November, 2023 in Criminal Appeal No.
17 of 2022 (Surendra Singh Vs. State of
U.P. & Another) under Section 12 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (for short "D.V. Act"),
Police Station-Baradari, District-Bareilly,
whereby the appeal filed by opposite party
no.2 against the judgment and order dated
8th September, 2022 passed by the Civil
Judge (Junior Division), F.T.C., Court no.1,
Bareilly in the case under Section 12 of the
D.V. Act has been allowed and set aside
the said order of the Civil Judge.

3. The crux of the allegation made by
the revisionist is that the marriage of the
revisionist was solemnized with Sardar Rao
Virendra Singh on 27th May, 2005 in
accordance
with
Sikhism
Rites
and
Customs at Sitarganj, Uttarakhand. From
the aforesaid wedlock, three daughters,
namely, Devendra Kaur, Ms. Parveen Kaur
1164 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and Sukhmani Kaur were born. After some
time of marriage, the relationship between
the revisionist with her in-laws including
her
husband
became
strained
and
incompatible. Consequently, the revisionist
had given an application before the
Superintendent of Police, Alwar Rajasthan,
the last being dated 15th August, 2016
wherein it was alleged that for additional
demand of dowry of Rs. 50,000/- as also
for her being delivered three female
children, her two brothers-in-laws had
beaten her badly with sticks from which
she had sustained head injuries and her
treatment was undertaken at Government
Hospital, Govindgarh, Alwar, Rajasthan.
On 20th September, 2016, the revisionist,
her parents and other family members came
to office of Monitor Patrika of Baradari,
Stadium Road, Police Station-Baradari,
District
Bareilly
where
a
meeting/'Panchayat' was fixed. In-laws of
the revisionist along with some known
persons armed with weapons also came
there and participated in the meeting.
During the meeting, at around 07:00 p.m.
all the members of her in-laws started to
abuse the revisionist and her father while
threatening that unless they do not fulfil
their additional demand of dowry of Rs.
50,000/-, they would not allow the
revisionist to stay/live at her in-laws' place
along
with
her
three
daughters.
Consequently, an application was made by
the
revisionist
before
the
Senior
Superintendent
of
Police
Bareilly.
Although the most of the cause of action
arose in Sitarganj, Uttarakhand but due to
said marriage, the last cause of action arose
at a office in the name of Monitor Patrika
situated at the Police Station-Baradari,
District-Bareilly, the revisionist made a
complaint bearing Complaint Case No. 984
of 2016 (Smt. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manjeet
Kaur Vs. Sardar Rao Virendra Singh @
Bhola Singh and Others) under Section 12
of the D.V.Act, Police Station-Baradari,
District-Barielly on 3rd October, 2016. The
court below, after considering the facts and
circumstances of the case vide ex-parte
order dated 8th September, 2022 under
Section 12 of the D.V. Act allowed the said
complaint
and
directed
her
in-laws
including her husband either to make
arrangement
for
a
residential
accommodation to her along with her
daughters or to pay Rs. 9,000/- per month
under Section 19 of the D.V. Act. The court
below has also directed the in-laws of the
revisionist to pay a lump sum amount of
Rs. 4,00,000/- (rupees four lacs only) to the
revisionist and her three daughters for their
maintenance under Section 20 (3) of
D.V.Act. Feeling aggrieved by the said
order, the opposite party no. 2 filed
Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 2022 (Surendra
Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Charanjeet
Kaur & Manpreet Kaur) under Section 12
of the D.V. Act. The said appeal was
allowed by the appellate court vide order
dated 16th November, 2023 on the ground
that since the court below had no
jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the
revisionist under Section 12 of D.V. Act,
therefore, the ex-parte order passed by the
trial court has been set aside. Hence the
present criminal revision.

