# Deep Narayan & Anr v. State Of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2016) 8 ILRA 802
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-08-08
- **Bench:** Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/deep-narayan-anr-v-state-of-u-p-anr-44272
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

802 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(2016) 8 ILRA 802
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.08.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. VIJAY LAKSHMI, J.

Application U/S 482 No.- 14286 Of 2013

Deep Narayan & Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for Applicants:
Rakesh Dubey, Rajiv Gupta

Counsel for Opposite Parties:
Govt. Advocate, Shashank Tripathi

Territorial Jurisdiction - Sections 177 to 179 Cr.P.C. - Offence under Section 498A I.P.C. being a
Continuing Offence -- Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed to quash proceedings in a complaint case
under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and 3/4 D.P. Act, on the ground that the Magistrate at Kanpur
Nagar lacked territorial jurisdiction as the alleged offence took place at Katni, M.P., the matrimonial home of
the complainant's daughter - Held: The complaint discloses that the wife was subjected to cruelty for dowry
demand at her matrimonial home and was thereafter left at her parental home at Kanpur with a threat that
she would not be permitted to return unless the dowry demand was met; the offence under Section 498A
I.P.C. being a continuing one, commencing at the matrimonial home and continuing to the parental home, is
squarely covered by clause (c) of Section 178 and by Section 179 Cr.P.C. (relying on Sunita Kumari Kashyap
Vs. State of Bihar and another, Criminal Appeal No. 917 of 2011; Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) Vs. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30; and State of M.P. Vs. Suresh Kaushal and another, (2003) 11 SCC 126) - The
Magistrate at Kanpur Nagar therefore has jurisdiction to try the case. (Paras 7, 11-24)

Effect of Prior Compromise Between Spouses - Fresh Cause of Action on Subsequent Harassment
- Distinction from Cases of Permanent Separation -- Contention that the summoning order could not
survive an earlier compromise recorded between the parties at the Mediation Centre, pursuant to which a final
report had been submitted - Held: A fresh dispute between husband and wife may arise at any time even
after reunion following a compromise, giving rise to a fresh cause of action; this position may not hold where
the spouses separate permanently after the compromise - The judgment in Ruchi Agarwal Vs. Amit Kumar
Agrawal and others, 2005 SCC (Cri) 719, is distinguishable, being a case where the parties had permanently
separated after compromise and the wife had accepted alimony in lieu of divorce, unlike the present case
where the parties reunited and a fresh cause of action arose upon renewed harassment for dowry - Reliance
on Geeta Mehrotra and another Vs. State of U.P., (2012) 10 SCC 741, held not to assist the applicants on facts
of the case. (Paras 8, 25-26)

Section 204(2) Cr.P.C. - Filing of List of Witnesses - Not a Condition Precedent to Institution of
Complaint - Directory in Nature -- Contention that the summoning order is vitiated for want of
compliance with Section 204(2) Cr.P.C., as no list of witnesses was filed by the complainant before summons
were issued - Held: The impugned order itself directs the complainant to file the list of witnesses and take
8 All. Deep Narayan & Anr. Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.
803
steps within seven days, summons being issuable thereafter only upon compliance, which is the normal
procedure followed by the court's office; there is no material to show that summons were actually served
without an accompanying list of witnesses - The requirement of Section 204(2) Cr.P.C. is that the list of
witnesses be filed before issuance of summons and not along with the complaint, and any omission in this
regard, where the purpose of the provision is otherwise served, is curable under Section 465 Cr.P.C. (relying
on Sardar Awtar Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2006 Cr.L.J. 715; Krishna Kant Pathak Vs.
State of U.P., 1995 ACC 14; and Ved Prakash Vs. Sri Om, Delhi High Court, decided on 31.10.2011, following
Abdul Hafiz Vs. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, 1997 Cri. L.J. 518). (Paras 9, 27-31)

Quashing of Proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Scope - Case Not Falling Within Recognised
Categories -- Held: The case does not fall within any of the categories recognised by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in its catena of judgments, the latest being A.R.C.J. Vs. Nimra Carglass Technics (P) Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC
348, which would justify quashing of the proceedings - Prayer for quashing accordingly refused, with liberty to
the applicants to apply for bail before the court below within six weeks, to be considered in light of the Full
Bench decision in Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P., 2004 (57) ALR 290, as affirmed in Lal Kamlendra
Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P., 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC); no coercive action to be taken against the applicants
for the said period of six weeks. (Paras 32-35)
Application Disposed off. (Para 36)

