# Chote Lal v. The L.I.C. of India and others

- **Citation:** (2008) 1 ILRA 95
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2008-01-08
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 63373 of 2007
- **Bench:** Pankaj Mithal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/chote-lal-v-the-l-i-c-of-india-and-others-41155
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Sri Govind Saran
Sri Vivek Singh
Sri Prakash Padia
Sri R.C. Shukla
Sri V.K. Chandel
Sri Sanjeev Singh

Constitution of India, Art. 226-Service
Law-writ petition-dealing with service
matter
of
L.I.C.
and
Railways-not
maintainable-preliminary
objection
regarding jurisdiction-be decided firstheld-in view of L. Chandra Kumar Casewrit petition not maintainable.

Held: Para 10 & 33

In view of the above legal position the
High
court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
entertain
writ
petitions
directly
in
service matters of the employees in
respect to whom tribunals have been
constituted
and
the
tribunals
so
constituted
alone
shall
have
the
jurisdiction in the matters as the courts
of first instance.

Thus, in the totality of circumstances the
preliminary objection raised on behalf of
the Railways and the LIC is sustained
and it is held that such dispute is in
respect of a service matter and the same
96 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
is not entertainable by the High Court
directly in exercise of writ jurisdiction
and in view of the ratio of L. Chandra
Kumar's case.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1997 SC-1125, 2004 (2) SCC-274, 2002
(4) SCC-145, 2003 (6) SCC-581, 2003 (6) SCC675, 2006 (2) SCC-269, AIR 2000 SC-43, 2001
(9) SCC-87, 1999 AWC-958, 1999 (6) SCC

## Text

1 All] Chote Lal V. The L.I.C. of India and others
95
qualified advocates, therefore, the burden
to do justice and to show that justice is
being done is upon the Court. If the
parties are not well conversant with the
procedure, they must be informed by the
Court about the procedure or exercise its
power under Rules where it is necessary
and expedient in the interest of justice.

12. For the reasons aforesaid and for
the fact that the labour Court has not
given any basis for disbelieving of the
employer's witness and relying upon the
workman evidence for the purpose of
arriving at the conclusion that workman
had worked for 240 days or more
continuously,
the
evidence
is
not
sufficient basis for the award in deciding
the reference in favour of the workman.

13. In my opinion, the award of the
labour court suffers from an error
apparent on the face of record and
illegality in shifting the burden on the
employer to prove that the workman had
not worked for 240 days. It was the
workman
who
has
come
in
the
adjudication proceedings therefore in
accordance with settled principles of law,
it was the workman to prove his case.

14. For the reasons stated above,
writ petition is allowed. The impugned
order is quashed. The matter is remanded
back to the labour Court to decide the
matter afresh in accordance with law
within a period of six months from the
date of production of certified copy of this
order by either of the parties before it.

15. Consequently, the recovery
notice
dated
13.8.2001
passed
in
pursuance of the award aforesaid is also
quashed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.01.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 63373 of 2007

Chote Lal

...Petitioner
Versus
The Life Insurance Corporation of India
and others

...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Siddhartha Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Govind Saran
Sri Vivek Singh
Sri Prakash Padia
Sri R.C. Shukla
Sri V.K. Chandel
Sri Sanjeev Singh

Constitution of India, Art. 226-Service
Law-writ petition-dealing with service
matter
of
L.I.C.
and
Railways-not
maintainable-preliminary
objection
regarding jurisdiction-be decided firstheld-in view of L. Chandra Kumar Casewrit petition not maintainable.

Held: Para 10 & 33

In view of the above legal position the
High
court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
entertain
writ
petitions
directly
in
service matters of the employees in
respect to whom tribunals have been
constituted
and
the
tribunals
so
constituted
alone
shall
have
the
jurisdiction in the matters as the courts
of first instance.

Thus, in the totality of circumstances the
preliminary objection raised on behalf of
the Railways and the LIC is sustained
and it is held that such dispute is in
respect of a service matter and the same
96 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
is not entertainable by the High Court
directly in exercise of writ jurisdiction
and in view of the ratio of L. Chandra
Kumar's case.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1997 SC-1125, 2004 (2) SCC-274, 2002
(4) SCC-145, 2003 (6) SCC-581, 2003 (6) SCC675, 2006 (2) SCC-269, AIR 2000 SC-43, 2001
(9) SCC-87, 1999 AWC-958, 1999 (6) SCC

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.)

