# Dan Bahadur Yadav v. Managing Director And Ceo Bank of Baroda Corporate Center Mumbai & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 2 ILRA 668
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-02-11
- **Case number:** Writ - A No. 12905 of 2024
- **Bench:** Attau Rahman Masoodi, Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dan-bahadur-yadav-v-managing-director-and-ceo-bank-of-baroda-corporate-center-53020
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Service Law - Pension - Bank of
Baroda
(Employees')
Pension
Regulations, 1995 - Regulation 41 -
Commutation - The Central Civil Services
(Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981 -
Rule 10 A - Restoration of commuted
pension
-
Doctrine
of
Estoppel
-
Wednesbury Unreasonableness - Matters
related to commutation of pension are
complex affairs involving vexed issues
traversing
diverse
fields,
requiring
specialized expertise - In such matters,
the Court would venture only in cases of
manifest and apparent arbitrariness.
(Para -13)

Petitioner (retired employee of Bank of
Baroda) challenged - validity of a note
appended to Regulation 41 of the Bank of
Baroda (Employees') Pension Regulations,
1995 - which mandates a 15-year period for
the restoration of commuted pension -
petitioner argued - commuted amount had
already been set off in 9.81 years, making
the remaining deductions unjust enrichment.
(Para - 2,3,4)

HELD: - Petitioner voluntarily accepted the
commutation scheme in 2013 and is now
estopped
from
challenging
it.
15-year
restoration
rule
is
neither
arbitrary
nor
unreasonable and has been upheld by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common Cause case.
Provision
does
not
amount
to
unjust
enrichment, and no interference is warranted.
(Para -13,19)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

668 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

20. There shall be no order as to costs.

21. The Registrar (Compliance) is
directed to communicate this order to the
Superintending
Engineer,
Irrigation
Workshop Circle, Lucknow through the
learned
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Lucknow,
and
the
Works
Manager,
Irrigation Workshop Division, Meerut and
the
Assistant
Engineer-II,
Irrigation
Workshop Division, Meerut, both through
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Meerut.
----------
(2025) 2 ILRA 668
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 11.02.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI, J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ - A No. 12905 of 2024

Dan Bahadur Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
Managing Director And Ceo Bank of
Baroda Corporate Center Mumbai & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Salik Ram Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
Prashant Kumar Srivastava

(A) Service Law - Pension - Bank of
Baroda
(Employees')
Pension
Regulations, 1995 - Regulation 41 -
Commutation - The Central Civil Services
(Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981 -
Rule 10 A - Restoration of commuted
pension
-
Doctrine
of
Estoppel
-
Wednesbury Unreasonableness - Matters
related to commutation of pension are
complex affairs involving vexed issues
traversing
diverse
fields,
requiring
specialized expertise - In such matters,
the Court would venture only in cases of
manifest and apparent arbitrariness.
(Para -13)

Petitioner (retired employee of Bank of
Baroda) challenged - validity of a note
appended to Regulation 41 of the Bank of
Baroda (Employees') Pension Regulations,
1995 - which mandates a 15-year period for
the restoration of commuted pension -
petitioner argued - commuted amount had
already been set off in 9.81 years, making
the remaining deductions unjust enrichment.
(Para - 2,3,4)

HELD: - Petitioner voluntarily accepted the
commutation scheme in 2013 and is now
estopped
from
challenging
it.
15-year
restoration
rule
is
neither
arbitrary
nor
unreasonable and has been upheld by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common Cause case.
Provision
does
not
amount
to
unjust
enrichment, and no interference is warranted.
(Para -13,19)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

1. Hari N. Saste & ors. Vs U.O.I. & ors., C.A.T.,
Mumbai Bench, Mumbai in O.A. No. 860 of 2024

2. Shila Devi & ors. Vs St. of Punj. & ors.,
C.W.P. No. 9426 of 2023 (O&M)

3. "Common Cause" a registered society & ors.
Vs U.O.I., (1987) 1 SCC 142

4. Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. Vs
Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 K.B. 223

5. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Vs Collector of
Customs, AIR 1962 SC 1893

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Salik Ram Yadav, the
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Prashant Kumar Srivastava for the opposite
parties.
2 All.Dan Bahadur Yadav Vs. Managing Director And Ceo Bank of Baroda Corporate Center
 Mumbai & Ors.
669

2. By means of the instant writ petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, the petitioner has challenged the
validity of a note appended to Regulation
41 of Bank of Baroda (Employees')
Pension Regulation, 1995 which reads as
under: -

"(2) An employee who had
commuted
the
admissible
portion
of
pension is entitled to have the commuted
portion of the pension restored after the
expiry of a period of fifteen years from the
date of commutation."

