# Committee of Management v. Regional Deputy Director of Education

- **Citation:** (2003) 3 ILRA 657
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2003-05-22
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 363 of 2003
- **Bench:** S.P. Srivastava, K.N. Ojha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/committee-of-management-v-regional-deputy-director-of-education-40150
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Rules of Court-Chapter VIII Rule 5Judgment meaning thereof-Impugned
order passed by the learned Single Judge
can be said to be a judgment-yes, it has
the traits and trappings of finality is a
final order within the definition of
judgment-Termination
order
passed
without inquiry and in utter violation of
the
principles
of
natural
justice,
quashed-liberty given to proceed against
the petitioner after holding the regular
inquiry as contemplated under the Rules.

Held: Para 11 and 15

The learned counsel for the appellant as
well as the learned Standing Counsel
representing, the Regional Director of
Education, Meerut, as well as Basic
Shiksha Adhikari, Ghaziabad, respondent
nos. 1 and 2, respectively have stated
that they will have no objection to the
quashing of the aforesaid two orders
dated 24.10.2001 and 31.10.2001, as the
petitioner had no been afforded any
opportunity of hearing before passing of
the said order. He, however, further
stated that they may be given liberty to
proceed against the petitioner after
holding
the
regular
inquiry,
as
contemplated under the rules

The impugned order contains the traits,
trappings
and
qualities
and
characteristics of a final order. Although
the expression 'judgment' has not been
defined either in the Letters Patent or
under the Rules of the Court but
whatever tests may be applied, the order
impugned in the present case clearly
shows that the order impugned in the
present case clearly shows that the order
has in it the traits and trapping of finality
and taking into consideration its ultimate
effect, has to be taken to be in the
nature of a final order so as to fall within
the definition of the 'judgment'.
Case referred:
AIR 1974 SC 1719

## Text

3 All] Vibhuti Prasad Mishra V. State of U.P. and others
657
ever communicated or served personally
to the petitioner. The petitioner has not
been afforded to adduce evidences or
allowed opportunity to cross examine the
witnesses. The documents relied by the
respondents have also not been furnished
or was shown to the petitioner. In the
present case notice of charge sheet and
inquiry was neither served personally nor
sent by the registered post nor the same
were published in the news papers even
the petitioner was not given proper
attachment order in respect of the place
and the office in the suspension order
consequently the charge sheet, notice for
disciplinary inquiry cannot be deemed or
held to have been served upon the
petitioner. If the petitioner was evading
service of notice or charge sheet issued by
the police department or any of the
information of the inquiry officer, it does
not give any licence to the respondents to
proceed ex parte against the petitioner.
Here this is a glaring case where the
petitioner has been dismissed from
service without adopting the proper
procedure for dismissal on the aspects of
the lack on the procedure and by not
providing
the
petitioner
proper
opportunity of hearing, the dismissal
order and the appellate order both are in
violation of the principles of the natural
justice and cannot legally be sustained.

15. The allegations against the
petitioner was not irrespective of the
moral or in respect of the financial
irregularities
or
embezzlement,
the
charges are mainly for absence from duty,
therefore, this court cannot think even in
the present facts and circumstances to
allow the respondents to initiate to give
charge sheet afresh to initiate the
disciplinary proceeding because it is irony
of fate of the petitioner that since the
appointment from the year 1964 as Sub
inspector, he could not visualise fortunate
comfortable days in his service career and
has been only dragged under inquiry for
frivolous
allegations
for
which
the
respondents have not even bothered to
conduct the inquiry in accordance with
law.

16. In these circumstances, the
orders dated 8th November, 1989, 7th
April, 2000 and 17th February, 1994
passed by respondents no. 3, 1 and 2
respectively are set aside and the
petitioner is directed to be treated into
service and shall be allowed to be given
75% of the back wages only. The
petitioner
is
reinstated
without
consequential benefits of back wages as
well as increments. All the benefits to be
given to the petitioner consequent upon
this order to be finalised within three
months from this order.

The writ petition is allowed.

No order as to costs.

Certified copies of the judgements
delivered
today
where
the
State
Government is party may be given to Sri
M.C. Chaturvedi, Addl. Chief Standing
counsel free of cost.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.05.2003

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.P. SRIVASTAVA, J.
THE HON'BLE K.N. OJHA, J.

Special Appeal No. 363 of 2003

Committee of Management ...Appellant
Versus
Regional Deputy Director of Education
(Basic) Meerut & others ...Respondents
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658 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri S.K. Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri P. Padia
Sri H.R. Misra
S.C.

Rules of Court-Chapter VIII Rule 5Judgment meaning thereof-Impugned
order passed by the learned Single Judge
can be said to be a judgment-yes, it has
the traits and trappings of finality is a
final order within the definition of
judgment-Termination
order
passed
without inquiry and in utter violation of
the
principles
of
natural
justice,
quashed-liberty given to proceed against
the petitioner after holding the regular
inquiry as contemplated under the Rules.

