# Committee of management of managing Committee of Hidaytul Muslamin School Prayagraj & Anr/ v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1405
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-27
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 22704 of 2025
- **Bench:** Siddharth Nandan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/committee-of-management-of-managing-committee-of-hidaytul-muslamin-school-54663
- **Pages:** 12

## Text

4 All. Committee of management of managing Committee of Hidaytul Muslamin School Prayagraj & Anr/
 Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1405
resolution plan approval then the parties have got remedy under Electricity Act for which
they are at the liberty to proceed.

112. Before parting, we consider it necessary to observe that the exercise of statutory
power, even when otherwise available, must conform to the requirements of fairness, transparency,
and procedural propriety. Not providing adequate breakup of amount, clarity in computation, and
disclosure of the basis of classification or reassessment, as requested by the petitioners, cannot be
ignored and may have a bearing on the legality of demand notices even if it get issued for the post
resolution period.

113. Therefore, all the issues discussed above are concluded in the favour of petitioners.

114. In view of the above discussion and analysis, this Court is of the considered view that
the impugned demand notices dated 09.01.2023, 21.01,2023, 04.02.2023 and 17.05.2023 in Writ C
No. 19391 of 2023 and notices dated 09.03.2023, 18.01.2025 and 21.03.2023 in Writ C. No. 17846
of 2025, upto the extent of demand being made for pre-CIRP period, cannot be sustained in law and
hence deserve to be quashed.

VII
Order

115. These petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed. Impugned demand notices dated
09.01.2023, 21.01,2023, 04.02.2023 and 17.05.2023 in Writ C No. 19391 of 2023 and notices
dated 09.03.2023, 18.01.2025 and 21.03.2023 in Writ C. No. 17846 of 2025 are hereby quashed.
However, respondent authorities are at the liberty to issue fresh demand notice for any dues, which
may have occurred for the post-resolution period, in accordance with law.

116. No order as to costs.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 1405
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTH NANDAN, J.

Writ C No. 22704 of 2025

Committee of management of managing Committee of Hidaytul Muslamin School Prayagraj &
Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
1406 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Whether a subsequent amendment introducing an alternative remedy of appeal constitutes a
substantive change in law or is merely a procedural change; and in case the amendment of
Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is substantive, whether it shall have
retrospective application.
HEADNOTE
Societies Registration Act, 1860, s.25(1)(d) (inserted by U.P. Act No. 8 of 2022) - Society
dispute - Prescribed Authority, by order dated 21.08.2021, rejected the claim of respondent no.4
raised by way of reference under Section 25(1) of the Act, 1860 - Respondent no.4 assailed the
said order by filing Writ-C No. 33129 of 2021 - During pendency of the writ petition, amendment
dated 18.07.2022 introduced a new provision, namely Section 25(1)(d), providing remedy of
appeal before the Commissioner of the Division - Thereafter, Writ-C No. 33129 of 2021 was
withdrawn on 27.04.2024 with liberty to pursue alternative remedies available under law -
Respondent no.4 subsequently preferred appeal under Section 25(1)(d) against the order dated
21.08.2021 - Petitioners objected to maintainability of appeal contending that the amendment
introducing the right of appeal was a substantive change in law and could not operate
retrospectively - Objection rejected by Appellate Authority - Challenge in writ jurisdiction.

