# Corporation Ltd v. State (NCT of

- **Citation:** (2012) 2 ILRA 947
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-08-22
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11261 of 2000
- **Bench:** B. Amit Sthalekar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/corporation-ltd-v-state-nct-of-42312
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

U.P. State Universities Act, 1963-Section
60-D-Single operation order passed by
DIOS-without affording opportunity to
the
management-Sanskrit
Maha
Vidyalaya-only
Deputy
Director-heldcompetent to pass such order-held-order
without jurisdiction-quashed.

Held: Para 9

From a reading of the said provisions
there is no doubt that the power to
instruct
the
bank
that
the
Salary
Payment Account shall be operated by
the Dy. Director or by some other officer
duly authorised by him vests with the
Dy. Director of Education. There is
nothing
on
the
record
nor
is
it
948 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
demonstrated from the impugned order
that any power was conferred upon the
DIOS for directing single operation.
Therefore, so far as the first question is
concerned, it is established from the
impugned order itself that the same is
wholly without jurisdiction having been
passed
by
the
DIOS
without
any
authorization to that effect by the
Deputy Director as contemplated by the
second proviso of Section 60-D of the
U.P. State Universities Act, 1973.

## Text

2 All] Committee of Management V. Direction of Education & Others
947
difference at the stage of summoning. It is
noteworthy that the complaint was
presented on behalf of Allahabad Bank,
which is a public sector bank constituted
under
the
Banking
Companies
(Acquisition & Transfer of Undertakings)
Act, 1970, which is a Central Act.
Moreover it is a Government Company
under section 617 of the Companies Act.
Therefore, by virtue of Section 21 clause
Twelfth of Indian Penal Code read with
Section 2(y) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, its branch Manager, who
presented the complaint, would be a
"public servant" and, as such, by virtue of
the decision of the Apex Court in the case
of
National
Small
Industries
Corporation Ltd. V. State (NCT of
Delhi)
(2009)
1
SCC
407
(vide
paragraphs 16, 19 and 20 of the
judgment) the benefit of the proviso to
Section 200 CrPC i.e. exemption from
examination of the complainant and the
witnesses, would be available, even
though Allahabad Bank (the Company)
was the complainant. Accordingly, the
summoning order cannot be faulted on
this ground as well.

9. Before parting, the Court
expresses deep anguish at the prevailing
state of affairs that in a matter like this,
the court below took 17 years to issue
process, when the statement under section
200 CrPC, which was not even required
by law, was recorded 17 years back.
Matters
under
section
138
of
the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are to
be dealt with utmost expedition otherwise
the very purpose, for which the provision
was inserted in the Act, would stand
frustrated.

10. For the reasons mentioned
above, I do not find any illegality,
impropriety or jurisdictional error in the
summoning
order.
The
revision
application is, accordingly, dismissed.

11. The Registry is directed to send
a copy of this order to the court
concerned, within three weeks from
today, for information.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.08.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE B. AMIT STHALEKAR, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11261 of 2000

Committee of Management Shri Narang
Sanskrit
Maha
Vidyalaya,
Ghughli,
Maharajganj

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Director of Education & others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Dr.H.N.Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri Anil Tiwari

U.P. State Universities Act, 1963-Section
60-D-Single operation order passed by
DIOS-without affording opportunity to
the
management-Sanskrit
Maha
Vidyalaya-only
Deputy
Director-heldcompetent to pass such order-held-order
without jurisdiction-quashed.

Held: Para 9

From a reading of the said provisions
there is no doubt that the power to
instruct
the
bank
that
the
Salary
Payment Account shall be operated by
the Dy. Director or by some other officer
duly authorised by him vests with the
Dy. Director of Education. There is
nothing
on
the
record
nor
is
it
948 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
demonstrated from the impugned order
that any power was conferred upon the
DIOS for directing single operation.
Therefore, so far as the first question is
concerned, it is established from the
impugned order itself that the same is
wholly without jurisdiction having been
passed
by
the
DIOS
without
any
authorization to that effect by the
Deputy Director as contemplated by the
second proviso of Section 60-D of the
U.P. State Universities Act, 1973.