3. The petitioner has sought a
direction to the opposite party to restore
full pension of the petitioner immediately
after expiry of 9.81 years, instead of 15
years
as
provided
in
the
aforesaid
provision.

4. The petitioner retired from Bank
of Baroda on 31.03.2013 and he got 1/3rd
of his pension commuted in accordance
with the following provisions contained in
Chapter
VIII
of
Bank
of
Baroda
(Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995: -

 "41. Commutation.

(1) An employee shall be entitled
to commute for a lump sum payment of a
fraction not exceeding one-third of his
pension:

Provided that in respect of an
employee who is governed by subregulation (5) of Regulation 3 of these
regulations, the family of such employee
shall also be entitled to commute for a
lump sum payment a fraction not exceeding
one-third of the pension admissible to the
employee.
 (2) An employee shall indicate
the fraction of pension, which he desires to
commute, and may either indicate the
maximum limit of one-third pension or such
lower limit, as he may desire to commute.
 (3) If fraction of pension to be
commuted results in fraction of rupee, such
fraction of a rupee shall be ignored for the
purpose of commutation.

(4)The lump sum payable to an
applicant shall be calculated in accordance
with the Table given below.

TABLE
Commutation values for a pension of Re.
one per annum

Age
Ne
xt
birt
hda
y
Commutation
value
expressed as
number of
year's
purchase
Age
next
birth
day
Communic
ation value
express as
number of
year's
purchase
17
19.28
51
12.95
18
19.20
52
12.66
19
19.11
53
12.35
20
19.01
54
12.05
21
18.91
55
11.73
22
18.81
56
11.42
23
18.70
57
11.10
24
18.59
58
10.78
25
18.47
59
10.46
26
18.34
60
10.13
27
18.21
61
9.81
28
18.07
62
9.48
29
17.93
63
9.15
30
17.78
64
8.82
31
17.62
65
8.50
32
17.46
66
8.17
33
17.29
67
7.85
34
17.11
68
7.53
35
16.92
69
7.22
36
16.72
70
6.91
670 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
37
16.52
71
6.60
38
16.31
72
6.30
39
16.09
73
6.01
40
15.87
74
5.72
41
15.64
75
5.44
42
15.40
76
5.17
43
15.15
77
4.90
44
14.90
78
4.65
45
14.64
79
4.40
46
14.37
80
4.17
47
14.10
81
3.94
48
13.82
82
3.72
49
13.54
83
3.52
50
13.25
84
3.32

85
3.13

Notes:

(1) The Table above indicates the
commuted value of pension expressed as
number of years' purchase with reference to
the age of the pensioner as on his next
birthday. The commuted value in the case of
an employee retiring at the age of fifty eight
years is 10.46 years' purchase and, therefore,
if he commutes rupees one hundred from his
pension within one year of retirement, the
lump sum amount payable to him works out
to Rs.100 X 10.46 X 12 = Rs. 12,552.;

(2)
An
employee
who
had
commuted the admissible portion of pension
is entitled to have the commuted portion of
the pension restored after the expiry of a
period of fifteen years from the date of
commutation.

(3)...

(4)...

(5)...

(6)..."

5. As per the provisions contained in
the aforesaid Regulation, the petitioner
would become entitled to restoration of full
pension after expiry of a period of 15 years
from the date of commutation i.e. with
effect from 01.04.2028, which is clearly
mentioned in the pension payment order
dated 01.04.2013. The petitioner has
challenged
validity
of
the
aforesaid
Regulation and he has submitted that the
amount received by him by way of
commutation, has been set off within 9.81
years and he is entitled to restoration of full
pension after the aforesaid period. The
petitioner has submitted that the deduction
of pension for 15 years would mean that
the opposite parties are charging interest on
the commuted amount at the rate of 8% per
annum, which amount to unjust enrichment
of the state at the expense of the
pensioners/senior citizens. The provision
has
been
termed
as
arbitrary
and
unreasonable.

6. The petitioner has pleaded that the
Union Territory of Chandigarh has issued
an Office Memorandum dated 04.09.2024
directing that recovery of commutation
amount be stopped from the pensioners
who have completed ten years from the
date of their superannuation and he is
seeking parity of the aforesaid Office
Memorandum.

7. The learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon a judgment and
order dated 11.11.2024 passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai
Bench, Mumbai in O.A. No. 860 of 2024
titled Hari N. Saste and others Vs. Union
of India and others.