4. Contention of the learned counsel
for the revisionist is that the appellate
court, without considering the facts and
circumstances of the case and without
applying its judicial mind, has passed the
impugned order, which per se illegal,
arbitrary and unfair in the eyes of law. It is
further
contended
that
due
to
non-
fulfilment of additional demand of dowry
to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- and also due to
the fact that she delivered three female
children and not any male child, the
9 All. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1165
revisionist along with her parents were
tortured and harassed by her in-laws
including her husband. The revisionist was
also not permitted by them to live at her
matrimonial
house
along
with
her
daughters. The in-laws of the revisionist
clearly refused to bear her and her
daughters' expenses. Despite the fact that
in-laws of the revisionist have a lot of
agriculture land and 8 to 10 houses, but due
to greed, they used to demand the
additional dowry. Due to ill treatment by
the in-laws of the revisionist, she and her
daughters remained ill most of the time and
because of the same, a lump sum Rs. 10
lakhs were spent for their treatment. It is
lastly argued by the learned counsel for the
revisionist that since the last cause of action
arose within the territorial limits of Police
Station-Baradari,
District
Bareilly,
therefore the complaint legally lies within
the territorial jurisdiction of District Court,
Bareilly. Therefore, the court below, while
allowing the complaint filed by the
revisionist under Section 12 of the D.V.
Act has not committed any error under the
ex-parte order. It had the jurisdiction to
hear the same. Such aspect of the matter as
well as the statutory provisions applicable
on the subject have completely been
ignored by the appellate court, while
passing the impugned order.

5. On the cumulative strength of the
aforesaid,
learned
counsel
for
the
revisionist
states
that
the
impugned
judgment passed by the court below cannot
be legally sustained and is liable to be
quashed.

6. On the other-hand, learned counsel
for opposite party no.2 and the learned
A.G.A. for the State have opposed the
present criminal revision by submitting that
there is no illegality or infirmity in the
impugned judgment, so as to warrant any
interference by this Court in exercise of
revisional jurisdiction.

7. Apart from the above, learned
counsel for opposite party no.2 states that
the marriage of the revisionist and her
husband were solemnized at Sitarganj,
Uttarakhand where the cause of action
arose. It is further submitted that a first
class Magistrate under Section 27 of the
D.V. Act within whose local jurisdiction,
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or
temporarily resides or carries on business
or is employed; or (b) the respondent
resides or carries on business or is
employed; or (c) the cause of action has
arisen, is competent to grant a protection
order and other orders and try the offences
under this Act. It is then submitted that in
the present case, neither the revisionist nor
her
husband
never
resided
permanently/temporarily
or
were
employed, within the area of Police
Station-Baradari, District at Bareilly, where
the revisionist filed compliant under
Section 12 of D.V. Act. It is next submitted
that under Section 2 (s) of D.V. Act, "share
household" has been defined by which a
complaint is filed at a place where a
household is situated in which the person
aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in
a domestic relationship either singally or
along with the respondent. However, in the
present case the revisionist never lived in a
domestic relationship either singally or
along with her husband in Baradari, District
Bareilly. It is, on the basis of the aforesaid
legal proposition of law that the court
below has no jurisdiction to try the
complaint filed by the revisionist that the
appellate court is correct in holding that the
Magistrate i.e. court below had no
jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the
revisionist under Section 12 of D.V. Act.
1166 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Therefore, the appellate court is legally
justified in setting aside the order of the
court below vide the order impugned. As
such, learned counsel for opposite party
no.2 submits that the present criminal
revision is liable to be dismissed.

8. I have considered the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties and have gone through the records
of the present criminal revision.

9. The core issue that is requisite to be
addressed before this Court is whether the
court below i.e. Civil Judge (Junior
Division) F.T.C., Court no.1, Bareilly had
jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the
revisionist under Section 12 of D.V. Act or
not?

