# Dev Dutt Pachauri v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 776
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-08
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 9576 of 2025
- **Bench:** Manish Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dev-dutt-pachauri-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53984
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

C.S.C.

Issues for consideration
(a) Whether an appeal is maintainable in the
present circumstances?
(b) Whether in circumstances where appeal is
maintainable against recommendations under
provisions of Ss. 13, 14 and 17 of the Act of
2013, the present petition would be entertainable or is required to be relegated to the
appellate jurisdiction?

Headnotes
A. Service Law - Sexual Harassment of
Women
at
Workplace
(Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013:
Section 13; U.P. Government Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal)
Rules,
1999;
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act, 1946: Section 2 - Where provisions of
another Act have been incorporated with
legislation by reference, the provisions of
the Act which is referred to, become an
intrinsic part of the legislation to which it
is
sought
to
be
referred.
In
such
circumstances, the provisions of the Act of 1946
particularly w.r.t. Appellate Authorities would be
become applicable upon persons aggrieved by
recommendations made under the relevant
clauses of Sections 13, 14, and 17 of the Act of

## Text

776 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Works. A mandamus is further issued to
the General Manager as well as the Nagar
Ayukt, Nagar Nigam, Kanpur Nagar, to
ensure amongst themselves, payment to the
second petitioner of post retiral benefits,
including
pension,
gratuity,
leave
encashment, group insurance and provident
fund, due on account of her husband Kripa
Shankar's services, together with simple
interest at the rate of 6% per annum, within
a period of two months of receipt of a copy
of this order. The second petitioner shall be
paid current family pension forthwith.

34. There shall be no order as to costs.

35. Let the original service-book and
other records be returned to Mr. R.M.
Saggi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf
of respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4, for its
onward and safe transmission to the Nagar
Nigam, Kanpur Nagar.

36. Let a copy of this order be
communicated
by
the
Registrar
(Compliance) to the Nagar Ayukt, Nagar
Nigam, Kanpur Nagar and the General
Manager, Water Works Department, Nagar
Nigam, Kanpur Nagar.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 776
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 08.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Writ A No. 9576 of 2025

Dev Dutt Pachauri ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shireesh Kumar, Utkarsh Kumar
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Issues for consideration
(a) Whether an appeal is maintainable in the
present circumstances?
(b) Whether in circumstances where appeal is
maintainable against recommendations under
provisions of Ss. 13, 14 and 17 of the Act of
2013, the present petition would be entertainable or is required to be relegated to the
appellate jurisdiction?

Headnotes
A. Service Law - Sexual Harassment of
Women
at
Workplace
(Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013:
Section 13; U.P. Government Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal)
Rules,
1999;
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act, 1946: Section 2 - Where provisions of
another Act have been incorporated with
legislation by reference, the provisions of
the Act which is referred to, become an
intrinsic part of the legislation to which it
is
sought
to
be
referred.
In
such
circumstances, the provisions of the Act of 1946
particularly w.r.t. Appellate Authorities would be
become applicable upon persons aggrieved by
recommendations made under the relevant
clauses of Sections 13, 14, and 17 of the Act of
2013. Therefore, the aspect of whether a
person aggrieved is a Central Government
Employee or State Government Employee loses
importance and it is this provision of appeal
indicated under Act of 1946 which will prevail.
(Para 26)

A perusal of various Sections of the Act of 2013
prima facie indicate certain contradiction w.r.t.
Rules being framed by appropriate Government.
However for the purposes of this particular
dispute, Section 29 of the Act of 2013 clearly
empowers only the Central Government to issue
Rules in terms of the Act and therefore
notification of the Rules by the Central
Government in terms of Section 29 of the Act of
2013 will be equally applicable upon State
Government Employee as well. (Para 27)

Any
person
aggrieved
by
recommendations made under relevant
9 All. Dev Dutt Pachauri Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
777
portions of Sections 13, 14 or 17 of the Act
of 2013 would have the remedy of appeal
to the authorities indicated in terms of
notification
dated
04.05.2016,
as
amended from time to time in terms of the
Act of 1946. (Para 28)

Preliminary objection w.r.t. availability of appeal
therefore is upheld. (Para 29)

