# Constable Firoz Khan(Terminated) v. I.G. Police, Bareilly Zone, Bareilly & others - **Citation:** (2000) 3 ILRA 295 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2000 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/constable-firoz-khan-terminated-v-i-g-police-bareilly-zone-bareilly-others-39507 - **Pages:** 4 ## Text 295 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000 is no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation. The above view finds support from the decisions of the apex Court in: 1. AIR 1981 SC 1473 2. AIR 1983 SC 194 3. AIR 1987 SC 2111 (Pr.12) 16. Besides what has been argued at the Bar and referred to above, this Court would like to note that Petitioner did not implead Committee of Management of the College. Instead she had impleaded the Authorised Controller. Chiranji Lal Balika Inter College, Aligarh/City Magistrate, Aligarh. Assuming that there was a validly elected Committee of Management, constituted as contemplated under the scheme of Administration under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921", the aggrieved party, in case the petitioner is granted relief, shall be Committee of Management. The Authorised Controller is appointed under the Act only to represent the Committee of Management for time being for day to day function. The Authorised Controller is in fact, not the committee of Management as such Committee of Management ought to have been impleaded in the petition and sought to be served through Authorised Controller instead of Manager. In the absence of committee of Management, which is not only relevant but also necessary party in the instant case the Petitioner cannot be granted relief claimed in the Writ Petition. 17. It may be noted that the whole dispute of seniority between Petitioner and Respondent No.3 assumed importance and became significant inasmuch as under U.P. Secondary Service Commission Act senior most teacher is required to take over on ad hoc basis if regular incumbent is not available. 18. In view of the above, I find no error apparent on the face of record. The writ Petition looks merit. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition Dismissed. 25,*,1$/ -85,6',&7,21 25,*,1$/ -85,6',&7,21 &,9,/ 6,'( &,9,/ 6,'( '$7(' $//$+$%$' '$7(' $//$+$%$' %()25( %()25( 7+( +21·%/( $. <2* - 7+( +21·%/( $. <2* - &LYLO 0LVF ZULW 3HWLWLRQ 1R RI &RQVWDEOH )LUR] .KDQ WHUPLQDWHG «3HWLWLRQHU 9HUVXV ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO RI 3ROLFH %DUHLOO\ =RQH %DUHLOO\ DQG RWKHUV «5HVSRQGHQWV &RXQVHO IRU WKH 3HWLWLRQHU 6KUL 5DM .XPDU .KDQQD &RXQVHO IRU WKH 5HVSRQGHQWV 6& &RQVWLWXWLRQ RI ,QGLD $UWLFOH ± 7HUPLQDWLRQ RI 3HWLWLRQHU VHUYLFH DV FRQVWDEOH XSRQ KLV FRQYLFWLRQ E\ &ULPLQDO &RXUW ZLWKRXW DQ\ GHFLVLRQ E\ DSSHOODWH &RXUW LQ YLRODWLRQ RI SULQFLSOHV RI QDWXUDO -XVWLFH ± 2UGHU RI 7HUPLQDWLRQ VHW DVLGH ± FDVH UHPDQGHG +HOG ± 3DUD $VVXPLQJ WKH *RYHUQPHQW RUGHU GDWHG 2FWREHU SHUPLWV GLVPLVVDO WHUPLQDWLRQ RI D *RYHUQPHQW HPSOR\HH ZLWKRXW ZDLWLQJ IRU ILQDO GHFLVLRQ RI DSSHDO LI *RYHUQPHQW HPSOR\HH LV FRQYLFWHG E\ D WULDO &RXUW WKH LPSXJQHG RUGHU GRHV QRW GLVFORVH WKDW VXFK D WHUPLQDWLRQ FDQ EH SDVVHG ZLWKRXW FRPSO\LQJ ZLWK WKH UHTXLUHPHQW RI SURFHGXUH OLNH JLYLQJ QRWLFH DQG 3All] Constable Firoz Khan(Terminated) V. I.G. Police, Bareilly Zone, Bareilly & others 296 RSSRUWXQLW\ XQGHU $UWLFOH &RQVWLWXWLRQ RI ,QGLD RU DV FRQWDLQHG LQ UHOHYDQW VHUYLFH UXOHV &DVH ODZ GLVFXVVHG /&' 3U DQG $&- '% 3U By the Court 1. All the respondents are represented by the standing counsel and writ petition can be disposed of finally as the time likely for final hearing of the case will be the same as for deciding ' stay application' I propose to decide the writ petition finally as contemplated under Chapter XXIII of the Rules of Court. 2. No counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents in spite of several opportunities being given by the Court. 3. On perusing the petition and the documents annexed therewith, it is apparent that the facts stated in the petition are matter of record. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel. 5. Petitioner was employed as constable in the department of police, U.P. Government. At the relevant time, he was serving as constable (No. 88) ever since, he was appointed in the year 1968. He completed 28 years of his service with unblemished record as stated in (paras 4 and 5 of the writ petition) 6. According to the petitioner, there was some dispute to the petitioner, there was some dispute with his landlord about residential accommodation in his tenancy and a crime case No. 346 of 1989 under sections 323, 452, 504, 506 I.P.C. was registered against him on the basis of the first information report lodged at the police station, Civil Lines, District Moradabad on 9.3.1989. petitioner alleges that the said first information report was lodged by the landlord to implicate him falsely out of enmity. 7. In the aforesaid of time case the 4th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad found him guilty of committing offences under section 323 I.P.C. an imposed fine of Rs.250/- and in case of failure to deposit the same within the stipulated period he had to serve one week's rigorous imprisonment. He was found not guilty of other offences. In appeal, the Ist Additional District & Sessions Judge, dismissed the appeal vide judgment of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate. Petitioner preferred criminal revision No.1330 of 1995 before this Court which has been admitted on October 20, 1995 and pending (para 8 of the writ petition). 8. It is contended that the impugned order of termination (Annexure -1 to the writ petition) suffers from manifest illegality an as the same has been passed without notice and without affording opportunity of hearing (para 9 of the writ petition) 9. Perusal of the impugned order dated 3.6.1996 passed by the Superintendent of police, Rampur indicates that the said authority had imposed punishment of termination of service on the basis of Government order in question, permits termination in case of a Government employee being found guilty of criminal offences by a criminal Court, without waiting for final decision 297 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000 in appeal. No other reason or circumstances has been disclosed therein. Assuming the Government order dated October 12, 1979 permits dismissal termination of a Government employee without waiting for final decision of appeal (if Government employee is convicted by a trial Court), the impugned order does not disclose that such a termination can be passed without complying with the requirement of procedure like giving notice and opportunity under Article 311 (2) constitution of India an or as contained in relevant service rules. Against aforesaid impugned order dated 3.6.1996 Appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed vide impugned order dated 28.4.1997 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Zone Moradabad., 10. The appellate authority also failed to refer to the specific pleas faised by the petitioner in his defence in the memorandum of appeal, Review petition has also been dismissed vide his order dated 28.11.1997 (Annexure - 4 to the writ petition). The said order is far from being satisfactory as it does not disclose the details of the ruling cited before it. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has pleased reliance on the decisions in the following cases: - (i) State of Uttar Pradesh through director N.O.C. V. Sri Sadanand Misra and another (1984 (2) Lucknow Civil Decision (LCD) page 294 (Paragraph 3 and 4). In the said case learned single Judge while dealing with requirement of Article 311 of the Constitution of India in which case a Government employee being terminated from service having been punished by a criminal Court, held that an enquiry under clause (a) of Article 311 (2) may not be held when order of removal from service is passed on the ground of conduct which has led to conviction on a