10. On going through the provisions of
D.V. Act, this Court is of the opinion that
precisely, the object of the D.V. Act is to
provide various reliefs to those women,
who are or have been in domestic
relationships with the abuser, where both
the parties have lived together in a shared
household
and
are
related
by
consanguinity, marriage or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage or
through adoption. Besides, relationships
with family members living together as a
joint family are also included within the
ambit of the D.V. Act. The definition of
"domestic violence" as set out in the D.V.
Act is very wide and includes any act of
physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or
economic abuse or threat of such abuse.
The D.V. Act provides for various
remedies including right of a woman to
reside in the matrimonial home or shared
household whether or not she has any title
or rights in such home or household;
protection orders to prevent the abuser
from aiding or committing an act of
domestic violence or any other specified
act, entering the work place frequented by
the
aggrieved
person
attempting
to
communicate with her etc. That apart, it
also provides for monetary reliefs to meet
the expenses incurred or losses suffered by
the aggrieved person, as a result of such
domestic violence. Besides the aforesaid
remedies in civil law, the breach of the
protection order by the abuser and failure
on the part of protection officer in
discharging the duties assigned are made
punishable offences under the D.V. Act.

11. This Court is of the opinion that
the jurisdiction to entertain and decide a
complaint under Section 12 of the D.V. Act
be reckoned with reference to Sections 3
and 27 of the D.V. Act alone. Section 27 of
the D.V. Act is the sole repository of
jurisdiction
for
an
application
under
Section 12 of the D.V. Act and the
Magistrate is the statutorily designated
forum to entertain an application under
Section 12 of the D.V. Act and also to try
offences under the D.V. Act.

12. For appreciating the above issue it
would be worthwhile to reproduce Sections
2 (a), (f) and (s), Section 3 and Section 27
of the D.V. Act, which are quoted
hereunder:

"2.
Definitions.-In
this
Act,
unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a) `aggrieved person' means any
woman who is, or has been, in a domestic
relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act of
domestic violence by the respondent;

x x x

xxxx
9 All. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1167

(f) `domestic relationship' means
a relationship between two persons who
live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shared household, when they
are related by consanguinity, marriage, or
through a relationship in the nature of
marriage, adoption or are family members
living together as a joint family;

x x x

(s) `shared household' means a
household where the person aggrieved lives
or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the
respondent and includes such a house hold
whether owned or tenanted either jointly by
the aggrieved person and the respondent,
or owned or tenanted by either of them in
respect of which either the aggrieved
person or the respondent or both jointly or
singly have any right, title, interest or
equity and includes such a household
which may belong to the joint family of
which the respondent is a member,
irrespective of whether the respondent or
the aggrieved person has any right, title or
interest in the shared household."

"3.
Definition
of
domestic
violence.-For the purposes of this Act, any
act, omission or commission or conduct of
the respondent shall constitute domestic
violence in case it-

(a) harms or injures or endangers
the health, safety, life, limb or well-being,
whether mental or physical, of the
aggrieved person or tends to do so and
includes causing physical abuse, sexual
abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or
endangers the aggrieved person with a
view to coerce her or any other person
related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any dowry or other property or
valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening
the aggrieved person or any person related
to her by any conduct mentioned in clause
(a) or clause (b); or

(d) otherwise injures or causes
harm, whether physical or mental, to the
aggrieved person. Explanation I.-For the
purposes of this section,-

(i) `physical abuse' means any act
or conduct which is of such a nature as to
cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life,
limb, or health or impair the health or
development of the aggrieved person and
includes assault, criminal intimidation and
criminal force;

(ii) `sexual abuse' includes any
conduct of a sexual nature that abuses,
humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates
the dignity of woman;

(iii) `verbal and emotional abuse'
includes-

(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation,
name calling and insults or ridicule
specially with regard to not having a child
or a male child; and

(b) repeated threats to cause
physical pain to any person in whom the
aggrieved person is interested;

(iv) `economic abuse' includes-

(a) deprivation of all or any
economic or financial resources to which
the aggrieved person is entitled under any
1168 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
law or custom whether payable under an
order of a court or otherwise or which the
aggrieved person requires out of necessity
including, but not limited to, house hold
necessities for the aggrieved person and
her children, if any, Stridhana, property,
jointly
or
separately
owned by
the
aggrieved person, payment of rental
related to the shared house hold and
maintenance;

(b) disposal of household effects,
any alienation of assets whether movable
or immovable, valuables, shares, securities,
bonds and the like or other property in
which the aggrieved person has an interest
or is entitled to use by virtue of the
domestic relationship or which may be
reasonably required by the aggrieved
person or her children or her Stridhana or
any other property jointly or separately
held by the aggrieved person; and

(c) prohibition or restriction to
continued access to resources or facilities
which the aggrieved person is entitled to
use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic
relationship including access to the shared
household.