B. Whether in such circumstances where
appeal
is
maintainable
against
recommendations
under
provisions
of
Sections 13, 14 and 17 of the Act of 2013,
the present petition would be entertainable
or is required to be relegated to the
appellate jurisdiction. (Para 30)

Notwithstanding any forum of appeal, a writ
petition would be entertain-able in case
orders
under
challenge
are
without
jurisdiction or have been passed without
adhering the principles of natural justice,
amongst other aspects. (Para 32)

In case the complainant could not file the
complaint within the prescribed time limit
due to circumstances beyond her control,
the complaint would be entertain-able in
such circumstances. (Para 35)

Prima facie, from submissions advanced by
learned counsel for parties and perusal of material
on record, it appears that the Local Committee in
its report has not adverted to the aspect of
complaint being beyond the limitation period as
prescribed u/s 9 of Act of 2013. The aspect of
whether the complaint would come within view of
Section 2(n) of the Act of 2013 has also not been
adverted
to
by
Local
Committee
in
its
recommendations. Another aspect which will
require consideration is whether the entire process
of inquiry was completed within one day due to
which ample opportunity of defence was not
provided to petitioner. (Para 36)

Opposite parties are granted three weeks' time to
file a counter affidavit. List this case on 10.10.2025
alongwith service report. Till next date of listing,
operation of impugned recommendations dated
01.08.2025 shall remain stayed. (Para 37 to 39)

Stay granted. (E-4)
Case Law Cited

1. Rohitash Kumar and Ors. Vs. Om Prakash
Sharma and Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 451 (Para 14)

2. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India Vs.
Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu & Ors., (2024) 6
SCC 508 (Para 25)

3. Girnar Traders (3) Vs. State of Maharashtra &
Ors., (2011) 3 SCC 1 (Para 25)

4. Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks, Mumbai and Ors., (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Para
32)

5. Vishwesh Dayal Shrivastava Vs. Union of
India & Ors. MANU/UP/2979/2015, 2016 (8) ADJ
597 (Para 35)

List of Acts
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act
2013; U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1999; Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

List of Keywords
Service, sexual harassment.

Appearances for Parties
For Petitioner: Shireesh Kumar, Utkarsh
Kumar
For Respondent: C.S.C

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Shireesh Kumar, learned
counsel for petitioner and learned State
counsel for opposite parties no.1 to 6.

1A. Supplementary affidavit filed
today is taken on record.

2. Liberty is granted to petitioner to
implead the complainant as opposite party
no.7 during the course of day.

3. Issue notice to newly impleaded
opposite party no.7.
778 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

4. Petition has been filed challenging
recommendations
dated
01.08.2025
submitted in terms of Section 13 of the
Sexual
Harassment
of
Women
at
Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act 2013.

5. At the very outset, Mr. Sandeep
Sharma, learned State Counsel has raised a
preliminary
objection
regarding
maintainability of this petition in view of
the fact that recommendations submitted in
terms of Section 13 of the Act of 2013 are
appealable and therefore, petitioner has an
alternative and equally efficacious remedy
for filing appeal before the Authority
concerned in terms of Section 18 of the Act
read with Rule 11 of the Rules framed
thereunder.

6. In rebuttal thereof, learned counsel
for petitioner submits that Section 18 of the
Act of 2013 indicates that primarily an appeal
is required to be preferred to the Court or
Tribunal concerned in accordance with
provisions of Service Rules applicable to the
said person and it is only where such Rules
do not exist then an appeal is required to be
preferred in such manner as may be
prescribed. It is submitted that petitioner
being a Government Servant, the U.P.
Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1999 are applicable upon him but do
not indicate any Court or Tribunal as an
Appellate Authority and therefore in such
circumstances, the benefit of appeal would
not be applicable to petitioner since the U.P.
State Public Services Tribunal does not have
any power of jurisdiction under the Act under
which it was constituted to entertain appeals
against
recommendations
made
under
Section 13 of the Act of 2013.