(Delivered by Hon'ble B. Amit Sthalekar, J.)

1. This writ petition has been filed by
the petitioner challenging the order dated
19.2.2000 by which the District Inspector
of Schools, Maharajganj (DIOS) has
ordered for single operation in the
Institution known as Shri Narang Sanskrit
Mahavidyalaya, Ghughli, Maharajganj (the
Institution).

2. The Institution is duly recognized
and aided and is imparting education from
the level of Prathama upto Acharya. The
Institution
is
affiliated
to
the
Sampurnanand
Sanskrit
University,
Varanasi and also received granted-in-aid
from the State Government and is
governed by the provisions of the U.P.
State Universities Act, 1973.

3. The contention of the petitioner is
that the respondent no. 1 Director of
Education, Shiksha Samanya 2 Vistar
Anubhag, Allahabad by his letter dated
25.5.1995 sanctioned different posts in the
Institution and also directed for making
appointment in the Institution with the
approval of the Vice Chancellor of the
University. In terms of the said order and
direction, appointments were made in the
Institution on 30.11.1995, which were also
approved by the Vice Chancellor of the
University, Annexure-1 to the writ petition,
is the list of 8 teachers. These 8 teachers
were accordingly given appointment on
10.12.1995 and they were working as such
in the Institution. Their salaries have also
been duly paid from time to time. It is
further stated that without any notice or
reason the payment of salaries of the
teachers has been suspended by the State
Government and therefore, the teachers
filed writ petitions no. 48351 of 1999 and
48352 of 1999. These writ petitions were
disposed of by this Court on 18.11.1999
with a direction to the DIOS to decide the
representation of the petitioners-teachers in
accordance with law within a period of
three months.

4. The contention of the petitioner
further is that all of sudden an order has
been passed on 13.1.2000 whereby a
direction has been given by the DIOS to
lodge an FIR against the Committee of
Management of the Institution on the
ground that for the 8 teachers, who were
appointed in the Institution, there was no
approval by the Vice Chancellor and,
therefore, these appointments have been
fraudulently made and salaries have been
paid to them illegally. The said order dated
13.1.2000 was challenged by the petitioner
in writ petition no. 4613 of 2000 and on
4.2.2000 this Court issued notices to the
parties and also stayed the operation of the
impugned order to the extent regarding
direction for lodging of the F.I.R. but
directed that other proceedings may go on.

5. The contention of the petitioner is
that in the meantime, the impugned order
dated 19.2.2000 was passed for single
operation, which is the subject matter of
challenge in this writ petition.

6. I have heard Dr. H.N. Tripathi,
learned counsel for the petitioner and the
2 All] Committee of Management V. Direction of Education & Others
949
learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel
appearing for the State respondents.

7. The submission of Dr. Tripathi is
that the DIOS who has passed the
impugned order is not competent to pass
the said order inasmuch as under the
second proviso of Section 60-D of the U.P.
State Universities Act, 1973, the said
power vests in the Dy. Director of
Education or by any other officer as may
be authorised by him in that behalf. The
second submission of Dr. Tripathi is that
before passing the impugned order of
single operation, no show cause notice nor
opportunity of hearing was given to the
petitioner-Committee of Management and
the entire proceedings and finding of the
fraudulent appointments of the teachers
was taken behind the back of the petitioner
and, therefore, the impugned order is bad
in law being ex-parte and violative of
principles of nature justice inasmuch as it
visits
the
petitioner
with
civil
consequences.

