# D.B. Upadhyaya v. D.D.C. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 804
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-02
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 12565 of 1982
- **Bench:** Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/d-b-upadhyaya-v-d-d-c-ors-54477
- **Pages:** 11

## Text

804 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

17. The writ petition stands allowed and the judgement of Trial Court dated 30.10.1971 is
maintained. 18. No order as to costs.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 804
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.

Writ B No. 12565 of 1982

D.B. Upadhyaya ...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C. & Ors. ...Respondents
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation was justified in holding the contesting respondent
to be an adhivasi and subsequently a sirdar merely on the basis of entries in his favour in 1356F, 1359-F and 1362-F, without considering the nature and manner of such entries, whether they
were recorded in accordance with the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, the fact that his name
was subsequently struck off in 1365 Fasli, and the concurrent finding that his name had not been
recorded for more than ten years prior to commencement of consolidation proceedings.
HEADNOTE
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 - ss.9-A(2), 48 - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 - s.20(b) - Disputed plots were recorded in the basic year in the names of
predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners - Contesting respondent filed objections claiming
adhivasi and consequential sirdari rights over the disputed plots on the basis of entries in 1356F, 1359-F and 1362-F - Consolidation Officer rejected the objections holding that continuity of
possession was not proved and that the entries relied upon were not genuine - Settlement
Officer of Consolidation affirmed the findings and further held that possession recorded as 'Batai
Nisfi' did not establish adverse possession - Deputy Director of Consolidation, in revision,
reversed the concurrent findings and declared the contesting respondent to be adhivasi and
sirdar in respect of certain plots - Challenge in writ jurisdiction.

Held: Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation recorded concurrent findings that the
name of the contesting respondent was recorded on the disputed plots in certain Fasli years as sikmi with a
note of Batai Nisfi, however, there was no entry in his favour in subsequent Fasli years and his name was not
recorded for more than ten years before commencement of consolidation proceedings - Findings returned by
the Revisional Authority that the contesting respondent had become an adhivasi and subsequently a sirdar on
the basis of entries of 1356-F, 1359-F and 1362-F were erroneous since continuous possession of the
contesting respondent was not proved - Entry of a sikmi tenant with a note of Batai Nisfi indicated permissive
possession and not adverse possession.

Court further held that entries which are not genuine cannot confer adhivasi rights and an entry under Section
20(b) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act must be an entry made in accordance with law -
4 All. D.B. Upadhyaya Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
805
Consolidation Officer had recorded detailed reasons that there was no document to show possession of the
contesting respondent after 1365-F and that the entries relied upon were not sufficient to establish adhivasi or
sirdari rights - Deputy Director of Consolidation lightly interfered with the concurrent findings without
considering the nature and manner of entries and without setting aside the findings recorded by the
authorities below - Impugned orders passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation set aside - Judgments of
the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation restored - Writ petition allowed. (E-5)
[Paras 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28]
CASE LAW CITED
Mata Din Singh v. D.D.C. and others, 2023:AHC:158629;
Bachan and another v. Kankar and others, (1972) 2 SCC 555;
Chandrika Prasad v. Pullo (D) by LRs and others, (2000) 4 SCC 227;

List of Acts
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953;
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.
List of Keywords
Adhivasi rights; Sirdari rights; Adverse possession; Nec vi nec clam nec precario; Sikmi tenant; Batai Nisfi;
Revenue entries; Continuity of possession; Hostile possession; Genuine entries; Section 20(b); Concurrent
findings; Revisional jurisdiction; Consolidation proceedings; Permissive possession; Basic year entry.
CASE ARISING FROM
From the order dated 17.09.1982 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh in revision
proceedings arising out of objections under Section 9-A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner: A.K. Rai, R.N. Singh, S.N. Singh, Vishnu Singh
Advs. for the Respondents: Chandrajeet Yadav, S.C., S.L. Yadav, Upendra Nath Yadav
(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J.)

1. Present writ petition, pending before this Court for last four decades, is arising out of
objections filed in consolidation proceedings u/s 9A(2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1953 (for short "U.P.C.H. Act").