Held: Right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure but is a matter of substantive right - Legal pursuit
of a remedy by way of suit or appeal are steps in a series of proceedings and are to be regarded as one legal
proceeding - Right of appeal is a statutory and vested right which accrues to a litigant from the date the lis
commences - Once a lis commences, all rights get crystallized and no clog upon a likely appeal can be put
unless the law is made retrospective expressly or by fair implication - Applicability of a right of appeal is
governed by the law prevailing on the date of institution of the proceedings and not by the law subsequently
brought into force.
Court held that the amendment dated 18.07.2022 introducing Section 25(1)(d) created a right of appeal which
was otherwise not available and, therefore, constituted a substantive change in law - Intention to vest a right
of appeal retrospectively cannot be presumed unless such intention is clearly manifested by express words or
necessary implication - Since the amendment neither expressly nor by necessary implication provided
retrospective operation, the remedy of appeal introduced by Section 25(1)(d) could not be invoked against an
order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 21.08.2021 prior to the amendment.
Court further held that a superior court cannot vest jurisdiction in an authority which otherwise does not exist
- Liberty granted by this Court to pursue alternative remedies available under law did not confer jurisdiction
upon the appellate authority to entertain an appeal otherwise not maintainable - Appeal filed under Section
25(1)(d) against the order dated 21.08.2021 held not maintainable - Impugned order dated 10.06.2025 and
entire proceedings initiated under Section 25(1)(d) quashed - Writ petition allowed. (E-5)
[Paras 15, 16, 18; Conclusion Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6]
CASE LAW CITED
Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165;
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) AC 369;
Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540;
Mukund Deo (Dead) by LRs v. Mahadeo, AIR 1965 SC 703;
Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of M.P., (1953) 1 SCC 299;
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602;
Chirag Ashiyana Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Santosh and Another, 2025 (12) ADJ 87;
Vithalbhai Nema Bhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, AIR 1967 SC 344;
ECGC Ltd. v. Mokul Shriram EPC JV, (2022) 6 SCC 704;
Ganpat Rai Hira Lal v. Aggarwal Chambers of Commerce Ltd., (1952) 2 SCC 214;
4 All. Committee of management of managing Committee of Hidaytul Muslamin School Prayagraj & Anr/
 Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1407
Janardan Reddy v. State, AIR 1951 SC 217;
State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 980;
Chitra Srivastava v. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2006) 110 FLR 1171 (Del.).

List of Acts
Constitution of India;
Societies Registration Act, 1860;
Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2021 (U.P. Act No. 8 of 2022).
List of Keywords
Right of appeal; Vested right of appeal; Substantive right; Procedural law; Retrospective operation;
Prospective operation; Statutory appeal; Commissioner; Prescribed Authority; Election dispute; Alternative
remedy; Appellate jurisdiction; Jurisdictional objection; Societies Registration Act.
CASE ARISING FROM
From the order dated 10.06.2025 passed by the Commissioner, Prayagraj Division, Prayagraj in Appeal No.
1105 of 2025 (Farid Javed Ansari v. Tariq Nihal Ansari), rejecting objection regarding maintainability of appeal
under Section 25(1)(d) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner: Gautam Baghel, Rajesh Kumar Shukla.
Advs. for the Respondents: Ashutosh Chaubey, C.S.C., Pramod K. Gupta, Shailendra Kumar, Shivendu Ojha.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Siddharth Nandan, J.)

1. Heard Shri Gautam Baghel, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri R.K. Ojha, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Umang Chandra Gupta, Advocate holding brief of Shri Shivendu
Ojha, learned counsel for the respondent no.4 and Shri Vaibhav Tripathi, learned Standing Counsel
for the State-respondent nos. 1 to 3.

2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 10.06.2025 passed
by respondent no.2 in Appeal No. 1105 of 2025 (Farid Javed Ansari Vs. Tariq Nihal Ansari), by
way of which the objection filed by the petitioner has been rejected; and further seeking quashing
of the entire proceedings of Appeal No. 1105 of 2025 filed under Section 25(1) (d) of the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1860).

Facts

1. There is a society in the name and style of Managing Committee of Hidaytul Muslamin
School, Prayagraj registered under the Act 1860 and is governed by its own by-laws, which has
been renewed from time to time. The said society runs and administers a Madarsa, namely Hidaytul
Muslamin School, Prayagraj, which is under grant-in-aid.
1408 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2. Certain disputes were raised regarding the elections of the Committee, leading to Writ-C
No. 49987 of 2015 (Nihaluddin Ansari and Another Vs. State of U.P. and 10 Others) which was
allowed vide order dated 08.04.2019, holding that the list of office bearers of Nihaluddin Ansari,
has come to be registered continuously for more than a decade and the court does not find any
illegality in the same.

