# Committee of Management Angoori Devi Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 4 ILRA 249
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-11-07
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 27906 of 2019
- **Bench:** Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/committee-of-management-angoori-devi-inter-college-aurangabad-bulandshahar-anr-44990
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Employees' Provident
Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 - Section 7A and 7I - Employees'
Provident
Fund
Appellate
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1997 - Rule 7 -
Limitation - Appeal may be preferred
within 60 days from the date of issue of
the order, provided that the Tribunal
may, if it is satisfied that the appellant
was prevented by sufficient cause from
preferring
the
appeal
within
the
prescribed period, extend the said period
by a further period of 60 days. (Para 30)

Held -37. The time limit is prescribed by the
rule making authority for filing an appeal and
also
the
extended
period
having been
provided, and no further extension thereof
having been envisaged or contemplated, the
Appellate Authority could not have granted
any further extension. In view of the
aforesaid, the order passed by the Appellate
Authority recording its conclusion that the
appeal was filed beyond the statutory period
of limitation, cannot be faulted with.
B. Limitation Act, 1963 - Applicability -
Principle of implied exclusion of Act, 1963
by Special law - EPF Act, 1952 is a special
law - In terms of the rules framed
thereunder a certain period of limitation for
filing an appeal having been provided for in
clear terms and a further provision having
been made for extension of such period
only upto a specified time period and no
further, the Appellate Tribunal would have
no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an
appeal
filed
before
it
beyond
such
maximum time limit specified in terms of
the statutory rules - The provisions
contained under the Act, 1963 would
therefore not be applicable for seeking
extension of time beyond the statutory time
period of 60 days from the date of issue of
the notification/order, extendable by a
further period of 60 days. (Para 31 & 32)

C. Interpretation of statute - Where the
statute confers power on the authority
to condone the delay only to a limited
extent the same cannot be stretched or
extended
beyond
what
has
been
provided under the statute. (Para 33)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-1)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

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4 All. Committee of Management Angoori Devi Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
249
(2019)12 ILR A249

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.11.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ-C No. 27906 of 2019

Committee of Management Angoori Devi
Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar
& Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Pradip Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., A.S.G.I., Sri Brijesh Kumar, Sri
Jagdish Pathak, Sri Sachindra Upadhyay

A. Civil Law - Employees' Provident
Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 - Section 7A and 7I - Employees'
Provident
Fund
Appellate
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1997 - Rule 7 -
Limitation - Appeal may be preferred
within 60 days from the date of issue of
the order, provided that the Tribunal
may, if it is satisfied that the appellant
was prevented by sufficient cause from
preferring
the
appeal
within
the
prescribed period, extend the said period
by a further period of 60 days. (Para 30)

Held -37. The time limit is prescribed by the
rule making authority for filing an appeal and
also
the
extended
period
having been
provided, and no further extension thereof
having been envisaged or contemplated, the
Appellate Authority could not have granted
any further extension. In view of the
aforesaid, the order passed by the Appellate
Authority recording its conclusion that the
appeal was filed beyond the statutory period
of limitation, cannot be faulted with.
B. Limitation Act, 1963 - Applicability -
Principle of implied exclusion of Act, 1963
by Special law - EPF Act, 1952 is a special
law - In terms of the rules framed
thereunder a certain period of limitation for
filing an appeal having been provided for in
clear terms and a further provision having
been made for extension of such period
only upto a specified time period and no
further, the Appellate Tribunal would have
no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an
appeal
filed
before
it
beyond
such
maximum time limit specified in terms of
the statutory rules - The provisions
contained under the Act, 1963 would
therefore not be applicable for seeking
extension of time beyond the statutory time
period of 60 days from the date of issue of
the notification/order, extendable by a
further period of 60 days. (Para 31 & 32)

C. Interpretation of statute - Where the
statute confers power on the authority
to condone the delay only to a limited
extent the same cannot be stretched or
extended
beyond
what
has
been
provided under the statute. (Para 33)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-1)

List of cases cited: -

1. M/s Port Shramik Cooperative Enterprises
Ltd.
Vs.
Employees
Provident
Fund
Organisation 2018 (156) FLR 363 (Cal.H.C.)

2.Assistant Regional Provident FundCommissioner,
Meerut Vs. Employees Provident Fund Appellate
Tribunal & Ors. 2006 (108) FLR 35 (Del.H.C.)

