# Charanjeet Singh v. Smt. Lakhviri & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 1 ILRA 187
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-10-12
- **Case number:** FAFO Defective No. 6 of 2020
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/charanjeet-singh-v-smt-lakhviri-ors-45977
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Civil Law - Limitation Act (36 of 1963) -
Section 5 - Condonation of delay -
sufficient
cause - delay
must be
sufficiently explained - parties should
not resort to dilatory tactics and should
not sleep over their rights (Para 3)

Appeal filed against award of a Claims
Tribunal - delay of 3937 days in filing appeal
- Explanation given for delay - that the
judgment passed by Tribunal was never
communicated to the owner- appellant &
188 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
only when he received recovery warrant
issued against him he came to know about
award - Held - owner-appellant contested the
claim petition, filed written statement - in
objection filed by owner in the recovery
proceedings nowhere it was alleged that the
owner-appellant was never informed about
the award passed by the Tribunal by his
counsel - Section 168 (2) provides that the
Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the
award to the parties concerned expeditiously
and in any case within a period of fifteen
days from the date of the award - hence bald
statement in appeal that the owner-appellant
was not aware of the award for about more
than 10 years is not acceptable Court
declined to condone the delay of more than
11 years in filing the appeal

Dismissed. (E-4)

List of Cases cited :-

## Text

1 All. Charanjeet Singh Vs. Smt. Lakhviri & Ors.
187

13. In State of Karnataka v. Appu
Balu Ingele, AIR 1993 SC 1126=II (1992)
CCR 458 (SC), Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that in exercise of the revisional
powers, it is not permissible for the Court
to reappreciate the evidence. In Pathumma
and Anr. v. Muhammad, AIR 1986 SC
1436, the Apex Court observed that High
Court "committed an error in making a reassessment of the evidence" as in its
revisional jurisdiction it was "not justified
in substituting its own view for that of the
learned Magistrate on a question of fact".

14. If the instant case is examined in
view
of
the
aforesaid
settled
legal
propositions, it is not permissible for the
Court to reappreciate the evidence. More so,
there is nothing on record to show that the
findings of facts recorded by the Family
Court are perverse, based on no evidence or
have been arrived contrary to the evidence on
record.

15. Maintenance under Section 125
includes
expenses
for
food,
clothing,
residence, medical and other expenses
relating to normal persuit of fife and it has
certainly
no
bearing
from
starvation
maintenance so that the person maintained is
forced to lead an indignified life. However,
Court must consider that awarding such
amount should not render the person liable to
maintain a pauper.

16. It is admitted fact that there is no
source of income of her wife / respondent no.
2, so she is unable to maintain herself. She is
living
separately
due
to
continuous
harassment and demand of dowry. Learned
trial court after appreciating each and every
fact awarded the maintenance allowance of
Rs. 19,000/- to the respondent no. 2.
Judgment of the learned family court is well
reasoned and well discussed. There is no
illegality or irregularity in the assessment of
the maintenance allowance so there is no
interference warranted in the order dated
14.5.2019 passed by learned family court.

17. Revision is devoid of merit and is
accordingly dismissed.

18. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

19. A copy of this order be
communicated to the lower court for
necessary compliance.
----------
(2021)01ILR A187
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.10.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.

FAFO Defective No. 6 of 2020

Charanjeet Singh ...Appellant
Versus
Smt. Lakhviri & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Namit Kumar Sharma, Sri Garun Pal
Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Amit Singh

Civil Law - Limitation Act (36 of 1963) -
Section 5 - Condonation of delay -
sufficient
cause - delay
must be
sufficiently explained - parties should
not resort to dilatory tactics and should
not sleep over their rights (Para 3)

Appeal filed against award of a Claims
Tribunal - delay of 3937 days in filing appeal
- Explanation given for delay - that the
judgment passed by Tribunal was never
communicated to the owner- appellant &
188 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
only when he received recovery warrant
issued against him he came to know about
award - Held - owner-appellant contested the
claim petition, filed written statement - in
objection filed by owner in the recovery
proceedings nowhere it was alleged that the
owner-appellant was never informed about
the award passed by the Tribunal by his
counsel - Section 168 (2) provides that the
Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the
award to the parties concerned expeditiously
and in any case within a period of fifteen
days from the date of the award - hence bald
statement in appeal that the owner-appellant
was not aware of the award for about more
than 10 years is not acceptable Court
declined to condone the delay of more than
11 years in filing the appeal