1. This batch of writ petitions under
Section 226 of the Constitution of India
involves a similar controversy based upon
identical facts and as such are being taken
up together with the consent of the
respective counsel appearing for the
contesting parties.

2. The brief background leading to
the filing of these petitions is that the Life
Insurance Corporation of India (in short
LIC) for promotion of its business interest
launched a "salary saving scheme,"
particularly, for the salaried class of
people
viz.,
government
and
semi
government employees and the employees
of the various corporations etc. The
scheme provides for the payment of
monthly
premium
by
the
assured
employees. The scheme is optional and
under it the employees subscribing to the
scheme have an option to pay the LIC
premium either directly or through their
respective employers to the LIC on
monthly basis. The employees in making
such a payment through the employer
have a definite advantage of rebate of 5%
on payment of such premium. Apparently,
there is no advantage to the employers in
taking the responsibility of deducting the
LIC premium from the monthly salary of
its employees and to make the lump sum
payment to the LIC. It appears that as
deduction
of
LIC
premium
on
authorization of the employees is legally
permissible from the wages of the
employees in view of Section 7 (d) of the
Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (in short
Wages Act), most of the employers
initially agreed for making such deduction
and in making payment of lump sum
premium to the LIC on behalf of the
employees, but later, on account of the
amount of extra work and accounting
involved in it, they realised the mistake
and evolved methods to withdraw from
the responsibility.

3. The petitioners in this batch of
writ petitions are all employees of
Railways. All of them have individually
taken the above policy from the LIC and
has authorized the Railways to make
deduction of the LIC premium from their
monthly salary for payment to the LIC.
The Railways till now had been making
the deduction and paying the premium to
the LIC collectively on behalf of its
employees. However, by the impugned
order dated 30th April 2007 followed by
the consequential order dated 2/3.7.2007
the Railways have decided not to make
such a deduction in future from the
monthly salary of its employees including
the petitioners for payment to the LIC. It
is against this action of the Railways that
the petitioners have individually come up
before this Court in writ jurisdiction.

4. I have heard Sri Siddhartha
Srivastava,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners, Sri Govind Saran and Sri
Vivek Singh for the Railways and Sri
Prakash Padia, Sri R.C. Shukla, Sri V.K.
Chandel and Sri Sanjeev Singh for the
LIC.

5. A preliminary objection has been
raised jointly on behalf of the Railways
1 All] Chote Lal V. The L.I.C. of India and others
97
and the LIC that the Court has no
jurisdiction
to
entertain
these
writ
petitions directly without first relegating
the
petitioners
to
the
Central
Administrative Tribunal, in as much as,
the matter relates to the service of the
employees of the Indian Railways. In
support reliance has been placed upon L.
Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and
others, AIR 1997 SC1125. To meet the
above
preliminary
objection,
Sri
Siddhartha Srivastava learned counsel
appearing for petitioners has argued that
first of all it is not a service matter as
defined under Section 3(q) of the
Administrative
Tribunals
Act,1985
(herein after referred to as Tribunals Act).
Secondly, even if it happens to be a
service matter, the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 is not completely
ousted and the High Court is within its
jurisdiction to entertain such petitions, if
they fall within the 3 exceptional
categories, particularly when no factual
dispute is involved, namely;

(i) where the order is completely
without jurisdiction;
(ii) it has been passed in violation of the
principles of natural justice; and
(iii) where it is apparently on order
passed contrary to any provision of a
statute.

In the light of the submissions made
on the preliminary objection two points as
under arises for determination:-

1.
Whether
the
High
Court
has
jurisdiction to directly entertain writ
petitions, concerning the 'service matter'
of the Railway employees; and
2.
Whether the action of the Railways
in refusing to make deduction of LIC
premium from the monthly salary of its
employees would fall within the ambit of
the 'service matter' as defined under
Section 3 (q) of the Tribunals Act.