Held: Para 11 and 15

The learned counsel for the appellant as
well as the learned Standing Counsel
representing, the Regional Director of
Education, Meerut, as well as Basic
Shiksha Adhikari, Ghaziabad, respondent
nos. 1 and 2, respectively have stated
that they will have no objection to the
quashing of the aforesaid two orders
dated 24.10.2001 and 31.10.2001, as the
petitioner had no been afforded any
opportunity of hearing before passing of
the said order. He, however, further
stated that they may be given liberty to
proceed against the petitioner after
holding
the
regular
inquiry,
as
contemplated under the rules

The impugned order contains the traits,
trappings
and
qualities
and
characteristics of a final order. Although
the expression 'judgment' has not been
defined either in the Letters Patent or
under the Rules of the Court but
whatever tests may be applied, the order
impugned in the present case clearly
shows that the order impugned in the
present case clearly shows that the order
has in it the traits and trapping of finality
and taking into consideration its ultimate
effect, has to be taken to be in the
nature of a final order so as to fall within
the definition of the 'judgment'.
Case referred:
AIR 1974 SC 1719
(Delivered by Hon'ble S.P. Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard the learned counsel for the
appellant.

2. Shri H.R. Misra, the learned
Standing
Counsel
representing
the
respondent nos. 1 and 2 as well as Dr.
Padia,
learned
Senior
Advocate,
representing the petitioner-respondent no.
3 have also been heard.

3. Perused the record.

4. The dispute in this case relates to
the appointment and the entitlement of
respondent no. 3 to hold the post of an
Assistant Teacher in an educational
institution known as Nehru Jai Jawan Jai
Kisan Junior High School, Galand,
Ghaziabad, which institution imparts
education up to the standard of class-VIII
and receives the grant-in-aid from the
State. At present an Authorised Controller
has been appointed for that institution
vesting
him
with
the
jurisdiction
exercisable
by
the
Committee
of
Management.

5. This appeal has been filed by the
Committee of Management through the
learned single judge holding that the
respondents which included the Regional
Deputy Director of Education and Basis
Shiksha Adhikari, Ghaziabad were not
entitled to be heard in opposition to the
writ petition as they had in utter disregard
of the impugned order dated 22.02.2002
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3 All] C/M V. Regional Dy. Director of Education (Basic) Meerut and others
659
passed by this court had not carried into
effect the said order.

6. It may be noticed that feeling
aggrieved by the interim order dated
22.02.2002, a Special Appeal had been
filed, which was registered as Special
Appeal No. 343 of 2002 and was finally
disposed
of
vide
the
order
dated
21.03.2002, directing that the writ petition
be listed on 16.04.2002, indicating the
expectation that the writ petition shall be
disposed of as early as possible. The
appellant was given a liberty to move an
application for vacating the interim order.
Pursuant to the aforesaid order passed by
the Division Bench disposing of the
special appeal, an application seeking
vacation of the interim order was filed on
16.04.2002. The learned Single Judge
vide the order dated 25.03.2003 had
directed the respondents to inform the
court by the next date fixed as to whether
the interim order dated 22.02.2002 with
regard to the payment of current salary of
the petitioner had been complied with or
not, providing further that the interim
order dated 22.02.2002 shall continue to
remain operative until further orders of
this court. The learned counsel for
appellant has urged that in spite of the
order passed by the Division Bench for
the expeditious hearing of the writ
petition and even fixing a date for its
disposal, nothing was done and the writ
petition continues to remain pending
undecided.

7. The grievance raised by the
learned counsel for the appellant is that on
the one hand the writ petition is kept
pending and on the other hand the
appellant is being insisted to comply with
the interim order granted in favour of the
petitioner ignoring altogether the fact that
the petitioner had obtained the interim
order by practicing fraud and on the basis
of misrepresentation of facts. It is urged
that in the present case the fraud and
misrepresentation is writ large yet the
learned Single Judge has passed the
impugned order without disposing of the
application seeking vacation of the
interim order.

8. A perusal of the writ petition
giving rise to the Special Appeal indicates
that the main grievance of the petitioner is
that absolutely no inquiry, whatsoever,
was held, by the College Management/
Authorised Controller, which was the
competent authority under the relevant
rules and even the Basis Shiksha Adhikari
concerned, before passing the impugned
order which visited the petitioner with
evil consequences. It is further urged that
the services of the petitioner could not be
terminated after a long period of 22 years
and payment of her salary could not be
denied after such a long period of regular
working without affording a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to her.

9.

Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner-respondent has further urged
that the District Basis Shiksha Adhikari
had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned
order, as it was only the Managing
Committee, which could terminate the
services of as person who is an employee
of the Institution.

10. The record indicates that the
authorized controller had passed an order
on 24.10.2001 wherein it was held that
the petitioner had obtained a B.Ed.
Degree from a non-existent University
and further that she had secured an
appointment on the post in question at a
time when she was studying in the same
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660 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
college. The Basic Shiksha Adhikari was
of the further view that being the wife of
the then Manager, she could not be
selected by a Selection Committee of
which the Manager was a member. It was
contrary to the statutory provision. On the
aforesaid findings, holding that the B.Ed.
Degree claimed to have been obtained by
the petitioner was a fictitious document,
her entitlement for getting salary was
negatived. On 31.03.2001 the Authorised
Controller consequentially passed an
order terminating the services of the
petitioner.

