# Chetram @ Mintu & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 10 ILRA 626
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-10-18
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Review Application No. 4 of 2023
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Piyush Agrawal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chetram-mintu-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-51072
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Civil Law - Review - Code of Civil
Procedure,1908 - Section 141- Order 47,
Rule 1 - Constitution of India - Art. 226 -
Writ Petition - Review is permissible only
when there is error apparent on the face of
record i.e. error should be grave and
palpable, and the error must be such as
would be apparent on mere looking of record,
without requiring any long drawn process of
reasoning, and reappraisal of entire evidence
for finding the error, as same would amount
to exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Review
lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order
47, Rule 1 read with Section 141 CPC. Party
must satisfy the Court that the matter or
evidence discovered by it at a subsequent
stage could not be discovered or produced at
the initial stage though it had acted with due
diligence. A party filing a review application
on the ground of any other "sufficient reason"
must satisfy that the said reason is analogous
to the conditions mentioned in the said
provision of C.P.C. Neither review court can
examine the merit of the judgment as an
appellate court nor in the garb of review
petition, re-hearing of the matter can be
permitted by this Court - In the instant
case each and every aspect of the matter
was considered by the Division Bench and
thereafter, the writ petition was dismissed. No
case was made out to review the judgment.
(Para 22, 23)
Dismissed. (E-5)
List of Cases cited:

## Text

626 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
they may not approach this Court to oppose
the public cause.

33. A copy of this order be sent to
Principal
Secretary,
Panchayat
Raj
Department, Government of U.P. Lucknow
for compliance.

34. Registrar (Compliance) to take
steps.
----------
(2024) 10 ILRA 626
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.10.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J
THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Review Application No. 4 of 2023

Chetram @ Mintu & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Applicants:
Ashish Mishra, Jai Shanker Misra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Kaushlendra Nath Singh

Civil Law - Review - Code of Civil
Procedure,1908 - Section 141- Order 47,
Rule 1 - Constitution of India - Art. 226 -
Writ Petition - Review is permissible only
when there is error apparent on the face of
record i.e. error should be grave and
palpable, and the error must be such as
would be apparent on mere looking of record,
without requiring any long drawn process of
reasoning, and reappraisal of entire evidence
for finding the error, as same would amount
to exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Review
lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order
47, Rule 1 read with Section 141 CPC. Party
must satisfy the Court that the matter or
evidence discovered by it at a subsequent
stage could not be discovered or produced at
the initial stage though it had acted with due
diligence. A party filing a review application
on the ground of any other "sufficient reason"
must satisfy that the said reason is analogous
to the conditions mentioned in the said
provision of C.P.C. Neither review court can
examine the merit of the judgment as an
appellate court nor in the garb of review
petition, re-hearing of the matter can be
permitted by this Court - In the instant
case each and every aspect of the matter
was considered by the Division Bench and
thereafter, the writ petition was dismissed. No
case was made out to review the judgment.
(Para 22, 23)
Dismissed. (E-5)
List of Cases cited:
1. Gajraj Singh & ors.Vs St. of U.P. & ors.2011
(11) ADJ 1 (FB)
2. Pratap Singh Vs St. of UP & ors. Writ C
No.6022 of 2008 decided on 17.02.2012
3. Kanwar Raj Singh (D) through Legal
Representatives Vs GEJO (D) Through Legal
Representatives & ors. (2024) 2 SCC 416
4. Ram Saran Lall Vs Domini Kuer AIR 1961 SC
1747
5. Shivdeo Singh Vs St. of Pun. . AIR 1963 SC
1909
6. A.P. Sharma Vs A.P. Sharma 1979 (4) SCC
389
7. Meera Bhanja Vs Nirmla K. Chaudhary 1995
(1) SCC 170
8.
Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan
Hegde
Vs
Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale AIR 1960 SC
137
9. Parsion Devi & ors. Vs Sumitri Devi & ors.
1997 (8) J.T. SC 480
10 All. Chetram @ Mintu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
627
10. Smt. Meera Bhanja Vs St. Nirmala Kumari
Choudhary 1985 (1) SCC 170
11. Lily Thomas Vs U.O.I.AIR 2000 SC 1650
12. Subhash Vs St. of Mah & anr. AIR 2002 SC
2537
13. St. Haryana Vs Mohinder Singh JT 2002 (1)
197
14. U.O.I.Vs B. Valluvar 2006 (8) SCC 686
15. St. of Haryana & ors. Vs M.P. Mohila 2007
(1) SCC 457
16. Bhagwant Singh Vs Deputy Director of
Consolidation & anr. AIR 1977 All. 163
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra
Tripathi, J. & Hon'ble Piyush Agrawal, J.)

