# Chhedi Ram Pandey (Deceased) & Ors v. Smt. Malti Bajpai (Deceased) & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 12 ILRA 785
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-11-26
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 17588 of 2024
- **Bench:** Ajit Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chhedi-ram-pandey-deceased-ors-v-smt-malti-bajpai-deceased-ors-51353
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Prakash
Chandra
Dwivedi,
Padmaker
Pandey

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 227 - Civil Procedure Code,1950 -
Order 41 Rules 27 - Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 - Sections - 21(1)(a)
&
21(1)(b):-
Petition
u/Article
227
-
questioning the findings of the prescribed
authority as well as appellate authority on the
score of release application being granted
exercising power chiefly the Act, 1972 -
Bonafide need - plea setup in defence by the
tenant before the court below that they have
sufficient alternative accommodation in the form
of a vacant space behind the shop in question
being used as a godown - court finds that, it
clearly transpires that landlords needed not only
the shop to settle the sons but also for the
purpose of self-settlement as they were not
having sufficient financial resources for their
sons and daughters to survive and since
building was in a dilapidated state they intended
it reconstruction after demolition - and survey
commission report did not support the case of
tenant, - and, once the landlord has set up a
need and it has come to be stated and proves
that members of the family are not gainfully
employed, any business even if run a few may
not suffice the financial need of the entire family
and, therefore, need would be bona fide - held,
landlord is a sole arbitrator of his need and it
does not lie in the mouth of tenant to suggest
as to which accommodations would suit the
landlord better - A tenant must understood that
after all he is a tenant and cannot claim an
indefeasible right to retain tenancy - and if the
bona fide need issue has been decided correctly
in favour of the landlord, the question whether
the building was in a dilapidated condition or
not need not be gone into - and the application
for release deserved to be allowed - petition
lack merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
(Para - 24, 25, 29, 33)

Application Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

12 All. Chhedi Ram Pandey (Deceased) & Ors. Vs. Smt. Malti Bajpai (Deceased) & Ors
785
find any patent error or illegality in the
order passed by the learned Single Judge
dismissing the writ petition on the ground
of delay/laches.

33. The appeal lacks merit and is
accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2024) 12 ILRA 785
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ-A No. 17588 of 2024

Chhedi Ram Pandey (Deceased) & Ors.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Smt. Malti Bajpai (Deceased) & Ors
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Ravi Anand Agarwal, Shreya Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:
Prakash
Chandra
Dwivedi,
Padmaker
Pandey

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 227 - Civil Procedure Code,1950 -
Order 41 Rules 27 - Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 - Sections - 21(1)(a)
&
21(1)(b):-
Petition
u/Article
227
-
questioning the findings of the prescribed
authority as well as appellate authority on the
score of release application being granted
exercising power chiefly the Act, 1972 -
Bonafide need - plea setup in defence by the
tenant before the court below that they have
sufficient alternative accommodation in the form
of a vacant space behind the shop in question
being used as a godown - court finds that, it
clearly transpires that landlords needed not only
the shop to settle the sons but also for the
purpose of self-settlement as they were not
having sufficient financial resources for their
sons and daughters to survive and since
building was in a dilapidated state they intended
it reconstruction after demolition - and survey
commission report did not support the case of
tenant, - and, once the landlord has set up a
need and it has come to be stated and proves
that members of the family are not gainfully
employed, any business even if run a few may
not suffice the financial need of the entire family
and, therefore, need would be bona fide - held,
landlord is a sole arbitrator of his need and it
does not lie in the mouth of tenant to suggest
as to which accommodations would suit the
landlord better - A tenant must understood that
after all he is a tenant and cannot claim an
indefeasible right to retain tenancy - and if the
bona fide need issue has been decided correctly
in favour of the landlord, the question whether
the building was in a dilapidated condition or
not need not be gone into - and the application
for release deserved to be allowed - petition
lack merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
(Para - 24, 25, 29, 33)

Application Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta
- (1999 vol. 6 SCC 222),

2. Guru Prasad Vs 1st A.D.J., Kanpur ((1999 Vol.
2 ARC 28),

3. Ramesh Chand & anr. Vs Ghaziabad
Development Authority & ors. (Appeal Civil No.
2349 of 2008 decided 31.03.2008,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Shreya Gupta, learned
counsel for the petitioners and Sri Atul
Dayal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by
Sri Prakash Chandra Dwivedi, learned
counsel for the respondent - landlord.