8. Per contra, the learned counsel for
the opposite parties has submitted that the
petitioner had availed the benefit of
commutation of pension as per the
provisions contained in Regulation 41 of
2 All.Dan Bahadur Yadav Vs. Managing Director And Ceo Bank of Baroda Corporate Center
 Mumbai & Ors.
671
Bank of Baroda (Employees') Pension
Regulation, 1995 alongwith the conditions
attached to it, way back in the year 2013,
including the condition that his full pension
will be restored after 15 years, i.e. with
effect from 01.04.2028. The petitioner did
not challenge the condition at the time of
availing the benefit. Now he is estopped
from challenging the condition attached to
the benefit that he availed more than a
decade ago.

9. The learned Counsel for the
opposite parties has placed reliance on a
judgment dated 27.11.2024 passed by the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh in Shila Devi and others
versus State of Punjab and others -
C.W.P. No. 9426 of 2023 (O&M) along
with a bunch of 807 other writ petitions
wherein the petitioners had opted for
commutation of their pension in terms of
the provisions contained in Chapter XI of
Punjab Civil Services, Vol-II. The question
involved in the writ petitions was whether
the portion of pension of the petitioners
should be restored after completion of 15
years from the date of commutation as
provided in Rule 11.1(2) of Punjab Civil
Service Rules Volume-II or it should be
restored after lessor period i.e. about 12
years. Rules 11.1 provides as follows: -

11.1 (1) A Government employee,
on superannuation/pre-mature retirement,
shall be entitled to commute for a lump sum
payment a fraction not exceeding 40%
(forty percent) of his pension. The fraction
of pension so commuted on retirement i.e.
superannuation/premature retirement shall,
however, be restored to him on completion
of 15 years from the date of retirement or
15 years from the actual receipt of
commutation value, whichever is later.

(2)..."

The Punjab and Haryana High
Court rejected the challenge made to the
aforesaid provision and held that: -

"27. It is a matter of record that
all the petitioners before us are retired
employees who have admittedly availed of
the benefit of commutation of pension.
Admittedly, pension of some of the
employees also stands restored. All the
petitioners were in service at the time of
issuance of notification dated 21.07.1998.
They never raised any objection to the
stipulated
period
of
15
years
for
restoration of pension. Having availed of a
benefit which is clearly voluntary in nature,
it is not open to the petitioners to raise the
grievances as noted above, at this stage, to
seek a variation in the terms and accepted
by them with open eyes. They are not
entitled to seek recovery of the amount so
deposited by them in accordance with the
accepted terms and conditions.

28. In this factual matrix, the
argument that it is a continuing cause of
action as it pertains to pension, is clearly
unacceptable. There is no question of any
direction to the State to restore pension on
expiry of 11.5 years or 12 years as prayed
for or to refund the amount so recovered. It
is necessarily for the State to take a
considered decision thereon after delving
into the complex questions and underlying
parameters which would be involved for
assessment of the issues. Admittedly,
matters related to commutation of pension
are complex affairs involving vexed issues
traversing diverse field which calls for
application of specialized expertise. It is a
settled position that in such matters the
Court would venture only in case of
manifest
and
apparent
arbitrariness.
Learned counsel for petitioners were
unable to point out any material on record
to indicate that the formula adopted is per
672 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
se and ex facie irrational or arbitrary
which calls for interference by this Court."

10. Punjab & Haryana High Court has
referred to a decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of "Common
Cause" a registered society and others
versus Union of India: (1987) 1 SCC 142,
which was a Writ Petition under Article 32
of the Constitution of India filed by
'Common Cause', a registered society and
three
retired
government
servants
challenging certain provisions of the
Commutation of Pension Rules applicable
to civilian and defence pensioners as per
which when a pensioner commuted any
part of his pension up to the authorised
limit, his pension was reduced for the
remaining part of his life by deducting the
commuted portion from the monthly
pension. Thus the Union of India recovered
more than what was paid to the pensioners
upon commutation. The petitioners had
prayed for a direction that an appropriate
scheme rationalising the provisions relating
to commutation be brought into force. The
argument advanced on behalf of the
petitioners was that there has been a
substantial
improvement
in
the
life
expectancy of the people in India had not
been refuted on behalf of the respondent.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court had suggested
to the respondent in course of the hearing
that in the changed situation then prevailing
in the country, a new look should be given
to the matter. In deference to the suggestion
made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the
Union of India agreed to restore the
commuted portion of the pension in regard
to all civilian employees at the age of
seventy years or after fifteen years,
whichever is later. Thereafter the following
Rule was inserted in the Central Civil
Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules,
1981: -