6. Administrative Tribunals Act,
(Act No. 13 of 1985) was enacted in
exercise of powers under Article 323-A
and 323-B of the Constitution of India,
which were introduced by way of 42nd
amendment of 1976 with effect from 3rd
January 1977. The object for enacting the
said act was to constitute tribunals as
alternative forum for the purpose of due
consideration of the matters relating to the
service of persons appointed to public
service and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union of India or any State
or any local or other authority within the
territory of India or under control of
Government
of
India
or
of
any
corporation owned or controlled by the
Government of India. The object was to
minimise the work load of the High
Courts in deciding matters concerning the
above area of law under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Article 323-A of the
Constitution specifically provides that the
parliament may while enacting such law
make provision for the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of all courts with respect to
the matters concerning the above area of
law except that of the Supreme Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India. Accordingly, Section 28 of the
Tribunals Act also provide that on and
from the date the jurisdiction and the
powers under the said Act are exercisable
by tribunals matters concerning the above
area of law shall exclusively be dealt with
by the tribunals and not by any other court
except the Supreme Court. The validity of
the above enactment was upheld by the 5
Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the
case of S.P. Sampat Kumar Vs. Union of
India and others AIR 1987 SC 386. The
98 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
Apex Court held that parliament is
competent to provide and make effective
alternative institutional mechanism or
arrangements
for
judicial
review.
Therefore, the enactment providing for
such
an
alternative
institutions
or
tribunals as additional forums barring the
jurisdiction of the High Court can not be
faulted with. In L. Chandra Kumar's
case (supra), the 7 Judges bench of the
Supreme Court concluded that the power
of the High Court under Article 226/227
of the Constitution of India does not stand
completely ousted with the enforcement
of the Tribunals Act or with the
establishment of Central Administrative
Tribunals in as much as all decisions of
the tribunals shall be subject to scrutiny
before a Division Bench of the High
Court. The tribunals shall act as courts of
first instance in respect of the areas of law
for which they have been constituted and
it will not be open for the litigants to
directly approach the High Court under
Article 226/227 of the Constitution
without first going to the court of first
instance i.e., the tribunals, even in cases
involving the vires of statutory legislation
(except where legislation which creates
the tribunal itself is under challenge) by
over looking the jurisdiction of the
concerned tribunal. The conclusions of
the aforesaid verdict of the Supreme
Court has been summarised in paragraphs
93 and 99 of the judgment which are
being reproduced herein below:-

93"Before moving on to other
aspects,
we
may
summarise
our
conclusions of the jurisdictional powers
of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are
competent to hear the matters where the
vires
of
statutory
provisions
are
questioned. However, in discharging this
duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the
High Courts and the Supreme Court
which have, under our constitutional
setup, been specifically entrusted with
such an obligation. Their function in this
respect is only supplementary and all
such decisions of the Tribunals will be
subject to scrutiny before a Division
Bench of the respective High Courts. The
Tribunals will consequently also have the
power to test the vires of subordinate
legislations and rules. However, this
power of the Tribunals will be subject to
one important exception. The Tribunals
shall not entertain any question regarding
the vires of their parent statutes following
the settled principle that a Tribunal which
is a creature of an Act cannot declare that
very Act to be unconstitutional. In such
cases alone, the concerned High Court
may be approached directly. All other
decisions of these tribunals rendered in
cases
that
they
are
specifically
empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue
of their parent statutes, will also be
subject to scrutiny before a Division
bench of their respective High Court. We
may add that the Tribunals will, however,
continue to act as the only Courts of first
instance in respect of the areas of law for
which they have been constituted. By this,
we mean that it will not be open for the
litigants to directly approach the High
Courts even in cases where they question
the vires of statutory legislations (except,
as mentioned, where the legislation which
creates
the
particular
Tribunal
is
challenged)
by
overlooking
the
jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.
99. All decisions of these Tribunals
will, however, be subject to scrutiny
before a Division Bench of the High
Court within whose jurisdiction the
concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals
will, nevertheless, continue to act like
Courts of first instance in respect of the
1 All] Chote Lal V. The L.I.C. of India and others
99
areas of law for which they have been
constituted. It will not, therefore, be open
for litigants to directly approach the High
Courts even in cases where they question
the vires of statutory legislations (except
where the legislation which creates the
particular Tribunal is challenged) by
overlooking
the
jurisdiction
of
the
cornered Tribunal. Section 5 (6) of the
Act is valid and constitutional and is to be
interpreted in the manner we have
indicated."