2. Contesting respondents have filed objections in regard to plot nos. 1100, 4643, 1072, 3275,
883 in village Haraiya, District Azamgarh. Undisputedly, said plots were recorded in basic year in
the name of Radhey Kishun Upadhyay and Shridhar Upadhyay (predecessors of present petitioner).

3. Basis of objections filed by contesting respondent-4 were that he was recorded over land in
suit for substantial long time and therefore by virtue of law, he become adhivasi and sirdar being
806 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
recorded in 1956-F and 1959-F, whereas petitioner has opposed said objections on substantial
grounds that he is successor of Radhey Kishun Upadhyay and Shridhar Upadhyay, the original
tenure holder and name of contesting respondents was recorded only as a 'sikmi tenant' with a note
Batai Nisfi as well as that said entries were later on discontinued also and accordingly, entries were
disputed being not genuine.

4. The Consolidation Officer vide a judgment dated 23.01.1971 rejected the objections filed by
contesting respondent-4 and basis year entries which were in favour of Radhey Kishun Upadhyay
and Shridhar Upadhyay were directed to be continued. For reference, relevant part of judgment of
Consolidation Officer is quoted below :-

"In the Khata no. 188 and 73 Kharbhan has stated that he has been in possession of the
five disputed plots for before the abolition of zamindari and that he filed a suit u/s 229B ZA Act
which was decreed in his favour of copy of the judgment of the learned J.O. is on file, the case was
decided after the village was brought under consolidation scheme as the judgment is dated 20.1.69
whereas notification u/s 41 was made in Aug.68. This judgment and the decree therefore is of no.
This case is to be decided on merits. Plot no. 3275/-360 is recorded in the name of Kharbhan
s/o Ram Gulam as Shikmi tenant with a note ' Batai Nisfi' plot no. 3643/- 288 is recorded in
his name in class 19 but the disputed plot is 4643/-288. There is a mistake. An uncertified
copy of Khasra 1364F is on file. These are remarks column entry in favour of Kharbhan but
the plots are not clear, In the Consolidated Khasra 1353 to 1364 F main column entry
continued in favour of Radha Krishna etc. In 1356F over plot no. 1072/ 316 Kabiz Kharbhan
son of Ramgulam has been noted. This entry in 1357 F, 1358F, 1361F, 1362F, 1363F, and
1364F.

In 1365 F plot no. 1072/316 is in favour Kharbhan. On plot no. 1100/-174 possession
of Kharbhan is noted in 1357 F, 1359F, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1364F. There is no such entry in
1365F against this plot on plot no. 3275, possession stands from 1358 F as noted in the
consolidated khasra, there is no such enry in 1363F. There is ag. Remarks col. Entry against
this plot in 1364 F and 65 F.I. have perused the statement of ARK who appeared before me
with the khasra of 1365F. He stated that entry of remarks column in 1365F. Khasra is made
but it has been struck off (plot no. 1072/-316 similarly in case of plot no. 3275/360 Remark
Col. Entry has been made in red ink but it has been struck of, extract of khasra 1365F filed
by the defdt. Radha Krishna shows that remarks col. Entry made there in was struck off.
However, there are no papers on file to show the possession of Kharbhan over the suit and
after 1365F since there are no such entry in favour of Kharbhan for the last more than ten
years(before the start of consolidation) he can hardly before his claim of sirdary rights over the
same the remarks column entry in possession of Kharbhan in 1359F after do not seem to be
genuine because be unfit to have became adhivasi cum sirdar 1363. On the basis continuity of
possession over the suit land is not proved from the records on file. The objectors Kharbhan has not
been able to establish his claim of sirdari rights. Radha Krishna etc. are the kabiz tenure holders of
the suit land, the issues are accordingly decided."

