# Chetan Das v. D.C .S.C., U.P., LKO & Ors

- **Citation:** (2015) 1 ILRA 293
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2015-03-18
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 17647 of 1995
- **Bench:** Ashwani Kumar Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chetan-das-v-d-c-s-c-u-p-lko-ors-43304
- **Pages:** 19

## Headnote

Rehabilitation) Act 1954-Section 24 read
with Displaced persons claims & other Laws
Repeal Act, 2005 and General Clauses Act
1897-Section 6(e)-Revision Proceedingsorder
validity
challenged
under
writ
petition-whether maintainable even on
repeal of old Act 1954?-held-'Yes'-in view of
Section 6 (e) of General Clauses Act-such
proceeding shall continue.
Held: Para-17
The General Clauses Act is a part of
every Central Act, and has to be read, as
such, in the Act, unless, it is specifically
excluded. In view of the authoritative
pronouncement of law on the question
by the Apex Court, as reiterated by Full
Bench of this Court, I am of the
considered opinion that the proceedings
of the present writ petition would not
abate on account of repeal of Act of
1954, and the writ petition would be
294
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
maintainable,
and
will
have
to
be
decided on merits.
(B)Displaced Persons (Compensation &
Rehabilitation) Act 1954-Section 20 read
with Rules-76-A, 76-B, 90(8)(12) and
(15)-Rights in property-whether creates
only after-declaration of highest ----and
deposit of amount or issuance of sale
certificate?-held-only after issuance of
sale certificate-not earlier.
Held:Para-26
The revisional court, therefore, was not
justified in holding the sale certificate dated
14.6.1968 to be illegal, and thus directing it
to be cancelled for the sole reason that Tota
Mal alone had participated in the bid, and
three other persons were not participants
to the bid. The reason assigned for
cancellation of the sale certificate dated
14.6.1968, therefore, is not liable to be
sustained. Question no.2, therefore, is
answered by holding that right in the
property was not created merely at the
stage of making of bid by Tota Mal, and it
was only after payment of the bid amount
and issuance of sale certificate that right in
the property got crystallized.
(C)Displaced Person Act 1954-Section
24-Revision-against
sale
certificatewhether maintainable?-held-'No'-reason
disclosed.
Held:Para-29
In view of the discussions made above,
this Court finds that the sale certificate
dated 14.6.1968, did not qualify to be an
order passed by the authorities, which
could be subjected to challenge in a
revision under Section 24 of the Act, and
the question is answered accordingly.
(D)Limitation
Act-Article
29(2)-
Applicability
in
Revision-in
view
of
Section 29 (2)-outer limit of 3 yearsprovided under Article 137-revision filed
after 20 years-held-barred by time.
Held: Para-31
The term 'at any time' therefore cannot
be given an unguided and arbitrary
scope. Examining the issue from a
different perspective also, this Court
finds that as the provisions of the Indian
Limitation Act have not been excluded,
therefore, by virtue of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act, the outer limit of
three years stipulated in Article 137 of
the Limitation Act will have to be read.
Case Law discussed:
[1968 (4) DLT 78]; [AIR 2000 SC 811]; [1955 AIR
SC 84]; [(1969) 2 SCC 412)]; [(2002) 3 SCC 481];
[(2002) 7 SCC 1]; [2013 (10) ADJ 612]; [2006
SCC Online P&H 334]; [AIR 2000 SC 811]; [(2002)
7 SCC 1]; [2013 (10) ADJ 612]; [AIR 1958 SC
289]; [AIR 1965 SC 1994]; [(1986) 4 SCC 667];
[(1994) 5 SCC 471]; [AIR 1962 Raj 112]; [(1964)
7 SCR 103]; [(2011) 5 SCC 607]; [1968 (4) DLT
78]; [(1997) 6 SCC 71].

## Text

_Characters 0–39,937 of 64,189. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39937 for what follows._

1 All] Chetan Das Vs. D.C.S.C., U.P., LKO & Ors.
293
13. Clause 7 of the amended scheme
of administration provides for a term of
three
years
for
the
committee
of
management. A further period of grace of
one month is provided. If the new
committee of management does not take
over charge on the expiry of a period of
three years and one month, the term of the
earlier committee would ipso facto come
to an end. Thereupon, the Joint Director
of Education is authorised to appoint a
Prabandh
Sanchalak.
The
Prabandh
Sanchalak, in turn, is duty bound to conduct
elections as expeditiously as possible, so
that the newly elected committee of
management can be handed over charge.
