# Court in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash

- **Citation:** (2001) 1 ILRA 317
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2000-10-11
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/court-in-state-of-rajasthan-v-prakash-39614
- **Pages:** 6

## Text

INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
317
deceased to tide over the sudden financial
crisis, which the family is facing due to
the death of sole bread earner of the
family. Compassionate appointments are
made as an exception to the general rule
of recruitment.

For the aforesaid reasons, this writ
petition is devoid of any merit. The writ
petition
fails
and
is
accordingly
dismissed.
Petition Dismissed.

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By the Court

1. We have heard Sir Ashwani
Kumar for the appellant and Sir B.N.
Misra, learned standing counsel for the
State.

2. In the instant special appeal the
appellant has challenged the jurisdiction
of the learned single Judge to take up the
matter and pass order dismissing his writ
petition. It has been submitted by Sri
Ashwani Kumar, learned Advocate of the
appellant that the order was passed on 11th
October, 2000, when the learned single
Judge was taking up service writs relating
to co-operative societies and matter for
orders, admission and hearing.

3. The appellant was working as a
driver in the office of Assistant Sugar
Commissioner,
respondent
no.4
who
admittedly was not working with the cooperative societies. It is well settled that
the Chief Justice alone has power to
confer jurisdiction on the Judges as to
what matter a Judge shall take up. In this
connection Mr. Ashwani Kumar has
relied upon a decision of the Supreme
Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Prakash
Chand and others (AIR 1998 SC 1344).
The
relevant
portion
of
the
said
judgement is set out herein below:

"15. A careful reading of the
aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance and
Rule
54
(supra)
shows
that
the
administrative control of the High Court
vests in the Chief Justice of the High
Court alone and that it is his prerogative
1All] Chandra Bhushan Tiwari V. State of U.P. and others
318
to distribute business of the High
Court both judicial and administrative. He
alone, has the right and power to decide
how the Benches of the High Court are to
be constituted; which Judge is to sit alone
and which cases he can and is required to
hear a also as to which Judges shall
constitute a Division Bench and what
work those Benches shall do. In other
words the Judges of the High Court can
sit alone or in Division Benches and do
such work only as may be allotted to them
by an order of or in accordance with the
directions of the Chief Justice. That
necessarily means that it is not within the
competence or domain of any Single or
Division Bench of the Court to give any
direction to the Registry in that behalf
which will run contrary to the directions
of the Chief Justice. Therefore in the
scheme
of
things
judicial
discipline
demands that in the event a single Judge
or a Division Bench considers that a
particular case requires to be listed before
it for valid reasons, it should direct the
Registry to obtain appropriate orders from
the Chief Justice. The punish Judge are
not expected to entertain any request from
the Advocates of the parties for listing of
case, which does not strictly fall within
the determined roster. In such cases, it is
appropriate to direct the counsel to make
a mention before the Chief Justice and
obtain appropriate order. This is essential
for smooth functioning of the court.
Though, on the judicial side the Chief
Justice is only the 'first amongst the
equals', on the administrative side in the
matter of constitution of Benches and
making of roster he alone is vested with
the necessary powers. That the power to
make roster exclusively vests in the Chief
Justice and that a daily case list is to be
prepared under the directions of the Chief
Justice as is borne out from Rule 73,
which reads thus:-

"Rule 73. Daily Cause List - The
Registrar shall subject to such directions
as the Chief Justice may give from time to
time cause to be prepared for each day on
which the Court sits, a list of cases which
may be heard by the different Benches of
the Court. The list shall also state the hour
at which and the room in which each
Bench shall sit. Such list shall be known
as Day's List."

16. This is the consistent view taken
by some of the High Courts and this
Court, which appears to have escaped the
attention of Shethna, J. in the present
case, when he directed the listing of
certain part-heard cases before him as a
single Judge by providing a separate
board for the purpose, while sitting in a
Division Bench.

4. A Division Bench of this Court in
State v. Devi Dayal (AIR 1959 All. 421)
considered the scope and powers of the
Chief Justice under the Constitution with
particular reference to Rule, Chapter V of
the Rules of the Court, which is set out
herein below:
".... It is clear to me, on a careful
consideration
of
the
constitutional
position, that it is only the Chief Justice
who has to right and the power to decide,
which Judge is to sit alone and which
cases such Judge can decide; further it is
again for the Chief Justice to determine,
which Judges shall do. Under the rules of
this court, the rule that I have quoted
above, it is for the Chief Justice to allot
work to Judges and Judges can do only
such work as is allotted to them."
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
319
5. It is not, in my view, open to a
Judge to make an order, which could be
called an appropriate order, unless and
until the case in which he makes the order
has been placed before him for orders
either by the Chief Justice or in
accordance with his directions. Any order,
which a Bench or a single Judge may
choose to make in a case that is not placed
before them or him by the Chief Justice or
in accordance with his directions is an
order, which, in my opinion, if made, is
without jurisdiction.
(Emphasis ours)
18. In his separate but concurring
opinion H.P. Asthana, J. Observed (Paras
19 and 20 of AIR):

"Rule 1, Chapter V of the Rules of
this Court, provides that Judges shall sit
alone or in such Division Courts as may
be constituted from time to time and do
such work as may be allotted to them by
order of the Chief Justice or in accordance
with his directions.