4. Aforesaid judgment was thereafter challenged by way of three Appeals filed by contesting
respondents, however, all appeals were dismissed vide a judgment dated 07.05.1971 and findings
returned by the Consolidation Officer were confirmed with further observation that it was not a
4 All. D.B. Upadhyaya Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
807
case of adverse possession rather appellants had cultivated land in suit as Batai Nisfi. Relevant part
of said judgment is quoted below :-

"I have heard the parties and gone through the evidence on file. The appellant has
claimed possession on the disputed land since before the enforcement of ZA Act and have filed
extract of khasra for 12 years to prove his possession. The entry of possession before 1365F to
1359F in favour of appellant are in the remarks col. Of the Khasra. As held in RD 1966 page 132
such entries are against law and cannot be recognised for going sirdari rights. As the peirod of
possession upto 1359F is of no avail to the appellant. The entries of possession for 1361 F and do
not show adverse possession of the appellant but show that he cultivated all land on batai. This
conclusion is on the basis of the extract of khasra for 12 years filed by the applicant. Thus it is not
proved that the applicant has enttered in adverse possession after the enforcement of ZA Act the
and the lower court is justified in not giving him sirdari right I have no reason to interfere with the
finding of the lower court.

The appeal has no force and is therefore dismissed. This will govern case no. 1025 and
1029 also."

5. Contesting respondents being aggrieved by aforesaid two judgments have filed three
Revision Petitions u/s 48 of 'U.P.C.H. Act' before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh
who vide an order dated 26.10.1971 has partly allowed the revision petitions and interfered with
concurrent findings returned by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation.

6. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has held that revisionist/contesting respondent-2 has
able to prove to an extent that he was in possession of Gata No. 1072, 1100 and 3275 in 1358-F,
1359-F, 1361-F and 1362-F and accordingly, held that he became firstly adhivasi and later on sirdar
of said plots and accordingly, allowed the revision petition partly to the extent of said three plots
i.e. 1072, 1100 and 3275.

7. Thereafter, petitioners have filed a restoration/recall application before D.D.C. concerned
which was allowed vide an order dated 03.10.1972 by D.D.C. itself. Thereafter, contesting
respondents have challenged said order before this Court in Writ Petition No. 7615/1972. and this
Court vide its order dated 25.08.1978 remanded the matter back to concerned D.D.C. to pass a
fresh order. Accordingly, D.D.C. concerned had reconsidered and rejected the restoration/recall
application vide an order dated 17.09.1982. Relevant part of Order dated 26.10.1971 passed by
D.D.C. is mentioned hereinafter:-

उपरोक्त से र्ह प्रकि होता है कक प्रािी का कब्जा 1072 नम्बर पर केवि 56 फसिी में दजय िा
तिा 1072, 1100 और 3275 नम्बर पर 59 फसिी में दजय है। जमीन्दारी उन्मूिन अधितनर्म के अन्तगयत
अधिवासी अधिकार 56 तिा 59 फसिी के इन्राज के आिार पर ही हालसि होते हैं। अन्तर केवि र्ह है कक
56 फसिी का इन्राज र्हद तनर्मानुकूि है तो वह अधिवासी बनने के लिर्े पर्ायप्त है। 59 फसिी के इन्राज
के लिर्े र्ह आवश्र्क है कक काबबज व्र्जक्त पूरे फसिी साि में काबबज रहा हो। ववपिी की ओर से र्ह तकय
808 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ककर्ा गर्ा है कक 56 और 59 फसिी में ककर्े गर्े इन्राज तनर्मानुसार नहीं हैं। प्रािी का कब्जा िाना
कैकफर्त में लिर्ा है जबकक उसे लशकमी के िाने में दजय होना िाहहए। ववपिी की ओर से इस सम्बन्ि में
िैण्ड ररकाडय मैनुअि के पैरा 87 पर बहुत बि हदर्ा गर्ा है ककन्तु उक्त पैरे के प्रोवाइजो में र्ह भी उल्िेि है
कक लशकमी के िाने में तभी इन्राज ककर्ा जार्ेगा जबकक बिवारा को र्ह इिमलमनान हो जार्े कक
सम्बजन्ित काश्तकारों के बीि में कोई मोआहहदा (कान्ट्ैक्ि) हो गर्ा है। र्हद काबबज व्र्जक्त और असि
काश्तकार के बीि में कोई मोआहहदा (कान्ट्ैक्ि) नहीं हुआ है तो कब्जे का इन्राज िाना कैकफर्त में ककर्ा
जार्ेगा। इसलिर्े 1356 तिा 59 फसिी में ककर्े गर्े इन्राज अतनर्लमत नहीं कहे जा सकते।