7. It has been submitted that in such a
situation, recourse may be taken to
provisions of appeal under Rule 11 of the
Rules of 2013 but refer to the aspect of
preferring an appeal to the Appellate
Authority notified under clause (a) of
Section 2 of the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Learned
counsel has thereafter adverted to the
aforesaid Act of 1946 to submit that the
Appellate Authority under Section 2
thereof means an authority appointed by
the appropriate Government in respect of
Industrial Establishments under the control
of
Central
Government
or
Railway
Administration or in a major port, mine and
for which, it is the Central Government
which is the appropriate Authority and in
all other cases, it is the State Government.

8. Learned counsel has also drawn
attention
to
definition
of
'Industrial
Establishment' defined under Section 2(e)
of the Act of 1946 to submit that the
petitioner would not come within purview
of any of the Industrial Establishments as
indicated therein. He has also adverted to
the notification dated 04.05.2016 issued by
the Ministry of Labour and Employment,
New Delhi in terms of Rule 11 of the Rules
of 2013 to submit that the said notification
is only with regard to Central Government
Employees whereas petitioner is a State
Government Employee and therefore in
terms thereof, no such Rules having been
notified by the State Government, the
Central Government notifications would be
inapplicable in the case of petitioner due to
which he does not have the remedy of
appeal. Learned counsel has also adverted
to Section 2(o) of the Act of 2013 to submit
that the definition of Workplace also does
not also include the petitioner as a
Government
Servant.
It
is
therefore
submitted that in terms thereof, the
petitioner does not have an alternative
remedy of filing appeal.
9 All. Dev Dutt Pachauri Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
779

9. Learned counsel in the alternative
has also raised a plea that even if this Court
comes to a conclusion that remedy of
appeal is available to petitioner, it would
not bar entertain-ability of this petition in
view of the fact that recommendations
impugned have been passed without
jurisdiction and are therefore not in
consonance with the wednesbury principle.

10. Upon consideration of submissions
advanced by learned counsel for parties and
perusal of material on record including the
statutory provisions, it is evident from a
bare perusal of Section 18 of the Act of
2013 that provision of appeal is available to
any
person
aggrieved
from
the
recommendations made under Section 13
or relevant portions of Sections 14 and 17
of the Act. The provisions of Section 18 of
the Act are as follows:-

"18. Appeal.-(1) Any person
aggrieved from the recommendations made
under sub-section (2) of section 13 or
under clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub-section
(3) of section 13 or sub-section (1) or
subsection (2) of section 14 or section 17
or
non-implementation
of
such
recommendations may prefer an appeal to
the court or tribunal in accordance with the
provisions of the service rules applicable to
the said person or where no such service
rules exist then, without prejudice to
provisions contained in any other law for
the time being in force, the person
aggrieved may prefer an appeal in such
manner as may be prescribed.

(2) The appeal under sub-section
(1) shall be preferred within a period of
ninety days of the recommendations."

11. A perusal of the aforesaid
provision therefore reveals that provision of
appeal is available to any person from the
recommendations made under Sections 13,
14 and 17 of the Act of 2013 to the Court
or Tribunal in accordance with provisions
of the Service Rule applicable upon said
person.

12. Admittedly, the Rules of 1999 are
applicable upon petitioner being a State
Government Servant. Rule 11 of the Rules
of 1999 provide for appeal to the next
higher Authority from an order passed by
the Disciplinary Authority. The provisions
of Rule 11 of the Rules of 1999 are as
follows:-

11. Appeal. (1) Except the orders
passed under these rules by the Governor,
the Government servant shall be entitled to
appeal to the next higher authority from an
order passed by the Disciplinary Authority.

(2) The appeal shall be addressed
and submitted to the appellate authority. A
Government servant preferring an appeal
shall do so in his own name. The appeal
shall contain all material statements and
arguments relied upon by the appellant.

(3) The appeal shall riot contain
any intemperate language. Any appeal,
which contains such language may be
liable to be summarily dismissed.

(4) The appeal shall be preferred
within
90
days
from
the
date
of
communication of impugned order. An
appeal preferred after the said period shall
dismissed summarily."