3. Mohd. Ashfaq Vs. State Transport Appellate
Tribunal U.P. & Ors. (1976) 4 SCC 330

4. Dr. A.V. Joseph Vs. Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner & Anr. 2009 (122) FLR 184 (Ker.H.C.)

5. C.B. Sharma Vs. Employees' Provident
Funds Appellate Tribunal & Ors. 2012 (135)
FLR 637 (P&H H.C.)

6. Saint Soldier Modern Senior Secondary School
Vs. Regional Provident FundCommissioner 2014
(142) FLR 730 (Del.H.C.)
250 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
7. Lotus Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Assistant
Provident
Fund
Commissioner,
(Compl.)
Rourkela 2018 (157) FLR 440 (Ori.H.C.)

8. Bihar Shiksha Pariyojna Parishad Vs.
Regional
Provident
Fund
Commissioner,
Employees' Provident Fund Organzation & Anr.
2017 (155) FLR 657 (Pat.H.C.)

9. Bihar State Industrial Development Corporation Vs.
Employees Provident Fund Organization & Anr. 2017
(154) FLR 88 (Pat.H.C.)

10.
Bihar
State
Industrial
Development
Corporation Vs. Employees Provident Fund
Organization, Patna & Anr. 2017 (154) FLR
537 (Pat.H.C.)

11. Commissioner of Customs and Central
Excise Vs. Hongo India Private Limited & Anr.
(2009) 5 SCC 791

12. M/s Kushang Security and House Keeping
Private Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer Central
Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour
Court & Anr. 2019 (8) ADJ 805

13. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh,
Lucknow Vs. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur
(1975) 4 SCC 22

14. Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs.
Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department &
Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 169

15. Patel Brothers Vs. State of Assam & Ors.
(2017) 2 SCC 350

16. Patel Brothers Vs. State of Assam & Ors.
2016 SCC OnLine Gau 124

17. Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain
Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133

18. Himachal Pradesh and others Vs. Tritronics
India Private Ltd. 2018 SCC OnLine 757

19. Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association
Vs. Kalyan Chowdhury (2018) 3 SCC 41

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1.

Heard
Sri
Pradip
Kumar
Srivastava, learned counsel for the
petitioners, Sri Mata Prasad, learned
Standing Counsel appearing for the first
respondent, Sri Brijesh Kumar, learned
counsel for the second respondent and Sri
Jagdish Pathak, learned counsel appearing
for the third respondent.

2. The present writ petition has been
filed seeking to assail the order dated
28.12.2019
passed
by
the
third
respondent/Assistant
Provident
Fund
Commissioner Regional Office, Meerut in
proceedings under Section 7-A of the
Employees'
Provident
Funds
and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 19521 and
also the order dated 15.07.2019 passed by
the fourth respondent/Presiding Officer
Central Government Industrial Tribunalcum-Labour Court, Kanpur whereunder
the appeal filed thereagainst has been
rejected on the ground of delay.

3. The records of the case reflect
that in proceedings for assessment of dues
for the period 08/2012 to 12/2012, under
Section 7-A of the EPF Act, 1952, an
order dated 28.12.2018 was passed
determining an amount against the
petitioners.

4. A writ petition, Writ-C No.5308
of 2019, was filed seeking quashing of the
aforementioned order dated 28.12.2018
which was dismissed on 18.02.2019 with
liberty to the petitioners to avail the
statutory remedy of appeal. Thereafter,
the petitioners preferred an appeal before
the fourth respondent, registered as
Appeal No.06 of 2019 which has been
dismissed vide order dated 15.07.2019 on
the ground that the appeal is barred by
time and has been filed after "60 days +
4 All. Committee of Management Angoori Devi Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
251
60 days" from the date of passing of the
order dated 28.12.2018.

5. Contention of the counsel for the
petitioners is that the delay in filing of the
appeal having been caused due to wrong
advice of the counsel and lack of
communication
of
the
order
dated
18.02.2019 passed by the High Court, the
delay ought to have been condoned, and
the Appellate Authority has illegally
rejected the appeal on the ground of
delay. It is also contended that the benefit
of extension of prescribed period under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 19632
and of exclusion of time under Section 14
thereof, would be available to the
petitioners and therefore the limitation in
filing an appeal ought to have been
extended.