दाखिि सबूत से र्ह भिीभााँतत साबबत है कक प्रािी गािा सं० 1072, 1100, और 3275 नम्बर पर
58, 59, 61, 62 फसिी में काबबज रहा है। 1360 फसिी में कागजात नहीं बने। अतः प्रािी तनर्ुक्त ततधि पर
इन तीनों नम्बरों का सीरदार हो जाता है। इन नम्बरों पर ववपिीगण को मुिालिफाना कब्जे के आिार पर
सीरदारी हक हालसि करने की अवधि समाप्त नहीं हुई है अतः बन्दोबस्त अधिकारी, िकबन्दी तिा िकबन्दी
अधिकारी का आदेश आंलशक रूप से तनरस्त कर र्ह आदेश हदर्ा जाता है कक प्रािी गािा सं० 1072, 1100,
और 3275 का सीरदार दजय हो। मािगुजारी रास्िर रेि से िगाई जार्ेगी। र्ह आदेश उपरोक्त तीनों
तनगरानीर्ों पर िागू होगा।"

8. Aforesaid both orders dated 26.10.1971 and 17.09.1982 are challenged before this Court in
present writ petition.

9. This Court has passed an interim order on 09.11.1982 that :-

"Issue notice returnable on the early date.

Meanwhile, petitioners may not be dispossessed from the land if they have

not
already been dispossessed."

10. Sri Durgesh Kumar Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Vishnu Singh, learned
counsel for petitioner has submitted that concurrent findings on facts as well as on law returned by
two Authorities viz. C.O. and S.O.C. were lightly interfered by D.D.C. in revisional jurisdiction.

11. Learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that objections filed by contesting
respondents so far as Gata No. 1072, 1100 and 3275 were accepted that he was recorded in 1356-F,
1358-F, 1359-F, 1361-F and 1362-F, however, a fact which was effectively considered by C.O. and
S.O.C. that subsequently, in 1365-F, there was no entry in favour of contesting respondents on plot
no. 3275. So far as plot no. 1072 is concerned, entry of respondent in 1365-F was made but it was
struck off. Similarly was the case of plot no. 3275. The initial entries were recorded in remark
column and subsequent entries were with remark 'batai nisfi'.

12. On plot no. 1100 also, there is no entry in 1365-F in favour of contesting respondents,
therefore, nature of entries for 1356-F, 1358-F, 1359-F, 1361-F and 1362-F becomes important that
4 All. D.B. Upadhyaya Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
809
entries were of 'sikmi tenant' with a note of Batai Nisfi. To declare respondents adhivasi and sirdar,
on basis of revenue records of 1356-F and 1359-F, ignoring above referred facts, would not be a
correct approach.

13. Learned Senior Advocate for petitioner has further submitted that in order to prove adverse
possession, there must be a clear and inequivable evidence that possession was hostile to real
owner. There must be animus of person doing those act which must be ascertained from facts and
circumstances of the case, however, D.D.C. in a very cursory manner has interfered with
concurrent findings of two authorities. Even there is no specific finding that concerned respondent
was in hostile possession for more than 12 years.

14. Per contra, S/Sri ChandraJeet Yadav and Upendra Nath Yadav have vehemently opposed
above submissions and placed heavy reliance upon the judgment of Deputy Director of
Consolidation that once name of contesting respondents was recorded for many years, obviously, it
would become hostile. Two Authorities i.e. C.O. and S.O.C. have misread revenue records so much
as that they have ignored possession of contesting respondents on three plots referred above for a
very long period as well as that petitioners have never taken steps for eviction. Respondents have
become adhivasi and sirdar on basis of revenue entry of 1356-F and 1359-F and it were rightly
considered by the D.D.C.

15. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the records.