Dismissed. (E-4)

List of Cases cited :-

1. Baljeet Singh (Dead) Thru L.R. & ors. Vs
St. of U.P. & ors. (2019) 15 SCC 33

2. Mohd. Sahid & ors. Vs Raziya Khanam
(Dead) Thru L.R. & ors. (2019) 11 SCC 384

3. Bhivchandra Shankar More Vs Balu
Gangaram More & ors. (2019) 6 SCC 387

4. Ashok Kumar @ Ashok Kumar Vohra Vs
Zonal
Manager
Zonal
Office
National
Insurance Co. & 4 ors. FAFOD No. 1490 of
2017

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.)

Re: Civil Misc. Delay condonation
Application No. 1 of 2020:-

1. Additional cause list has been
revised.
No
one
is
present
for
the
respondents.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant is
present.

3. Perused the office report dated
9.10.2020, according to which, in respect of
respondent nos. 1 to 5, 7 & 9 neither
undelivered cover nor acknowledgement
have returned after service and also no one
has put in appearance and so far as
respondent no.6 is concerned undelivered
cover has returned with the remarks that she
is dead. The respondent no.6 is also one of
the
claimants.
Admittedly,
the
other
claimants have received the notices. Notice in
respect of other claimants is deemed to be
sufficient in the light of the aforesaid office
report and I proceed to hear the application.

4. The stamp reporter had reported
delay of 3937 days in filing the present
appeal.

5. Heard learned counsel for the
applicant and perused the record.

6. Before proceeding further it would
be appropriate to take note of paragraph of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which
is quoted as under:-

"5. Extension of prescribed
period in certain cases:- Any appeal or any
application, other than an application
under any of the provisions of Order XXI of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be
admitted after the prescribed period if the
appellant or the applicant satisfies the
court that he had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period.

Explanation.-- The fact that the
appellant or the applicant was misled by
any order, practice or judgment of the High
Court in ascertaining or computing the
1 All. Charanjeet Singh Vs. Smt. Lakhviri & Ors.
189
prescribed period may be sufficient cause
within the meaning of this section."
(Emphasis supplied)

7. For the purpose of disposal of the
delay condonation application it would also
be beneficial to take note of few judgments
of Hon'ble Supreme Court on this issue.

8. In Baljeet Singh (Dead) Through
Legal Representatives And Others vs.
State of U.P. And Others (2019) 15 SCC
33 in para 7 it was observed as under:-

"7.
The
matter
requires
examination from another aspect viz.
laches and delay. It is a very recognised
principle of jurisprudence that a right not
exercised for a long time is non-existent.
Even when there is no limitation period
prescribed by any statute relating to
certain proceedings, in such cases, courts
have coined the doctrine of laches and
delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence
and
non-suited
the
litigants
who
approached the court belatedly without any
justifiable explanation for bringing the
action after unreasonable delay. In those
cases, where the period of limitation is
prescribed within which the action is to be
brought before the court, if the action is not
brought within that prescribed period, the
aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot
enforce his legal right after the period of
limitation is over, however, subject to the
prayer for condonation of delay and if
there is a justifiable explanation for
bringing the action after the prescribed
period of limitation is over and sufficient
cause is shown, the court may condone the
delay. Therefore, in a case where the
period of limitation is prescribed and the
action is not brought within the period of
limitation and subsequently proceedings
are initiated after the period of limitation
along with the prayer for condonation of
delay, in that case, the applicant has to
make out a sufficient cause and justify the
cause for delay with a proper explanation.
It is not that in each and every case despite
the sufficient cause is not shwon and the
delay is not properly explained, the court
may condone the delay. To make out a case
for condonation of delay, the applicant has
to make out a sufficient cause/ reason
which prevented him in initiating the
proceedings within the period of limitation.
Otherwise, he will be accused of gross
negligence. If the aggrieved party does not
initiate the proceedings within the period of
limitation without any sufficient cause, he
can be denied the relief on the ground of
unexplained laches and delay and on the
presumption that such person has waived
his right or acquiesced with the order.
These
principles
are
based
on
the
principles relatable to sound public policy
that if a person does not exercise his right
for a long time then such right is nonexisting." (emphasis supplied)

9. In Mohd. Sahid And Others vs.
Raziya Khanam (Dead) Through Legal
Representatives And Others (2019) 11
SCC
384,
the
rejection
of
delay
condonation application for condoning the
delay of 349 days in availing provisions of
Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was upheld as reason
given was not sufficient and satisfactory.