6. Sri Jagdish Pathak, learned
counsel appearing for the third respondent
has submitted that as per the provisions of
Section 7-I of the EPF Act, 1952 read
with Rule 7 of the Employees' Provident
Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure)
Rules, 19973 the limitation for filing of an
appeal is 60 days from the date of
issuance of the order with a further
discretion to the Tribunal to extend the
prescribed period by a further time period
of 60 days upon recording its satisfaction
that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring appeal
within the prescribed period. It is
submitted that the maximum period for
filing of the appeal is "60 days + 60 days"
from the date of issuance of the order and
there is no power conferred on the
Appellate Authority to condone the delay
beyond the said time period.

7. The question which thus falls for
consideration is as to whether the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963
would be applicable so as to extend the
period of limitation prescribed for filing
an appeal under Section 7-I of the EPF
Act, 1952 read with Rule 7 of the Rules,
1997 which provides for a period of 60
days for filing an appeal with a provision
for extension of the said time period by a
further period of 60 days.

8. In order to appreciate the rival
contentions
the
relevant
statutory
provision with regard to filing of appeal
under Section 7-I of the EPF Act, 1952
may be adverted to:-

"7-I. Appeals to Tribunal.--(1)
Any person aggrieved by a notification
issued by the Central Government, or an
order passed by the Central Government
or any authority, under the proviso to subsection (3), or sub-section (4), of Section
1, or Section 3, or sub-section (1) of
Section 7-A, or Section 7-B(except an
order rejecting an application for review
referred to in sub-section (5) thereof), or
Section 7-C, or Section 14-B, may prefer
an appeal to a Tribunal against such
notification or order.

(2) Every appeal under subsection (1) shall be filed in such form and
manner, within such time and be
accompanied by such fees, as may be
prescribed."

9. The power to make rules
including the power to make rules in
respect of the form and the manner in
which, and the time within which, an
appeal shall be filed before a Tribunal and
the fees payable for filing such appeal is
provided for under Section 21 of the EPF
Act, 1952. The relevant provision is being
extracted below:-
252 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"21. Power to make Rules.--(1)
The
Central
Government
may,
by
notification in the Official Gazette, make
rules to carry out the provisions of this
Act.

(2) Without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing power, such
rules may provide for all or any of the
following matters namely:-

x x x x x

(b) the form and the manner in
which, and the time within which, an
appeal shall be filed before a Tribunal and
the fees payable for filing such appeal."

10. In exercise of powers conferred
under sub-section (1) of Section 21 of Act
No.19 of 1952 ''The Employees Provident
Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure)
Rules, 1997'' have been made. The
procedure including the time period for
filing an appeal is provided under Rule 7
of the aforementioned Rules, 1997.

"7. Fee, time for filing appeal,
deposit of amount due on filing appeal.-
-

(1) Every appeal filed with the
Registrar shall be accompanied by a fee
of Rupees five hundred to be remitted in
the form of Crossed Demand Draft on a
nationalized bank in favour of the
Registrar of the Tribunal and payable at
the main branch of that Bank at the station
where the seat of the said Tribunal situate.

(2) Any person aggrieved by a
notification
issued
by
the
Central
Government or an order passed by the
Central
Government
or
any
other
authority under the Act, may within 60
days from the date of issue of the
notification/order, prefer an appeal to the
Tribunal:

Provided that the Tribunal may
if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from
preferring
the
appeal
within
the
prescribed period, extend the said period
by a further period of 60 days:

Provided further that no appeal
by the employer shall be entertained by a
Tribunal unless he has deposited with the
Tribunal (a Demand Draft payable in the
Fund and bearing) 75 per cent of the
amount due from him as determined
under Section 7-A:

Provided also that the Tribunal
may for reasons to be recorded in writing,
waive or reduce the amount to be
deposited under Section 7-O."

11. A plain reading of the
aforementioned
statutory
provisions
indicates that in terms of sub-section (2)
of Section 7-I every appeal under subsection (1) is to be filed in such form and
manner, within such time and is to be
accompanied by such fees, as may be
prescribed. Further, Rule 7 of the Rules,
1997 provides that the appeal may be
preferred within 60 days from the date of
issue of the order, provided that the
Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from preferring the appeal within
the prescribed period, extend the said
period by a further period of 60 days.