13. Upon conjoint examination of
Section 18 of the Act of 2013 with Rule 11
of the Rules of 1999, it is thus evident that
the term ?Authority? as mentioned in Rule
11 of the Rules of 1999 is conspicuously
absent in Section 18 of the Act of 2013
which provides appeal only to a Court or
Tribunal. In such circumstances, evidently
the first portion of Section 18 of the Act of
780 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2013 providing appeal to the Court or
Tribunal in accordance with provisions of
Service Rules would not be available to
petitioner.

14. The principle of Casus omissus is
now settled in a catena of decisions that
words which had deliberately been omitted
in the wisdom of legislature in a statute
cannot be supplied by the Court in case the
same is unambiguous. The said aspect has
been considered by Hon'ble the Supreme
Court in the case of Rohitash Kumar and
Ors. vs. Om Prakash Sharma and Ors.
reported in (2013)11 SCC 451 in the
following manner:-

"27. The Court has to keep in
mind the fact that, while interpreting the
provisions of a Statute, it can neither add,
nor subtract even a single word. The legal
maxim
"A
Verbis
Legis
Non
Est
Recedendum" means, "From the words of
law, there must be no departure". A section
is to be interpreted by reading all of its
parts together, and it is not permissible, to
omit any part thereof. The Court cannot
proceed with the assumption that the
legislature, while enacting the Statute has
committed a mistake; it must proceed on
the footing that the legislature intended
what it has said; even if there is some
defect in the phraseology used by it in
framing the statute, and it is not open to the
court
to
add
and
amend,
or
by
construction, make up for the deficiencies,
which have been left in the Act. The Court
can only iron out the creases but while
doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of
which an Act is woven. The Court, while
interpreting statutory provisions, cannot
add words to a Statute, or read words into
it which are not part of it, especially when
a literal reading of the same, produces an
intelligible
result.
(Vide:
Nalinakhya
Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors.,
AIR 1953 SC 148; Mr. Ram Ram Narain
Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC
459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala
Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107;
The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank
Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya &
Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi
Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors.,
(2001) 7 SCC 71).

28. The Statute is not to be
construed in light of certain notions that
the legislature might have had in mind, or
what the legislature is expected to have
said, or what the legislature might have
done, or what the duty of the legislature to
have said or done was. The Courts have to
administer the law as they find it, and it is
not permissible for the Court to twist the
clear language of the enactment, in order
to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship
which such literal interpretation may
cause."

 15. In such circumstances, we may
find recourse to the second portion of
Section 18 of the Act of 2013 which
provides appeal to an aggrieved person in
such manner as may be prescribed. For the
said purpose we are required to examine
provisions of the Rules of 2013 framed
under the Act of 2013 with particular
emphasis on Rule 11 thereof which is as
follows:

"11. Appeal.- Subject to the
provisions of section 18, any person
aggrieved from the recommendations made
under sub-section (2) of section 13 or
under clauses (i) or clause (ii) of subsection (3) of section 13 or sub-section (1)
or sub section (2) of section 14 or section
17
or
non-implementation
of
such
recommendation may prefer an appeal to
the appellate authority notified under
9 All. Dev Dutt Pachauri Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
781
clause (a) of section 2 of the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
(20 of 1946)."

16. Upon examination thereof, it is
evident
that
appeal
against
recommendations in terms of specific
provisions of Sections 13, 14 or 17 of the
Act of 2013 is provided to the Appellate
Authority notified under clause (a) of
Section 2 of the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Section 2 of
the Act of 1946 specifically indicates the
Appellate Authority to be an authority
appointed by the Appropriate Government
by notification in the Official Gazette to
exercise in such area as may be specified in
the notification the functions of Appellate
Authority under the Act. The term
'Appropriate Government' has thereafter
been defined in clause (b) of Section 2 of
the Act of 1946 in the following manner:-

S. 2. Interpretation.- In this Act,
unless there is anything repugnant in the
subject of context-

(b) "appropriate Government"
means
in
respect
of
industrial
establishments under the control of the
Central Government or a 9[Railway
administration] or in a major Port, mine or
oil field, the Central Government, and in
all other in all other cases the State
Government:

10[Provided that where question
arises as to whether any industrial
establishment is under the control of the
Central industrial establishment is under
the control of the Central Government that
Government may, either on a reference
made to it by the employer or the workman
or a trade union or other representative
body of the workmen, or on its own motion
and after giving the parties an opportunity
of being heard, decide the question and
such decision shall be final and binding on
the parties:]"

17. It is thus evident that in terms of
the
Act
of
1946,
the
appropriate
Government
with
regard
to
State
Government Employees would be the State
Government.