3. Subsequently, the petitioner no.2 was elected as Manager on 14.07.2019 and the list of
office bearers of committee of management was also approved vide order dated 12.06.2019; which
was challenged by respondent no.3 (Farid Javed Ansari) in Writ-C No. 27312 of 2019 but the same
was subsequently withdrawn on 20.02.2020, since the order dated 12.06.2019 was challenged
before the prescribed authority by making a reference under Section 25(1) of the Act, 1860.

4. However the prescribed authority on 21.08.2021 rejected the claim of respondent no.4.
Against the order dated 21.08.2021, respondent no. 4 filed Writ-C No. 33129 of 2021; but, no
interim relief was granted, as the order dated 08.04.2015 had already attained finality upon
dismissal of Writ-C No. 26908 of 2015; and eventually, the said writ petition was also withdrawn
on 27.04.2024.

5. In between, the petitioner no. 2 was again elected as the Manager of the Society in the
year 2024, and the list was duly approved by respondent no. 3 for the year 202425. Thereafter,
learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had no knowledge about the order
dated 27.04.2024, whereby the writ petition was withdrawn with liberty to pursue alternative
remedies available to him under law. For ready reference, the order dated 27.04.2024 is reproduced
below:

 "1. Sri Chaudhary N.A. Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Dinesh Shukla,
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner prays that this case may be dismissed on the ground of
alternative remedy.

2. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to pursue his
alternative remedies available to him under law."

6. It is further stated that the petitioners came to know about the order dated 27.04.2024
only upon receipt of notice issued by respondent no. 2 in Appeal No. 1105 of 2024, purportedly
issued in proceedings/Appeal under Section 25(1)(d) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860,
preferred against the order dated 21.08.2021, passed by the Prescribed Authority.

7. The petitioner filed two objections before the Commissioner on 14.05.2025, raising
specific grounds, firstly regarding the maintainability of the appeal, i.e. on jurisdiction issue; and
secondly reliance was placed on the objections dated 21.04.2025, taking the ground of limitation,
emphasizing the fact that the ground taken in the writ petition for explaining the delay in filing the
appeal, i.e. for want of knowledge, is un-sustainable, as the petitioner being a practicing lawyer,
was in know-how of the correct legal position.
4 All. Committee of management of managing Committee of Hidaytul Muslamin School Prayagraj & Anr/
 Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1409
8. Furthermore, the petitioner submits that he had taken specific ground that the
amendment dated 18.07.2022, introducing a remedy of appeal under Section 25(1)(d) of the Act,
1860, does not have a retrospective effect, and hence the appeal is not maintainable in the eyes of
law. For the sake of convenience, Paragraph-7 of the objection dated 21.04.2025 is reproduced
below:

 "7. That, the appellant is dragging to the deponent in several litigations, regarding this,
institution merely filing an Application, he is dragging from several years. The Amendment dated
18.07.2022 having no retrospective effect, under the law hence the Appeal is not maintainable in
the eye of law."

Submission on Law

Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that by way of the amendment dated
18.07.2022 in the U.P. Societies Registration Act, 1860 (U.P. Act No. 8 of 2022), a new provision,
namely Section 25(1)(d), has been added by which an appellate court has been established, against
the order passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 25(1) of the Act, 1860; and the
appellate power has been vested in the Commissioner of the Division, and the limitation prescribed
for filing the appeal is one month from the date of communication of the order. A relevant extract
of the notification dated 18.07.2022 is quoted below:

"No. 357 (2)/LXXIX-V-1-2022-1-ka-10-2021
Dated Lucknow, July 18, 2022

IN pursuance of the provisions of clause (3) of Article 348 of the Constitution of India, the
Governor is pleased to order the publication of the following English translation of the Society
Registrikaran (Uttar Pradesh Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 2021 (Uttar Pradesh Adhiniyam Sankhya 8
of 2022) as passed by the Uttar Pradesh Legislature and assented to by the President on July 7,
2022. The Vitt (Lekha-Pariksha) Anubhag 2 is administratively concerned with the said
Adhiniyam.