11. The learned counsel for the
appellant as well as the learned Standing
Counsel
representing,
the
Regional
Director of Education, Meerut, as well as
Basic
Shiksha
Adhikari,
Ghaziabad,
respondent nos. 1 and 2, respectively have
stated that they will have no objection to
the quashing of the aforesaid two orders
dated 24.10.2001 and 31.10.2001, as the
petitioner had no been afforded any
opportunity of hearing before passing of
the said order. He, however, further stated
that they may be given liberty to proceed
against the petitioner after holding the
regular inquiry, as contemplated under the
rules into the matter of fraud and
misrepresentation and ineligibility of the
petitioner to get an appointment as an
Assistant Teacher in the institution.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has
urged that taking advantage of her own
fraud and misrepresentation the petitioner
is trying to get the salary etc. which will
cause
financial
loss
to
the
State
Exchequer.

12. Learned counsel for the
petitioner states that the petitioner is ready
to face the full-fledged inquiry into the
aforesaid aspects before the termination
of her service.

13. It has been urged by the learned
counsel for the respondent-petitioner that
the impugned order passed by the learned
Single Judge cannot fall within the ambit
of
the
expression
"judgment"
as
envisaged under Chapter-VIII Rule 5 of
the Court and in this view of the matter
the present Special Appeal cannot be held
to be maintainable.

14. As pointed out by the Apex
Court in its decision in the case of Shanti
Kumar R. Canji Vs. the Home Insurance,
Co. of New York, report in AIR 1974 SC
1719 in finding out whether the order is a
Judgment, it has to be found out that the
order affects the merits of the action
between the parties by determining some
right or liability. The nature of the order
will have to be examined in order to
ascertain whether there has been a
determination of any right or liability.

15. The impugned order contains the
traits,
trappings
and
qualities
and
characteristics of a final order. Although
the expression 'judgment' has not been
defined either in the Letters Patent or
under the Rules of the Court but whatever
tests may be applied, the order impugned
in the present case clearly shows that the
order impugned in the present case clearly
shows that the order has in it the traits and
trapping of finality and taking into
consideration its ultimate effect, has to be
taken to be in the nature of a final order so
as to fall within the definition of the
'judgment'.

16. In view of what has been
indicated hereinabove, the objection in
regard to the maintainability of the
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3 All] C/M V. Regional Dy. Director of Education (Basic) Meerut and others
661
Special Appeal is clearly devoid of merit
and is not at all sustainable.

17. Taking into consideration the
facts and circumstances as brought on
record, we are clearly of the opinion that
it will be appropriate that the impugned
orders, which are claimed to have been
passed without affording any reasonable
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner
deserve to be quashed with the liberty to
the present appellant as well as the
present respondent nos. 1 and 2 to hold an
inquiry into the aforesaid matter of fraud
and misrepresentation of facts and other
aspects going to the root of the matter
after proceeding in accordance with law
ensuring that the entire exercise is
completed within three months from
today.

18. This Special as well as the writ
petition
shall
stand
disposed
of
accordingly.

19. It is, however, provided that the
salary and other allowances to which the
petitioner is entitled on the basis of the
earlier approval of her appointment by the
Basis Shiksha Adhikari dated 06.02.1993
shall be paid to her henceforth subject to
her furnishing adequate security for the
amount to the satisfaction of the Basis
Shaiksha
Adhikari,
Ghaziabad.
The
security may included the amount lying
with the State to the credit of the
petitioner like provident Fund etc.

20. The petitioner-respondent shall
cooperate in the inquiry.

Ordered accordingly.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 1.7.2003

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J.
THE HON'BLE R.S. TRIPATHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 47222 of 2002

Shaukat Ali

...Petitioner
Versus
Allahabad Development Authority and
another

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sudhir Kumar
Sri M.K. Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri B.B. Paul
Sri A.K. Misra

U.P. Urban Planning and Development
Act, 1973- Sections 15 (2-A), 2 (ee), 2
(jj), 2 (kk), 33, 35, 36, 37 and 38-U.P.
Regulation of building operations Act,
1958- Ss 5 and 7 (2-(C)- U.P. Water
supply and sewerage Act, 1975- Power
under-Arbitrary
exercise of- IllegalApplication for sanction of map-Demand
notice demanding exorbitant amounts as
permit fee, water fee, stocking fee,
division
fee,
development
charges,
Inspection fee and open area penaltyheld arbitrary and illegal. Since no
development activity services rendered
by ADA- cannot charge development
charge.

Held- paras 62 and 63

In the present cases we find that the
demand
is
not
preceded
by
any
development work which might have
been done by the A.D.A. in relation to the
land in question.

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