The actual handing over of charge is what
merits emphasis. In the event of a dispute, a
provision has been made for its resolution
by the Deputy Director of Education. A
newly elected committee of management
may be unable to take charge in a given
case despite the election which has been
conducted by the Prabandh Sanchalak for a
reason not bearing on its own default. In
such a case, the term of office of the
committee
of
management
would
commence with effect from the date on
which it has taken over charge. However,
where despite the absence of any hurdle, the
newly elected committee of management
fails to take over charge due to its own
default, its term of office of three years
would commence with effect from the date
of declaration of the result of the election
and would not be postponed to the date on
which it takes over charge. The judgment of
the Division Bench in Vaibhav
Jain
(supra) lays down a principle contrary to
what has been explained above in the
earlier judgments of the Division Benches
in Jangali Baba and in Ratan Singh
Solanki. The decision in Vaibhav Jain
(supra) would not be construed as laying
down the correct principle of law.
14. We, accordingly, answer the
reference in the aforesaid terms. The writ
petition shall now be placed before the
regular court for disposal in the light of
the reference, as answered.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.03.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
Writ C No. 17647 of 1995
Chetan Das
...Petitioner
Versus
D.C .S.C., U.P., LKO & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.N. Singh, Sri A.K. Rai, Sri C.K.
Parikh, Sri R.N. Singh
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri A.C. Tripathi, Sri Satish
Mandhyan, Sri Tarun Tiwari
(A) Displaced Persons (Compensation &
Rehabilitation) Act 1954-Section 24 read
with Displaced persons claims & other Laws
Repeal Act, 2005 and General Clauses Act
1897-Section 6(e)-Revision Proceedingsorder
validity
challenged
under
writ
petition-whether maintainable even on
repeal of old Act 1954?-held-'Yes'-in view of
Section 6 (e) of General Clauses Act-such
proceeding shall continue.
Held: Para-17
The General Clauses Act is a part of
every Central Act, and has to be read, as
such, in the Act, unless, it is specifically
excluded. In view of the authoritative
pronouncement of law on the question
by the Apex Court, as reiterated by Full
Bench of this Court, I am of the
considered opinion that the proceedings
of the present writ petition would not
abate on account of repeal of Act of
1954, and the writ petition would be
294
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
maintainable,
and
will
have
to
be
decided on merits.
(B)Displaced Persons (Compensation &
Rehabilitation) Act 1954-Section 20 read
with Rules-76-A, 76-B, 90(8)(12) and
(15)-Rights in property-whether creates
only after-declaration of highest ----and
deposit of amount or issuance of sale
certificate?-held-only after issuance of
sale certificate-not earlier.
Held:Para-26
The revisional court, therefore, was not
justified in holding the sale certificate dated
14.6.1968 to be illegal, and thus directing it
to be cancelled for the sole reason that Tota
Mal alone had participated in the bid, and
three other persons were not participants
to the bid. The reason assigned for
cancellation of the sale certificate dated
14.6.1968, therefore, is not liable to be
sustained. Question no.2, therefore, is
answered by holding that right in the
property was not created merely at the
stage of making of bid by Tota Mal, and it
was only after payment of the bid amount
and issuance of sale certificate that right in
the property got crystallized.
(C)Displaced Person Act 1954-Section
24-Revision-against
sale
certificatewhether maintainable?-held-'No'-reason
disclosed.
Held:Para-29
In view of the discussions made above,
this Court finds that the sale certificate
dated 14.6.1968, did not qualify to be an
order passed by the authorities, which
could be subjected to challenge in a
revision under Section 24 of the Act, and
the question is answered accordingly.
(D)Limitation
Act-Article
29(2)-
Applicability
in
Revision-in
view
of
Section 29 (2)-outer limit of 3 yearsprovided under Article 137-revision filed
after 20 years-held-barred by time.
Held: Para-31
The term 'at any time' therefore cannot
be given an unguided and arbitrary
scope. Examining the issue from a
different perspective also, this Court
finds that as the provisions of the Indian
Limitation Act have not been excluded,
therefore, by virtue of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act, the outer limit of
three years stipulated in Article 137 of
the Limitation Act will have to be read.
Case Law discussed:
[1968 (4) DLT 78]; [AIR 2000 SC 811]; [1955 AIR
SC 84]; [(1969) 2 SCC 412)]; [(2002) 3 SCC 481];
[(2002) 7 SCC 1]; [2013 (10) ADJ 612]; [2006
SCC Online P&H 334]; [AIR 2000 SC 811]; [(2002)
7 SCC 1]; [2013 (10) ADJ 612]; [AIR 1958 SC
289]; [AIR 1965 SC 1994]; [(1986) 4 SCC 667];
[(1994) 5 SCC 471]; [AIR 1962 Raj 112]; [(1964)
7 SCR 103]; [(2011) 5 SCC 607]; [1968 (4) DLT
78]; [(1997) 6 SCC 71].
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar
Mishra, J.)
1. The present writ petition is
directed against the order dated 10th
January, 1995, passed by Deputy Chief
Settlement
Commissioner,
U.P.-cumMember, Board of Revenue, U.P. at
Lucknow, as well as its subsequent order
dated 6th April, 1995, rejecting the
restoration application of the petitioner.
2.