THE SOCIETIES REGISTRATION
(UTTAR PRADESH AMENDMENT) ACT, 2021
(UP. Act no 8 of 2022)
As passed by the Uttar Pradesh Legislature]
AN
ACT

 further to amend the Societies Registration Act, 1860 in its application to the State of
Uttar Pradesh

 IT IS HEREBY enacted in the Seventy-second Year of the Republic of India as follows:-

 Short Title 1. This Act may be called the Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh
Amendment) Act, 2021
1410 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
..

 Amendment of

 section 25 7. In the proviso to sub-section(1) of section 25 of the principal Act, after
clause (c), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:-

 (d) An appeal against an order made under this sub-section may be preferred to the
Commissioner of the Division in whose jurisdiction the headquarter of the Society lies, within one
month from the date of communication of such order:

 Provided that the appellate authority may admit an appeal after the expiry of such period
if the appellant satisfies the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal within such period."

Issue

 This Court, vide its order dated 31.03.2026, has framed the issue regarding
maintainability of appeal under Section 25(1) (d) of the Act, 1860; and following point of
determination is framed accordingly:-

 (I) Whether, a subsequent amendment, introducing an alternative remedy of Appeal,
constitutes a substantive change in law or is merely a procedural change; and in case the
Amendment of Section 25 is substantive, whether it shall have retrospective application?

 Since the issue raised is purely legal in nature, with the consent of the parties, the present
petition is being decided at the admission stage itself.

Discussions

1. Shri Gautam Baghel, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the provision of
appeal under Section 25(1)(d) of the Act, 1860 has been introduced by the legislature by way of
U.P. Act No. 8 of 2022, vide notification dated 18.07.2022; and since the order of the Prescribed
Authority was passed prior to the effective date of the aforementioned amendment, i.e., on
21.08.2021, the said provision of appeal cannot be applied retrospectively. He has further submitted
that this Court, vide order dated 27.04.2024 passed in Writ-C No. 33129 of 2021 (Farid Javed
Ansari vs. State of U.P. and Others), while dismissing the writ petition, merely granted liberty to
the petitioner to pursue alternative remedies available under law. The Court did not vest any
jurisdiction in the appellate authority to entertain an appeal, which is otherwise not available to the
petitioner, under law; since the Amendment in question, being a substantive change of law, cannot
operate retrospectively.

2. He has further submitted that the expression appeal has not been defined in the Code.
However, as per the dictionary meaning, an appeal is an application or a petition to a higher
4 All. Committee of management of managing Committee of Hidaytul Muslamin School Prayagraj & Anr/
 Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1411
authority or a court of law for reconsideration of a decision of a lower authority, or inferior court of
law. (Ref: 1997 edition of the Chambers 21st Century Dictionary).

 3. In Nagendra Nath Dey vs. Suresh Chandra Dey1,, wherein speaking for the judicial
committee of the Privy Council, Shri Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla stated

 "There is no definition of appeal in the Code of Civil Procedure but their Lordships have
no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate court, asking it to set aside or revise a
decision of a separate court is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term.."

4. A further reference has been made to a decision in the case of Colonial Sugar Refining
Co. Ltd. vs. Irving2, to submit on the issue whether right of appeal is a substantive right or is only a
matter of procedure and further whether the right of appeal could be crystalized by subsequent
legislation or not.

5. It is trite law that the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really
the steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one
legal proceedings; but as in the case of Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry,3 the
Hon'ble Apex Court held, that the right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a
substantive right. The said right exists as on and from the date the lis commences and such right is
to be governed by the law prevailing on the date of the institution of the proceeding and not by the
law that prevails on the date of its decision or on the date of filing of the appeal.