Civil
Misc.
Delay
Condonation
Application No.1 of 2023

1. Learned counsel for the
respondents states that he is not inclined to
file an objection to the delay condonation
application and he has no objection in case
delay condonation application is allowed.

2. For the reasons stated in
affidavit
filed
in
support
of
delay
condonation application, as the same
constitutes sufficient cause for condoning
delay in filing review application, the delay
condonation application is allowed. The
review application is treated to have been
filed well within time.

Review Application

1. Heard Sri Jai Shanker Misra,
learned
counsel
for
the
applicants/petitioners and Sri Kaushalendra
Nath Singh, learned counsel for the
respondent/NOIDA.

2. The instant review application is
preferred to review the judgment and order
dated 22.04.2022 passed by the Division
Bench in Writ C No.10106 of 2022
(Chetram Chauhan @ Mintu and others vs.
State of U.P. and 3 others).

Factual Matrix

3. Record reflects that the
applicants-petitioners were owners with
transferable
right
of
Khasra
No.422M/0.9700 hec., 428M/0.6410 hec.
and 570M/0.7460 hec. situated in Village
Sadarpur, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam
Buddh Nagar. The State Government vide
notifications
dated
30.03.2002
and
28.06.2003 had acquired the land of
different villages of NOIDA and Greater
NOIDA including the land of petitioners in
Khasra No.422 and 428. The petitioners
have invoked the writ jurisdiction for a
direction
commanding
second
respondent/Chief Executive Officer, New
Okhala Industrial Development Authority
(NOIDA), Gautam Buddh Nagar to pay
compensation @ Rs.44,000/- per square
meter in place of Rs.22,000/- per square
meter for 5% additional abadi land in
respect of the acquired land of petitioners
i.e. Khasra Nos.422M & 428M situated in
Village Sadarpur, Pargana & Tehsil Dadri,
District Gautam Buddha Nagar in the light
of the judgment and order dated 21.10.2011
passed by the Full Bench of this Court in
Gajraj Singh & others Vs. State of U.P.
& others1. A Division Bench vide
judgment and order dated 22.04.2022 had
dismissed the writ petition. For ready
reference, the judgment and order dated
22.04.2022 is quoted herein under:-
628 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
"1. The prayer made in the
present petition is for a direction to
the
respondent
no.2
to
pay
compensation @ Rs. 44,000/- per
square meter in place of Rs.
22,000/- per square meter for 5%
additional abadi land with reference
to the acquisition thereof in Village
- Sadarpur, Pargana & Tehsil -
Dadri, District - Gautam Buddha
Nagar in terms of the judgement of
the Full Bench of this Court in
Gajraj Singh & others Vs. State of
U.P. & others reported in 2011 (11)
ADJ 1 (FB).
2. At the very outset,
learned counsel for the respondents
pointed out that challenge to the
acquisition pertaining to land of
Village - Sadarpur vide same
notification was considered by the
Full Bench of this Court in Gajraj
Singh (supra) and the writ petitions
were
dismissed.
Hence,
the
petitioners cannot be granted any
benefit in terms thereof.
3. To this, learned counsel
for the petitioners submitted that
only three writ petitions pertaining
to
Village
-
Sadarpur
were
dismissed and not all of them.
4. We are not impressed
with this argument. Whatever writ
petitions, pertaining to acquisition
of land in Village - Sadarpur vide
same notification were listed before
the Full Bench of this Court, the
same were specifically dismissed.
That does not mean that any further
relief, which was not granted to the
writ petitioners before the Full
Bench of this Court, could be
granted to any other land owners.
5. For the reasons stated
above, we do not find any merit in the
present
petition.
The
same
is,
accordingly, dismissed."