The order impugned dated
10.1.1995 has been passed, allowing revision
filed under Section 24 of the Displaced
Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
Act, 1954, whereby sale certificate dated
14.6.1968, issued in favour of four persons,
including the petitioner, has been cancelled,
and a direction has been issued to issue a
fresh sale certificate in favour of deceased
Tota Mal, for the reason that he alone was
the auction purchaser. The order dated
10.1.1995 is reproduced:-
"Heard the learned counsel for both
the parties and perused the record of the
case.
1 All] Chetan Das Vs. D.C.S.C., U.P., LKO & Ors.
295
The sale certificate dated 14.6.1968
incorporating the names of the alleged
co-purchasers Sri Amrumal S/o Sri
Manumal, Sri Khem Chand S/o Sri Amru
Mal and Sri Kakkoo Mal S/o Sri Amru
Mal is cancelled as the bidsheet shows
that they were not the purchasers.
Revision is allowed. The managing
officer, Varanasi is directed to issue and
the certificate of sale in favour of the
revisionist, who are the heirs of the
deceased Tota Mal, who was the auctionpurchaser."
3. A restoration application was
filed by the petitioner alleging that the
order dated 10.1.1995 was passed upon a
revision, which itself was highly belated,
as it was filed after 23 years, and without
there being any order for condonation of
delay, the same was allowed ex-parte, by
a cryptic order, without hearing the
petitioner. Various other grounds were
pressed for restoration of the proceedings.
4. While rejecting the restoration
application, learned Member of the Board
of Revenue took note of the fact that a
previous restoration application was filed
by one Kakoo Mal on 18.1.1995, which
was rejected by the following orders on
18.1.1995:-
"Heard the learned counsel at
length. The plea is that Kakoo Mal S/o
Amru Mal defendant no.4 in the revision
did not have notice of the hearing and the
proceedings may be restored.
The revision had been decided on
10.1.95 setting aside the sale certificate
issued by the managing officer, Varanasi
on 14.6.1966 incorporating the names of
the defendants as co-purchasers of the
evacuee property. The ground for this
decision is that the revisionist was the
sole successful auction bidder.
Subsequently, it seems that the
defendants, who were related to the
revisionist had applied to the managing
officer, Varanasi that they have no
objection if their claim are adjusted
against once purchase money to be paid
by the revisionist. They also stated that
they had no objection, if the sale
certificate is issued in favour of the
revisionist. It is also noticed that the
wrong sale certificate was issued 1st
years after the auction. Under the
circumstances the defendants have no
legal right of getting their names to be
recorded in the sale certificate as copurchasers. If there is any civil claim,
they can enforce the same through the
civil process. The revisionist the sale
purchaser in the auction of the evacuee
property and the Displaced Persons Act,
1954 cannot be invoked by quoting the
facts unrelated to the auction.
I, therefore, do not consider that
there is any sufficient ground to reopen
the case which has already been decided
on merits. The earlier sale certificate
issued by the managing officer was a
patent act a illegality and the defendants
cannot be allowed to base their claim of
the same."
5. Learned Member of the Board of
Revenue took note of the fact that claims
of 22 displaced persons had been adjusted
towards payment of bid amount, but all
such persons had agreed that sale
certificate be issued in the name of Tota
Mal. Learned Member also took note of
the fact that Tota Mal himself had moved
an application that three more persons be
admitted as co-purchaser, with each one
having 1/4th share, including 1/4th share
for himself, which was allowed, resulting
296
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in issuance of the sale certificate dated
14.6.1968, in favour of four persons. The
revisional authority was of the view that
inclusion of these additional three names
was illegal, and consequently, it rejected
the restoration application. Following
paras of the subsequent order dated
6.4.1995, which is under challenge, are
reproduced:-
"5. Subsequently, the situation got
further compounded when Tota Mal move
the managing officer requesting that the
sale
certificate
may
be
issued
incorporating the name of three more
persons besides himself. There three
persons Amru Mal, Khem Chand and
Kakoo Mal are shown as holding 1/4th
share each alongwith Tota Mal in the sale
certificate. It is, therefore, clear that
against the compensation claim of twenty
two persons which was utilized in paying
for the auction money, only three were
admitted as co-purchasers. The share of
these co-purchasers also does not tally
with their compensation claims utilized in
the purchase. It is obvious that some
settlement of money was made behind the
scene between the parties. The action of
the
auction-purchaser
Totamal
in
requesting that these three persons may
be admitted as co-purchasers with a share
of 1/4th each in the property, is clearly
unauthorized under rule 76(a) & (b) of
the Displaced Persons (C&R) Act, 1954
and the rules.
5.
The
managing
officer
was,
therefore, acting illegally in admitting
these three persons as co-purchasers in
the sale certificate.
6. Therefore, there is no ground or
justification for altering the verdict of the
orders
dated
10.1.95
and
18.1.95.