"10 A. Restoration of Commuted
Pension - "The commuted amount of
pension shall be restored on completion of
fifteen years from the date the reduction of
pension
on
account
of
commutation
becomes operative in accordance with rule
6: Provided that when the commutation
amount was paid on more than one
occasion on account of upward revision of
pension, the respective commuted amount
of pension shall be restored on completion
of fifteen years from the respective date(s)"

The petitioners contended that the
commuted portion out of the pension is
ordinarily recovered within about 12 years
and, therefore, there is no justification for
fixing the period at 15 years. Commutation
brings about certain advantages. Rejecting
this contention, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that: -

"5....The commuting pensioner
gets a lump-sum amount which ordinarily
he would have received in course of a
spread
over
period
subject
to
his
continuing to live. Thus, two advantages
are
certainly
forthcoming
out
of
commutation - (1) availability of a lump
sum amount, and (2) the risk factor. Again
many of the State Governments have
already formulated schemes accepting the
15 year rule. In this background, we do not
think we would be justified in disturbing the
15-year
formula
so
far
as
civilian
pensioners are concerned."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court further
held that: -

"9. In dealing with a matter of
this nature, it is not appropriate to be
guided by the example of life insurance;
equally unjust it would be to adopt the
interest basis. On the other hand, the
2 All.Dan Bahadur Yadav Vs. Managing Director And Ceo Bank of Baroda Corporate Center
 Mumbai & Ors.
673
conclusion should be evolved by relating it
to the "years-of-purchase" basis. An
addition of two years to the period
necessary for the recovery on the basis of
years of purchase justifies the adoption of
the 15-year rule. That is more or less the
basis which appears to be equitable..."
(Emphasis added)

11. The petitioner has challenged
validity of the aforesaid Regulation and he
has submitted that the amount received by
him by way of commutation, has been set
off within 9.81 years and he is entitled to
restoration of full pension after the
aforesaid
period.
The
petitioner
has
submitted that the deduction of pension for
15 years would mean that the opposite
parties are charging interest on the
commuted amount at the rate of 8% per
annum,
which
amounts
to
unjust
enrichment of the state at the expense of
the pensioners/senior citizens.

12. The petitioner has contended
that the provision of restoration of full
pension after 15 years, suffers from
Wednesbury
unreasonableness.
The
principle of Wednesbury unreasonable was
propounded in Associated Provincial
Picture Houses, Limited V. Wednesbury
Corporation: (1948) 1 K.B. 223, in which
the defendant corporation had granted a
license to the plaintiff company, who was
the owner and licensee of Gaumont
Cinema, Wednesbury, Staffordshire, a
license to give performances on Sunday
under Section 1 (1) of the Sunday
Entertainments Act, 1932; but the license
was granted subject to a condition that "no
children under the age of fifteen years shall
be admitted to any entertainment whether
accompanied by an adult or not." The
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the
condition was ultra vires and unreasonable.
While dismissing the claim, the King's
Bench laid down the following proposition
of law, which came to be known as 'the
Wednesbury principle' and which is being
consistently followed by the Court's in
India: -

"It is true to say that, if a
decision on a competent matter is so
unreasonable that no reasonable authority
could ever have come to it, then the courts
can interfere. ...It is not what the court
considers unreasonable, a different thing
altogether. If it is what the court considers
unreasonable, the court may very well have
different views to that of a local authority on
matters of high public policy of this kind.
Some courts might think that no children
ought to be admitted on Sundays at all, some
courts might think the reverse, and all over
the country I have no doubt on a thing of that
sort honest and sincere people hold different
views. The effect of the legislation is not to set
up the court as an arbiter of the correctness
of one view over another. It is the local
authority that are set in that position and,
provided they act, as they have acted, within
the four corners of their jurisdiction, this
court, in my opinion, cannot interfere."

13. We have to examine the challenge
to the Regulation laying down the policy of
fixing 15 years duration for restoration of
commuted
pension
on
the
test
of
Wednesbury
unreasonableness.
The
Regulation fixing 15 years period for
restoration of full pension has been framed
by the Bank of Baroda. Matters related to
commutation of pension are complex
affairs involving vexed issues traversing
diverse field which calls for application of
specialized expertise. It is a settled position
that in such matters the Court would
venture only in case of manifest and
apparent arbitrariness.
674 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

14. Note 2 appended to Rule 41 of
Bank of Baroda (Employees') Pension
Regulations, 1995 contains a provision
similar to Rule 10-A of the Central Civil
Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules,
1981, the validity whereof has already been
examined and upheld by the Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
in
Common
Cause
(Supra). The learned Counsel for the
petitioner did not make any effort to
distinguish the present case from the case
of Common Cause (Supra). Therefore, the
aforesaid contentions of the petitioner have
no force in light of the law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common
Cause (Supra).