2. This is a tenant petition filed under
Article 227 of the Constitution invoking
superintending and supervisory jurisdiction
786 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of this Court to question the findings of the
prescribed authority as well as the appellate
authority on the score of release application
being granted exercising power chiefly
under Section 21(1)(a) and then at the same
time under Section 21 (1) (b) of the U.P.
Act No.- 13 of 1972.

3. There is no dispute qua jural
relationship of landlord and tenant between
petitioner and the respondent, however, the
plea is set up in defence by the tenant
before the prescribed authority as well as
before the appellate authority was that
tenant
had
sufficient
alternative
accommodation in the form of a vacant
space behind the shops in question being
used as a godown and, therefore, neither
the need was so pressing, nor bona fide one
inasmuch as on the point of comparative
hardships, the petitioner having no other
source of livelihood except the business
being run from the shop, it lilted more in
favour of the tenant.

4. Here another point pressed before
this Court is that after the release
application was filed petitioner came to
know that some partition had already taken
amongst the co-owners of the property and
the property in question having gone to the
share of Vijay Prakash Bajpai, one of the
respondents in the release application, the
need set up by the landlord-respondent no
more remained bona fide.

5. A third argument was also advanced
that certain documents were sought to be
led qua separate share as a result of
partition,
by
moving
appropriate
application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC
but hearing as to the admissibility of those
documents was deferred to be considered
by the court of appeal at the time of final
judgment but it completely got scaped from
the consideration by the court and hence
judgment is rendered bad. In support of her
argument, she has relied upon a judgment
of Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh
Chand
and
another
v.
Ghaziabad
Development Authority and others in
Appeal (Civil) No.- 2349 of 2008 decided
on 31st March, 2008.

6. In support of her above arguments,
learned counsel for the petitioner has led
the Court to the pleadings raised in the
release application, the amended release
application, the written statement filed
including the written statement filed by
Vijay
Prakash
Bajpai
impleaded
as
proforma respondents in the case and also
the survey commission report including the
documents sought to be brought on record
vide application filed under Order 41 Rule
27 CPC on 15th May, 2024. She has taken
the Court through the grounds raised in
appeal also to question the order of
prescribed authority for there being no
findings touching the point of availability
of alternative accommodation.

7. Yet another argument advanced by
Ms.
Shreya
Gupta
is
that
release
application could not have been allowed
simulteneously under Section 21(1)(a) and
Section 21(1) (b) of the Act No.- 13 of
1972. In support of her argument learned
counsel for the petitioner has relied upon
the Division Bench judgment of this Court
in the case of Guru Prasad v. 1st
Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1999
(2) ARC 28.

8. Meeting the arguments advanced by
learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Atul
Dayal, learned Senior Advocate submitted
before the Court that throughout the plea
taken in the release application was that
accommodation needed for the landlord to
12 All. Chhedi Ram Pandey (Deceased) & Ors. Vs. Smt. Malti Bajpai (Deceased) & Ors
787
settle the sons and heirs and it was also
throughout the case that there was a joint
family but for the mutual convenience they
had adjusted the accommodation into
possession specific, however, there had
been no partition in metes and bounds and,
therefore it would not lie in the mouth of
tenant to suggest that the shop in question
had fallen in the share of Vijay Prakash
Bajpai and that he being not applicant for
the release, the release application deserved
to be dismissed. He submitted that when
the property is joint one, any one of coowners of the property can maintain the
release application.

9. In support of his argument learned
counsel for the respondent has further
submitted that no document in evidence
was led by the tenant petitioner to
demonstrate that the particular shop in
question had gone to the share of Vijay
Prakash Bajpai. He further submitted that
Municipal No.- 60/39 was allotted to the
entire plot/ campus where the building
situates and upon mutual understanding for
the purposes of municipal taxes, the shares
were determined as 1/4th each but nowhere
it has come on record that particular shop
in question had gone to the share of Vijay
Prakash Bajpai. He submits that it is true
that house No.- 60/39 was there claimed by
the Vijay Prakash Bajpai but that does not
mean that the shop in question itself had
fallen to his share in house No.- 60/39.

10. Arguing on the point of alternative
accommodation, it is submitted by Sri
Dayal, learned Senior Advocate appearing
for respondent that this accommodation
was already there and there is no denial to
that effect but the accommodation was
being used as a godown and this has come
to be averred so in the release application
by way of amendment.

11. Sri Dayal has further contended
that the survey commission report which
has been heavily relied upon by learned
counsel appearing for the respondent only
comes to show that there is certain area
which was being used as godown.