10. In Bhivchandra Shankar More
vs. Balu Gangaram More And Others
(2019) 6 SCC 387 in paras 15 and 16 it was
observed as under:-

"15. It is a fairly well settled law
that "sufficient cause" should be given
liberal construction so as to advance
sustainable justice when there is no
inaction, no negligence nor want of
190 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
bonafide could be imputable to the
appellant.
After
referring
to
various
judgments, in B. Madhuri, this Court held
as under:-

"6.
The
expression
"sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is
elastic enough to enable the courts to apply
the law in a meaningful manner which
serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast
rule has been or can be laid down for
deciding the applications for condonation
of delay but over the years courts have
repeatedly
observed
that
a
liberal
approach needs to be adopted in such
matters so that substantive rights of the
parties are not defeated only on the ground
of delay."

16. Observing that the rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties, in N. Balakrishnan v.
M. Krishnamurthy, this Court held as
under:-

"11. Rules of limitation are
not meant to destroy the rights of parties.
They are meant to see that parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their
remedy promptly. The object of providing a
legal remedy is to repair the damage
caused by reason of legal injury. The law of
limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal
remedy for the redress of the legal injury so
suffered. Time is precious and wasted time
would never revisit. During the efflux of
time, newer causes would sprout up
necessitating newer persons to seek legal
remedy by approaching the courts. So a
lifespan must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy
may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential
anarchy.
The
law
of
limitation is thus founded on public policy.
It is enshrined in the maxim interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy the rights of the parties.
They are meant to see that parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics but seek their
remedy promptly. The idea is that every
legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time.""
(emphasis supplied)

11. A reference may also be made to
the judgment/order of this Court dated
10.10.2017 passed in First Appeal From
Order Defective No. 1490 of 2017 (Ashok
Kumar Alias Ashok Kumar Vohra vs.
Zonal Manager Zonal Office National
Insurance Co. & 4 Others) whereby delay
condonation application was rejected. The
extract of pragraph 2 of the said judgment
is quoted as under:-

"2. This appeal under Section 173
of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been filed
with a delay of two years and 334 days. In
the
affidavit
accompanying
delay
condonation
application
filed
under
Section
5
of
Limitation
Act,
1963
(hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1963")
only explanation given is that concerned
counsel has not given information but
nothing has been placed on record to
substantiate this defence."
(emphasis supplied)

12. In the above appeal also ground
taken was that the learned counsel has not
given
the
information.
The
Hon'ble
Division Bench noted the related law in
paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13
of Ashok Kumar (supra) which are quoted
as under:-

"4. The expression "sufficient
cause" in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been
held to receive a liberal construction so as
to
advance
substantial
justice
and
1 All. Charanjeet Singh Vs. Smt. Lakhviri & Ors.
191
generally a delay in preferring appeal may
be condoned in interest of justice where no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fide is imputable to parties,
seeking condonation of delay. In Collector,
Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC
107, the Court said, that, when substantial
justice and technical considerations are
taken against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred,
for, the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because
of a non deliberate delay. The Court
further said that judiciary is respected not
on account of its power to legalise injustice
on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so.

5. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs.
State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the
Court said:

"Law
of
limitation
may
harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribe and the Courts have no
power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds."

6. The Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy rights of parties. They
virtually take away the remedy. They are
meant with the objective that parties should
not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over
their rights. They must seek remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. The statute relating
to limitation determines a life span for such
legal remedy for redress of the legal injury,
one has suffered. Time is precious and the
wasted time would never revisit. During
efflux of time, newer causes would come
up, necessitating newer persons to seek
legal remedy by approaching the courts. So
a life span must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy
may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential
anarchy.
The
statute
providing limitation is founded on public
policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). It is for this reason that when an
action becomes barred by time, the Court
should be slow to ignore delay for the
reason that once limitation expires, other
party matures his rights on the subject with
attainment of finality. Though it cannot be
doubted that refusal to condone delay
would result in foreclosing the suiter from
putting forth his cause but simultaneously
the party on the other hand is also entitled
to sit and feel carefree after a particular
length of time, getting relieved from
persistent and continued litigation.