Explanation II.-For the purpose
of determining whether any act, omission,
commission or conduct of the respondent
constitutes `domestic violence' under this
section, the overall facts and circumstances
of
the
case
shall
be
taken
into
consideration."

Section 27 in The Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

27. Jurisdiction

(1)
The
Court
of
Judicial
Magistrate of the first class or the
Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may
be, within the local limits of which

(a)
the
person
aggrieved
permanently or temporarily resides or
carries on business or is employed; or

(a) the respondent resides or
carries on business or is employed; or

(c) the cause of action has arisen,
shall be the competent Court to grant a
protection order and other orders under
this Act and to try offences under this Act.

(2) Any order made under this
Act shall be enforceable throughout India."

13. From bare reading of sub-Sections
(a), (f) and (s) of Section 2, Section 3 and
Section 27 of the D.V. Act, this Court finds
that the contours of a domestic relationship,
which is a sine-qua-non for definition of
"aggrieved person" as laid down in Section
2 (f) make it abundantly clear that the
legislature in its wisdom has given a wide
definition to domestic relationship to
include any relationship between two
persons, who either live at the present
moment or have at any point of time in the
past lived together in a shared household.
The relationship between the two persons
can be by consanguinity, marriage, a
relationship in the nature of marriage,
adoption or as family members living
together as a joint family. It is pertinent to
note that the domestic relationship, as
envisaged by Section 2 (f) of the D.V. Act
is not confined to the relationship, as
husband and wife or a relationship in the
nature of marriage, but it includes other
relationship as well, such as sisters, mother
etc. Thus, merely because the husband and
wife or a person living in a relationship in
the nature of marriage or the two persons
9 All. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1169
living together in any other domestic
relationship, as envisaged under Section 2
(f) of the D.V. subjected to domestic
violence, such a victim of domestic
violence shall not cease to be the
"aggrieved person" so as to disentitle her
from invoking the provisions of the D.V.
Act. As a matter of fact, since there cannot
be a legal divorce between the persons
living in the relationship in the nature of
marriage, the question of restricting the
applicability of the provisions to the parties
to the marriage subsisting as on the date of
coming into force of the D.V. Act and not
to apply the said provisions to the
aggrieved person, whose marriage stands
dissolved by a decree of divorce prior to
coming into force of the D.V. Act will run
contrary to the objects sought to be
achieved by the D.V. Act. A fortiori, if it
was intended by the legislature to provide
for the remedy only in respect of the act of
domestic violence committed prior to the
coming into force of the D.V. Act during
the subsisting domestic relationship, the
expression "have, at any point of time,
lived together" was not required to be used
in the definition of "domestic relationship"
as incorporated under Section 2 (f) of the
D.V. Act. "Shared household" means a
household where the person aggrieved lives
or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the
respondent and includes such a household
whether owned or tenanted either jointly by
the aggrieved person and the respondent, or
owned or tenanted by either of them in
respect of which either the aggrieved
person or the respondent or both jointly or
singally have any right, title, interest or
equity and includes such a household
which may belong to the joint family of
which the respondent is a member,
irrespective of whether the respondent or
the aggrieved person has any right, title or
interest in the shared household.

14. Once again, the definition of
"shared household" like that of "aggrieved
person" and "domestic relationship" is wide
in its scope and includes not just the
household, where person aggrieved lives at
present but also the household where the
person aggrieved has at any stage lived in
domestic relationship either singally or
along with respondent.