6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mukund Deo (Dead) by his legal
representatives Kasibai and Others Vs. Mahadeo4; held that it is true that as a general rule,
alteration in law of procedure are retrospective, but a right of an appeal, to a particular forum is a
substantive right; and is not lost by alteration in the law unless, the provision is made expressly in
that behalf or a necessary implication arises.

7. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs.
State of M.P.,5 held as following in Paragraph-24, which is as below:

 "24. The above decisions quite firmly establish and our decisions in Janardhan Reddy v.
State [Janardhan Reddy v. State, 1950 SCC 898 : 1950 SCR 940] and in Ganpat Rai v. Agarwal
Chamber of Commerce Ltd. [Ganpat Rai v. Agarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd., (1952) 2 SCC
214 : 1953 SCR 752] uphold the principle that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of
procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an inferior
tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in,
and before a decision is given by, the inferior court."

8. Relying on the aforesaid judgments, Shri Gautam Baghel, Advocate submits, that the
presumption is that a statute is prima facie prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary
implication made to have a retrospective operation.
1412 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
9. In the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra,6 the Hon'ble Apex
Court held as follows in Paragraph No. 26:

 "26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively
and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which
the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From
the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which
emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may
be culled out as follows:

 (i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation
unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which
merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be
retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly
confined to its clearly defined limits.

 (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to
right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.

 (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in
procedural law.

 (iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where
the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of
transactions already accomplished.

 (v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and
liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either
expressly or by necessary implication."

10. At this juncture, we may also refer gainfully to a decision in the case of Chirag
Ashiyana Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Santosh and Another7; wherein this court referring to the various
decisions held as follows:

 29. The right of appeal is a substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure. It is a
vested right and accrues in favour of the litigant on the date lis commences and although, it may be
actually exercised when an adverse judgment is pronounced, such a right is governed by the law
prevailing at the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the
date of its decision or at the date of filing of appeal. It is well-settled that right of appeal arises
when a proceeding is commenced and cannot be taken away by a subsequent legislation except by
express provision or by necessary intendment to the contrary. Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal,
(1928) ILR 50 All. 965 (FB).

 31. Again in case of Seth Nand Lal and another v. State of Haryana and others; AIR 1980
SC 2097, following the Anant Mill's case (supra) the Supreme Court stated ''It is well-settled by
4 All. Committee of management of managing Committee of Hidaytul Muslamin School Prayagraj & Anr/
 Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1413
several decisions of this Court that the right of appeal is a creature of a statute and there is no
reason why the legislature while granting the right cannot impose conditions for the exercise of
such right so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions
rendering the right almost illusory''.

 32. Again in case of Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and another v. Collector of Customs
(Preventive), Bombay; (1988) 4 SCC 402, the Supreme Court reiterated ''the right to appeal is
neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be
followed in all judicial or quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and
it can be circumscribed by the condition in grant......If the statute gives a right of appeal upon
certain conditions, it is upon fulfillment of those conditions that right becomes vested and
exercisable by the appellant.''

 33. In case of Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury; 1957 AIR 540, after
referring to several leading decisions on the point, the Supreme Court observed that a vested right
of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides either expressly or by
necessary intendment and not otherwise. (Para 28 of the judgment).

 34. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mukund Deo (Dead) represented by his legal
representatives Kasibai and others v. Mahadeo and others, AIR1965 SC 703, held that it is true
that as a general rule, alteration in the law of procedure are retrospective, but a right of appeal to
a particular forum is a substantive right and is not lost by alteration in the law unless, provision is
made expressly in that behalf, or a necessary implication arises.

 35. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court a right of appeal is a
vested right and is governed by the statute which confers such right. In case the statute or the law
which confers the right places certain conditions for exercise of such right, the said can be
exercised only after the fulfillment of those conditions by the appellant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
while interpreting the right of appeal being substantive right has held to the extent that by a
subsequent enactment (such as Court Fees Act), the right of the appellant cannot be impaired or
made onerous by providing additional conditions by the subsequent Act. Unless, the subsequent Act
providing for such a condition is made retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment."