18. It is admitted between the parties
that till date no notification has been issued
by the State Government in terms of
Section 2 of the Act of 1946.

19.
However
a
perusal
of
the
provisions of Act of 2013 also indicates the
definition
of
term
'Appropriate
Government' under Section 2(b) as in
relation to workplace which is established,
owned,
controlled
or
wholly
or
substantially financed by funds provided
directly or indirectly by the Central
Government or by the State Government in
relation to any workplace not covered
under clause (i) and falling within the
territory, the State Government. The
provision of Section 2 (b) is as follows:-

"2.
(b)
"appropriate
Government" means-

(i) in relation to a workplace
which is established, owned, controlled or
wholly or substantially financed by funds
provided directly or indirectly-

(A) by the Central Government or
the Union territory administration, the
Central Government;

(B) by the State Government, the
State Government;"

20. In view thereof, it is evident that
with
regard
to
State
Government
Employees, it is only the State Government
which
is
empowered
to
issue
any
782 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
notification
prescribing
Appellate
Authorities in terms of the Act of 2013.

21. However, it is the provisions of
Section 29 of the Act of 2013 which strike
a discordant note and clearly indicates only
the Central Government authorized to make
Rules for carrying out provisions of the
Act. The said Section 29 of the Act of 2013
does not empower the State Government to
frame any Rules under the Act for
determination of Appellate Authorities. It is
in exercise of powers conferred under
Section 29 of the Act of 2013 that the
Central Government has framed the Rules
of 2013 indicating in Rule 11 the aspect of
Appeal under the Act of 1946.

22. Upon examination of all the
aforesaid
statutory
provisions
and
particularly in view of Section 29 of the
Act of 2013, it thus emerges that in terms
of Section 29 of the Act of 2013 power has
been conferred only upon the Central
Government to frame Rules for carrying
out provisions of the Act.

23. Rule 11 of the Rules of 2013
referring to the Appellate Authority only in
terms of Act of 1946 therefore assumes
significance. It is in terms of the Act of
1946 that the notification dated 04.05.2016
has been issued by the Ministry of Labour
and Employment, New Delhi, which is as
follows:

"New Delhi, the 4th May, 2016

S.O. 1632(E). In exercise of the
powers conferred by clause (a) of section 2
of the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), and in
supersession of the notification of the
Government of India in the Ministry of
Labour and Employment number S.O. 1062
dated the 15 March, 1990, the Central
Government hereby appoints the following
officers to exercise the functions of
appellate authority under the said Act in
respect of the industrial establishment
under the control of Central Government
or a Railways administration or a major
port, mine or oil-field situated anywhere in
India, namely:-

(1) Chief Labour Commissioner
(Central): (2) Additional Chief Labour
Commissioner (Central); (3) All Deputy
Chief Labour Commissioner (Central).
[No.S-12011/3/2014-IR(PL)]
G.
VENUGOPAL REDDY. Jt. Secy."

24. A perusal of the aforesaid
provisions therefore clearly indicates the
aspect that under Section 29 of the Act of
2013, it is only the Central Government
which is empowered to frame Rules under
the Act of 2013 and in terms thereof the
Rules of 2013 have been framed clearly
indicating the Appellate Authority in Rule
11 thereof.

25. It is quite clear that Rule 11 of the
Rules of 2013 adverting to the Act of 1946
would therefore come within purview of
the doctrine of legislation by reference. The
aforesaid doctrine has been enunciated and
explained by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in
the cases of Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Board of India versus Satyanarayan
Bankatlal Malu & Ors. reported in
(2024)6 SCC 508 and Girnar Traders(3)
versus State of Maharashtra & Ors.
reported in (2011)3 SCC 1. The relevant
portion of which are as follows:-

"31.It could thus be seen that the
effect of incorporation means the bodily
lifting of the provisions of one enactment
and making it part of another so much so
that the repeal of the former leaves the
9 All. Dev Dutt Pachauri Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
783
latter wholly untouched. However, in the
case of a reference or a citation of the
provisions of one enactment into another
without incorporation, the amendment or
repeal of the provisions of the said Act
referred to in a subsequent Act will also
bear the effect of the amendment or repeal
of the said provisions.