16. It is a case where concurrent findings of two Authorities i.e. C.O. and S.O.C. were
disturbed by Revisional Authority i.e. D.D.C. and Revisions were partly allowed qua to plot nos.
1072, 1100 and 3275 and that contesting respondent-2 has possession over said plots in nature of
adverse possession as well as they become adhivasi and sirdar.

17. In order to consider rival submissions, Court proceeded to consider concurrent finding
returned by the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation that name of contesting
respondent was recorded on the above referred three plots in 1356-F, 1358-F, 1359-F, 1361-F and
1362-F as 'sikmi' with a note of Batai Nisfi, however, their name were not recorded in subsequent
fasli years i.e. there was no entry in favour of contesting respondent (kharban) for last more than 10
years before consolidation commenced and that findings was not considered by Revisional Court,
therefore, it was not set aside, despite it has legal consequence.

18. In view of above, one of basic ingredients to prove adverse possession is that hostile
possession be continued for more than 12 years before it was raised but on basis of undisputed
revenue record, it was absolutely missing.

19. In above circumstances, a findings returned by the Revisional Court on basis of revenue
records of 1356-F, 1359-F, 1362-F and 1365-F were erroneous since it would fall short of
requirement to prove adverse possession, when continuous possession of contesting respondent was
not proved on basis of subsequent revenue entries as admittedly said respondents' name were not
recorded thereafter.
810 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

20. In view of above, entry of 'sikmi tenant' with a note of Batai Nisfi would also become
relevant that it was a permissive possession and not an adverse possession.

21. Otherwise also, Court finds that basic ingredient to prove adverse possession i.e. nec vi
nec clam and nec precario are absolutely missing.

22. In this regard, Court takes note of a judgment of this Court in Mata Din Singh vs. DDC
and others, 2023:AHC:158629 and for reference, relevant paragraph is quoted below :-

"28. Recently the Supreme Court in Uttam Chand (Dead) through LRs vs. Nath Ram
(Dead) through LRs and others, 2020 (11) SCC 263 has reiterated earlier judgments and observed
that -:

"15. The matter has been examined by a Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq (Ram
Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v Suresh Das [M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das,
(2020) 1 SCC 1] wherein, it has been held that a plea of adverse possession is founded on the
acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another, against whom the claimant asserts
possession adverse to the title of the other. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 703-706, paras 11421143 & 1147-1150)

1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the
property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the
other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other
person against whom it is claimed.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession
which is peaceful, open and continuous possession which meets the requirement of being nec vi
nec claim and nec precario. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the
possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the
knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly
established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is
well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in
the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded
case. Reading Para 11(a), it becomes evident that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in
long, exclusive and continuous possession beginning from the time when the Mosque was built and
until it was desecrated, no factual basis has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or
evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is
not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the
pleadings and established in the evidence.

***

1147. In Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. &
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038]
, R.S. Sarkaria, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the concept of
4 All. D.B. Upadhyaya Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
811
possession is polymorphous embodying both a right (the right to enjoy) and a fact (the real
intention). The learned Judge held: (SCC p. 278, para 13)

13. It is impossible to work out a completely logical and precise definition of possession
uniformly applicable to all situations in the contexts of all statutes. Dias and Hughes in their book
on Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorising it is that of possession.
Much of this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence, 12th Edn.,
1966) caused by the fact that possession is not purely a legal concept. Possession, implies a right
and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It
involves power of control and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes, ibid.) These observations
were made in the context of possession in Section 29(b) of the Arms Act, 1959.

1148. In P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy [P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi
Reddy, 1957 SCR 195 : AIR 1957 SC 314] , Jagannadhadas, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of
this Court dwelt on the classical requirement of adverse possession: (AIR pp. 317-18, para 4)

4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec
vi nec clam nec precario. (See Secy. of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan [Secy. of
State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan, 1933 SCC OnLine PC 65 : (1933-34) 61 IA 78]
IA at p. 82.) The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to
show that it is possession adverse to the competitor.