7. There is no presumption that
delay in approaching the court is always
deliberate. No person gains from deliberate
delaying a matter by not resorting to take
appropriate legal remedy within time but
then the words "sufficient cause" show that
delay, if any, occurred, should not be
deliberate, negligent and due to casual
approach of concerned litigant, but, it should
be bona fide, and, for the reasons beyond his
control, and, in any case should not lack
bona fide. If the explanation does not smack
of lack of bona fide, the Court should show
due consideration to the suiter, but, when
there is apparent casual approach on the part
of suiter, the approach of Court is also bound
to change. Lapse on the part of litigant in
approaching
Court
within
time
is
understandable but a total inaction for long
period of delay without any explanation
whatsoever and that too in absence of
showing any sincere attempt on the part of
suiter, would add to his negligence, and
would be relevant factor going against him.

9. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs.
Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 a three
192 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Judge Bench of the Court said, that, unless
want of bona fide of such inaction or
negligence as would deprive a party of the
protection of Section 5 is proved, the
application must not be thrown out or any
delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

10. The Privy Council in Brij
Indar Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45
Cal 94 observed that true guide for a court
to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is
whether
the
appellant
acted
with
reasonable diligence in prosecuting the
appeal. This principle still holds good
inasmuch as the aforesaid decision of Privy
Council as repeatedly been referred to,
and, recently in State of Nagaland Vs.
Lipok AO and others, AIR 2005 SC 2191.

11. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai
Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and
others, JT 2001(5) SC 608 the Court said
that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it should
adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction
must be made between a case where the
delay is inordinate and a case where the
delay is of a few days. In the former case
consideration of prejudice to the other side
will be a relevant factor so the case calls
for a more cautious approach but in the
latter case no such consideration may arise
and such a case deserves a liberal
approach. No hard and fast rule can be
laid down in this regard and the basic
guiding
factor
is
advancement
of
substantial justice.

12. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead)
by LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC
448, in para 17 of the judgment, the Court
said :

"...The evidence on record
suggests neglect of its own right for long
time in preferring appeals. The court
cannot enquire into belated and state
claims on the ground of equity. Delay
defeats equity. The court helps those who
are vigilant and "do not slumber over their
rights."

13. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai,
2012 (5) SCC 157, in para 18 of the
judgment, the Court said as under:

"What needs to be emphasised
is that even though a liberal and justice
oriented approach is required to be adopted
in the exercise of power under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act and other similar statutes,
the Courts can neither become oblivious of
the fact that the successful litigant has
acquired certain rights on the basis of the
judgment under challenge and a lot of time is
consumed at various stages of litigation apart
from the cost. What colour the expression
'sufficient cause' would get in the factual
matrix of a given case would largely depend
on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the
Court finds that there has been no negligence
on the part of the applicant and the cause
shown for the delay does not lack bona fides,
then it may condone the delay. If, on the other
hand, the explanation given by the applicant
is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it
would be a legitimate exercise of discretion
not to condone the delay. In cases involving
the State and its agencies/instrumentalities,
the Court can take note of the fact that
sufficient time is taken in the decision making
process but no premium can be given for
total lethargy or utter negligence on the part
of the officers of the State and / or its
agencies/instrumentalities
and
the
applications filed by them for condonation of
delay cannot be allowed as a matter of
course by accepting the plea that dismissal of
the matter on the ground of bar of limitation
will cause injury to the public interest." "
(Emphasis supplied)

13. Since, the law is well settled that
delay must be sufficiently explained and
1 All. Charanjeet Singh Vs. Smt. Lakhviri & Ors.
193
shall not be a dilatory tactic, I am not
inclined to refer to other judgments and I
proceed to consider the delay condonation
application in the present appeal filed for
condoning delay of 3937 days in filing the
appeal on merits.

14. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the
affidavit filed in support of the delay
condonation application are quoted as
under:-

" 7. That on 22.12.2008, Learned
Tribunal has illegally and arbitrarily
allowed the claim petition and awarded
compensation of Rs. 3,25,000/- in favour of
the claimants/ Respondent No.3 to 10 and
given right to recovery to the Insurance
Company to the amount of compensation
from the Appellant. The aforesaid judgment
passed by the Learned Tribunal was never
communicated by counsel of the appellant
to him therefore he is not aware about the
judgment and the right to recovery given to
the Insurance Company.

8. That in compliance of aforesaid
award
dated
22.12.2008,
Respondent
Insurance Company has deposited the
awarded amount along with interest as Rs.
4,25,302/- before Learned Tribunal and
thereafter, in the year 2015, after the lapse of
more than 6 years of passing the judgment
and award initiated recovery proceeding and
filed R.M. 68/2015 (The Oriental Insurance
Company Limited vs. Charanjeet Singh)
against the Appellant for recovery of Rs.
4,25,302/- on which the notices were also
issued to the Appellant by the Court below
but the same has not been served upon the
Appellant.
A
Photostat
copy
of
the
Application u/s 174 M.V. Act registered as
R.M. 68/2015 (The Oriental Insurance
Company Limited vs. Charanjeet Singh) is
being filed herewith and marked as Annexure
No.-3 to this affidavit.

9. That surprisingly, in the month
of September 2019, Appellant received
Recovery Warrant issued against him by the
Court Below thereafter, he enquired the
matter with his local counsel at Mathura only
then he has came into knowledge about the
passing of order dated 22.12.2008 and the
recovery right given to the Insurance
Company against him thereafter, without any
further delay, he immediately on 19.09.2019
filed his Objection i.e. Paper No.9-Ga
against the recovery proceeding in R.M.
68/2015 but the Learned Tribunal has
illegally, arbitrarily and contrary to evidence
and material available on record rejected the
Objection i.e. Paper No. 9-Ga filed by the
Appellant on 04.11.2019. For kind perusal of
this Hon'ble Court, a xerox copy of the
objection dated 19.09.2019 i.e. Paper No. 9Ga filed by the Appellant and true and
certified copy of entire order sheet of the
R.M. 68/2015 (The Oriental Insurance
Company Limited vs. Charanjeet Singh) are
being filed herewith and marked as Annexure
No.-
4
&
5
to
this
affidavit
respectively."(emphasis supplied)

15. Placing reliance on paragraphs 7,
8 and 9 of the affidavit filed in support of
the delay condonation application it was
submitted that the award was passed on
22.12.2008 awarding compensation of Rs.
3,25,000/- in favour of the claimants and
giving right of recovery to the Insurance
Company to recover the amount of
compensation from the appellant. The said
judgment passed by the learned Tribunal
was never communicated by counsel of the
appellant
to
owner-
appellant
and,
therefore, he was not aware about the
judgment and right of recovery given to the
Insurance Company. It is further submitted
that recovery proceedings were initiated in
the year 2015 and when the ownerappellant received information about the
194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
recovery proceedings, he immediately filed
his objection i.e. Paper No. 9-Ga against
the recovery proceedings in R.M. 68 of
2015 on 19.9.2019. In such view of the
matter, it is submitted that there is no
deliberate delay on the part of the
appellant.

16. On perusal, first of all I find that
the annexure no.3 to the affidavit filed in
support
of
the
delay
condonation
application at page 81 clearly indicates that
in paragraph 3 of the affidavit it has been
mentioned that the entire award amount of
Rs. 4,25,302/- was deposited vide Cheque
No. 5083, Bank of Baroda, Mathura dated
13.04.2009. At the top, the case number is
shown as R.M. ....... of 2009 and is duly
signed
by
the
Divisional
Manager.
However, it prima facie, appears from the
order-sheet of the recovery proceedings in
the present case that the same was filed on
14.8.2015 for the reasons best known to the
officers/
officials
of
the
Insurance
Company. Insofar as recovery proceedings
are concerned, fact remains that the ownerappellant had contested the claim petition
and in the written statement filed by him it
was not pleaded that the Driver was
holding valid license. A finding on the
issue that the driver was not holding the
valid license was recorded on the basis of
the report submitted by the Insurance
Company being paper no. 71-Ga/1-4 and
thereafter, the judgment was passed giving
right of recovery to the Insurance Company
to recover the amount from the ownerappellant herein. A bald statement in this
regard that the owner-appellant was never
informed about the passing of the award by
the counsel for a period of more than 10
years is not acceptable in the case. The
appellant-herein
is
a
transporter
by
profession/
business
and
the
vehicle
involved was a water tanker.