However, as the sale certificate was
issued in the June, 1968, the amended
sale certificate is to issue on the same
date is the name of Tota Mal, who was
alive on date and not in the name of
revisionists, who are the heirs of the
deceased Tota Mal. To that extent the
earlier
order
dated
10.1.95
stands
amended. The opposite parties are free to
seek civil remedy of their interest and can
hope to regularise, what appears to be a
sale, through the assertion that they may
be associated as co-purchasers in sale
certificate."
It is these two orders, which are
under challenge in the present writ
petition.
6. Facts, in brief, giving rise to filing
of the present writ petition are that the
Central
Government
had
built
05
residential flats and 25 shops, upon a
parcel of land, bearing Municipal No. B47/203, situate at Ramapura, Godaulia,
Varanasi, for rehabilitation of displaced
persons. It was decided to auction the
property amongst the displaced persons,
under the provisions of the Displaced
Persons
(Compensation
and
Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Act'). An auction was
conducted on 31.1.1961, in which the
highest bid of Tota Mal amounting to
Rs.94,000/- was accepted. An initial
amount of 10% i.e. Rs. 9,400/- was
deposited with a sum of Rs.392.49 paise,
in cash, and adjustment of claim of
Rs.9,007.51 paise of Tota Mal, as
displaced person. It appears that the
competent authority, thereafter, directed
Tota Mal to deposit balance amount, so
that the sale itself could be confirmed. It
is alleged by the petitioner that Tota Mal
was not having sufficient fund to deposit
1 All] Chetan Das Vs. D.C.S.C., U.P., LKO & Ors.
297
the amount, and he associated Amru Mal,
another displaced person, who was related
to Tota Mal, and his two sons. A letter
was thereafter sent by Tota Mal on
20.4.1962 to the Regional Settlement
Commissioner stating that pursuant to bid,
sale certificate be issued in favour of Tota
Mal himself, alongwith three sons of
Amru Mal namely Khem Chand, Kakoo
Mal and Chetan Das, with each one of
them
having
1/4th
share.
Certain
proceedings continued in respect of the
auction, which appears to have been
cancelled, but thereafter the auction stood
restored
in
appeal,
and
ultimately,
required sum of Rs. 94,000/- was
deposited by adjusting claim of other
displaced persons, under the Act. A sale
certificate was issued for the entire
property on 14.6.1968 in favour of
aforesaid four persons. Though sale
certificate was issued in 1968, but no
objection was raised against it by Tota
Mal, who remained alive till 1980. Upon
his demise, an original suit was filed by
Smt. Gyani Devi widow of Tota Mal, as
an indigent person, before the Civil Court
at Varanasi, which was initially registered
as Case No.33 of 1983, and was
subsequently renumbered as Original Suit
No.386 of 1989. In the said suit, a
declaration has been sought that the suit
property, which consisted of building No.
B-47/203, consisting of 05 flats and 25
shops, situated at Mohalla Ramapura,
Godaulia, Varanasi, be declared to be
exclusive property of Tota Mal, and the
plaintiffs be held entitled to receive rent
etc. from tenants. Relief of cancellation of
will dated 12.10.1979, allegedly executed
by Tota Mal in favour of petitioner
Chetan Das was also sought, alongwith
relief of possession and damages. This
suit is pending before Civil Court,
Varanasi.
7. An application by the plaintiffs to
appoint a receiver in the suit was rejected
by the trial court on 14.11.1985, which
was affirmed by this Court on 20.12.1985,
in FAFO No. 929 of 1985. An application
for injunction in the suit was also filed,
which was refused. The trial court took
note
of
subsequent
developments,
including the orders in revision filed
under the Act, and an order was passed
restraining the plaintiffs and defendant
IInd Set, from interfering with the rights
of defendants Ist Set (petitioner and others
in the present writ petition), and a
direction to maintain status quo was
issued. This order of trial court was
challenged before this Court in FAFO No.
905 of 1995, which was summarily
rejected, under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC, by
observing that suit itself be decided within
six months, on merits, without being
influenced by any observations made by
trial court regarding rights of the parties.
8. During pendency of the suit, a
belated revision, under Section 24 of the
Act, No. 09 of 1990-1991 was filed
against
the
sale
certificate
dated
14.6.1968 by Smt. Gyani Devi W/o Late
Tota Mal and his other heirs, without
impleading the petitioner. This revision
remained pending since April, 1991, and
was ultimately allowed on 10th January,
1995. There are no orders available on
record to demonstrate that any notices
were issued to the petitioner, or any order
was passed by the revisional authority
condoning delay in filing of revision. The
order itself, on face of the record, appears
to have been passed without hearing and
adjudicating version of its beneficiary,
including the petitioner. It is in this
context and background that challenge
has been made to the orders impugned.
298
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
9. I have heard Sri C.K. Parikh,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
petitioner, Learned Standing Counsel
appearing for the respondent nos.1 & 2,
and Sri B.D. Mandhyan, Learned Senior
Counsel, assisted by Sri Anuj Mandhyan,
appearing for the respondent nos.3 to 14.