15. Coming to the definition of
"domestic violence" as set out under
Section 3 of the Act, which is vital and
germane to issue raised herein, it is to be
noticed that "domestic violence" includes
within its ambit all kind of violence
occurring within the family and the
Explanation-I attached thereto enumerates
the various kinds of domestic abuse widely
prevalent in our country and explains the
scope and ambit thereof. The definition of
the "domestic violence" has already been
quoted above.

16. Even a fleeting glimpse at Section
3 of the D.V. Act as reproduced above
reflects that "domestic violence" has been
widely defined and it covers within its
ambit any act, omission or commission or
conduct of the respondent resulting in
physical,
sexual,
psychological
and
economic abuse or threat of such abuse
being inflicted upon a woman who is or has
been in domestic relationship with him.
Undoubtedly, while the physical or sexual
abuse caused by the respondent may be
time specific, the emotional abuse caused
cannot be time specific and its effects may
persist even after the actual occurrence of
the act of violence. Rather, the physical or
sexual abuse may be the cause of
1170 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
subsequent psychological and emotional
effects.

17.
Further,
the
Explanation
II
attached to Section 3 of the D.V. Act,
which provides that for the purposes of
determining whether any act, omission or
conduct of the respondent constitutes
"domestic violence" under the said Section,
the overall facts and circumstances of the
case shall be taken into consideration. In
this view of the matter, this Court is of the
view that where the act of domestic
violence on the part of the respondent is
specifically pleaded by the aggrieved
person, the petition/complaint seeking the
relief under the D.V. Act cannot be
dismissed at the initial stage and the matter
needs to be examined and determined by
the Magistrate as mandated under the
provisions of the D.V. Act. From a reading
of the provisions of the D.V. Act and with
understanding of the scheme of the said
enactment, it is clear that it is not necessary
that the applicant-woman should have a
marriage subsisting and existing with the
respondent at the time of filing of such
application under Section 12 of the Act. No
time period is also prescribed in the said
Act as to when the aggrieved person should
have been in domestic relationship with the
respondent. On the other hand, definition of
words "domestic relationship" given in
Section 2 (f) of the Act clearly uses the
words "at any point of time, lived together
in a shared household".

18. Section 27 (c) is like an exception
to the provisions contained in Section 27
(a) 27 (b) of the Act of 2005. The "cause of
action" may not necessarily accrue at a
place covered by Section 27 (a) or Section
27 (b) of the Act of the 2005. The
provisions contained in Section 27 (a) and
Section 27 (b) of the Act are relatable to the
principle of territorial jurisdiction, which is
the
place
where
the
contingencies
enumerated in Section 27 (a) and Section
27 (b) of the D.V. Act that may arise within
the territorial jurisdiction of a particular
Court and that will become the guiding
factor for deciding the place of suing by the
aggrieved person.

19. From the aforesaid provision, it is
apparently clear that it is not necessary for
a woman, who is an "aggrieved person"
should have resided in a "share household"
at the time of filing an application under
Section 12 of the D.V. Act as "domestic
violence" took place with her by her inlaws or husband or any family members of
her-in laws. As per Section 12 of the D.V.
Act it is also not mandatory for a
Magistrate
to
consider
the
domestic
incident report of a Protection Officer or
any service provider before the passing the
order under the Act.

20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in the case of Prabha Tyagi Vs.
Kamlesh
Devi
reported
in
MANU/SC/0631/2022, while answering on
the issues framed thereunder, has held in
paragraph 52 as follows:

".....

It is held that Section 12 does not
make it mandatory for a Magistrate to
consider a Domestic Incident Report filed
by a Protection Officer or service provider
before passing any order under the D.V.
Act. It is clarified that even in the absence
of
a
Domestic
Incident
Report,
a
Magistrate is empowered to pass both ex
parte or interim as well as a final order
under the provisions of the D.V. Act.