criminal charge, but the enquiry is not dispensed with where the order is based merely on the conviction recorded by the criminal Court. The Court observed that when removal from service on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge but on the ground of conviction itself. In my opinion, therefore the enquiry which the principles of natural justice require to be held could not be dispensed with. (ii) Dost Mohammad v Union of India - (1980 Allahabad Civil Journal) page 270 (DB) para (9). In the aforesaid case a Division Bench of this Court observed "a perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that the disciplinary authority did not apply his mind objectively to the question as to whether the conduct which led to the petitioner's conviction was sufficient to impose the penalty against him and if at all what penalty should be imposed on him. It appears that the disciplinary authority mechanically exercised its power under Rule 19 to remove the petitioner from service merely because the petitioner had been convicted of a criminal offences under section 323 I.P.C. In our opinion the disciplinary authority noted in violation of the principles of natural justice as well as in excess of his jurisdiction. The appellate authority also acted in the same manner and it failed to apply its mind to the question raised by the petitioner in appeal. 12. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 28.11.1997 is set 3All] Sunil Kumar V. Director, Rajya Shaikshik Anusandhan Parishad, Lucknow & others 298 aside and the matter is remanded back to the appellate authority (respondent no.1) to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above within three months of the receipt of a certified copy of this judgment provided it is filed within two months from today. It is made clear that the appellate authority shall decide the appeal without being prejudiced or influenced by any of the observations made in this judgment particularly and in accordance with material before him and in accordance with law. 13. Writ petition is allowed and the case is remanded back to respondent no. 1 appellate authority for decision Appeal in accordance with law. 25,*,1$/ -85,6',&7,21 25,*,1$/ -85,6',&7,21 &,9,/ 6,'( &,9,/ 6,'( '$7(' $//$+$%$' '$7(' $//$+$%$' %()25( %()25( 7+( +21·%/( 90 6$+$, - 7+( +21·%/( 90 6$+$, - &LYLO 0LVF :ULW 3HWLWLRQ 1R RI 6XQLO .XPDU «3HWLWLRQHU 9HUVXV 'LUHFWRU 5DM\D 6KDLNVKLN $QXVDQGKDQ $XU 3UDVKLNVKDQ 3DULVKDG 8WWDU 3UDGHVK /XFNQRZ DQG RWKHUV «5HVSRQGHQWV &RXQVHO IRU WKH 3HWLWLRQHU 6KUL $VKRN %KXVKDQ 6KUL $QLO %KXVKDQ &RXQVHO IRU WKH 5HVSRQGHQWV 6KUL 6& 9HUPD 6& &RQVWLWXWLRQ RI ,QGLD $UWLFOH ± 3HWLWLRQHU D FDQGLGDWH IRU 6%7& FRXUVH KDG VHFXUHG PRUH WKDQ TXDOLW\ SRLQW PDUNV PHQWLRQHG LQ WKH QHZV LWHP %XW KLV QDPH GLG QRW DSSHDU LQ VHFRQG OLVW ± ,Q HDUOLHU SHWLWLRQ WKH &RXUW E\ LQWHULP RUGHU SHUPLWWHG SHWLWLRQHU SURYLVLRQDOO\ WR MRLQ WKH FRXUVH ± +H VXFFHVVIXOO\ FRPSOHWHG 7UDLQLQJ ± %XW QRW DOORZHG WR DSSHDU LQ H[DPV E\ 'LUHFWRU LQ SXUVXDQFH RI JHQHUDO RUGHU E\ +LJK &RXUW ± $V SHU GLUHFWLRQ WR &RXUW SHWLWLRQHU VXEPLWWHG IUHVK UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ EHIRUH UHVSRQGHQW QR ± 5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ UHMHFWHG E\ 'LUHFWRU ± +HQFH SUHVHQW SHWLWLRQ +HOG ±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¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ GXH WR WKLV GHIHFW ZDV LQFRPSOHWH DQG KH ZDV LQHOLJLEOH By the Court 1. The petitioner a candidate for Special Basic Training Certificate Course (in brief SBTC) has approached this Court by way of second writ petition for redressal of his grievance. The basic facts cannot be disputed, as they are clear from the documents filed by the petitioner before the respondents at one or the other stage. They are also mentioned in the impugned order passed by the Director. Therefore, this petition is being disposed of at the admission stage, without calling for any counter affidavit, but after hearing the learned standing counsel.