12. Sri Dayal thus submitted that
merely for certain area being used as
godown, it does not give any right to tenant
to question the bona fide need on the
ground of an alternative accommodation.
He submitted that the landlord is the sole
arbiter of his need and requirement and
there being a joint family, once the need
has been set up, may be for a son or two,
that itself is sufficient to allow the release
application. He submits that once need got
set up, even in affidavit of a son it has not
come to be averred that need was set up for
him alone, it will not dilute the merit of the
release application and will not weaken the
point of bona fide need.

13. Meeting the point upon Order 41
Rule 27 application, Sri Dayal first
submitted that the municipal assessment
records that were sought to be led in
evidence would not have changed the
complexion of the case as to bona fide need
either. He submitted that this was for the
assessment year 2016 and the amendment
is sought to be led much thereafter. Besides
this Sri Dayal argues that this was only in
respect of the municipal No.- 60/39 and is
not indicative of any fact that shop in
question situated in house No.- 60/39
alone. Therefore, according to Mr. Dayal, a
case instituted against the Nagar Nigam for
the purposes of municipal taxes to fasten
liability upon the co-owners, cannot be an
evidence of an absolute partition in metes
and bounds of the property so as to enable
the tenant to question the bona fide need
and it is on this count also, he submits, the
788 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sons of Vijay Prakash Bajpai would fall
within the meaning of the family and not
outside the family as was sought to be
argued
by
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner. He submits that court of appeal
though has not referred to these documents
quite specifically but even reference to
them would not have changed the merit of
the case as far as the release application
was concerned. He sought to urge that a
document led even if not considered, can
become a good ground for remand
provided it affects the merit of the case and
non consideration thereof can be proved to
have led to miscarriage of justice.

14. Replying to the argument that
release could not have been allowed both
on the grounds of 21(1)(a) & 21(1)(b)
simultaneously, Mr. Dayal submitted that
once the court is satisfied with the bona
fide need and grants release for that, any
observation made on count of release of
building also for it being in a dilapidated
condition would not vitiate the decision of
release. He further argued that while
allowing release court may consider bona
fide need to the effect that building being in
a dilapidated condition needed demolition
to be raised again to be used by landlord to
satisfy his/ her need.

15. In the rejoinder Ms. Shreya Gupta
has sought to argue that the document as
was suggested by Mr. Dayal to be old one
being the year of assessment 2016, was not
an old one but issued in the financial year
2023-24 only and, therefore, petitioner
could not have its knowledge prior to its
issuance.

16. On the point of building being in a
dilapidated condition, Ms. Gupta argued
that engineer's report was contested and
another engineer's report was submitted on
behalf of the tenant that fully demonstrated
that only work of repair was needed. Thus,
she has sought to urge that building was not
in a dilapidated condition to be released
under Section 21(1) (b).

17. Replying to the argument raised in
counter Ms. Shreya Gupta, learned counsel
for the petitioner further submitted that the
affidavit of Sandeep Bajpai, one of the
heirs of the release applicants fully
demonstrated that he did not admit that he
needed the shop in question though the
need was set up for him. She, therefore,
submitted that if there is a need specific set
up, the shop can be released in favour of
that needy person only and no general
directions for the release can be made.

18. Having heard learned counsel for
the respective parties and having perused
the records, I see three following points to
have emerged for consideration by this
Court:

(i). Whether there was a bona fide
need established by the tenant-petitioner
and findings returned by the prescribed
authority can be termed to be perverse;

(ii). Whether the judgment of
court of appeal is bad for non consideration
of the additional evidence though taken on
record; and

(iii)
Whether
the
findings
returned under Section 21(1)(b) are liable
to be ignored in the event the Court concurs
with the findings under Section 21(1)(a) of
the Act No.- 13 of 1972.

19. Insofar as the bona fide need is
concerned, I have gone through the
application of release placed before me.
Although it has come to be specifically
averred vide paragraph 4 that the building
was
in
a
dilapidated
condition
for
12 All. Chhedi Ram Pandey (Deceased) & Ors. Vs. Smt. Malti Bajpai (Deceased) & Ors
789
construction being old and in paragraph 6 it
has been stated that petitioners had
sufficient
means
to
demolish
the
construction to raise new building, but in
paragraph 9 it has come to be stated that
tenanted premises in question was needed
to establish the sons of petitioner No.- 1
and 2 as they had already got married and
had their own families. The details of the
families have been given in the same
paragraph and in paragraph 11 it has been
stated that petitioners needed very badly
the accommodation in tenancy of opposite
party No.-2 and for which they had been
making repeated requests. It has also been
averred in paragraph 13 that petitioners
wanted to start business in electronics and
electrical goods and its repair in the
accommodation after the release and
reconstruction. Further it has been stated
that they do not intend to let out the newly
constructed shop to anyone else and have
pleaded that in view of hardships being
faced by them for settlement of members of
family, they needed the shop in question. In
paragraph 19 it is clearly averred that
progress in life of the sons and daughters
are stuck due to the lack of income. Thus
the relief was that the release application to
be allowed and tenanted premises be
handed over to the respondent - landlords.