15. Moreover, the petitioner availed of
the benefit of commutation of pension in
the year 2013, without raising any
objection to the stipulated period of 15
years for restoration of pension and,
therefore, the petitioner is estopped from
challenging the validity of the Regulation
which provides for restoration of full
pension
after
15
years
since
its
commutation.

16.
Regarding
the
judgment
of
reliance placed on the judgment and order
dated 11.11.2024 passed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench,
Mumbai in O.A. No. 860 of 2024, suffice it
to say that Article 141 of the Constitution
of India provides that the law declared by
the Supreme Court shall be binding on all
courts within the territory of India.

17. In East India Commercial Co.
Ltd. v. Collector of Customs: AIR 1962
SC 1893, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that: -

"31....Under Article 215, every
High Court shall be a court of record and
shall have all the powers of such a court
including the power to punish for contempt
of itself. Under Article 226, it has a plenary
power to issue orders or writs for the
enforcement of the fundamental rights and
for any other purpose to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases
any Government, within its territorial
jurisdiction. Under Article 227 it has
jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals
throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be
anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over
which the High Court has superintendence
can ignore the law declared by that court
and start proceedings in direct violation of
it. If a tribunal can do so, all the
subordinate courts can equally do so, for
there is no specific provision, just like in
the case of Supreme Court, making the law
declared by the High Court binding on
subordinate courts. It is implicit in the
power of supervision conferred on a
superior tribunal that all the tribunals
subject to its supervision should conform to
the law laid down by it. Such obedience
would also be conducive to their smooth
working : otherwise, there would be
confusion in the administration of law and
respect for law would irretrievably suffer.
We, therefore, hold that the law declared
by the highest court in the State is binding
on authorities or tribunals under its
superintendence, and that they cannot
ignore it either in initiating a proceeding
or deciding on the rights involved in such
a proceeding...." (Emphasis added)

18. The Tribunals have to follow the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and the High Court within whose
superintendence they function, but they do
not have the power to lay down law.
Therefore, the reliance placed by the
learned Counsel for the petitioner upon a
2 All. Surya Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
675
judgment of the Central Administrative
Tribunal is misconceived.

19.
Moreover,
the
Central
Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench
has passed the order dated 11.11.2024
without referring to the law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common
Cause (Supra) and against the principle of
law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, which vitiates the order. The
petitioner or any person cannot claim any
benefit on the basis of an order passed by a
Tribunal in violation of the law laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

20.
In
view
of
the
aforesaid
discussion, we find no force and the writ
petition is dismissed accordingly.
----------
(2025) 2 ILRA 675
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.02.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

Writ - A No. 16401 of 2024

Surya Pratap Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Satyendra Chandra Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Jitendra Ojha, Rama Nand Pandey

A. The petitioner challenged the order
dated 16.08.2024 which assigned him
Booth Level Officer (BLO) election dutiesHeld, Authorities must review and revise
the deployment of teachers for election
duties-Teachers should only be appointed
if
all
other
categories
(Patwaris,
Panchayat
Secretaries
etc.)
are
exhausted-until review, the petitioner
must perform duties only on holidays or
after school hours. (Para 1 to 42)

The writ petition is disposed of. (E-6)
List of Cases cited:

1. Sunita Sharma Adv. HC & anr. Vs St. of UP &
ors., PIL No.11028 of 2015

2. Nirbhay Singh & ors.Vs St. of UP & ors., Writ
A No. 26204 of 2021

3. ECI Vs St. Mary's School (2008) AIR SC 655

4. Uttar Pradeshiya Prathmik Shikshak Sangh &
ors. Vs St. of UP & ors., PIL No. 36449 of 2016

5. Sudhir Kr. Sharma Vs St. of UP & ors., Writ A
No. 34551 of 2015

6. Umakant Ramkrushan Mahure Vs St. of Mah.
& ors., W.P. No. 6718 of 2019

7. Satyendra Kr. Sandilya Vs St. of Bih. &
ors.(2018) 11 ADJ 393

8. Mahesh Swami & ors.Vs St. of Raj. & ors.W.P.
No. 17945 of 2021

9. Smt. Rekha Vs St. of UP, Crl. Misc. Bail Appl.
No. 25993 of 2024

10. Avinash Nagra Vs Navodaya Vidyalaya
Samiti (1997) 2 SCC 534

11. Vineet Mishra Vs BHU (2023) SCC Online All
2972

12. Sushmita Basu Vs Ballygunge Shiksha
Samity (2006) 7 SCC 680

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot, J.)

1. The judgement is being structured
in the following conceptual framework to
facilitate the discussion:

A. Introduction