12. It is seen that the initial period
for filing of appeal is 60 days which can
be extended by the EPF Appellate
Tribunal for another 60 days only when
there
is
sufficient
cause
and
not
otherwise. In this regard, reference may
be made to the judgment in the case of
M/s
Port
Shramik
Co-operative
Enterprises
Ltd.
Vs.
Employees
Provident Fund Organisation4. The
relevant
observations
made
in
the
judgment are as follows:-
4 All. Committee of Management Angoori Devi Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
253

"3. ...The period of limitation
for filing an appeal against an order
passed under Section 7-A or Section 14-B
of the Employees' Provident Funds and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act is 60 days.
If the appellant satisfies the Tribunal that
it was prevented by sufficient cause from
not filing the appeal within the said period
of 60 days, in appropriate case, the
Tribunal has the power to condone the
delay of another 60 days. Thus, even if
the Tribunal wanted to condone the delay
it could not condone it beyond a period of
60 days."

13. In the case of Assistant
Regional
Provident
Fund
Commissioner, Meerut Vs. Employees
Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal &
Ors.5, an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal
was filed after 165 days from the date of
the order of the EPF Authority and the
delay was condoned by the Appellate
Authority in view of the provisions under
Section 5 of the Act, 1963. Upon a
challenge
being
raised
the
order
condoning the delay was set aside and it
was held that when the period of 60 days
was provided under Rule 7(2) and a
further period of 60 days for condoning
the delay is allowed under the proviso to
the said rule only then that much period
could be condoned. It was held that
applicability of Section 5 of the Act, 1963
was specifically excluded. The relevant
observations made in the judgment are as
follows:-

"8. ...On behalf of the Assistant
Provident Fund Commissioner before the
Tribunal, a preliminary objection was
raised to the effect that the appeal is
barred by time. The appeal was preferred
after more than 160 days and the Tribunal
had no jurisdiction to condone the delay
beyond 60
days. The appeal
was
presented on 11.1.1999 though the order
dated 10.7.1998 was received by the
appellant on 20.7.1998. Thus it took 165
days in preferring the appeal. In view of
the provisions contained in Section 7-I(2)
of the Act read with Rule 7(2) of the
Rules, the appeal was required to be
preferred within 60 days to the Tribunal.
It was submitted that the Tribunal on
being satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause in preferring
the appeal within the prescribed period of
60 days, may extend the said period by a
further period of 60 days and thus in all
the appeal was required to be preferred
maximum within a period of 120 days and
not beyond that.

x x x x x

11. It is in view of the aforesaid
provisions, it was contended that the
appeal was hopelessly time barred and
after the period of 60 days granted for
preferring an appeal, if there is a delay of
60 days then such delay can be condoned
and no further.

12. The Tribunal expressed an
opinion that the power of the Tribunal to
condone the delay under Section 5 of the
Indian Limitation Act, 1963, is not
curtailed by the Legislature..Therefore,
the provisions under the Employees'
Provident
Funds
Appellate
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1997, only to condone
a delay of 60 days is ultra vires and is
void. Therefore, it held that the Tribunal
has jurisdiction to condone any delay, if it
is satisfactorily explained...

13. Learned counsel for the
Company submitted that sub-clause (b) of
sub-section (1) of Section 21 provides the
rule making authority to prescribe time
limit within which an appeal shall be filed
before the Tribunal. Legislature only
authorized the rule making authority to
254 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
make a provision for prescribing a period
for preferring an appeal, however, the rule
also provided a further period of 60 days
by proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the
Rules. In view of this, it was contended
that proviso is ultra vires the provisions
contained in the Act. It was further
submitted that if the proviso is ultra vires
the provisions contained in the Act, then
the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply. In the
submission of learned counsel for the
Company, the Tribunal has rightly held
that the law of limitation is applicable. It
was submitted that Section 7-I of the Act,
if read it becomes very clear that subsection (2) of Section 7-I also refers such
time within which the appeal is to be
filed.

14. The Act is a labour
legislation wherein provision is made for
provident funds to be deposited by the
employer. Section 7-D to 7-H provide for
the Appellate Tribunal, the term of the
office of the Presiding Officer of
Tribunal, salary, allowances and other
terms and conditions of Presiding Officer
and the staff of the Tribunal. Section 7-I
provides for appeals to the Tribunal. The
Chapter further provides procedure before
the Tribunal, assistance of a legal
practitioner,
right
of
hearing
or
rectification of an order, finality of orders
of the Tribunal, deposit of amount due on
filing an appeal, transfer of cases, the
manner of recovery, recovery certificate,
validity of the certificate and such other
things. It provides penalties, offences by
companies,
enhanced
punishment
in
certain cases and offences under the Act
to be cognizable. It also provides the
Court which shall try the offences. Thus a
special mechanism is indicated in the Act
itself.