Case Law Discussed

1. Geeta Mehrotra and another Vs. State of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 741
2. Ruchi Agarwal Vs. Amit Kumar Agrawal and others 2005 SCC (Cri) 719
3. Sunita Kumari Kashyap Vs. State of Bihar and another, Criminal Appeal No. 917 of 2011 (decided
11.4.2011)
4. Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) Vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997) 5 SCC 30
5. State of M.P. Vs. Suresh Kaushal and another (2003) 11 SCC 126
6. Sardar Awtar Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. and others 2006 Cr.L.J. 715
7. Krishna Kant Pathak Vs. State of U.P. 1995 ACC 14
8. Ved Prakash Vs. Sri Om, Delhi High Court, decided on 31.10.2011
9. Abdul Hafiz Vs. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din 1997 Cri. L.J. 518
10. A.R.C.J. Vs. Nimra Carglass Technics (P) Ltd. (2016) 1 SCC 348
11. Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. 2004 (57) ALR 290 (Full Bench)
12. Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi, J.)

1. The applicants, by means of this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., have invoked the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court with prayer to quash the entire proceedings in Complaint Case
No. 141 of 2012, Ram Dulare Gaur Vs. Avadh Narayan and another, under Sections 498A, 323,
504, 506 I.P.C. and 3/4 D. P. Act, P.S. Mahila Thana, district Kanpur Nagar, pending in the court of
M.M. Court No. IV, Kanpur Nagar.

2. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have already been exchanged between the parties.

3. Heard learned counsel for the applicants, learned A.G.A. for the State and learned
counsel for O.P. No. 2. Perused the records.
804 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

4. Learned counsel for the applicants has contended that the applicant nos. 1 and 2 are the
real brothers, who are the Jeth and husband of the daughter of O.P. No. 2, respectively; the
applicant no. 1 has no concern with the matrimonial dispute between his brother (applicant no. 2)
and his wife i.e. the daughter of O.P. No. 2, Smt. Indira Gaur. Learned counsel has further
submitted that the marriage between the applicant no. 2 and Smt. Indira Gaur was performed on
12.7.2008 at district Katni (M.P.) without any dowry. After the marriage, it transpired that Smt.
Indira Gaur is a disabled lady. Despite that the applicant no. 2 was ready to cooperate with her.
However, after sometime she lodged a first information report against the applicants and their
family members making false and frivolous allegations. The matter was referred to Mediation
Centre, Kanpur, and the dispute was settled between the parties. On the basis of the said
compromise the I.O. submitted a final report in the court. On the said final report, the learned
Magistrate issued notice to the complainant (O.P. No. 2) for filing his objection, if any. The O.P.
No. 2 filed the objections/ protest petition, even though admitting the fact of compromise reached
between the parties, alleging that the applicants, after the said compromise, started to ill-treat his
daughter once again in connection with dowry demand.

5. The learned Magistrate treated the protest petition/ objection as a complaint and after
recording the statements of the complainant and his daughter Smt. Indira Gaur under sections 200
and 202 Cr.P.C., summoned the applicants.

6. The aforesaid summoning order has been challenged before this court on three grounds:

(1) Lack of territorial jurisdiction to the Magistrate of Kanpur Nagar, as the offence
alleged has taken place at Katni, M.P. Where the daughter of O.P. No. 2 was residing in her
matrimonial home.

(2) The learned Magistrate, only on the basis of general and vague allegations
made in the protest petition, with regard to dowry demand and even in absence of any injury report,
has summoned the applicants without application of mind to the fact that the matter has already
been settled between the parties by way of compromise. The learned counsel for the applicants has
relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741, Geeta
Mehrotra and another Vs. State of U.P. and 2005 SCC (Cri) 719, Ruchi Agarwal Vs. Amit
Kumar Agrawal and others in support of this contention.