The Court cited the following extract from U.N. Mitra's Tagore Law Lectures on the Law
of Limitation and Prescription: (AIR p. 319, para 7)

7. An adverse holding is an actual and exclusive appropriation of land commenced and
continued under a claim of right, either under an openly avowed claim, or under a constructive
claim (arising from the acts and circumstances attending the appropriation), to hold the land against
him (sic) who was in possession. (Angell, Sections 390 and 398). It is the intention to claim
adversely accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cause
of action which constitutes adverse possession. [ 6th Edn., Vol. I, Lecture VI, at p. 159]

This Court held: (AIR p. 319, para 7)

Consonant with this principle the commencement of adverse possession, in favour of a
person implies that the person is in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious hostile claim of
exclusive title, to repel which, the true owner would then be in a position to maintain an action. It
would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by
adverse possession his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with
the requisite animus.

1149. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of India [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union
of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779] , S. Rajendra Babu, J. speaking for a two-Judge Bench held that:
(SCC p. 785, para 11)

11. Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in
exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this
nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law.
Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into
possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was
known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was
open and undisturbed.

The ingredients must be set up in the pleadings and proved in evidence. There can be no
proof sans pleadings and pleadings without evidence will not establish a case in law.
812 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1150. In Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam [Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam, (2007) 14 SCC
308] , this Court emphasised that mere possession of land would not ripen into a possessory title.
The possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner.
Moreover, he must continue in that capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act."

23. The D.D.C has not considered claim of the respondent on basis of 'adverse possession' but
on nature revenue entries that the respondent was recorded on plot no. 1072 in 1356-F as well as
recorded on plot no. 1072, 1100 and 3275 in 1359-F, therefore, respondent became 'Adhivasi' and
in regard to entry of 'sikmis' is concerned, the D.D.C. held that such entries would be made only
after 'partition or any contract', therefore, 'sikmi' was a legal entry and further held that respondent
became Sirdar on basis year i.e. in 1362-F so far as above referred three plots. The findings in
regard to 'partition' or 'contract' were based on assumption and not on records, therefore, are
unsustainable.

24. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has returned a finding that Respondent-2 become
firstly adhivasi and later on sirdar in a very cursory manner only on basis that he was recorded in
1356-F, 1359-F and 1362-F on three plots without taking note nature and manner of entry, i.e.,
whether it was recorded in accordance with the provisions of Land Revenue Act as well as that
subsequently, i.e., in 1365 Fasli his name was cut off. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has
also ignored the findings of two authorities on basis of record that 10 years prior to consolidation
proceedings commenced, name of Respondent-2 was not recorded. It would become more
important when Deputy Director of Consolidation has not even considered plea of adverse
possession.

25. I have already discussed in earlier paragraphs that plea of adverse possession raised by
Respondent-2 in objection, was not legally made out. So far as entries of 1356-F, 1359-F and 1362F are concerned, in this regard the Court takes note of judgments passed by Supreme Court in
Bachan and another vs. Kankar and others, (1972) 2 SCC 555 that if entries are not genuine, it
would not confer any Adivasi right and for that the Court takes note of detail reasons assigned by
Consolidation Officer on basis of record that there was no document to show possession of
respondent over suit land after 1365-F since there was no such entry in his favour for last more than
10 years before start of consolidation proceedings as well as that on basis of entries in remark
column in 1356-F, 1359-F it cannot be a genuine entry, therefore, he cannot be declared Adivasi or
Sirdar on basis of such nature of entry of 1362-F. The DDC without much deliberation on manner
of entries of 1356-F, 1359-F and 1362-F has wrongly proceeded to declare that respondents became
adhivasi and sirdar. Relevant paragraphs of above referred judgment are quoted below :-

"15. This Court in Sonawati v. Sri Ram [AIR 1968 SC 466(1968) 1 SCR 617 :] said that
Section 20 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 conferred certain rights
upon persons whose names were recorded in the revenue records in respect of agricultural land. In
Sonawati case this Court found that there was strong evidence which was relied on by the Revenue
Court that the name of Pritam Singh predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was surreptitiously
entered in the Khasra. The first appellate court there did not at all consider that evidence. The
surreptitious entry in Sonawati case was held by this Court to disentitle the appellants to any
adhivasi right under Section 20 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
4 All. D.B. Upadhyaya Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
813