7. In Samrendra Das Vs. State of
West Bengal and others 2004 (2) SCC
274 a dispute arose before the Apex Court
as to whether the posts of Assistant Public
Prosecutor appointed in a Magistrate
court by the Governor of the State was a
civil post and the matter falls within the
purview of Section 15, 4(2) and 2(c) of
the Tribunals Act. The Court held that the
employment
was
under
the
State
Government of West Bengal, therefore,
the learned Single Judge of the High
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain, try
and dispose of the matter under Article
226 of the Constitution of the India.

8. In another case relating to the
service matter concerning the employees
of 2002 (4) SCC 145 Kendriya Vidyalaya
reported in Kendriya Vidyalaya and
another
Vs.
Subhash
Sharma
the
Supreme Court in paragraphs 12 and 13
laid down as under:-

12. "The Constitution Bench of this
Court has clearly held that tribunals set
up under the Act shall continue to act as
the only courts of first instance "in respect
of areas of law for which they have been
constituted." It was further held that it
will not be open for litigants to directly
approach the High Court even in cases
where they question the vires of statutory
legislation (except where the legislation
which creates the particular Tribunal is
challenged)
by
overlooking
the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.
13.
In
view
of
the
clear
pronouncement of this Court the High
Court erred in law in directly entertaining
the writ petitions concerning service
matters of the employees of Kendriya
Vidyalaya as these matters come under
the jurisdiction of the Administrative
Tribunal. We, therefore, hold that the
High Court committed an error by
declining to transfer the writ petition tot
he
Central
Administrative
Tribunal.
Consequently, we set aside the impugned
orders and direct the High Court to
transfer both the writ petitions to the
Central
Administrative
Tribunal.
Chandigarh Bench which may, in its turn,
make over the case to the Circuit Bench in
the State of Jammu and Kashmir for
disposal in accordance with law."

9. A plain reading of the aforesaid
judgments of the Supreme Court makes it
clear in no ambiguous terms that in
respect of service matters in relation to
the services contemplated by Article 323A of the constitution and the Tribunals
Act no litigant is authorised to approach
the High Court directly invoking the writ
jurisdiction and the tribunal shall act as
the court of first instance. It is only after a
decision has been rendered by the tribunal
that the matter can be taken to the High
Court for judicial review under Article
226/227 of the Constitution of India.

10. In view of the above legal
position the High court has no jurisdiction
to entertain writ petitions directly in
service matters of the employees in
respect to whom tribunals have been
100 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
constituted
and
the
tribunals
so
constituted
alone
shall
have
the
jurisdiction in the matters as the courts of
first instance.

Sri Siddhartha Srivastava on behalf
of the petitioners placed reliance upon
T.K. Rangrajan Vs. Government of
Tamil Nadu and others, 2003 (6) SCC
581, Suraj Deo Rai Vs. Ram Chadnra
Rai and others, 2003 (6) SCC 675, L.K.
Verma Vs. HMT Limited and another
2006 (2) SCC 269 and U.P. State
Spinning Company Limited Vs. R.S.
Pandey and others 2005 (8) SCC 264.

11. The rulings cited on behalf of
the petitioners referred to above are
practically decisions which lays down that
under certain given circumstances even
where statutory alternative remedy is
provided, a litigant may approach the
High Court in writ jurisdiction without
exhausting the alternate remedy. Meaning
thereby, that alternate remedy is not an
absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition
in a given set of circumstances. However,
we must not over look that the question of
alternate remedy and the question of
jurisdiction of the Court are two different
aspects altogether. It may be in the
discretion of the High Court to entertain a
writ petition instead of dismissing it on
the ground of availability of alternate
remedy but this discretion would not at all
be available where the High Court has no
jurisdiction at all to entertain the writ
petition directly. In such cases where the
jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain
a petition directly is excluded, the order if
any passed would be a nullity being
without jurisdiction.