15. With a view to see that the
proceedings are disposed of as early as
possible, it was left by the Legislature to
fix ''such time'' for preferring an appeal.
Section 21(2)(b) refers to the time within
which an appeal shall be filed and in view
of this it was submitted that in absence of
any power, it was not open to prescribe a
specific period for condonation of delay
in sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Act in
exercise of the powers conferred under
sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act.

16. The Legislature left it open
to the rule making authority to prescribe
time for preferring an appeal. However, at
the same time the rule making authority
while prescribing the period of limitation
for preferring an appeal also provided a
period during which if there is a delay, the
same can be condoned if the Tribunal is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented
by sufficient cause from preferring the
appeal within the prescribed period.
However, the limitation was placed that
that can be done if there is a delay of a
further period of 60 days.

17. In our opinion, it cannot be
said that the rule making authority has
exceeded its limit while prescribing the
period of limitation. Like the provisions
in other statutes for condoning the delay,
the rule making authority thought it fit to
provide some period if there is a sufficient
cause and the Tribunal is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented from preferring
the appeal on such cause to extend the
period of limitation. This provision is an
enabling provision. It does not take away
the right of a person of preferring an
appeal but on the contrary it enables a
party who could not prefer an appeal
within the prescribed period for sufficient
reasons. However, at the same time,
keeping in mind that that provision is
made for a weaker section, disputes must
be resolved at the earliest, therefore,
restricted the period, i.e. that if the delay
4 All. Committee of Management Angoori Devi Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
255
is of 60 days then to that extent delay can
be condoned. Therefore, in our opinion,
the provision cannot be said to be ultra
vires of the provisions of the Act as the
provision for condonation of delay is
made to help the litigant who might be
facing genuine difficulties. It is difficult
to say that the proviso to sub-rule (2) of
Rule 7 is bad. If that is declared as bad or
ultra vires Section 7-I or Section 21(1)(b)
of the Act, it can be said that the period of
limitation prescribed is bad for want of
not providing extended period in case of
difficulty.

18. It is required to be noted that
in case of Delta Impex v. Commissioner
of Customs, decided on 13.2.2004, this
Court had an occasion to examine the
question raised by the applicant which
reads as under:

"Whether
the
provision
of
Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962
completely
bars
the
Commissioner
(Appeals) from condoning the delay
beyond the period of 30 days even in a
deserving case and that despite the order
made by the Commissioner (Appeals) is it
incumbent upon the Tribunal to consider
the appeal on merits?"

19. There also it was submitted
that considering the provisions contained
in section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation
Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Limitation Act') read with section 5
thereof, irrespective of the fact that the
matter was under the Customs Act, the
appellate
authority
ought
to
have
condoned the delay, examined the matter
on merits and it could not have dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the
Commissioner
(Appeals)
can
only
condone the delay, if an appeal is
presented within a period of 30 days after
the statutory period of 60 days in view of
section 128 of the Act.

20. In case of Collector of C.E.
Chandigarh v. Doaba Co-operative Sugar
Mills, Supreme Court pointed out that the
authorities functioning under the Act are
bound by the provision of the Act. If the
proceedings are taken under the Act by
the
Department,
the
provisions
of
limitation prescribed in the Act will
prevail. In the case of Miles India Limited
v. Assistant Collector of Customs, the
Court
observed
that
the
Customs
Authorities acting under the Act were not
justified in disallowing the claim as they
were bound by the period of limitation
provided there in the relevant provisions
of the Customs Act, 1962.

21. The Court in the aforesaid
case pointed out that the period of
limitation prescribed by the Act for filing
an application being different from the
period prescribed under the Limitation
Act, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the said
Act, it shall be deemed as if the period
prescribed by the different Act is the
period prescribed by the schedule to the
Limitation Act. However, it would be
difficult to say that section 5 of the
Limitation Act is intended to be made
applicable in view of the proviso to
section 128 of the Customs Act.

22. The Court is required to
examine the scheme of the special law,
and the nature of the remedy provided
therein. Considering these aspects, the
Court will have to find out whether the
Legislature
intended
to
provide
a
complete code by itself which along
should govern the matters provided by it.
On
examination
of
the
relevant
provisions, if it becomes clear that the
provisions of section 5 of the Limitation
Act are necessarily excluded, then the
said provisions cannot be called in aid to
supplement the provisions of the Act. It is
256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
open to the Court to examine whether and
to what extent the nature of the provisions
contained in the Limitation Act in
comparison with the scheme of the special
law are excluded from operation. When a
specific period is provided and a further
period of 60 days by way of extended
period only then that much period can be
condoned.