(3) The third ground on the basis of which leanred counsel for the applicant has
challenged the legality and correctness of impugned summoning order, is that, without following
the mandate of sub-section 2 of section 204 Cr.P.C., which makes it compulsory for the
complainant to file the list of witnesses, the Magistrate has issued summons, therefore, the
impugned summoning order cannot be sustained. Learned counsel has contended that no list of
prosecution witnesses was filed by the complainant, which fact is evident from perusal of the
impugned order itself, which clearly shows that the learned Magistrate has directed the complainant
to file the list of witnesses. He has contended that in absence of the list of prosecution witnesses,
8 All. Deep Narayan & Anr. Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.
805
the summoning of the applicants, being against the mandatory requirement of section 204(2)
Cr.P.C. is bad in law and the same cannot be sustained.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 has contested the aforesaid arguments on the
ground that in the protest petition, it has been clearly alleged that after the compromise between the
parties, the applicants again started harassment of the daughter of O.P. No. 2, therefore, he had to
file protest petition against the final report, and as there was sufficient prima-facie material before
the learned Magistrate, to summon the applicants, he, treating the protest petition as complaint case,
rightly summoned the accused persons including the applicants. It does not make any difference
that the dispute was earlier settled between the parties by way of compromise. Learned counsel for
O.P. No. 2 has further submitted that the applicants have dishonestly grabbed the belongings of the
daughter of O.P. No. 2 hence the offence under section 406 I.P.C. is fully made out against the
applicants. Apart from that, the ingredients of sections 498A, 504, 506 I.P.C. being present in this
case, the learned Magistrate did nothing wrong while summoning the applicants under these
sections.

8. Considered the rival submissions of the parties.

9. In so far as the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate is concerned, there appears no
force in the aforesaid submissions because the offence under section 498-A I.P.C. is a continuing
offence, which may start at the matrimonial home of the bride and continue to her parental home
where as a consequence of her maltreatment at the hands of her husband and in-laws, she is forced
to live under a state of mental agony and depression, after being driven out from her matrimonial
home.

10. The law relating to territorial jurisdiction of a criminal court, is provided under section
177 to section 179 of Cr.P.C. All these sections are reproduced below:

"177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial - Every offence shall ordinarily be
inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

178. Place of inquiry or trial. (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local
areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more
local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,

It may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such
local areas.
806 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues. When an act is an
offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the
offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been
done or such consequence has ensued."

11. From the above provisions, it is clear that the normal rule is that the offence shall
ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
However, when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where
an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another or where an offence is a
continuing one, and continues to be committed in more than one local area and takes place in
different local areas as per Section 178, the Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas is
competent to inquire into and try the offence. Section 179 makes it clear that if anything happened
as a consequence of the offence, the same may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose
local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.

12. Now, returning to the case in hand, the facts of the instant case, as per the complaint,
clearly show that after being treated with cruelty for dowry demand, the wife was left at her
parental home by her husband and her in-laws only in the clothes, she was wearing at that time and
her husband and her in-laws, while leaving her at Kanpur, threatened her that if without fulfilling
their dowry demand, she dared to come back to Katni, she would not physically be in a position to
return to Kanpur.

13. Thus it is clear that the occurrence started at Katni but continued to Kanpur Nagar
where the aforesaid episode of threatening the wife by the husband and in-laws for dowry demand,
took place. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur,
had no jurisdiction to try the case.

14. In the case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap Vs. State of Bihar and another, Criminal
Appeal No. 917 of 2011 decided on 11.4.2011 the same question about territorial jurisdiction
Magistrate under section 498A I.P.C. arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for consideration and
the Apex Court held that the offence under section 498A I.P.C. being a continuing one, it is covered
under sections 179 and also under section 178 Cr.P.C. The relevant extracts from the aforesaid
landmark judgment is quoted below:-

"Perusal of the entire complaint, which was registered as an FIR, clearly shows
that there was ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of her husband and his family members at the
matrimonial home at Ranchi and because of their actions and threat she was forcibly taken to her
parental home at Gaya where she initiated the criminal proceedings against them for offences
punishable under Sections 498A and 406/34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act....."

"We have already adverted to the details made by the appellant in the complaint. In
view of the specific assertion by the appellant-wife about the ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands
of the husband and his relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that because of their action, she was
8 All. Deep Narayan & Anr. Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.
807
taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire consequences for not
fulfilling their demand of dowry, we hold that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code, the
offence in this case was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas and one of the
local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with the
criminal case instituted therein. In other words, the offence was a continuing one and the episode at
Gaya was only a consequence of continuing offence of harassment of ill-treatment meted out to the
complainant, clause (c) of Section 178 is attracted. Further, from the allegations in the complaint,
it appears to us that it is a continuing offence of ill-treatment and humiliation meted out to the
appellant in the hands of all the accused persons and in such continuing offence, on some occasion
all had taken part and on other occasion one of the accused, namely, husband had taken part,
therefore, undoubtedly clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code is clearly attracted.