8. So far as the first submission
raised by Shri Tripathi is concerned, a
reference may be made to the provisions of
Section 60-D of the Act and second
proviso thereto, which reads as under:

"60-D. Procedure for payment of
salary in case of certain colleges.-(1) The
management of every college shall for the
purposes of disbursement of salaries to its
teachers and employees open in a
scheduled bank or a co-operative bank or
post
office,
a
separate
account
(thereinafter in this Chapter called 'Salary
Payment Account') to be operated jointly
by a representative of the management and
by the Deputy Director or such other
officer as may be authorised by the Deputy
Director in that behalf :

..............................................................
..........................

Provided further that in the case
referred to in sub-section (3), or where in
any other case after giving to the
Management an opportunity of showing
cause, the Deputy Director is of opinion
that it is necessary or expedient so to do,
the Deputy Director may instruct the bank
that the Salary Payment Account shall be
operated only by himself, or by such other
officer as may be authorised by him in that
behalf and may at any time revoke such
instruction."

9. From a reading of the said
provisions there is no doubt that the power
to instruct the bank that the Salary
Payment Account shall be operated by the
Dy. Director or by some other officer duly
authorised by him vests with the Dy.
Director of Education. There is nothing on
the record nor is it demonstrated from the
impugned order that any power was
conferred upon the DIOS for directing
single operation. Therefore, so far as the
first question is concerned, it is established
from the impugned order itself that the
same is wholly without jurisdiction having
been passed by the DIOS without any
authorization to that effect by the Deputy
Director as contemplated by the second
proviso of Section 60-D of the U.P. State
Universities Act, 1973.

10. So far as the second question
raised by Shri Tripathi that no opportunity
of hearing was given before passing the
impugned order is concerned, from a
perusal of the impugned order it transpires
that it does not disclose anywhere that any
opportunity of hearing was given to the
petitioner-Committee of Management or
that any show cause notice was issued to
950 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
the petitioner or at any stage the petitioner
was heard before the impugned order was
passed. The impugned order is of single
operation which takes away the power
vested in the Committee of Management
and before any such power could have
been passed show cause notice or
opportunity of hearing ought to have been
given to the petitioner. The impugned
order of single operation visits the
petitioner with civil consequences and the
law in this regard is well settled and
followed from time time right from the
case of Dr. Bina Pani Dey till date the law
laid
down
by
the
Supreme
Court
consistently has been that the order which
visits a person with civil consequences,
opportunity of hearing must be given
otherwise such an order cannot survive on
the anvil of natural justice. Learned
standing counsel was not able to point out
from the counter affidavit whether any
opportunity of hearing was given to the
petitioner before passing the impugned
order nor whether any sanction had been
granted before passing the order of single
operation.

11. In the above backdrop, I find that
the impugned order is absolutely illegal,
arbitrary, violative of principles of natural
justice and without jurisdiction and
deserves to be quashed.

12. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ
petition is allowed and the impugned order
dated 19.2.2000 passed by the District
Inspector of Schools, Maharajganj is
quashed.

13. It will however be open for the
competent authority to proceed afresh in
the matter strictly in accordance with the
provisions of Section 60-D and the second
proviso
thereof
of
the
U.P.
State
Universities Act, 1973 after affording
adequate opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner and thereafter to take a decision
in accordance with law.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.08.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAN VIJAI SINGH, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1959 of 1976

Ram Narain

...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C. & Others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.L. Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A. K. Singh
Sri H.S.N. Tripathi
S.C.

U.P.
Consolidation
of
Holdings
ActSection-48-Power
of
Review-once
revision decided on merit-recall and
review application rejected-in garb of
compromise-can
not
be
reviewed-in
absence of statutory provisions.

Held: Para 14

In view of the Full Bench decision of this
Court, it is now well settled that the DDC
has no power of review, and once the
order dated 3.1.1974, by which the
revision was dismissed after hearing
both
the
parties
and
the
review
application filed by the respondents was
also dismissed after hearing both the
parties on 15.3.1974, there was no
occasion for the DDC to entertain the
review application and set aside the
earlier order on the basis of compromise.
Therefore, I am of the considered
opinion that the impugned order dated