12. Out of the aforesaid rulings
cited, much emphasis has been placed
upon the judgment of the Division Bench
of the Supreme Court reported in T.K.
Rangrajan Vs. Government of Tamil
Nadu and others, 2003 (6) SCC 581 to
canvass that High Court can proceed to
hear a writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India even though the
petitioners have not approached the
tribunal which is a court of first instance
and an alternative forum provided under
the
Tribunals
Act.
In
this
regard
paragraphs 5, 6 and 10 of the aforesaid
judgment are relevant which lay down
that the High Court is empowered to
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to
meet an unprecedented situation having
no parallel. The jurisdiction of the High
Court
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution is a part of inviolable basic
structure of the Constitution and it can not
be said that such tribunals are effective
substitute
of
the
High
Courts
in
discharging powers of judicial review. In
paragraph 10 of the same judgment it has
been said that there can not be any doubt
that the aforesaid judgment of the larger
Bench (L. Chandra Kumar's case) is
binding
upon
this
Court
and
we
respectfully
agree
with
the
same.
Thereafter, it proceeds to record that
because
of
very
exceptional
circumstances as the Court was of the
opinion that the Administrative Tribunal
would not be in a position to render
justice to the case, it was held that the
High Court was not justified in not
entertaining the petitions on the ground of
alternative remedy. This was so as the
tribunal was non functional.

13. The aforesaid judgment arose
out of an unprecedented situation which
was caused due to en mass termination by
the Tamil Nadu Government of service of
the employees who had resorted to strike.
1 All] Chote Lal V. The L.I.C. of India and others
101
The Supreme Court held that the
employees had no fundamental right, not
even a legal or a statutory right or any
moral or equitable justification for going
on strike but as most of the employees
had been reinstated the Supreme Court
directed for the reinstatement of service of
the remaining employees on their giving
unconditional apology and an undertaking
that in future they would maintain the
discipline and abide by the rules.
Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the aforesaid
judgment clearly shows that it was passed
in the peculiar facts and the exceptional
circumstances of that case on equitable
principles and when the tribunal was not
functioning. In short, the Supreme Court
held when tribunal is not functioning the
employee can not be denied right to
invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court
otherwise they will be rendered remedy
less.
However,
even
the
aforesaid
judgment no where states that the ratio of
L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra) was
not binding and that the litigant can
approach the High Court directly under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
bypassing the Central Administrative
Tribunal in respect of the areas of law for
which they have been constituted. Thus in
the circumstances petitioners derive no
benefit
even
out
of
the
aforesaid
judgment.
The
aforesaid
judgment
appears to be a judgment in persona only
which is confined to the peculiar facts of
case whereas the judgment in L.Chandra
Kumar's case (Supra) is of universal
application ie., a judgment in rem. The
true import of L. Chandra Kumar's case
(supra) is to the effect that though
tribunals do not substitute the High Court
but they act as additional forums of
redressal of dispute in respect of the areas
of law for which they have been
constituted. The litigant can not approach
the High Court in respect of such matters
directly
and
the
tribunals
would
supplement the High Court and act as the
courts of first instance and it is only
thereafter that the decision of the tribunal
would stand scrutiny by the division
bench of the High Court. In this way, the
jurisdiction of the High Court to exercise
the writ jurisdiction in mattes relating to
areas of law for which tribunals have been
created has completely been excluded.
Therefore, once it has been laid down that
the High Court has no jurisdiction to even
entertain a writ petition in relation to
subject matters covered by the tribunals,
the High Court is not competent to
exercise the said jurisdiction even though
alternate remedy may not have been set
up as a defence or a ground to refuse the
writ.

14. It is a question of jurisdiction
and not the availability of alternate
remedy which is crucial in the present
case. Since in view of L. Chandra
Kumar's case (supra) this Court has no
jurisdiction to exercise writ jurisdiction
directly, the present writ petitions are not
entertainable even though availability of
alternate remedy may not be an absolute
bar in as much as exercise of discretion in
this regard pails into insignificance when
the court lacks inherent jurisdiction. This
view of mine also finds support from an
unreported judgment of the single judge
of this Court dated 14.7.1998 passed in
writ petition No. 26743 of 1995 B.S.
Bhaskar Vs. General Manager, Northern
Railways and others.

This takes me to the second point.

15. According to the learned counsel
for the petitioner the matter with regard to
deduction or non deduction of the LIC
102 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
premium from the monthly salary of the
petitioners is not a 'service matter' and as
such the Central Administrative Tribunal
has no jurisdiction in this regard.