87. However, since this aspect
was argued by the learned counsel
appearing for the parties at great length,
we will proceed to discuss the merit or
otherwise
of
this
contention
without
prejudice to the above findings and as an
alternative plea. These principles have
been
applied
by
the
courts
for
a
considerable period now. When there is
general reference in the Act in question to
some earlier Act but there is no specific
mention of the provisions of the former Act,
then it is clearly considered as legislation
by reference. In the case of legislation by
reference, the amending laws of the former
Act would normally become applicable to
the later Act; but, when the provisions of an
Act
are
specifically
referred
and
incorporated in the later statute, then those
provisions alone are applicable and the
amending provisions of the former Act
would not become part of the later Act.
This
principle
is
generally
called
legislation
by
incorporation.
General
reference, ordinarily, will imply exclusion
of specific reference and this is precisely
the fine line of distinction between these
two
doctrines.
Both
are
referential
legislations,
one
merely
by
way
of
reference and the other by incorporation.
It, normally, will depend on the language
used in the later law and other relevant
considerations. While the principle of
legislation by incorporation has welldefined exceptions, the law enunciated as
of now provides for no exceptions to the
principle of legislation by reference.
Furthermore, despite strict application of
doctrine of incorporation, it may still not
operate in certain legislations and such
legislation may fall within one of the stated
exceptions."

26. Upon applicability of aforesaid
judgment
in
the
present
facts
and
circumstances of the case, it is thus evident
that where provisions of another Act have
been incorporated with legislation by
reference, the provisions of the Act which
is referred to, become an intrinsic part of
the legislation to which it is sought to be
referred.
In
such
circumstances,
the
provisions of the Act of 1946 particularly
with regard to Appellate Authorities would
be
become
applicable
upon
persons
aggrieved by recommendations made under
the relevant clauses of Sections 13, 14, and
17 of the Act of 2013. Therefore, the aspect
of whether a person aggrieved is a Central
Government
Employee
or
State
Government Employee loses importance
and it is this provision of appeal indicated
under Act of 1946 which will prevail.

27. A perusal of various Sections of
the Act of 2013 prima facie indicate certain
contradiction with regard to Rules being
framed
by
appropriate
Government.
However for the purposes of this particular
dispute, Section 29 of the Act of 2013
clearly
empowers
only
the
Central
Government to issue Rules in terms of the
Act and therefore notification of the Rules
by the Central Government in terms of
Section 29 of the Act of 2013 will be
equally applicable upon State Government
Employee as well.

28. In such circumstances, it is held
that
any
person
aggrieved
by
recommendations made under relevant
portions of Sections 13, 14 or 17 of the Act
784 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of 2013 would have the remedy of appeal
to the authorities indicated in terms of
notification dated 04.05.2016, as amended
from time to time in terms of the Act of
1946.

29. Preliminary objection with regard
to availability of appeal therefore are
upheld.

30. The next aspect which requires
consideration
is
whether
in
such
circumstances where appeal is maintainable
against recommendations under provisions
of Sections 13, 14 and 17 of the Act of
2013, the present petition would be
entertain-able or is required to be relegated
to the appellate jurisdiction.

31. Learned counsel for petitioner has
specifically
submitted
that
despite
availability of remedy of appeal, the
present petition would be maintainable
since the recommendations and even the
initiation of proceedings in terms of
complaint are without jurisdiction.

32. The said aspect has already been
settled in a catena of judgments particularly
in case of Whirlpool Corporation versus
Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and
Ors. reported in (1998)8 SCC 1 in which it
has already been held that notwithstanding
any forum of appeal, a writ petition would
be entertain-able in case orders under
challenge are without jurisdiction or have
been passed without adhering the principles
of natural justice, amongst other aspects.