6. It will appear from a perusal of
the above provisions that the High Court
as a whole consisting of the Chief Justice
and his companion Judges has got the
jurisdiction to entertain any case either on
the original side or on the appellate or on
the revisional side for decision and that
the other Judge can hear only those
matters which have been allotted to them
by the Chief Justice or under his
directions. It, therefore, follows that the
Judges
do
not
have
any
general
jurisdiction over all the cases which the
High Court as a whole is competent to
hear and that theirs jurisdictions limited
only to such cases as are allotted to them
by the Chief Justice or under his
directions."
(Emphasis supplied)

7. A full Bench of this Court has
also considered this question in Sanjay
Kumar Srivastava vs. Acting Chief
Justice [(1996) Allahabad Weekly Cases
644] and held as follows:

"27 The full Bench precisely dealt
with an objection raised in that case to the
effect that since the writ petition was a
part-heard matter of the Division Bench,
it was not open to the Chief Justice of the
High Court to refer that part-heard case to
a Full Bench for hearing and decision. It
was argued before the Full Bench, that
once the hearing of the case had started
before
the
Division
Bench,
the
jurisdiction to refer the case or the
question involved therein to a larger
bench vests only in the Judges hearing the
case and not in the Chief Justice. It was
also argued that the Chief Justice could
not, even on an application made by the
Chief Standing Counsel, refer the case,
which had been heard in part by a
Division Bench for decision by a Bench
of that Court."

28. After referring to the provisions
of the Rules of the Allahabad High Court
and in particular Rule 1 of Chapter V,
which provides that Judges shall sit alone
or in such Division Courts as may be
constituted by the Chief Justice from time
to time and do such work as may be
allotted to them by order of the Chief
Justice
or
in
accordance
with
his
directions and Rule 6 of Chapter V which
inter alia provides:

8. "The Chief Justice may constitute
a Bench of two or more Judges to decided
a case or any question of law formulated
by a Bench hearing a case. In the latter
event the decision of such Bench on the
1All] Chandra Bhushan Tiwari V. State of U.P. and others
320
question so formulated shall be returned
to the Bench hearing the case and that
Bench shall follow that decision on such
question and dispose of the case after
deciding the remaining questions, if any,
arising therein."

and a catena of authorities, rejected the
arguments of the learned counsel and
opined that the order of the Chief Justice,
on an application filed by the Chief
Standing Counsel, to refer a case, which
was being heard by the Division Bench,
for hearing by a larger Bench of three
Judges because of the peculiar facts and
circumstances
as
disclosed
in
the
application
of
the
Chief
Standing
Counsel, was a perfectly valid and a
legally sound order. The Bench speaking
through S. Saghir Ahmad, J. (As his
Lordship then was) said:

"Under Rule 6 of Chapter V of the
Rules of Court, it can well be brought to
the notice of the Chief Justice through an
application or even otherwise that there
was a case which is required to be heard
by a larger Bench on account of an
important question of law being involved
in the case or because of the conflicting
decisions on the point in issue in that
case. If the Chief Justice takes cognisance
of an application laid before him under
Rule 6 of Chapter V of the Rules of Court
and constitutes a Bench of two or more
Judges to decide the case, he cannot be
said to have acted in violation of any
statutory provisions."

9. 29. The learned Judge then went
on the observe:

"In view of the above, it is clear that
the Chief Justice enjoys a special status
not only under Constitution but also under
Rules of Court, 1952 made in exercise of
powers conferred by Article 225 of the
Constitution. The Chief Justice alone can
determine jurisdiction of various Judges
of the Court. He alone can assign work to
a Judge sitting alone and to the Judges
sitting in Division Bench or to Judges
sitting in Full Bench. He alone has the
jurisdiction to decide which case will be
heard by a Judge sitting alone or which
case will be heard by two or more Judges.