.............
9 All. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1171

It is held that it is not mandatory
for the aggrieved person, when she is
related by consanguinity, marriage or
through a relationship in the nature of
marriage, adoption or are family members
living together as a joint family, to actually
reside with those persons against whom the
allegations have been levelled at the time of
commission of domestic violence. If a
woman has the right to reside in the shared
household under Section 17 of the D.V. Act
and such a woman becomes an aggrieved
person or victim of domestic violence, she
can seek reliefs under the provisions of
D.V. Act including enforcement of her right
to live in a shared household.

.............

It is held that there should be a subsisting
domestic
relationship
between
the
aggrieved person and the person against
whom the relief is claimed vis-a-vis
allegation of domestic violence. However,
it is not necessary that at the time of filing
of an application by an aggrieved person,
the
domestic
relationship
should
be
subsisting. In other words, even if an
aggrieved person is not in a domestic
relationship with the respondent in a
shared household at the time of filing of an
application under Section 12 of the D.V.
Act but has at any point of time lived so or
had the right to live and has been subjected
to domestic violence or is later subjected to
domestic violence on account of the
domestic relationship, is entitled to file an
application under Section of the D.V. Act."

21. With the aforesaid analysis, when
the facts of the present case are examined,
the Court finds that the revisionist has
taken one fold plea for filing the complaint
in the competent Court at Bareilly on the
ground that the last cause of action has
accrued to the revisionist at Bareilly where
the revisionist and her family members and
the in-laws and their relatives had appeared
in a meeting which took place at Bareilly
and as per the allegation of revisionist, in
such meeting, the in-laws and their
relatives had abused the revisionist and her
family members.

22. In the case in hand, it is cropped
up from the record including the impugned
order of the appellate court as well as the
trial court that the marriage of the
revisionist was solemnized with Sardar Rao
Virendra Singh @ Bhola singh on 27th
May, 2005 at Sitarganj, Uttarakhand i.e. the
parental place of the revisionist. After
marriage, the revisionist resided with her
husband in her in-laws' house at District
Alwar, Rajasthan for some time and
thereafter she resided with her husband in
another house at Alwar. As per the
allegation made by the revisionist that since
marriage the husband of the revisionist and
mother-in-law Smt. Raghuveer Kaur and
her both brother-in-laws, namely, Sardar
Surendra Singh and Gurendra Singh used
to harass and torture her for additional
demand of dowry as they were not satisfied
with the dowry given by the parents of the
revisionist at the time of marriage. For the
said act of her in-laws, the revisionist had
made complaint before the Police Station
Govindgarh, District Alwar, Rajasthan
repeatedly and the last being dated 15th
August, 2016. It is also alleged by the
revisionist that her two brothers-in-laws
had beaten her badly with sticks in which
she had sustained head injuries and her
treatment was undertaken at Government
Hospital, Govindgarh, Alwar, Rajasthan.

23. It is not disputed by the private
opposite parties that for some time, the
revisionist resided in her in-laws house
1172 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
along with them where the alleged
"domestic" violence started with the
revisionist, which is "shared household". In
the present case, as per the allegation of
revisionist, she is an "aggrieved person"

24. It is also mentioned in the
impugned judgment of the appellate court
that
on
20th
September,
2016,
the
revisionist, her parents and other family
members and also the family members
came to office of Monitor Patrika of
Baradari, Stadium Road, Police StationBaradari,
District
Bareilly
where
a
meeting/'Panchayat' was fixed in which her
in-laws along with some known persons
armed with weapons. During the meeting,
at around 07:00 p.m. all the members of her
in-laws started to abuse the revisionist and
her father that unless they does not fulfil
the additional demand of dowry of Rs.
50,000/-, they would not take her at her inlaws' place. From the aforesaid it is crystal
clear that last cause of action accrued to the
revisionist at Bareilly.

25. Before this Court on the issue in
hand, no direct settled law has been placed
by either of the parties. However, upon
bare reading of sub-Sections (a), (b) and (c)
of Section 127 Cr.P.C. altogether, this
Court is of the opinion that the application
filed by the revisionist under Section 12 of
the D.V. Act before the Civil Court at
Bareilly on the ground of arising of last
cause of action with the revisionist by the
opposite parties is maintainable.