33. Learned counsel for petitioner to
substantiate his submissions has indicated
provisions of Section 2(n) of the Act of
2013 to submit that the term 'Sexual
Harassment' indicates five aspects indicated
in the said provisions. He has also adverted
to Section 9 of the said Act of 2013 to
submit that in terms thereof, the complaint
to be entertain-able under the Act of 2013
is required to comply not only the
provisions of Section 2(n) but also with
regard to Section 9 of the Act of 2013
which prescribes a limitation period of
three months from the date of incident or in
case of a series incidents, within a period of
3 months from the date of last incident. It is
therefore submitted that the complaint was
made on 12.03.2025 but pertains to an
incident which took place on 03.04.2024. It
is submitted that since the complaint
adverts to a single incident and not to a
series of incidents, the complaint was not
entertain-able after three months from the
date of such incident. He has also adverted
to
the
contents
of
complaint
dated
12.03.2025
to
submit
that
none
of
allegations made thereunder are referable to
Section 2(n) of the Act of 2013. In view
thereof, it is submitted that the very
initiation
of
proceedings
and
recommendations thereafter are without
jurisdiction.

34. He has also adverted to the fact
that he never received any show cause
notice nor was he provided an opportunity
to participate in the proceedings which
started and culminated in just one day on
01.08.2025 with statements of witnesses
also being recorded on the same day with
the inquiry report also being submitted on
the same day itself. It is therefore submitted
that no opportunity for providing defence
to petitioner was ever given.

35. Learned State Counsel has been
provided
written
instructions
dated
01.08.2025, a copy of which is taken on
record
and
as
per
which
the
recommendations dated 01.08.2025 have
been brought on record. It is submitted by
9 All. Ashok Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
785
learned State Counsel that a notice was
given to petitioner vide letter no.1102 dated
28.07.2025 but was not availed of by the
petitioner himself who refused either to
submit a reply or to participate in the
proceedings. He has placed reliance on
judgment rendered in the case of Vishwesh
Dayal Shrivastava versus Union of India
& Ors. MANU/UP/2979/2015 reported in
2016(8) ADJ 597 to submit that it has been
held that in case the complainant could not
file the complaint within the prescribed
time limit due to circumstances beyond her
control, the complaint would be entertainable in such circumstances.

36. Prima facie, from submissions
advanced by learned counsel for parties and
perusal of material on record, it appears
that the Local Committee in its report has
not adverted to the aspect of complaint
being beyond the limitation period as
prescribed under Section 9 of Act of 2013.
The aspect of whether the complaint would
come within view of Section 2(n) of the
Act of 2013 has also not been adverted to
by
Local
Committee
in
its
recommendations. Another aspect which
will require consideration is whether the
entire process of inquiry was completed
within one day due to which ample
opportunity of defence was not provided to
petitioner.

37. In view of aforesaid facts and
circumstances, opposite parties are granted
three weeks? time to file a counter
affidavit.

38. List this case on 10.10.2025
alongwith service report.

 39. Till next date of listing, operation
of
impugned
recommendations
dated
01.08.2025 shall remain stayed.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 785
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE VINOD DIWAKAR, J.

Writ C No. 20190 of 2024

Ashok Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Abhijeet Mukherji, Rajesh Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Jagannath Maurya, Rajeshwar Tripathi,
Shiv Prakash Gupta

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the petitioners, whose predecessors-ininterest sought enhanced compensation under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
are estopped from invoking Section 24(2) of the
Act, 2013 to contend that the acquisition has
lapsed?

HEADNOTE
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 4, 6,
17(1),
17(4),
31(2)
-
Right
to
Fair
Compensation
and
Transparency
in
Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 - Sections 24(2), 101 - Deemed lapse of
acquisition proceedings - Constructive res
judicata - Estoppel - Delay & laches
Land in dispute was acquired for construction of
residential and commercial buildings. Petitioners
asserted that neither possession was taken nor
compensation
paid.
Record
showed
that
possession was taken on 24-05-2002 and
compensation deposited in Court under Section
31(2) of the Act, 1894 on 13-12-2007.
Substantial
development
work,
including
construction of roads and public infrastructure,
was undertaken and more than 80% of tenure-