10. Sri C.K. Parikh, appearing for
the petitioner, has challenged the orders
impugned essentially on the ground that
the
same
are
without
jurisdiction,
inasmuch as no revision under Section 24
of the Act was maintainable against a sale
certificate; that the revision itself was
entertained after 23 years, without issuing
notices
on
the
delay
condonation
application, and without affording an
opportunity of hearing in the matter to the
petitioner, the restoration application of
petitioner has also been erroneously
rejected; that the revision itself could not
have been instituted or entertained and
allowed during pendency of suit for
declaration that the property in question
exclusively belong to Tota Mal, and his
heirs alone were entitled to have right in
respect of the suit property, rendering suit
itself meaningless; that act of sale
crystallizes at the stage of execution of
sale certificate, and not at the stage of
conduct of bid, and the mere fact that
Tota Mal was the highest bidder does not
lead to an inference that he becomes the
owner,
ignoring
subsequent
developments; and that the revision after
23 years could not be allowed in the
manner, as has been done.
11. Sri B.D. Mandhyan, Learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing
for
the
respondents, on the other hand, submits
that the writ petition itself is not
maintainable, as the Act itself has been
repealed by The Displaced Persons
Claims and Other Laws Repeal Act, 2005,
Sri Mandhyan submits that once the Act
itself has been repealed, the proceedings
of writ are liable to abate and all orders
passed therein have become final, and the
writ petition itself is liable to be
dismissed. He further submits that it is
undisputed that only Tota Mal had
participated in the auction proceedings,
and
bidsheet
etc.
have
also
been
highlighted to contend that Tota Mal had
participated in the bid in his individual
capacity, and thereafter, it was not open to
associate anyone else in sale certificate.
He further submits that Tota Mal was a
simple person, who was ignorant of the
local language, and since Amru Mal was
his relative, as such, a power of attorney
in his favour was executed, and taking
advantage of the power of attorney,
fraudulent manipulations were done,
without his consent and knowledge, by
Amru Mal, to include name of his sons. It
is then submitted that highest bid of Tota
Mal, which had been accepted, was since
in his individual capacity, therefore,
revisional authority has rightly passed
orders, which requires no interference. Sri
Mandhyan also submits that no limitation
is prescribed in filing of a revision under
Section 24 of the Act by virtue of law laid
down by Delhi High Court in M.C.
Rahbar Vs. Union of India [1968 (4) DLT
78], therefore, no question arose for delay
condonation in revision. It is submitted
that revision had remained pending for 05
years, and was duly contested by all
concerned, who had knowledge of it. He
further submits that the petitioner had not
contributed even a single naya paisa for
purchase of the property, and the sale
certificate
dated
14.6.1968
was
manipulated. Sri Mandhyan also submits
that order in revision was passed after
hearing the parties, and the same,
1 All] Chetan Das Vs. D.C.S.C., U.P., LKO & Ors.
299
therefore, requires no interference in the
present writ petition.
12. On the basis of submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the
parties, following questions arise for
consideration before this Court in the
present writ petition:-
(i) Whether the writ petition survives
after the repeal of the Act of 1954, by
virtue of the Displaced Persons Claims
and Other Laws Repeal Act, 2005 ?
(ii) Whether right in property gets
crystallized with acceptance of bid or
such a right comes into existence only
with deposit of bid amount and issuance
of sale certificate ?
(iii) Whether a revision under
Section 24 of the Act of 1954 lies against
a sale certificate ?
(iv) Whether any limitation is
prescribed for filing of revision under
Section 24 of the Act of 1954 ?
(v) Whether the order impugned has
been passed in accordance with law ?
Question No.(i)-
13. Sri B.D. Mandhyan, at the very
outset, has invited the attention of the
Court to the Displaced Persons Claims
and Other Laws Repeal Act, 2005, which
has received the assent of the President on
5th September, 2005, and has been
published in Gazette on 6th September,
2005, whereby The Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 44
of 1954 has been repealed. According to
Sri Mandhyan, once the Act itself has
been
repealed,
the
orders
passed
thereunder are no longer open to
challenge in the present writ proceedings,
which is liable to abate. For said
purposes, Sri Mandhyan has relied upon a
Constitution Bench Judgment in Kolhapur
Canesugar Works Ltd. Vs. Union of India
[AIR 2000 SC 811].
14. On the other hand, Sri Parikh has
placed reliance upon the language of
Sections 6 and 24 of The General Clauses
Act, 1897 to contend that as the Central
Act itself has been repealed, in the instant
matter, therefore, by virtue of Section
6(e), the proceedings of the writ petition
have been specifically saved. Reliance has
been placed upon judgments in State of
Punjab Vs. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh
[1955 AIR SC 84], Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd.