16. The answer to the above
question though appears to be simple is
not that simple. Petitioners are all
employees of the Railways. They are
asking for a relief against the Railways
independently and not against the LIC or
any agent of LIC. In a way, they want to
compel the Railways to make deduction
of LIC premium from their monthly
salary and to pay the same in lump sum to
LIC as authorized by them. This burden is
being thrust upon the Railways by the
petitioners only on account of their
employer and employees relationship
otherwise they have no authority of law to
insist upon the same. Therefore, the
dispute has naturally arisen in context
with
the
employer
and
employees
relationship between the Railways and the
petitioners and as such is a service matter.

17. It is also acknowledged legal
position that no employer can make any
deduction from the salary/wages of its
employees which do not have the sanction
of the law. The deductions which may be
made from the salary/wages have been
enumerated in section 7 of the Payment of
Wages Act, 1936. Section 7 (d) of the
Wages Act permits the employers to make
deduction of the LIC premium from the
salary/ wages of its employees on the
authorization of the employees and not
otherwise. Therefore, such a deduction by
the Railways from the salary of its
employees may nor may not be unlawful
nevertheless it is a matter concerning
salary of the employees. In the normal
understanding
of
a
common
man
therefore such a matter falls basically
within the ambit of 'service matter'.
Therefore, legal technicalities apart, it
would be a matter concerning service in
the eyes a prudent man.

18. In Delhi Electric Supply
Undertaking Vs. Basanti Devi & another
AIR 2000 SC 43 the Supreme Court while
dealing with this very scheme of the LIC
held that the employer while making such
deduction
from
the
salary
of
its
employees for payment of LIC premium
may not be acting in a strict sense as a
licensed agent of the LIC under Section
42 of Insurance Act, 1938 and the
provisions of the LIC of India Agents
Regulations, 1972 but nonetheless it
renders the services of an agent to the LIC
as contemplated by Section 182 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872. Now whether
in this case the Railways is acting as an
agent of the LIC or not is not material.
What is material is whether the action of
the Railways falls within the scope of '
Service matter' as per Section 3 (q) of the
Tribunals Act.

19. Section 14 of the Tribunals Act
provides that Central Administrative
Tribunal shall exercise all jurisdiction
powers and authority exercisable by all
courts except the Supreme Court in
relation to;

A) recruitment, and matters concerning
recruitment
to
any
all
India
Service.........................;
B) all service matters concerning;

a)
b)
c)

20. Thus from the above, the
tribunal has jurisdiction and power in
1 All] Chote Lal V. The L.I.C. of India and others
103
respect of all service matters. Service
matters have been defined in Section 3 (q)
of the Act as under:-

"Service matters", in relation to a person,
means all matters relating, to the
conditions of his service in connection
with the affairs of the Union or of any
State or of any local or other authority
within the territory of India or under the
control of the government of India, or, as
the case may be, of any corporation [or
society] owned or controlled by the
Government, as respects-
(i) remuneration (including allowances),
pension and other retirement benefits;
(ii)
tenure
including
confirmation,
seniority promotion, reversion, premature
retirement and superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind;
(iv) disciplinary matters; or
(v) any other matter whatsoever;
Note: emphasis supplied

21. It is couched in the widest
possible language. The term "any other
matter whatsoever" is wide enough to
include within its ambit any matter which
arises out of the relation-ship of employer
and employee.

22. In a judgment of 3 Judges of the
Supreme Court reported in Union of
India V. D.C. Pandey 1992 AWC 1795 it
has been observed that the scope of
Article 323-A is very wide and the
Administrative Tribunals Act covers a
very wide field and there is nothing to
suggest that the provisions dealing with
the jurisdiction of the tribunal should
receive a narrow interpretation. It was
accordingly held that the High Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of
the employees.

23. Reliance has been placed from
the side of petitioners upon the rule of
"ejusdem generis" and a decision of the
Supreme Court in Grasim Industries
Limited
Vs.
Collector
of
Custom,
Bombay 2002 (4) SCC 297. According to
the aforesaid rule when general words
follow the words of particular and specific
meaning in that case general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent
and are to be applied only in respect of
kind or class of things mentioned. The
rule however, does not necessarily require
that the general provision be limited in its
scope to identical things specifically
mentioned. Nor does it apply when the
context manifests a contrary intention.
This is what has been explained by the
Supreme Court in paragraph 12 of the
above judgment with a word of caution. It
says that the above rule is to be applied
with great care and caution. It is not an
inviolable rule of law but it is only a
permissible inference. There is no room
for application of this rule of "ejusdem
generis" where the words are clearly wide
in their meaning and aught not to be
qualified
on
the
ground
of
their
association with other words.