Submission
of
the
review
applicants/petitioners

4. Learned counsel for the applicantspetitioners vehemently submitted that earlier
the petitioners had preferred Writ Petition
No.44 of 2012 (Raj Kumar and others vs.
State of UP and others) and the same was
disposed of by the Division Bench vide an
order dated 04.01.2012 in terms of the Full
Bench judgement passed in Gajraj Singh's
case (supra). In this backdrop, it was pressed
that once the Division Bench had already
disposed of the said writ petition in terms of
judgement of Full Bench in Gajraj Singh's
case (supra) then the applicants-petitioners are
entitled to get full compensation @ 64.7% and
admittedly, the same has been accorded to the
petitioners.

5. Learned counsel for the applicants
further submitted that while dismissing the
writ petition, the Division Bench had
considered
the
benefit
of
additional
compensation in the light of Full Bench
judgment in Gajraj Singh's case (supra), which
has already been accorded to the petitioners by
the NOIDA. He submitted that mainly three
writ petitions pertaining to Village Sadarpur
were considered and dismissed by the Full
Bench in Gajraj Singh's case (supra) and
therefore, it cannot be presumed that no
benefit had been extended qua the land, which
was acquired in Village Sadarpur. In support of
his submission, he has placed reliance on the
judgement and order passed in Pratap Singh
vs. State of UP and others2. The operative
portion of the order is as under:-

"In result, the writ petitions
included in Group-A, Group-B and
Group-C are decided as follows:-
10 All. Chetram @ Mintu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
629
(i)The
Writ
Petition
Nos.41833 of 2011, 49068 of 2011,
50654 of 2009, 56821 of 2009,
63443 of 2009 and 51115 of 2011
of Group-A, relating to village
Devla, district Gautam Budh Nagar
are allowed and the notifications
dated 26th May, 2009 and 22nd
June, 2009 and all consequential
actions are quashed. The petitioners
shall be entitled for restoration of
their land subject to deposit of
compensation
which
they
had
received under agreement/award
before the authority/Collector. Rest
of the writ petitions of Group-A are
disposed of in terms of direction
No.3 and other directions in earlier
judgment and order dated 21st
October, 2011 (Gajraj and others
vs. State of U.P. and others)
reported in 2011(11) ADJ.
(ii)All the writ petitions of
Group-B are dismissed as barred by
laches.
(iii)The writ petitions of
Group-C relating to village Bisrakh
Jalalpur, district Gautam Budh
Nagar are disposed of in terms of
direction No.3 and other directions
in earlier judgment and order dated
21st October, 2011 (Gajraj and
others vs. State of U.P. and others)
reported in 2011(11) ADJ.
All the writ petitions are
decided accordingly. No costs."

6. Learned counsel for the
applicants next submitted that while
passing the order in Pratap Singh's case
(supra) the Division Bench had taken note
of list of Group-A cases relating to different
villages of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA
and also taken note of item no.211, Village
Sadarpur, wherein the notification under
Section 4 dated 30.03.2002 and the
notification under Section 6 of the Act
dated 28.06.2003 were mentioned and the
notification of land of petitioners covered
the benefit as per direction no.3 and other
directions in the earlier judgment passed in
Gajraj Singh's case (supra). In support of
his submission, he had placed reliance on
item no.7 of 191st Board Meeting of
NOIDA Authority dated 21.12.2016, by
which the Board had resolved to pay the
equivalent amount of the developed land of
additional 5% abadi plot of the tenure
holder. Even, the said relief is also liable to
be accorded in the light of the 191st Board
meeting of the NOIDA dated 21.12.2016.
The Division Bench without considering
the aforementioned grounds had rejected
the claim of the petitioners and in case the
order dated 22.04.2022 is not reviewed, the
applicants-petitioners
would
suffer
irreparable loss and injury.

Submission of counsel for the
respondent/authority

7. The review application was
resisted by Sri Kaushalendra Nath Singh,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent
authority on the ground that in the instant
matter, admittedly the disputed plot had
been purchased by the NOIDA authority
through mutual negotiation. The sale deeds
were executed on 28.11.2001 and the same
was
registered
by
the
Registrar
on
30.07.2002. The applicants were well
conversant with the fact, that they had no
right to press any relief in the light of the
Full Bench judgement in Gajraj Singh's
case (supra). The applicants-petitioners
tried to get the benefit of the date of
registration
by
the
Registrar
dated
30.07.2002 but in fact, the same was not
the date of the sale deed. The sale deed had
already been executed way back on
630 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
28.11.2001 and the entire sale consideration
was also passed on to the petitioners on the
said date. The said fact is also reflected
from the sale deed itself, wherein it had
been
acknowledged
that
the
entire
compensation had been accepted by the
petitioners in the month of November,
2001. In support of his submission, he had
also placed reliance on the sale deed, which
had also been brought on record by the
petitioners.