Vs. Director of Enforcement [(1969) 2
SCC 412)], State of Punjab Vs. Harnek
Singh [(2002) 3 SCC 481], General
Finance Co. Vs. C.I.T. [(2002) 7 SCC 1],
Full Bench Judgment of this Court in
Indrapal Singh Vs. State of U.P. And 2
others [2013 (10) ADJ 612], and Doaba
Nirmal Mandal (Regd.) Vs. Financial
Commissioner
Revenue
[2006
SCC
Online P&H 334].
15. Before proceeding to deal with
the submissions advanced in this regard, it
would be appropriate to notice the
language of Section 6(e) of The General
Clauses Act, 1897, which reads as under:-
"6(e). Where this Act, or any 1
[Central Act] or Regulation made after
the commencement of this Act, repeals
any enactment hitherto made or hereafter
to be made, then, unless a different
intention appears, the repeal shall not
affect any investigation, legal proceeding
or remedy in respect of any such right,
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty,
forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and
any such investigation, legal proceeding
or remedy may be instituted, continued or
enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
or punishment may be imposed as if the
repealing Act or Regulation had not been
passed."
16. In the facts of the present case,
by virtue of Repeal Act, 2005, the
provisions of the Act of 1954 itself have
been repealed. Since the Act of 1954 was
a Central Act, which itself has been
repealed, therefore, the provisions of
Section 6(e) would come into play, and
therefore, the present writ petition being a
legal proceeding in respect of a right
created under the repealed Act would be
clearly saved from the affect of repeal.
The Constitution Bench judgment relied
upon by Sri Mandhyan does not help his
cause, inasmuch as the said judgment of
the Apex Court dealt with Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act arising out of repeal
of a Rule framed under a Central Act,
which was not repealed. The aforesaid
view has been reiterated by the Supreme
Court in the Constitution Bench judgment
in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. Vs.
Union of India [AIR 2000 SC 811].
Relevant portion of paras 32 and 33 of the
judgment are reproduced:-
"32.
......The
decision
of
the
Constitution Bench is directly on the
question of applicability of Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act in a case where a
rule is deleted or omitted by a notification
and the question was answered in the
negative. The Constitution Bench said
that "Section 6 only applies to repeals and
not to omissions, and applies when the
repeal is of a Central Act or Regulation
and not of a Rule" (page 656 of the
Supreme Court Report).
33. The Full Bench appears to have
lost sight of the position that all the
relevant
terms
i.e.
'Central
Act',
'Enactment' 'Regulation', and 'Rule' are
defined in Sub-section 3(7), 3(19), 3(5),
3(50) and 3(51) respectively of the
General Clauses Act. When the term
Central Act or Regulation or Rule is used
in that Act reference has to be made to the
definition of that term in the statute. It is
not possible nor permissible to give a
meaning to any of the terms different from
the definition. It is manifest that each term
has a distinct and separate, meaning
attributed to it for the purpose of the Act.
Therefore, when the question to be
considered is whether a particular
provision of the Act applies in a case then
the clear and unambiguous language of
that provision has to be given its true
meaning and import. The Full Bench has
equated a 'rule' with 'statute'. In our
considered view this is impermissible in
view of the specific provisions in the Act.
When the legislature by clear and
unambiguous language has extended the
provision of section 6 to cases of repeal of
a 'Central Act' or 'Regulation', it is not
possible to apply the provision to a case
of repeal of a 'Rule'. The position will not
be different even if the rule has been
framed by virtue of the power vested
under an enactment; it remains a 'rule'
and takes its colour from the definition of
the term in the Act (General Clauses Act).
At the cost of repetition we may say that
the omissions in the judgment in M/s.
Rayala Corporation (supra) pointed out
in paragraph 17 of the judgment of the
Full Bench have no substance as they are
not relevant for determination of the
question raised for the reasons stated
herein."
17. The aforesaid proposition has
been followed in State of Punjab Vs.
Harnek Singh [(2002) 3 SCC 481], and
General Finance Co. Vs. C.I.T. [(2002) 7
SCC 1]. The same view has been
expressed by Full Bench of this Court in
1 All] Chetan Das Vs. D.C.S.C., U.P., LKO & Ors.
301
Indrapal Singh Vs. State of U.P. And 2
others [2013 (10) ADJ 612], wherein after
referring to the aforesaid decisions of the
Apex Court, it has been observed that The
General Clauses Act is a part of every
Central Act, and has to be read, as such,
in the Act, unless, it is specifically
excluded. In view of the authoritative
pronouncement of law on the question by
the Apex Court, as reiterated by Full
Bench of this Court, I am of the
considered opinion that the proceedings
of the present writ petition would not
abate on account of repeal of Act of 1954,
and
the
writ
petition
would
be
maintainable, and will have to be decided
on merits. The objection raised by Sri
Mandhyan, in this regard, consequently
fails. The first question is decided,
accordingly.