The
conferment
of
this
power
exclusively on the Chief Justice is
necessary
so
that
various
Courts
comprising of the Judges sitting alone or
in Division Bench etc., work in a coordinated manner and the jurisdiction of
one Court is not overlapped by other
Court. If the Judges were free to choose
their jurisdiction or any choice was given
to them to do whatever case they may like
to hear and decide, the machinery of the
Court would collapse and the judicial
functioning of the Court would cease by
generation of internal strife of account of
hankering for a particular jurisdiction or a
particular case. The nucleus for proper
functioning of the Court is the "self" and
"judicial" discipline of Judges, which is
sought to be achieved by Rules of Court
by placing in the hands of the Chief
Justice full authority and power to
distribute work to the Judges and to
regulate their jurisdiction and sittings."
(Emphasis ours)

10 In this connection it may not be
out of place to take note of the decision of
Calcutta High Court in Sohal Lal Baid vs.
State of West Bengal (AIR 1990 Calcutta
168), which had dealt with the same
point. In the aforesaid decision after
referring
to
the
provisions
of
the
Government of India Act 1935, the
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
321
Calcutta High Court Rules and a number
of decided cases, the Bench observed:

"The
foregoing
review
of
the
constitutional and statutory provisions and
the case law on the subject leaves no
room for doubt or debate that once the
Chief Justice had determined what Judges
of the Court are to sit alone or to
constitute the several Division Courts and
has allocated the judicial business of the
Court amongst them, the power and
jurisdiction to take cognisance of the
respective classes or categories of cases
presented in a formal way for their
decision, according to such determination,
is acquired. To put it negatively, the
power and jurisdiction to take cognizance
of and to hear specified categories or
classes of cases and to adjudicate and
exercise any judicial power in respect of
them
is
derived
only
from
the
determination made by the Chief Justice
in exercise of his constitutional, statutory
and inherent powers and from no other
source and no cases, which is not covered
by such determination can be entertained,
dealt with or decided by the Judges sitting
singly or in Division Courts till such
determination remains operative. Till any
determination made by the Chief Justice
lasts, no Judge who sits singly can sit in a
Division Bench nor can a Division Bench
be split up and one or both of the Judges
constituting such Bench sit singly or
constitute a Division Bench with another
Judge and take up any other kind of
judicial business. Even cases which are
required to be heard only by a particular
single Judge or Division Bench, such as
part-heard matters, review cases etc. ....
Cannot be heard, unless the Judge
concerned is sitting singly or the same
Division Bench has assembled and has
been taking up judicial business under the
extent determination. Such reconstitution
of Benches can take place only if the
Chief
Justice
specially
determines
accordingly."
(Emphasis ours)
The Supreme Court in paragraph 30
of the said judgement held and observed
as follows:

"30. The above opinion appeals to us
and we agree with it. Therefore from a
review of the statuary provisions and the
cases on the subject as rightly decided by
various High Courts, to which reference
has been made by us, it follows that no
judge or a Bench of Judges can assume
jurisdiction in a case pending in the High
Court unless the case is allotted to him or
them
by
the
Chief
Justice.
Strict
adherence of this procedure is essential
for maintaining judicial discipline and
proper functioning of the court. No
departure from it can be permitted. If
every Judge of a High Court starts picking
and choosing cases for disposal by him,
the discipline in the High Court would be
the casualty and the Administration of
Justice would suffer. No legal system can
permit machinery of the Court to collapse.
The Chief Justice has the authority and
the jurisdiction to refer even a part-heard
case to a Division Bench for its disposal
in accordance with law where the Rules
so demand. It is a complete fallacy to
assume that a part heard case can under
no circumstances be withdrawn from the
Bench and referred to a larger bench, even
where the Rules make it essential for such
a case to be heard by a larger Bench."

11. After considering all aspects of
the matter and the law as settled by the
aforementioned decisions, particularly of
the Supreme Court, we are of the view
that the learned single Judge has no
1All] Sri Shamsher Singh V.G.M.(Personnel) Punjab & Sind Bank and others
322
jurisdiction to decide the said matter
on that date.

12. Accordingly, we allow the
special appeal only on the question of
jurisdiction and set aside the order passed
by the learned single Judge. The matter is
required to be considered on merit and
shall be listed before the appropriate
Bench.

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By the Court

1. These two petitions have been
preferred
by
Sri
Shamsher
Singh
erstwhile Branch Manager, Punjab & Sind
Bank, against his employer. By means of
the first writ petition, the petitioner
challenged his compulsory retirement
from service of Punjab & Sind Bank, and
the second writ petition was preferred by
the petitioner assailing the denial of
pensionary benefits consequent on his
compulsory
retirement
from
service.
Since both the writ petitions are interconnected, the same are being disposed of
by this common judgement.

2. The petitioner was put under
suspension by the order of Regional
Manager on 24.11.92. He was served with
the statement of the allegations. A copy of