8. Sri Kaushalendra Nath Singh
further raised an objection that the
additional compensation was paid to only
those persons, whose land were acquired by
means of notifications, which were under
challenge before the Full Bench in Gajraj
Singh's
case
(supra).
Initially,
the
petitioners tried to mislead the Court that
their land were subject matter of challenge
in the preliminary notification i.e. Section 4
of the Act but in the final notification i.e.
under Section 6 of the Act, the said land
was not included. Therefore, the land of the
petitioners were never acquired and the
same were taken through sale deeds, which
were executed on 28.11.2001 and the entire
sale consideration was handed over on the
said date. Even while filing the earlier writ
petition, the petitioners claimed that their
land were also acquired by means of
notification and succeeded in obtaining
disposal order in the light of judgement
passed in Gajraj Singh's case (supra) and
later on, the petitioners had instituted the
said
writ
petition
with
material
concealment. Even on the basis of the
earlier order passed in Writ C No.44 of
2012, once it was brought into the notice of
the NOIDA Authority that the petitioners
were not entitled for any additional
compensation in the light of the judgement
passed in Gajraj Singh's case (supra) then
the recovery notice has been issued for
return of the additional compensation,
which was wrongly collected by the
petitioners by giving wrong facts.

9. Sri Kaushalendra Nath Singh
vehemently contended and placed reliance
on 180th Board meeting dated 29.11.2013,
wherein the decision was taken to accord
enhanced compensation of 64.7% to the
farmers keeping in mind the interest of the
tenure holders whose land were acquired
between 30.03.2002 to 17.03.2009. In the
instant matter, admittedly the notification
under Section 4 was issued on 30.03.2002
and the notification under Section 6 of the
Act was issued on 28.06.2003 but prior to
it, the petitioner's land was already
purchased by the NOIDA Authority in the
month of November, 2001. Even the
petitioners are not entitled to get the
additional compensation of 64.7% or 5%
developed land in the light of the Full
Bench judgement in Gajraj Singh's case
(supra). The judgment and order dated
22.4.2022 passed by the Division Bench is
well considered and same does not fall
within the parameters of review as there is
no infirmity in the same, as such review
petition is clearly not maintainable.

10. He further placed reliance on
the judgements passed by the Apex Court
in Kanwar Raj Singh (D) through Legal
Representatives vs. GEJO (D) Through
Legal Representatives and others3 and
Ram Saran Lall v. Domini Kuer4,
wherein it had been held that Section 47 of
the Registration Act, 1908 applies to a
document only after it has been registered,
and it has nothing to do with the
completion of the sale when the instrument
is one of sale.

Analysis by the Court
10 All. Chetram @ Mintu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
631
11. After respective arguments
have
been
advanced,
the
parameter
provided
for
exercise
of
Review
jurisdiction is being looked into.

12. The review application can be
allowed only on (1) discovery of new and
important matter of evidence which, after
exercise of due diligence, was not within
the knowledge of the person seeking
review, or could not be produced by him at
the time when the order was made, or (2)
when some mistake or error on the face of
record is found, or (3) on any analogous
ground. But review is not permissible on
the ground that the decision was erroneous
on merits as the same would be the
province of an Appellate Court.

13. In the case of Shivdeo Singh v.
State of Punjab5, Hon'ble Apex Court took
the view that there is nothing under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, which
precludes High Court from exercising the
power of review, which inheres in every
Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to correct grave
and palpable errors committed by it. It was
held that every Court including High Court
inheres plenary jurisdiction, to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to correct grave
and palpable errors committed by it.

14. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of A.P. Sharma v. A.P. Sharma6, has
cautioned that power of review of High
Court is not the same as appellate powers
and review on the ground that certain
documents have not been considered,
which formed the record. Hon'ble Apex
Court, in the case of Meera Bhanja v.
Nirmla K. Chaudhary7, has taken the
view that review must be confined to error
apparent on the face of record, error must
be such as would be apparent on mere
looking without any long drawn process of
reasoning, and reappraisal of evidence on
record for finding out error would amount
to exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which
is not at all permissible.