23. In the instant case, a
separate period of limitation is provided,
as also the period for which delay can be
condoned. The Legislature was aware
about the provisions contained in section
5 of the Limitation Act, yet with an
intention to curb the delay in labour
matters, Legislature left it to the Rule
making authority to make a provision for
limitation. Rule making authority under
the Statute has specifically provided that
after the statutory period, if there is delay
of 60 days, on showing sufficient grounds
for delay of 60 days, that can be
condoned. Thus applicability of section 5
of the Limitation Act is specifically
excluded.

24. The expression ''expressly
excluded'' in sub-section (2) of section 29
of the Limitation Act means an exclusion
by express words, i.e. by express
reference and not exclusion as a result of
logical process of reasoning. In the instant
case, there is no question of implied
exclusion but, it specifically provides a
different period of limitation, as also the
period during which, if delay has
occurred, it could be condoned.

25.
With
regard
to
the
applicability of sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act (inclusive) one will have
to refer to sub-section (2) of section 29 of
the Limitation Act, 1963. It specifically
states that these provisions shall apply
only so far as and to the extent to which,
they are not expressly excluded by special
or local law. Reading the language of
Rule 7 of the Rules and section 5 of the
Limitation Act, it is very clear that
extension of time for a period 60 days
only
can
be
condoned
subject
to
satisfaction and not beyond that. From an
examination of Rule 7 of the Rules, it is
very clear that section 5 of the Limitation
Act is expressly excluded as a specific
provision is made in Rule 7.

x x x x x

38. In the instant case, there is
clear intention of the Legislature for
asking the rule making authority to
prescribe the time during which an appeal
shall be filed. When the time is to be
prescribed, it is open for the rule making
authority to prescribe extended period
also. If the extended period is provided,
the provisions would not become bad or
ultra vires the provisions contained in the
Act, as it is only an enabling provision.

39. It is also clear that an
opinion
was
expressed
before
the
Legislature, that in the opinion of the
Government the provision should be
made
for
granting
provident
fund
facilities not only to the employees in
industrial establishments, but also to the
employees in commercial and other
undertakings. An assurance was given
that
the
Government
would
take
appropriate measures. It is thereafter the
Act came to be enacted. Reading the
provisions contained in the Act, it covers
large number of employees. Employer, as
indicated in the Act, has to make
contributions to the fund in the manner
indicated in section 6. Section 7-A of the
Act empowers the authority to decide a
dispute about the applicability of the Act
if raised and to determine the amount due
from any employer, as indicated in subclause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 7-
4 All. Committee of Management Angoori Devi Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
257
A of the Act. The officer empowered to
conduct an inquiry under sub-section (2)
of section 7-A of the Act in this behalf
having the powers as are vested in Code
under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for
trying a suit in respect of the matters
indicated therein. How the order is to be
reviewed is indicated under section 7-B.
Section 7-C refers to determination of
escaped amount. An order made by
authority was challenged before the
Appellate Tribunal known as ''Employees
Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal".
Thus it is a special statute to determine
the liability of employer to make his
contribution and to pass further orders by
the authorities which are to be examined
by the Tribunal in case of an appeal. It is
in this background the provisions of the
Act are to be examined.

40. Considering the language of
the Act and the rules, the Scheme, which
is meant for weaker section and from the
intention of the Legislature, it is clear that
the Legislature left it to the Rule making
authority to prescribe the time by
specifically referring that an appeal under
sub-section (1) shall be filed within such
time as also specifically referring in
section 21 about the form and the time
within which an appeal shall be filed. It is
clear that the Legislature left it to the Rule
Making Authority to prescribe total
period during which an appeal can be
filed, which includes extended period.
This being an enabling provision and in
consonance with the provision contained
in the Act cannot be said to be ultra vires
the provisions contained in the Act."