11. The effect of amendment of law relating to appeal after commencement of lis was
again, a subject matter of consideration before a Constitutional Bench in Vithalbhai Nema Bhai
Patel vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax,8 and the view taken in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd.
(supra) was reiterated, by stating that when a lis commences, all rights get crystallized and no clog
upon a likely appeal can be put unless the law is made retrospective, expressly or by fair
implication.

12. The maxim nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis, i.e. a new
law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past exemplifies this legal position.

13. Recently, the Apex Court had the occasion to examine the practice and procedure viz. a
viz. right of appeal and its nature and scope in ECGC Ltd. vs. Mokul Shriram EPC JV, 9 wherein
1414 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
giving reference to the case of Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. (supra) , the Court held that the
fact that the pre-existing right to appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that
the old law which created that right of appeal, must also exist to support the continuation of that the
appeal; and that the old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal.

14. The observation in the case of Ganpat Rai Hira Lal Vs. Aggarwal Chambers of
Commerce Ltd.,10 and Janardan Reddy Vs. State,11 firmly established the principle that the right
of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. This right of
appeal, from the decision of an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal, becomes vested in a party
when proceedings are first initiated in, and before a decision is given by, the inferior court.

15. From the aforesaid, the discernable principle is that, firstly, the right of appeal is not a
mere alteration in procedure but is a matter of substantive right; and secondly, once a pre-existing
right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment and continues to exist, post the amendment, and
it is equally applicable in a converse situation (Emphasis supplied) where the lis, was prior to
the amendment and the decision, as in the present case, is also prior to the amendment, creating a
right of appeal by way of Amendment; and as such unless and until the amendment is made
retrospective by the express words or necessary implication, it is trite law that the settled position
prior to the amendment, cannot be permitted to be re-agitated by way of enforcing a right of appeal,
which is otherwise not available, by a retrospective application.

16. The aforesaid view also find concurrence from a three Judge Bench judgment in State
of Bombay Vs. Supreme General Fils Exchange Ltd.,12 wherein it was held that an impairment of
the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not
a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does
so is not retrospective, unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment.

17. Shri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents does not dispute
the aforesaid propositions, but however submits that this court, vide its order dated 27.04.2024,
passed in Writ-C No. 33129 of 2021 had given the liberty to the respondents to pursue his
alternative remedy available to him under law. Therefore, he argues that the only remedy which
was available to him at the time of the passing of the order dated 27.04.2024 was a remedy under
Section 25(1)(d), and now since he has withdrawn his challenge, he shall be rendered remedy-less,
if the appeal is held to be not maintainable; and accordingly submits that in view of the order dated
27.04.2024 passed by this court, the present writ petition is devoid of any merit.

18. The aforesaid argument is only noted to be rejected, since it is trite law that a superior
court or for that matter any court, cannot vest jurisdiction in an authority, which otherwise does not
exist and the respondents had withdrawn the proceedings, even if under a misapprehension of law,
the appeal cannot be said to be maintainable.

19. Shri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on an order dated
26.03.2025 passed by this court in Writ-C No. 9039 of 2025, preferred by Farid Javed Ansari,
which was disposed off, directing the appellate authority to decide the appeal within a period of
four months. The aforesaid order dated 26.03.2025 also cannot come to the rescue of the
4 All. Committee of management of managing Committee of Hidaytul Muslamin School Prayagraj & Anr/
 Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1415
respondents, as while deciding the appeal, the appellate authority, ought to also have decided its
own jurisdiction with respect to the order dated 21.08.2021; and as to whether the appeal was
maintainable or not, which now this Court has held to be not maintainable.

Conclusion/Direction

1. In view of the various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this court, it is
evident from long line of decisions, that the right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure but
is a substantive right and though legal pursuit of a remedy by way of suit or appeal, are steps in a
series of proceedings and are to be regarded as one legal proceedings; however, the right to appeal
is a statutory right and can only be enforced or taken away by an enactment; and its applicability, if
is to be inferred with retrospectivity, the same has to be either expressly or by necessary
implication has to be provided and not otherwise. The intention to vest right to appeal
retrospectively, cannot be presumed, unless such intention is clearly manifested by expressed
words or necessary implications.