15. In the case of Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun
Bhavanappa Tirumale8, Hon'ble Supreme
Court has made the following observations
in connection with an error apparent on the
face of the record :-

"An error which has to be
established
by
a
long
drawn
process of reasoning on points
where there may conceivably be
two opinions can hardly be said to
be an error apparent on the face of
the record. Where an alleged error
is far from self-evident and if it can
be established, it has to be
established,
by
lengthy
and
complicated arguments, such an
error cannot be cured by a writ of
certiorari according to the rule
governing
the powers
of
the
superior Court to issue such a writ.
In our view the aforesaid
approach of the Division Bench
dealing
with
the
review
proceedings clearly shows that it
has overstepped its jurisdiction
under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. By
merely
styling
the
reasoning
adopted by the earlier Division
Bench as suffering from a patent
error. It would not become a patent
error or error apparent in view of
the settled legal position indicated
by us earlier. In substance, the
review Bench has re appreciated
the entire evidence, sat almost as
Court of appeal and has reversed
the findings reached by the earlier
632 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Division Bench Even if the earlier
Division Bench findings regarding
C.S. Plot No. 74 were found to be
erroneous, it would be no ground
for reviewing the same, as that
would be the function of an
appellate Court. Learned counsel
for the respondent was not in a
position to point out how the
reasoning adopted and conclusion
reached by the Review Bench can
be supported within the narrow and
limited scope of Order 47, Rule 1,
C.P.C. Right or wrong, the earlier
Division
Bench
judgment
had
become final so far as the High
Court was concerned. It could not
have
been
reviewed
by
reconsidering the entire evidence
with a view to finding out the
alleged apparent error for justifying
the invocation of review powers.
Only
on
that
short
ground,
therefore, this appeal is required to
be allowed. The final decision
dated 8th July, 1986 of the Division
Bench dismissing the appeal from
appellate decree No.569 of 1973
insofar as C.S. Plot No. 74 is
concerned as well as the review
judgment dated 5th September,
1984 in connection with the very
same plot, i.e. C.S. Plot No. 74 are
set aside and the earlier judgment
of the High Court dated 3rd
August, 1978 allowing the Second
Appeal regarding suit plot No. 74 is
restored. The appeal is accordingly
allowed.
In
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, there
will be no order as to costs."

16. In Parsion Devi and others v.
Sumitri
Devi
and
others9,
Hon'ble
Supreme Court has taken the view that
review proceeding has to be strictly
confined to the ambit and scope of Order
47, and therein the two earlier judgments
referred to above have been relied upon.
Again in Smt. Meera Bhanja v. St.
Nirmala Kumari Choudhary10, Hon'ble
Supreme Court once again held that review
proceedings are not by way of an appeal
and have to be strictly confined to the
scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

17. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a
judgment may be open to review inter alia
if there is mistake or an error apparent on
the face of the record. An error, which is
not self evident and has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, can hardly be said to
be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its
power of review Under Order 47 Rule 1
Code of Civil Procedure. In exercise of the
jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it
is not permissible for an erroneous decision
to be "reheard and corrected". A review
petition has a limited purpose and cannot
be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise."

18. Hon'ble Apex Court, in the
case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India11,
after considering the dictionary meaning of
word "review" has taken the view that
power of review can be exercised for
correction of mistake and not to substitute a
view. Such powers can be exercised within
the limits of the statute, dealing with
exercise of power; the review cannot be
treated as an appeal in disguise, and mere
possibility of two views on the subject is
not a ground of review.

19. In Subhash Vs. State of
Maharastra & another12, the Apex Court
emphasized that Court should not be
misguided and should not lightly entertain
the review application unless there are
10 All. Chetram @ Mintu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
633
circumstances falling within the prescribed
limits for that as the Courts and Tribunal
should not proceed to re-examine the
matter as if it was an original application
before it for the reason that it cannot be a
scope of review. In State Haryana v.
Mohinder
Singh13,
the
Apex
Court
disapproved the judgment of High Court,
wherein earlier writ petition was disposed
of by High Court being infructuous and
giving some directions, and subsequent to
the same, review was sought, which was
allowed, same was clearly termed to be
overstepping of jurisdiction, and amounting
to giving of one more chance of hearing.