14. In the aforementioned case of
Assistant Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner, Meerut (supra) reference
was made to the judgment in the case of
Mohd. Ashfaq Vs. State Transport
Appellate Tribunal U.P. & Ors.6, where
in the context of the provisions under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, it was held as
follows:-

"8. ...This clearly means that if
the application for renewal is beyond time
by more than 15 days, the Regional
Transport Authority shall not be entitled
to entertain it, or in other words, it shall
have no power to condone the delay.
There is thus an express provision in subsection (3) that delay in making an
application
for
renewal
shall
be
condonable only if it is of not more than
15 days and that expressly excludes the
applicability of Section 5 in cases where
an application for renewal is delayed by
more than 15 days..."

15. Rule 7(2) of the Rules, 1997
again came up for consideration in the
case of Dr. A.V. Joseph Vs. Assistant
Provident Fund Commissioner & Anr.7
and it was held that the maximum period
for filing an appeal is only 120 days from
the date of the impugned order. The
relevant
observations
made
in
the
judgment are as follows:-

"10. Section 7-I(2) of the Act
provides that every Appeal under subsection (1) shall be filed in such form and
manner, within such time and
be
accompanied by such fees, as may be
prescribed. Rule 7(2) of the Employees'
Provident
Funds
Appellate
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1997 states that any
person aggrieved by a notification issued
by the Central Government or an order
passed by the Central Government or any
other authority under the Act, may within
60 days from the date of issue of the
notification/order, prefer an appeal to the
Tribunal. The 'first proviso' thereunder
258 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
further stipulates that the Tribunal may, if
it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from
preferring
the
Appeal
within
the
prescribed period, extend the said period
by a further period of 60 days. In short,
the maximum period for filing the Appeal
is only 120 days from the date of the
impugned
proceedings/order
(60+60).
When the statute confers the power on the
Authority to condone the delay only to a
limited extent, it can never be widened by
any Court contrary to the intention of the
law makers..."

16. In the case of C.B. Sharma
Vs.
Employees'
Provident
Funds
Appellate Tribunal & Ors.8, the appeal
filed nine months after the date of the
order passed by the Commissioner was
dismissed and the challenge raised to the
order passed by the Tribunal was turned
down with the following observations:-

"9. In terms of the rule, period of 60
days has been provided for filing the
appeal before the Tribunal. For sufficient
reasons the Tribunal can extend the period
for further 60 days. Once the petitioner
undisputedly had the knowledge of the
order passed by the Commissioner on
16.2.2009, the appeal filed nine months
thereafter had rightly been dismissed by
the Tribunal as time barred."

17. The question as to whether the
Appellate Tribunal was vested with any
power to condone the delay in filing the
appeal beyond the prescribed period again
came up for consideration in the case of
Saint Soldier Modern Senior Secondary
School Vs. Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner9 and it was held that there
was no such power with the Appellate
Tribunal. The observations made in the
judgment are as follows:-

"8. A perusal of the section 7-I
of the Act and Rule 7 of the Rules would
reveal that the time period for filing an
appeal is within 60 days from the date of
issue of the notification/order, provided,
the Tribunal, if satisfied that for certain
sufficient cause, the appeal could not be
preferred within the period of 60 days,
then, the period to file appeal can be
extended to 60 days thereafter. Suffice to
state, the provision does not vest any
power with the Tribunal to condone a
delay beyond that period...

9. From the above decision of
the Supreme Court, even in the case in
hand, it is clear from the provisions of the
Act, which is a special statute, a certain
period of limitation is prescribed for filing
the appeal. In the eventuality, the appeal
is not filed within the said period, the
power to condone the delay is for a
further period of 60 days and no more..."

18. A similar view was again taken
in the case of Lotus Chemicals Pvt. Ltd.
Vs.
Assistant
Provident
Fund
Commissioner, (Compl.) Rourkela10,
wherein it was held as follows:-

"8. ...The procedure for filing of
appeal has been provided under the
provision of Rule 7 of the Employees
Provident
Fund
Appellate
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1997, wherein it has
been provided under Regulation 7(2) that
the appeal may be filed within 60 days
from
the
date
of
issuance
of
notification/order,
provided
that
the
Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from preferring appeal within the
prescribed period, may extend the said
period by a further period of 60 days,
meaning thereby the appeal is to be filed
before the appellate Tribunal within a
maximum period of 120 days subject to
4 All. Committee of Management Angoori Devi Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
259
its condonation and beyond that it cannot
be extended. It is settled that if any
legislation has been provided, it has to be
followed in its strict sense and if there is
specific time period framed in the
legislation to entertain an appeal, the
authorities concerned are not supposed to
extend that period by assuming the power
conferred under the Limitation Act, 1963.
Here in the instant case, the maximum
period of filing an appeal is 60 days,
subject to its condonation for a further
period of 60 days, hence the condonation
is only to be done for maximum period of
60 days, which suggests that the provision
of Limitation Act, 1963 will not be
applicable.