2. The right of an appeal is a vested right which accrues to a litigant from the date the lis
commences; and it is when a lis commences, all rights get crystalized and no clog upon a likely
appeal can be put unless the law was made retrospective, expressly or by fair implication.

3. In the present case, the order passed under Section 25(1) of the Act, 1860 was admittedly
passed on 21.08.2021 and the same was subjected to challenge in Writ-C No. 33129 of 2021 (Farid
Javed Ansari Vs. State of U.P. and Others); which was withdrawn by the petitioner therein vide
order dated 27.04.2024, with a liberty that he may seek such alternative remedy, which may be
available to him under the law.

4. Now, the question arises that what is the nature of remedy that may be available to him
under law and in case, the Writ-C No. 33129 of 2021 was withdrawn, under a misconception of
law, what remedy may be available to the respondents; as this court is also conscious of the fact
that no one should be rendered remedy-less.

5. In the eventuality, no remedy was available to the respondents against the order passed
under Section 25(1) of the Act, 1860, it cannot be said that the remedy of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was not available to him, and in view of the fact that the said writ petition was
dismissed with an observation that a liberty is available to the petitioner to pursue his alternative
remedy, which otherwise was not available to him, the dismissal of the writ petition on the ground
that there being an efficacious alternative remedy, may be an order, if the petitioner so advised, he
may seek for a recall or review (Ref: Chitra Srivastava Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi)13.
However, the aforesaid observation is in no way on the merits of the case and shall be
independently dealt with, in case appropriate proceedings are set in motion. The said question, is
left open, at this stage.

6. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order dated 10.06.2025 passed by the Respondent
no.2 in Appeal No. 1105 of 2025 (Farid Javed Ansari Vs. Tarik Nihal Ansari), along with entire
1416 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceedings initiated under Section 25(1)(d) of the Act, 1860, is hereby quashed and the writ
petition stands allowed.

7. However, no order as to costs.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1416
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 07.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 22877 of 2016

Aman Ullah ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether mere pendency of criminal cases or registration of FIRs, without allegations of misuse of firearm and
despite acquittal, can justify cancellation of an arms license under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959?

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Arms Act, 1959 - Sections 17(3), 18) - Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 307, 323, 504, 506: - Writ Petition under Article 226 - filed against
impugned orders, cancelling petitioner's DBBL arms license and also seeking restoration thereof - Arms license
cancellation - petitioner pleaded that FIRs registered against him were politically motivated, that he was
acquitted in both criminal cases - there was no allegation of misuse of firearm - District Magistrate cancelled
the license branding him "criminal minded" - Appellate authority upheld the order without considering
acquittals or reply - whether mere pendency of FIRs, absent misuse, can justify cancellation under Section
17(3) of the Arms Act - Court finds that cancellation based on speculative likelihood of misuse, ignoring
acquittals and reply, is arbitrary and perverse - pendency of criminal case cannot be sole ground - acquittal
strengthens innocence - licensing authority must record cogent reasons - held, Licensing authority must
record cogent reasons, speculative apprehension of misuse is arbitrary - Non-speaking orders ignoring reply
and acquittal judgments are unsustainable - hence, impugned orders are set-aside, writ petition, allowed
accordingly.
(Para - 9, 10)
WP Allowed. (E-11)
CASE LAW CITED
Writ-C No. 31473 of 2019 (Allahabad High Court, order dated 14.09.2022),
State of U.P. v. Jaswant Singh (AIR 1968 SC 191).
LIST OF ACTS
Constitution of India - Arms Act, 1959 - Indian Penal Code, 1860.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Arms license cancellation, FIR pendency, acquittal, misuse of firearm, arbitrary order, natural justice,
likelihood of misuse, non-speaking order.