24. A conjoint reading of Section 14
and 3(q) of the Tribunals Act reveals that
the words used are "all service matters"
and "any other matter whatsoever" both
these terms are of widest amplitude used
independently and does not qualify the
terms used earlier in the provision. "Any
other matter whatsoever" used in the 3(q)
(v) refers to all "service matters" used in
Section 14 of the act and not only in
connection with the conditions of service,
remuneration,
pension,
retirement
benefits, tenure, confirmation, seniority,
promotion,
reversion,
pre-mature
retirement, superannuation, leave are
104 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
disciplinary
matters.
The
word
"whatsoever",
also
has
its
own
significance and has not been used
superfluously. Therefore, Rule 3 (q) (v) of
the Tribunals Act can not be said to be of
a general nature qualifying the service
conditions of service enumerated earlier
in the provision. It is in itself an
independent rule and is not dependant on
the first four rules enumerated in Section
3(q) of the Tribunals Act and is wide
enough to cover every aspect of the
service. Therefore, the phrase "any other
matter whatsoever" though of general
nature but has been used independent of
the terms used in Section 3(q) (i) to (iv) of
the Act.

25. Besides, the rule of "ejusdem
generis" is merely a rule of construction
and not a substantive law and is hardly
applicable where general words such as
"any other matter whatsoever" does not
intend to take colour from the specific
words used earlier. The intention of
establishing
Central
Administrative
Tribunal is also to cover all service
matters arising from the employer and
employees relationship and therefore it
would not be apt to give any restricted
meaning to the phrase "any other matter
whatsoever"
and
to
confine
the
application of the Act only to recruitment
and conditions of service.

26. Therefore, it would not be
proper to apply the rule of "ejusdem
generis" in the interpretation of the
'service matter' in context with the
jurisdiction of the Central Administrative
Tribunals.

27. In view of the above, it is
difficult to comprehend how the present
matter can be excluded from the ambit of
the service matter.

28. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon a
decision of the Supreme Court in
Secretary Central Board of Direct Taxes
and others Vs. B. Shaym Sundar 2001
(9) SC 87 for the purpose establishing that
the matter in dispute is not a 'Service
matter'. I have carefully gone through the
aforesaid judgment. The said decision
relates to the employee of the revenue
department under the Ministry of Finance,
Government of India. The Central Board
of Direct Taxes by a scheme decided to
reward the officers and the staff of the
Income Tax Department by placing them
into various categories. One of the
employee was not given the award.
Therefore, the matter was taken to the
Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the claim
and directed the department to grant
award as prayed by the respondent
employee. The Supreme Court in such a
situation without any discussion observed
that the matter was outside the purview of
the tribunal as under Section 14 the
tribunal only had jurisdiction in respect of
service matter. The facts of the above case
are totally different and are not applicable
to the facts and circumstances of the
present case. There the matter was with
regard to grant of reward which was
purely ex gratia payment. Accordingly,
the aforesaid judgment is of no help to the
petitioners. On the other hand Sri Padia
placed reliance upon a Division Bench
decision of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court 1995 Labour and Industrial Cases
767
B.
Narsimha
&
others
Vs.
Commanding Officer & others. In this
case the dispute was with regard to
deduction of loan amount from the salary
of the employees. The Court held it to be
1 All] Chote Lal V. The L.I.C. of India and others
105
a service matter outside the purview of
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court &
the
petition
was
held
to
be
not
maintainable. It supports my view to a
great extent.

29. There is another angle of
examining the above aspect of the matter.
The petitioners have themselves chosen to
file these writ petitions under the category
"service matter" before the High Court
and the office also reported these petitions
to
be
service
matters
as
such.
Undoubtedly, therefore the petitioners
also impliedly accepted in one way or the
other that the matter relates to the service
matter. If that be the position, the
petitioner can not say that the cause is
partly concerning a service matter in some
respects and not a service matter in so far
as the jurisdiction of the tribunal is
concerned.

30. In view of the above position,
the dispute involved in the writ petition is
nothing but a dispute regarding the
'service matter' of the employees of the
Railways.