9. It is settled position of law
that the court of law or the Tribunal is
supposed to follow the statutory provision
and it cannot be interpreted, if there is no
ambiguity and it is settled that the things
is to be done as per the statutory
provision,
hence
applying
the
said
principle, it is the considered view of this
Court that the Tribunal has not committed
any error in passing the order under
Section 7-I by rejecting it, since appeal
was preferred after delay of 260 days,
hence the Tribunal is having no power to
condone the said delay period, in view of
the provision of Rule 7 of the Employees
Provident
Fund
Appellate
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1997 as discussed
herein above."

19. Reiterating a similar view, in the
case
of
Bihar
Shiksha
Pariyojna
Parishad Vs. Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner, Employees' Provident
Fund Organzation & Anr.11, it was
held that condonation of delay has to be
considered within the purview of the
statutory provision and the provisions of
the Act, 1963 cannot be imported or made
applicable into the EPF Act, 1952 and the
Rules, 1997. The relevant observations
made in the judgment are extracted
below:-

"18. Thus, in view of the fact
that the limitation is prescribed by
specific Rule 7(2) of 'the Rules' as also in
view of the ratio laid down by the
Supreme Court in Commissioner of
Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo
India Private Limited & Anr. (supra) and
M/s. Patel Brothers v. State of Assam &
Ors. (supra), condonation of delay has
also to be considered within the purview
of the statutory provision and the
provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be
imported or made applicable into 'the Act'
and 'the Rules'. In that view of the matter,
no illegality can be found with the order
impugned passed by the Tribunal."

20. A similar view has been taken in
the case of Bihar State Industrial
Development
Corporation
Vs.
Employees
Provident
Fund
Organization & Anr.12 and again in
Bihar State Industrial Development
Corporation Vs. Employees' Provident
Fund Organization, Patna & Anr.13.

21. The question with regard to
condonation of delay by applying Section
5 of the Act, 1963, in the context of filing
an appeal and reference under the Central
Excise Act, came up for consideration in
the case of Commissioner of Customs
and Central Excise Vs. Hongo India
Private Limited & Anr.14, and taking
into consideration that the Central Excise
Act is a special law and a complete code
by itself, it was held that the time limit
prescribed
for
making
a
reference
thereunder is absolute and unextendable
by the Court under Section 5 of the Act,
260 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1963. The relevant observations made in
the judgment are as follows:-

"30. In the earlier part of our
order, we have adverted to Chapter VI-A
of the Act which provides for appeals and
revisions to various authorities. Though
Parliament has specifically provided an
additional period of 30 days in the case of
appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent
about the number of days if there is
sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to
the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional
period of 90 days in the case of revision
by the Central Government has been
provided. However, in the case of an
appeal to the High Court under Section
35-G and reference application to the
High
Court
under
Section
35-H,
Parliament has provided only 180 days
and no further period for filing an appeal
and making reference to the High Court is
mentioned in the Act.

31. In this regard, it is useful to refer
to a recent decision of this Court in Punjab
Fibres Ltd, (2008) 3 SCC 73. The
Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise,
Noida was the appellant in this case. While
considering the very same question, namely,
whether the High Court has power to condone
the delay in presentation of the reference under
Section 35-H(1) of the Act, the two-Judge
Bench taking note of the said provision and the
other related provisions following Singh
Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3 SCC 70]
concluded that: (Punjab Fibres Ltd. Case
[(2008) 3 SCC 73] , SCC p. 75, para 8)

"8. ...the High Court was
justified in holding that there was no
power for condonation of delay in filing
reference application."

32. As pointed out earlier, the
language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position
clear that an appeal and reference to the
High Court should be made within 180
days only from the date of communication
of the decision or order. In other words,
the language used in other provisions
makes
the
position
clear
that
the
legislature
intended
the
appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by
condoning the delay only up to 30 days
after expiry of 60 days which is the
preliminary
limitation
period
for
preferring an appeal. In the absence of
any clause condoning the delay by
showing
sufficient
cause
after
the
prescribed period, there is complete
exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. The High Court was, therefore,
justified in holding that there was no
power to condone the delay after expiry
of the prescribed period of 180 days.

33.