26. Upon deeper scrutiny of the
impugned order passed by the appellate
Court, this Court finds that the court below
has erred in law in allowing the appeal filed
by the opposite party no.2. The appellate
court has not recorded any specific finding
regarding the material on the record on the
basis of which it came to the conclusion
that the court at Bareilly has no jurisdiction
to try the complaint. The appellate court
completely ignored the distinction between
the provisions of Section 27 (a) as well as
Section 27 (b) on the one hand and Section
27 (c) on the other hand.

27. Under such circumstances, this
Court finds that the impugned order dated
16th November, 2023 passed by the
appellate court cannot be legally sustained
and is hereby quashed. There is no illegally
or infirmity in the order passed by the Civil
Judge (Junior Division), Fast Track Court,
Court No.1, Bareilly dated 8th September,
2021,
which
is
competent
to grant
protection order in view of Section 27 (c)
of D.V. Act, so as to warrant any
interference by this Court while exercising
its revisional jurisdiction. The order of the
Civil Judge dated 8th September, 2021 is,
hereby, affirmed.

28. However, it is clarified that except
the
issue
of
maintainability
of
the
complaint under Section 12 of the D.V. Act
before the Civil Court, Bareilly, which has
been decided by the appellate court against the
revisionist
holding
that
the
Magistrate
concerned has no jurisdiction to entertain the
same, this Court is not expressing any opinion
on the other issues. Any observations made by
this Court herein above shall not adversely
affect the rights of the parties to raise before
the court below except the issue of jurisdiction
of the Magistrate concerned to try the
complaint made by the revisionist under
Section 12 of the D.V. Act. It shall be open for
the parties to raise issues, which has not ben
decided by this Court before the court
concerned as may be permissible under law.

29. The present criminal revision is,
accordingly, allowed.
9 All. Chandra Shekhar Tiwari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1173

30. There shall be no order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 1173
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE NALIN KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Criminal Revision No. 3080 of 2025

Chandra Shekhar Tiwari & Ors.
 ...Revisionists
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionists:
Ramanuj Yadav

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Phool Singh Yadav, Vaibhav Yadav

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the trial court rightly exercised its
power under Section 319 CrPC to summon the
revisionists, who were initially exonerated
during investigation, based on the deposition of
PW-1 and PW-2.
Whether reliance solely on witness testimony,
despite lack of incriminating material in the
investigation, is legally sustainable.

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections - 193, 200, 201, 202, 300,
319, 398 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Section 147, 201, 302, - Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 - Section 6 - Criminal Revision -
against the impugned order passed by the
Sessions Judge in Sessions Trial, arising out of
Case Crime under Sections 147, 302, 201 IPC,
pursuant to an application under Section 319
CrPC - matrimonial dispute - FIR - offence of
murder - alleged that the deceased was beaten,
tied, and strangulated by the accused including
the revisionists, though initially exonerated by
the Investigating Officer - Court emphasized
that under Section 319 CrPC, wide discretionary
power exists to summon additional accused
during inquiry or trial based on evidence
recorded in court, even at the stage of
examination-in-chief without waiting for crossexamination, provided the material is stronger
than a mere prima facie case but short of
conviction certainty - further observed that trial
evidence
has
primacy
over
investigation
materials,
which
may
only
serve
as
corroboration, and res gestae principles under
Section 6 of the Evidence Act allow facts
forming part of the same transaction to be
admissible - relying on Hardeep Singh, Brijendra
Singh, and Satbir Singh, the Court held that
there were sufficient evidence beyond a mere
prima facie case to justify summoning on
record,
therefore,
the
impugned
order
summoning the revisionists under Sections 147,
302, 201 IPC is affirmed and the criminal
revision is stands dismissed. (Para - 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28)
Revision Dismissed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC
92 / (85) ACC 313
Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2014) 3 SCC
306
Brijendra Singh & Others v. State of Rajasthan,
(2017) 7 SCC 706
Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar & Others, (2025)
5 SCC 740
State of U.P. v.