Question No.(ii)-
18. The revisional authority for the
purposes of passing the order impugned
has solely relied upon the fact that it was
Tota
Mal,
who
had
individually
participated in the auction bid, and it was
his individual bid of Rs.94,000/-, which
was accepted. The revisional authority
took note of the fact that name of other
three persons namely Amru Mal and his
two sons Khem Chand and Kakoo Mal
were not shown as purchasers in the
auction
proceedings.
The
revisional
authority proceeded on the premise that
Tota Mal was the bidder, whose name bid
was accepted, who became owner, and a
subsequent addition of name in the sale
certificate was impermissible.
19.
-Sri Parikh has invited the
attention of the Court to the provisions of
Section 20 of the Act read with Rules 76A, 76-B, and 90 (8), (12), (15) of the
Rules. The aforesaid provisions are
reproduced:-
"S.20 Power to transfer property out
of the compensation pool.-(1) Subject to
any rules that may be made under this
Act, the managing officer or managing
corporation may transfer any property
out of the compensation pool-
(a) by sale of such property to a
displaced person or any association of
displaced persons, whether incorporated
or not, or to any other person, whether
the property is sold by public auction or
otherwise;
(b) by lease of any such property to a
displaced person or an association of
displaced persons, whether incorporated
or not, or to any other person;
(c) by allotment of any such property
to a displaced person or an association of
displaced persons whether incorporated
or not, or to any other person, on such
valuation as the Settlement Commissioner
may determine;
(d) in the case of a share of an
evacuee in a company, by transfer of such
share to a displaced person 1 or any
association of displaced persons, whether
incorporated or not, or to any other
person], notwithstanding anything to the
contrary
contained
in
the
Indian
Companies Act, 19132 (7 of 1913 .) or in
the
memorandum
or
articles
of
association of such company;
(e) in such other manner as may be
prescribed.
(2) Every managing officer or
managing
corporation
selling
any
immovable property by public auction
under sub- section (1) shall be deemed to
be a Revenue Officer within the meaning
of sub- section (4) of section 89 of the
Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908
).
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(3) Where the ownership of any
property has passed to the buyer before
the payment of the whole of the purchase
money, the amount of the purchase money
or any part thereof remaining unpaid and
any interest on such amount or part shall,
notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law, be a first
charge upon the property in the hands of
the buyer or any transferee from such
buyer and may, on a certificate issued by
the Chief Settlement Commissioner, be
recovered in the same manner as an
arrear of land revenue.
4. [(1A) 3 For the purpose of
transferring any property out of the
compensation pool under sub- section (1),
it shall be lawful for the managing officer
or the managing corporation to transfer
the same to a displaced person jointly
with any other person or an association of
displaced persons or otherwise.]
76-A. Adjustment of payment of price
of properties or of public dues by
association of claims--Notwithstanding
anything contained in these rules the
Central Government may, by general or
special order made in this behalf allow,
subject to such terms and conditions as
may be specified in such order.
(i) payment of price of properties
forming part of the compensation pool or
any part of such price; or
(ii) payment of any public dues, by
adjustment against the net compensation
payable in respect of the verified claim of
any displaced person.
76-B. Deed of transfer to be made
out--Where any person in occupation of a
property
forming
part
of
the
compensation pool has associated with
himself any other displaced person having
a verified claim whose net compensation
is to be adjusted against the purchase
price in pursuance of rule 76-A, the
transfer shall be made out jointly in the
name of all such persons specifying the
extent of interest of each in the property:
Provided that where every such
displaced person who has so associated
himself sends an intimation in writing to
the Settlement Commissioner that the
deed of transfer may be made out in the
name of person in occupation , or the
deed of transfer may be made in the name
of such persons.
90. Procedure for sale of property by
public auction--
(8). The person declared to be the
highest bidder for the property at the
public auction shall pay in cash or by a
cheque drawn on a scheduled bank and
endorsed "good for payment upto six
months" or in such other forms as may be
required by the Settlement Commissioner,
immediately on the fall of hammer a
deposit not exceeding 20 per cent of the
amount of his bid to the officer
conducting the sale and in default of such
deposit the property may be resold.
(12). The balance of the purchase
money
may,
subject to
the
other
provisions of these rules be adjusted
against the compensation payable to the
auction purchaser in respect of any
verified claim held by him. In any such
case
the auction purchaser shall be
required to furnish within seven days of
the receipt of intimation about the
approval of bid, particulars of the
compensation filed by him:
Provided
that
the
Settlement
Commissioner or any officer appointed by
him in this behalf may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, extend the aforesaid
period of seven days by such further
period not exceeding fifteen days as the
Settlement Commissioner or such other
officer may deem fit:
1 All] Chetan Das Vs. D.C.S.C., U.P., LKO & Ors.
303
Provided further that the period
extended under the preceding provisio
may further be extended (without any
limit of time) by the Chief Settlement
Commissioner.