20.
Reading
the
entire
release
application as discussed above any prudent
man would come to conclude that the
landlords needed not only the shop to settle
the sons but also for the purposes of self
settlement as they were not having
sufficient financial resources for their sons
and daughters to survive and since building
was in a dilapidated state they intended its
reconstruction after demolition. So in a
sense it can be construed also that demand
of release was sought for reconstruction
after its demolition for personal need of the
family to use it after its reconstruction.

21. The need was set up for family
need as well as for the sons' and daughters'
need and at the same time the release was
sought to raise needbased reconstruction
and with further statement that it would not
be let out to a third party any further.

22. In the written statement that was
filed in reply to the release application it
has come to be averred in paragraph 27 that
there is commercial place available with an
area of 400 Square feet which would be
sufficient
alternative
accommodation
available to the landlord to fullfill the needs
of the sons and daughters.

23. Interestingly in paragraph 25 it has
come to be averred that commercial use
was being done jointly by the sons of late
Vishwanath Bajpai and also Vijay Prakash
Bajpai and others. In reply to this an
application was filed by the respondentlandlord to amend the release application
with
averments
to
the
effect
that
accommodation was being used as a
godown and I am apprised at the bar that
this amendment was though questioned but
ultimately challenge laid to the amendment
came to an end with the rejection of the of
the petition by the higher courts.

24. Now looking to the pleadings
raised by respective parties it clearly
transpires that the accommodation was
needed by the family for its own use and
settlement of their sons and daughters and
it cannot be said that there was a person
specific need. Even though it may not have
come in the affidavit of Sandeep Bajpai
that he needed the shop in question but I do
not find to be there something to infer in
support of the petitioner tenant that there
790 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
was no more any need of the shop in
question for him. It is an affidavit filed in
support of release application and for a
little vagueness in it, if any, it cannot be
read negatively to benefit the defence.

25. The survey commission report is
there which also upon perusal I do not find
to be supporting the case of the tenant
petitioner to question bona fide element
need set up by landlord. All that has come
that behind the shop there is certain space
already in possession of landlord and
landlord has come to state candidly that it
was already in use as godown. Hence need
could not to be neutralized for this
accommodation. It has been held that
admittedly by this Court and there are the
authorities of the Supreme Court that
landlord is a sole arbitrator of his need and
it does not lie in the mouth of tenant to
suggest as to which accommodations would
suit the landlord better (Shiv Sarup Gupta
v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6
SCC 222).

26. In the face of the fact that there is
no denial to the available premises of 400
square yard being used as a godown, the
tenant cannot suggest that that space can be
used for purposes for which need was set
up better.

27. Coming to the second point as to
the evidence being not considered sought to
be led by way of additional evidence
though there was an order by the court of
appeal that it would deal with at the stage
of final hearing, I gave this opportunity to
the petitioner's counsel to demonstrate that
how the additional evidence in any manner
help her client in getting the findings by the
prescribed authority on the question of
bona fide need reversed. She though has
sought to place before the Court the plaint
filed in the suit by the Vijay Prakash Bajpai
against the municipal corporation and also
certain papers qua municipal assessment of
the premises in question but upon perusal
thereof, I am not able to infer from those
documents that there was in fact any
partition in metes and bounds and the shop
in question fell in the share of Vijay
Prakash Bajpai. There is no pleading as
such in the entire written statement except
for the additional evidence sought to be led.
The court may not have considered this
additional
evidence
but
even
after
considering this additional evidence, since
the shop in question cannot be said to be
have already fallen in the share of Vijay
Prakash Bajpai, it could not have led the
court to hold that for alleged partition the
need no more remained a bona fide one.