31. Lastly, learned counsel for the
petitioners has placed reliance upon
certain interim orders passed by this Court
in similar and identical writ petitions.

32. I have gone through the said
orders. In none of them the basic
controversy about the jurisdiction of the
Court to entertain the writ petition was
raised or was considered. The said interim
orders though time bound appears to have
been passed in ignorance of the question
of jurisdiction of the Court. It is well
settled that an interim order is not a
precedent. A reference may be had to a
Full Bench of this Court in the case of
S.C. Shukla Vs. G.B. Singh 1999 AWC
958. Therefore, where the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition
merely because few petitions have been
entertained and an interim order has been
passed therein would not compel me to
follow the suit and pass a similar interim
order. It is also settled position that where
a
preliminary
objection
about
the
maintainability of the proceedings/ writ
petition or of the jurisdiction of the court
has been raised it is incumbent upon the
Court to first decide the same before
proceeding on the merit of the case. This
is the view expressed in T.K. Lathika Vs.
Seth Karsandas Jamnadas 1999 (6) SCC
632 and Manubhai ji Patel & another
Vs. Bank of Baroda and others 2000 (10)
SCC 253.

33. Thus, in the totality of
circumstances the preliminary objection
raised on behalf of the Railways and the
LIC is sustained and it is held that such
dispute is in respect of a service matter
and the same is not entertainable by the
High Court directly in exercise of writ
jurisdiction and in view of the ratio of L.
Chandra Kumar's case.

34. Accordingly, all the writ
petitions
are
dismissed
as
not
maintainable
with
liberty
to
the
petitioners to approach the Central
Administrative Tribunal, if so advised. No
order as to costs.
---------
106 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.01.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
THE HON'BLE ARUN TANDON, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53064 Of
2006

B.C. Malviya and others ...Petitioners
Versus
State of UP and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Rajeev Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri B.D. Mandhyan
Sri S.C. Mandhyan
Sri Ghanshyam Dwivedi
S.C.

Local Fund Audit Subordinate Rules
1985-Seniority-claiming seniority as per
feeding cadre-admittedly respondent no.
4 is senior in feeding cadre of auditorbut due to adverse entry promoted on
the post of senior Auditor in 1985 while
junior were already promoted in 1983held-respondent no. 4 can be given the
benefit of seniority on promotional post
from
the
date
on
which
juniors
promoted-e.g. 1983 while there was no
existence of respondent No. 4 on the
promotional post.

Held: Para 9

In view of the above whatever might be
the interpretation of the Rules 1985, any
order granting seniority to the said
respondent no. 4 over and above the
petitioners would amount to granting
promotion from the date the petitioners
had
been
so
promoted
(even
if
notionally) which as already recorded
above
would
be
contrary
to
the
judgement of this Court dated 23-021992, and hence legally not permissible.
An issue which has attained finality
cannot
be
re-opened
in
collateral
proceeding.
Case law discussed:
(1981) 4 SCC 716, AIR 1986 SC 1859

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.)

1. This writ petition has been filed
for quashing the impugned order dated 4th
April, 2006 (Annexure-25) by which the
respondent no. 4 has been granted
seniority over and above the present
petitioners.

2. The facts and circumstances
giving rise to this case are that the
petitioners as well as the respondent no. 4
had been working as Auditor. The
respondent no. 4 was senior to the present
petitioners as he had been appointed prior
to them on the post of Auditor. The
respondent no. 4 was promoted on ad-hoc
basis as Senior Auditor but was reverted
to the post of Auditor because of the
adverse entries given to him. During
regular selection for promotion to the post
of Senior Auditor he was found unsuitable
and therefore superseded. The present
petitioners who were junior to the said
respondent no. 4 in the feeding cadre were
selected and appointed on 03-05-1983 on
the post of Senior Auditor on the
recommendation of the Departmental
Promotion Committee on regular basis.
The respondent no. 4 being aggrieved
challenged the adverse entries by filing a
claim petition before the UP Public
Service Tribunal. However, the tribunal
refused to quash the adverse entries vide
its judgement and order dated 1st March,
1982. Being aggrieved he preferred the
Writ Petition No. 2147 of 1982. The same
was decided vide judgement and order
dated 22-02-1989. While deciding the