20. In the case of Union of India
v. B. Valluvar14, Hon'ble Apex Court has
again considered the parameters of review
jurisdiction of High Court and held that
same shall be exercised within the
limitations as provided under Section 114
read with Order 47 Rule of C.P.C., and
without recording finding as to there
existed error apparent on the face of the
record, merit cannot be gone into. Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of State of
Haryana and others v. M.P. Mohila15, has
taken the view that in the garb of
clarification
application,
recourse
to
achieve the result of review application,
cannot be permitted.

21. In the case of Bhagwant Singh
Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation &
another16, this Court rejected the review
application filed on a ground which had not
been argued earlier because the counsel, at
initial stage, had committed mistake in not
relying on and arguing those points, and
held as under:-

"It is not possible to review
a judgment only to give the
petitioner a fresh inning. It is not
for the litigant to judge of counsel's
wisdom after the case has been
decided. It is for the counsel to
argue the case in the manner he
thinks it should be argued. Once
the case has been finally argued on
merit and decided on merit, no
application for review lies on the
ground that the case should have
been differently argued."

Conclusion

22. On the touchstone of the
dictum
noted
above,
the
review
is
permissible only when there is error
apparent on the face of record i.e. error
should be grave and palpable, and the error
must be such as would be apparent on mere
looking of record, without requiring any
long drawn process of reasoning, and
reappraisal of entire evidence for finding
the error, as same would amount to exercise
of appellate jurisdiction. Further, the review
lies only on the grounds mentioned in
Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 141
CPC. The party must satisfy the Court that
the matter or evidence discovered by it at a
subsequent stage could not be discovered
or produced at the initial stage though it
had acted with due diligence. A party filing
a review application on the ground of any
other "sufficient reason" must satisfy that
the said reason is analogous to the
conditions mentioned in the said provision
of C.P.C.

23. The applicants/petitioners
could not demonstrate anything to satisfy
the Court on the three grounds of review as
mentioned in the earlier part of this
judgement, hence the judgement dated
22.4.2022
does
not
fall
under
the
parameters of review. It is by now settled
that neither review court can examine the
634 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
merit of the judgment as an appellate court
nor in the garb of review petition, rehearing of the matter can be permitted by
this Court.

24. Perusal of judgment under
review dated 22.4.2022 passed by this
Court shows that each and every aspect of
the matter has been considered by the
Division Bench and thereafter, the writ
petition in question was dismissed. No case
is made out to review the judgment passed
on 22.4.2022.

25. Consequently, the review
application is dismissed
----------
(2024) 10 ILRA 634
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.10.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Transfer Application (Civil) No. 267 of 2023
&
Transfer Application (Civil) No. 269 of 2023

Shubhi Saxena ...Petitioner
Versus
Rahul Srivastava & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shobhit Saxena

Counsel for the Respondents:
Vijyant Nigam

Civil Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1908
- Section 24 - Order 39 Rule 2 - Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 - Section - 13 -
Guardians and Wads Act, 1890 - Sections
7 & 25: - Transfer Application - seeking
transfer of custody and divorce Cases from
Lucknow to Bareilly - court finds that -
applicant's permanent resides in Lucknow and
the minor Child resides there and studying at
Lucknow - and the applicant's frequent transfer
do not justify the transfer of cases - held, both
custody and divorce cases should ideally be
decided by the same court for the interest of
justice - application lacks merit and the same is
dismissed.
(Para - 12, 13, 14)

Transfer Application Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. Delma Lubna Coelho Vs Edmond Clint
Fernandes - 2023 SCC Online SC 440,

2. Sumita Singh Vs Kumar Sanjay & anr.- 2001
vol. 10 SCC 41.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Shobhit Saxena, the
learned counsel for the applicant and Sri
Vijyant Nigam, the learned counsel for the
opposite parties.

2. Transfer Application (Civil) No.
267 of 2023 has been filed 'under Section
24 read with under Order 39, Rule 2 of
Civil Procedure Code, 1908' seeking
transfer of Case No. 353 of 2023, under
Section 7 read with Section 25 of Guardian
and Wards Act from the Court of Principal
Judge, Family Court, Lucknow to the Court
of Principal Judge, Family Court, Barelly.

3. Transfer Application (Civil) No.
269 of 2023 has been filed 'under Section
24 read with under Order 39, Rule 2 of
Civil Procedure Code, 1908' seeking
transfer of Case No. 4412 of 2022, under
Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
from the Court of Principal Judge, Family
Court, Lucknow to the Court of Principal
Judge, Family Court, Bareilly.

4.

The
statutory
provision
regarding transfer of cases is contained in