17. Even in the application paper
no.
9-Ga
filed
in
the
recovery
proceedings it has nowhere been alleged
that the owner-appellant was never
informed about the award passed by the
Tribunal by his counsel and was not
aware of the same till the receipt of the
recovery certificate.

18. The contention that the ownerappellant was not aware of the award for
about more than 10 years is not
acceptable also in view of the provisions
of Section 168 (2) of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 which clearly provides that
"(2) The claim Tribunal shall arrange to
deliver copies of the award to the parties
concerned expeditiously and in any case
within a period of fifteen days from the
date of the award."

19. In such view of the matter, I am
not inclined to condone the delay of more
than 11 years in filing the present appeal.

20.

Therefore,
the
delay
condonation application has no merit and
the explanation given in this regard is not
sufficient. The same is, accordingly,
rejected and consequently, the appeal also
stands dismissed.

21. The statutory amount deposited
before this Court shall be remitted to the
Tribunal concerned for adjustment that is
to be recovered from the appellant herein.

Re: First Appeal From Order
Defective:-

1. Since the delay condonation
application has been rejected by me by
order of date, consequently, present appeal
also stands dismissed.
----------
1 All. I.C.I.C. Bank Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Krishna Kumar Gujrati
195
(2021)01ILR A195
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED:LUCKNOW 03.12.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI, J.

First Appeal From Order No.- 60 of 2018

I.C.I.C. Bank Ltd. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Krishna Kumar Gujrati ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Prashant Kumar

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri K.K. Gujrati (In person)

Service Law - Termination of Service -
Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963),-
Sections 14, 41(e) - Contract of
Service - Contract of service which
essentially is personal contract, is not
enforceable under provisions of S. 14
r.w.
Ss.
41(e),(h)
-
where
the
employer is a statutory body but the
relationship is purely governed by
contract with no element of statutory
governance, the contract of personal
service
will
not
be
specifically
enforceable - for the termination of
such a contract, the remedy for
damages alone would lie before the
competent civil court - Code Of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11,
Rejection of plaint where suit barred
by any law - plaintiff assailed both the
order of transfer from Lucknow to
Hyderabad as well as the order of
termination from service - Held -
employee who freely accepts the
employment inclusive of a clause
contemplating transfer of services
from one place to another, looses his
right to question such a cause - suit
was legally non-maintainable as the
relief
sought
was
to
declare
termination of service as illegal but
the remedy for damages was not
prayed in the plaint (Para 19, 20, 21)

Allowed. (E-4)

List of Cases cited :-

1.Executive Committee of Vaish Degree
College Vs Laxmi Narain & ors. , (1976) 2
SCC 58

2.Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs Badri
Nath Dixit & ors. (1991) 3 SCC 54

3.Integrated Rural Development Agency Vs
Ram Pyare Pandey (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 494

4. M/s Pearlite Liner Pvt. Ltd. Vs Manorama
Sirsi (2004) 3 SCC 172

5.S.B.I. Vs S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92

6.Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs Badri
Nath Dixit & ors., (1991) 3 SCC 54

7.Integrated Rural Development Agency
Vs Ram Pyare Pandey (1995) Supp. 2 SCC
494

8. Federal Bank Ltd. Vs Sagar Thomas &
ors., (2003) 10 SCC 733

9.Indian Airlines Corporation Vs Sukhdeo
Rai (1971) 2 SCC 192

10. ICICI Bank Vs Lakshmi Narayan 2008
(3) LNN 320 Manu/TN/0056/2003

11.Krishna Kumar Gujrati Vs ICICI Bank
Writ Petition No. 964 (SB) of 2011 dt
26.5.2011

12.T. Avrivandandam Vs T.V. Satyapal
(1977) 4 SCC 467