(15). When the purchase price has
been realised in full from the auction
purchaser, the Managing Officer shall
issue to him a sale certificate in the form
specified in Appendix XXXII or XXXIII, as
the case may be. A certified copy of the
sale certificate shall be sent by him to the
Registering Officer within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the whole or any
part of the property to which the
certificate relates is situated. If the
auction purchaser is a displaced person
and has associated with himself any other
displaced person having a verified claim
whose net compensation is to be adjusted
in whole or in part against the purchase
price, the sale certificate shall be made
out jointly in the name of all such persons
and shall specify the extent of interest of
each in the property."
20. Relying upon the aforesaid
provisions, Sri Parikh submits that the Act
as well as the Rules clearly admit
inclusion of other displaced persons for
securing purchase of the property by the
bidder, and such persons are entitled to be
joined as purchasers. Sri Parikh, therefore,
submits that mere fact that Tota Mal had
individually taken part in the bid would
not lead to an inference that he alone
became the owner of the property
pursuant to the bid and that inclusion of
other names was unauthorized. It is
submitted that right in the property is
created only when the entire bid money is
paid and a sale certificate is issued. The
submission is that mere making of highest
bid does not entitled the bidder to secure a
sale certificate, and it is only pursuant to
payment of its price, in cash or by
adjustment of claim, that such right in the
property is created with issuance of sale
certificate.
21. Act of 1954 was a special Act
enacted
to
secure
payment
of
compensation and rehabilitation grant to
displaced persons. The term displaced
person was defined in Section 2(b) of the
Act. Considering the adversities, which
were being faced by these displaced
persons, the legislature treated such
displaced persons as a separate class in
themselves, and provisions for allotment
and sale of properties to them was
separately provided. Section 20 clearly
made reference to sale of property to a
displaced person or any association of
displaced persons. Sub-section 4 of
Section 20 clearly made it lawful for
managing officer to transfer the property
to a displaced person, or to a set of
displaced persons jointly, with any other
person or an association of displaced
persons or otherwise. Provision in Rules
were
also
introduced,
accordingly.
Transfer of property, therefore, was made
legal to an individual displaced person or
jointly to a group of displaced persons of
the same genus.
22. Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Bombay Salt & Chemical Industries Vs.
L.J. Johnson [AIR 1958 SC 289], while
dealing with the provisions of the Act of
1954 observed as under in Para 10:-
"10. It is clear from the rules and the
conditions of sale set out above that the
declaration that a person was the highest
bidder at the auction does not amount to a
complete sale and transfer of the property
to him. The fact that the bid has to be
approved by the Settlement Commissioner
shows that till such approval which the
304
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Commissioner is not bound to give, the
auction-purchaser has no. right at all. It
would further appear that even the
approval of the bid by the Settlement
Commissioner does not amount to a
transfer of property for the purchaser has
yet to pay the balance of the purchase
money and the rules provide that if he
fails to do that he shall not have any
claim to the property. The correct
position is that on the approval of the bid
by the Settlement Commissioner, a
binding contract for the sale of the
property to the auction-purchaser comes
into existence. Then the provision as to
the sale certificate would indicate that
only upon the issue of it a transfer of the
property takes place. Condition of sale
No. 7 in this case, furthermore, expressly
stipulated that upon the payment of the
purchase price in full the ownership
would
be
transferred
and
a
sale
certificate issued. It is for the appellants
to show that the property had been
transferred. They have not stated that the
sale certificate was issued, nor that the
balance of the purchase money had been
paid. In those circumstances, it must be
held that there has as yet been no.
transfer of the salt pans to respondents
Nos. 4 and 5. The appellants cannot
therefore claim the benefit of S. 29 and
ask that they should not be evicted. Mr.
Purshottam Trikamdas contended that the
sale certificate will in any event be
granted and that once it is granted, as the
form of this certificate shows, the transfer
will relate back to the date of the auction.
It is enough to say in answer to this
contention that assuming it to be right, a
point which is by no. means obvious and
which we do not decide, till it is granted
no. transfer with effect from any date
whatsoever takes place and none has yet
been granted."
23. Again in Bishan Paul Vs. Mothu
Ram [AIR 1965 SC 1994], following
observations were made in paras 9 to 11,
which are reproduced:-
"9.
The
passing
of
title
thus
presupposes the payment of price in full
and the question is at what stage this
takes place. Obviously, there are several
distinct stages in the sale of property.
These are: (a) the fall of the hammer and
the declaration of the highest bid; (b) the
approval of the highest bid by the
Settlement
Commissioner
or
officer
appointed by him; (c) payment of the full
price after approval of the highest bid; (d)
grant of certificate; and (e) registration of
the certificate.
10. The first and last in this series,
namely, the fall of the hammer and the
registration of the certificate are not
critical dates for this purpose and they
have not been suggested as the starting
point of title. It is also clear that till
payment of full price title is in abeyance
for the rules themselves say that if the
price is not paid the auction purchaser
has no claim to the property. Under
Section 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
title is deemed to commence from the date
of auction and not when the sale becomes
absolute.