In view of the above discussion and conclusion, the impugned order of the High
Court holding that the proceedings at Gaya are not maintainable due to lack of jurisdiction cannot
be sustained. The impugned order of the High Court dated 19.03.2010 in Criminal Misc. No. 42478
of 2009 and another order dated 29.04.2010 in Criminal Misc. Case No. 45153 of 2009 are set
aside. In view of the same, the SDJM, Gaya is permitted to proceed with the criminal proceedings
in trial Nos. 1551 of 2008 and 1224 of 2009 and decide the same in accordance with law.

15. Similar issue was considered by the Apex Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) vs.
Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30, and the Hon'ble Apex Court found that Clause (c)
of Section 178 Cr.P.C. is attrachted and the Magistrate at wife's parents' place has also jurisdiction
to entertain the complaint. Accepting the stand of complainant, the Apex Court held as under:-

"We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it
appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation
meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents and in such continuing
offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the
respondents had taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
is clearly attracted."

16. In State of M.P. vs. Suresh Kaushal and another, (2003) 11 SCC 126, again in a
similar circumstance, considering the provisions of Section 179 with reference to the complaint
relating to the offences under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC, Hon'ble Apex Court held as
under:

"6. The above Section contemplates two courts having jurisdiction and the trial is
permitted to take place in any one of those two courts. One is the court within whose local
jurisdiction the act has been done and the other is the court within whose local jurisdiction the
consequence has ensued. When the allegation is that the miscarriage took place at Jabalpur it
cannot be contended that the court at Jabalpur could not have acquired jurisdiction as the acts
alleged against the accused took place at Indore."
808 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

17. In wake of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases cited above, none of
which have been over-ruled by any larger Bench of the Apex Court, this court is of the considered
view that the Magistrate at Kanpur Nagar has jurisdiction to try the case.

18. The second ground taken by the appellants for challenging the impugned order, related
to an earlier compromise between the parties, also appears to be without any basis. It is a matter of
common knowledge that fresh dispute between husband and wife may take place at any time, even
after their reunion in pursuance of a compromise entered between them, giving rise to a fresh cause
of action. However, the situation may be otherwise in the cases where the husband and wife get
separated after the compromise. Hence it cannot be held that the wife cannot file fresh complaint
against the husband even if a fresh cause of action, due to fresh dowry demand and her harassment
in connection with such demand, has taken place.

19. The judgment rendered in the case of Ruchi Agarwal (supra) is of no help to the
applicants due to the reason that the facts of Ruchi Agarwal's case are entirely different from the
facts of the present case. In Ruchi Agarwal's case both the husband and the wife had separated
themselves after the compromise. The wife had given her consent for divorce after taking a
handsome amount as alimony. To the contrary, in the present case the husband and the wife, after
the compromise were reunited and were living together when fresh cause of action in the shape of
fresh harassment of the wife arose, compelling her to file the protest petition.

20. The third ground, taken by leaned counsel for the applicants is that without following
the mandate as provided under section 204(2) Cr.P.C., which provides that no summon or warrant
shall be issued against the applicants under sub-section 1 of section 204 Cr.P.C. until list of
prosecution witnesses has been filed, the learned Magistrate in the instant case, has straightway
summoned the applicants to face trial.

21. The aforesaid ground too, appears to be without any force. The learned Magistrate in
the impugned summoning order itself, has directed the complainant to file the list of witnesses and
the copy of the complaint. The complainant has been further directed to take steps within seven
days. Summons were to be issued by the office of the Magistrate only after taking steps by the
complaint in compliance of the aforesaid directions of the court, which is the normal procedure
followed by the office. The applicant has nowhere stated that summons were served on him without
list of witnesses being attached to it. Therefore, it cannot be said that summons were actually issued
by the office of Magistrate, without such list of witnesses.