28. Besides the above, I do not find
there to be any pleading raised before the
court of appeal or before the prescribed
authority that there was a partition in metes
and bounds to be suggestive of shop in
question falling in the share of Vijay
Prakash Bajpai or there to be any admission
by Vijay Prakash Bajpai as to partition and
ownership of shop coming to him. In the
absence of such pleadings raised even if the
additional evidence is considered, it cannot
said with certainty that the shop in question
had fallen in the share of Vijay Prakash
Bajpai and, therefore, release application
was not maintainable at the instance of
other co-owners of the property. Nothing in
the affidavit of Sandeep Bajpai as has been
argued to be demonstrative of any such
partition.

29. Even otherwise if the ownership of
landlords is not disputed and while there
exists joint ownership and co-owners are in
joint possession and do not claim partition,
it is not for the tenant to question title to
12 All. Chhedi Ram Pandey (Deceased) & Ors. Vs. Smt. Malti Bajpai (Deceased) & Ors
791
non-suit the landlord in a claim for release
set up for bona fide need. A tenant must
understand that after all he is a tenant and
cannot claim an indefeasible right to retain
tenancy. Once landlord has set up a need
and it has come to be stated and proves that
members of the family are not gainfully
employed, any business even if run by a
few may not suffice the financial need of
the entire family and, therefore, need would
be bona fide. Similarly it should be
landlord's choice to use a particular
partition of his property for a particular
business to settle members of the family.
Tenant should make search for a new
accommodation
to
accommodate
the
landlord and not vice versa.

30. A matter can be remanded if a
particular point was required to be
addressed but only when it may affect merit
of the matter. It will be too technical a view
to be taken to set aside an order to remit the
matter to be decided for consideration of
such evidence which the Court finds to be
of no help to the party leading such
evidence and result is bound to be the
same. In matters where substantive rights
as to title may be an issue, a matter can be
remanded but in summary trial of eviction
of tenant for want of premises by landlord
to settle his family, I do not see any
justification for any justification for such
highly technical to be taken to remand a
matter for consideration of certain more
documents to test the bona fide need of
landlord. Thus, I do not see there to be any
prejudice caused to the tenant in the matter
for no consideration of plaint of suit filed
by one of the landlords against Municipal
Corporation for settlement of municipal
taxes and document relating to assessment
of the building more especially when issue
as to the application of Act No.- 13 of 1972
was not involved. Remand for remands'
sake is not necessary.

31. Coming to the last argument on the
question of order being passed under
Section 21(1)(a) and Section 21(1)(b) of
the Act No.- 13 of 1972 simultaneously, in
my view once findings returned on the
question of bona fide need is sustainable
for not suffering from any perversity so as
to interfere with, this itself shows a
sufficient ground to order for release. Once
the court finds that the bona fide need issue
has been decided correctly in favour of the
landlord, the question whether the building
was in a dilapidated condition or not and
whether the order on that count is
sustainable need not be gone into. The
judgment of Division Bench which has
been cited raises a valid point that where
the bona fide need is set up, this can be
allowed irrespective of the state of building
and even if claim of bona fide need is held
not sustainable, still landlord can press for
release on the ground that building is in a
dilapidated stage. Vide paragraphs 5, 6, 7
& 8 of the judgement, the Court has held
thus:

"5.
When
the
composite
application under clauses (a) and (b) of
Section 21(1) is made by the landlord it is
open to him to press his case under any of
the two clauses. He may claim eviction of
the tenant under clause (a) if proves
bonafide requirement of the building for his
personal occupation and also satisfies the
other requirements laid down by the
relevant Rules. In such a case even if the
building is in dilapidated condition which
requires demolition and new construction
the case will be covered by clause (a) and
not by clause (b). If the landlord fails to
satisfy the requirement of clause (a) he can
792 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
still press the application for release of the
building under clause (b).

6. In Bhulan Singh v. Ganendra
Kumar
Roy
Chowdhury
[AIR
1950
Calcutta 74.] , a Division Bench of
Calcutta High Court while considering the
proviso (f) to Section 11 of West Bengal
Premises
Rent
Control
(Temporary
Provisions) Act, 1948, which provided that
where the premises are bona fide required
by the landlord either for purposes of
building or rebuilding, or for his own
occupation or for the occupation of any
person for whose benefit the premises are
held it may be released in favour of the
landlord, has laid down as under:

"It is suggested that this provision
giving the landlord a right to possession, if
he established that he required the
premises bona fide for rebuilding, could
have no application whatsoever unless the
state of the premises was such that they
required to be rebuilt. It is to be observed
that proviso (f) to Sec. 11(1) of the Act does
not mention premises, requiring rebuilding.
What it states is that sub-sec. (1) shall have
no application if the landlord requires the
premises bona fide for rebuilding. The state
of the premises therefore is not an essential
factor in the case".