16. This Court recently in Ram Das v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ballia, [(1971)
1 SCC 460 : AIR 1971 SC 673] dealt with the contention of the appellants on the one hand who
were recorded as Sir Khudkasht-holders of the plots in dispute and the contention of the
respondents on the other who were entered as sub-tenants in respect of those plots in the year 1356
Fasli. Suits were filed between the parties. A compromise was entered into the suits. It was
admitted by the respondents that the appellants were Bhoomidars and that the respondents had no
interest. The further admission in the compromise was that the entry in the revenue records in
favour of the respondents was fictitious. The respondents subsequently applied for setting aside the
compromise decrees on the ground that they had been obtained fraudulently. During the pendency
of the suits consolidation proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
commenced. The Consolidation Authorities held that the suits were not maintainable because on
the date on which the suits were filed the respondents had become sirdars. The appellants filed a
writ petition under Article 226 challenging the order of the Consolidation Authorities. The High
Court held in that case relying on the earlier decisions of that Court that even if the entry was
fictitious the respondents who were recorded as occupants would, under Section 20(b) of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 become adhivasi of the disputed land. This
Court relying on the earlier decision in Sonawati case held that there was evidence to show
that the entry was fictitious and the person whose name was entered on the record on the
material date could not claim the right of an adhivasi."

26. The above referred case was followed in Chandrika Prasad vs. Pullo (D) by LRs and
others, (2000) 4 SCC 227 and for reference, relevant paragraph is quoted below :-

"22. Xxxxx

xxxxx

xxxxx

xxxxx

xxxxx

5. It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that if the entry was not correct,
it could not be regarded as an entry made according to law at all and the right to take or retain
possession of the land could not be determined on the basis of an incorrect entry. He placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in Bachan v. Kankar [(1972) 2 SCC 555 : (1973) 1 SCR 727 :
AIR 1972 SC 2157] . In that judgment the nature of the entries in khasra or khatauni is discussed
and it is also discussed as to how this entry should be made. This Court held that entries which are
not genuine cannot confer adhivasi rights. It has been observed that an entry under Section 20(b) of
the said Act, in order to enable a person to obtain adhivasi rights, must be an entry under the
provisions of law and entries which are not genuine cannot confer adhivasi rights. In that judgment
it has been stated that the High Court was wrong when it held that though the entry was incorrect, it
could not be said to be fictitious. That observation, however, has to be understood in the context of
what follows, namely, that an entry which is incorrectly introduced into the records by reason of illwill or hostility is not only shorn of authenticity but also becomes utterly useless without any
lawful basis. This judgment, in our view, does not lay down that all incorrect entries are fictitious
but only lays down that a wrong entry or incorrect entry which has been made by reason of ill-will
or hostility cannot confer any right under Section 20(b) of the said Act. This decision is clarified
814 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
by a subsequent judgment of this Court in Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan [(1976) 3
SCC 642 : 1976 Supp SCR 519 : AIR 1976 SC 1485] where it has been held as follows (at p.
1488 of AIR): (SCC p. 645, para 14)

"It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at
their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their
correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or
fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one
cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry in the revenue record states but the entry
is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob
a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title."

(emphasis supplied)"

27. Above referred findings of Consolidation Officer were upheld by Settlement Officer of
Consolidation, however, it was very lightly interfered by Deputy Director of Consolidation,
therefore, interference is legally unsustainable as well as above discussed legal position is also
against the contesting respondents.

28. Therefore, impugned judgment passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation is accordingly
set aside and judgments passed by Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation
are upheld.

29. Writ petition is, accordingly, allowed.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 814
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE MRS. SWARUPAMA CHATURVEDI, J.

Writ C No. 1489 of 2026 alongwith connected cases

Ashish Rawat ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Matter pertains to:
(i) Whether the term "property" under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 extends to the entire bank account or only to a particular amount therein alleged to be
stolen or suspected to be involved in an offence;