22. A coordinate Bench of this court, in the case of Sardar Awtar Singh and others Vs.
State of U.P. and others, 2006 Cr.L.J. 715 has held that the complainant under section 204(2)
Cr.P.C. is required to file list of witnesses before issuance of the summons to the accused. He is not
required to file list of witnesses along with the complaint.
8 All. Deep Narayan & Anr. Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.
809
23. In Krishna Kant Pathak Vs. State of U.P. 1995 ACC 14 also, this Court has held that it
is not necessary that list of witnesses should accompany the petition of complaint. It can be filed at
the time of issuing process.

24. Delhi High Court in Ved Prakash Vs. Sri Om decided on 31 October 2011 relying on
its earlier judgment rendered in Abdul Hafiz Vs. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, 1997 Cri. L.J. 518, has
held that omission to file list of witnesses does not vitiate the proceedings if the purpose is
otherwise served. The omission is regularly curable under section 465 Cr.P.C. The purpose being
that the accused should be apprised at the earliest point of time of the persons, who are likely to
give evidence against him.

25. In view of the above, there does not appear any substance in any of the grounds taken
by learned counsel for the applicants.

26. On the basis of the above discussion, I do not find any justification to quash the entire
proceedings of the aforesaid complaint case and also because this case does not fall in any of the
category recognized by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of judgments the latest one being
A.R.C.J. Vs. Nimra Carglass Technics (P) Ltd. (2016) 1 SCC 348, which may justify its quashing.
Hence, the prayer for quashing the proceedings of the complaint case is refused

27. However, it is directed that if the applicants appear before the court below and apply for
bail within six weeks from today, the court below shall endeavour to decide their bail application,
keeping in view the observations made by this Court in the Full Bench decision of Amrawati and
another Vs. State of U.P. 2004 (57) ALR 290 and affirmed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC).

28. For the aforesaid period of six weeks no coercive action shall be taken against the
applicants.

29. With the aforesaid directions this application is finally disposed off.
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810 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(2016) 8 ILRA 810
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.08.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Application U/S 482 No.- 23676 Of 2016

Rajkumar Prabhakar & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for Applicants:
Ashish Pandey, Satya Prakash Rathor

Counsel for Opposite Parties:
G.A.

.................................
Revisional Jurisdiction - Section 397 Cr.P.C. - Scope and Limits - Not Akin to Appellate Scrutiny
of Evidence -- Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. preferred against the judgment dated 23.7.2016 of the
Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Mahoba, in Criminal Revision No. 41/2015, whereby the order dated
22.5.2015 passed by the C.J.M., Mahoba, dismissing the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C. was quashed
and the matter remanded for fresh orders in light of the revisional court's observations - Held: Revisional
jurisdiction is confined to examining the correctness, legality or propriety of a finding, sentence or order, and
the regularity of proceedings of the subordinate court; it is not an appeal permitting scrutiny/re-appreciation
of evidence, nor can it be exercised merely because another view is possible (relying on Jagannath Choudhary
& Ors. vs. Ramayan Singh & Another, AIR 2002 SC 2229) - Where factual appreciation is involved,
interference is permissible only in the class of cases resulting in a perverse finding, and only to ensure that
justice is done and there is no abuse of power, a mere apprehension or suspicion being insufficient (relying on
Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460).

Complaint Case - Dismissal Under Section 203 Cr.P.C. - Successive Remands by Revisional Court
on Factual Observations -- Investigation, statements of the victim before the police and the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, and the final report disclosed no prima facie commission of any offence by the applicants, who
were not named as accused; complaint case initiated on a protest petition was twice dismissed under Section
203 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate, and on both occasions the revisional court remanded the matter with
observations touching upon facts rather than points of law - Held: Such repeated remand accompanied by
factual observations and directions is impermissible, since it places the Magistrate under practical pressure to
pass an order in conformity with the revisional court's view of the facts merely to avoid further remand,
thereby prejudicing the legal rights of the persons sought to be proceeded against - As a rule, revisional
courts should refrain from recording findings, observations or directions on facts or on the merits of a
complaint case while exercising jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C.

Effect of Order in Revision - Not a Finding on Merits - Magistrate to Independently Apply Judicial
Mind -- Held: Allowing or dismissal of a revision by the revisional court is not to be treated as a finding
against or in favour of the findings recorded by the Magistrate's court, since orders in revisional jurisdiction