7.
Following
the
aforementioned
decision of Calcutta High Court as well as
other cases a learned Single Judge of this
court in Smt. Champa Kunwar Trust v.
District Judge, [AIR 1976 All. 252.] has
held that state or the condition of the
building is not material for the purpose of
application of Section 21(1)(a). Another
learned Single Judge in Madan Gopal v. III
Addl. District Judge, [1982 Allahabad Rent
Cases 226.] has also held that a very old or
dilapidated premises can be released under
Section 21(1)(a) without complying with
the provision of Section 21(1)(b) or Rule
17. Relevant extract from the said decision
of learned Judge is reproduced below.

"Then
question
arises
for
consideration whether the premises could
have been released for making new
constructions and that too after demolition
of the premises in dispute, in absence of
non-compliance of Rule 17 of the Rules
framed under the 'Act'. It is not in dispute
that the plan has already been submitted
and the finding has been recorded by the
appellate court that the shop is in
dilapidated condition. The appellate court
relied upon evidence including affidavits
and other material on record in arriving at
this finding. It believed the affidavits filed
on behalf of landlord. Though the shop may
not be in such a dilapidated condition
which requires immediate attention, but it
is an old shop and from its structure it can
be said to be dilapidated. The word
'dilapidated' is a relative term and the
meaning given to it cannot be static. Under
Section 21(1)(a) of the 'Act' a premises can
be released in the existing form even for the
purpose of new constructions and in the
instant case the need of the landlord has
been held to be bona fide and genuine and
the premises have been released under
Section 21(1) of the Act and the need of the
landlord having been found to be genuine
under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, as such,
there was no question of applicability of
Section 21(1)(b) of the 'Act' as also Rule 17
of the Rules framed under the Act. This
ground also has got no force."

8. In Hans Raj Sharma v. Ist
Additional District Judge, Badaun [1986
(12) ALR 408.] , a learned Single Judge
while analysing clauses (a) and (b) of
Section 21, has held as follows:

"An analysis of the clauses (a)
and (b) clearly leads to the conclusion that
where a landlord applies for an order of
eviction of a tenant on the ground that the
12 All. Jageshwar Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
793
building is in a dilapidated condition and is
required for purposes of demolition and
new construction the case will be squarely
covered by clause (b). Where, on the other
hand, the application of the landlord is
founded on the assertion that the building
is required for the personal occupation of
the landlord whether in its existing form or
after demolition and new construction, the
case will be covered by clause (a) of
Section 21(1). A building may be required
for personal occupation by the landlord
after demolition and new construction even
if it may not be in a dilapidated condition.
The landlord may simply require the
building for his personal occupation in
whatever condition it may be, whether in its
existing form or after demolition and new
construction."

32. And finally vide paragraph 10 of
the judgment answered the reference as
under:

"10. ......The need of the landlord
under Section 21(1)(a) can be considered
even if the landlord had pleaded that the
building is in dilapidated condition and
requires demolition and new construction."

33. Looking to this above legal aspect
and applying the same to the facts of the
present case, I find that the pleading was
raised that there was a need but the
building was too old to be used. If the
judgment of Division Bench is read in its
correct perspective and is applied to the
facts of the case it can, of course, be held
that the court rightly concluded that the
building was in a dilapidated condition but
since need was there, the application for
release deserved to be allowed.

34. Thus, I do not find any manifest
error either in the order of prescribed
authority or of the appellate authority to
exercise my extraordinary supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution.

35. Petition lacks merit and is,
accordingly, dismissed.

36. Cost made easy.
----------
(2024) 12 ILRA 793
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.12.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAM MANOHAR NARAYAN
MISHRA, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 3172 of 1983

Jageshwar Singh & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
T. Rathore, Mahesh Prasad Yadav, V.S.
Singh

Counsel for the Respondent:
D.G.A., A.G.A., G.S., Chaturvedi

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 3 -
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -Section
173 - Failure to seize and prepare
inventory of material objects relied upon
for identification, effect on prosecution
case - Pre-existing enmity. There were
various civil and criminal cases which
were
either
undergone
between
the
parties or were pending on the date of
incident in various courts and, therefore,
the PW-1 was throughout knowing the
names of the three accused persons,
whom he had named in the FIR. Court was
of the view that when three young ablebodied persons had entered the house
with their faces covered and were also