# Devendra Singh -Informant v. State of U.P. & Ors. 350 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

- **Citation:** (2022) 8 ILRA 349
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-07-12
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal U/S 372 No. 254 of 2022
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla, Vikas Budhwar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/devendra-singh-informant-v-state-of-u-p-ors-350-indian-law-reports-allahabad-48769
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 498 A,201,302,304,322 & 323 -
Prosecution witnesses and documents-weak
evidence-FIR lodged after enormous delay.

Appeal dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1.Tota Singh & anr. Vs St. of Pun., (1987) 2 SCC
529

2.Ramesh Babulal Doshi Vs St. of Guj., (1996) 9
SCC 225

3.St.of Raj. Vs St. of Guj., (2003) 8 SCC 180,

4.St. of Goa Vs Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC
755,

5.Chandrappa & ors. Vs St. of Kar., (2007) 4
S.C.C. 415

6.Ghurey Lal Vs St. of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450

7.Siddharth Vashishtha @ Manu Sharma Vs St.
(NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1

## Text

_Characters 0–39,954 of 58,234. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39954 for what follows._

8 All. Devendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
349
statement has though recited the injuries
and the physical status of the complainant
but according to him the complainant was
brought to emergency and the injuries so
sustained is on account of road traffic
accident in Chhata. The said statement also
disbelieves the prosecution theory.

32. In defence D.W. 2 Pankaj got himself
examined
and
according
to
him
the
complainant who is injured came to his house
and he along with one Tejveer had taken into
his house. In case the version so contained in
the FIR is taken into face value viz a viz the
statement of D.W. 1 Pankaj then it would
emerge that the complainant went to his house
at the first instance however, in the FIR in
question and the statement of the other
prosecution
witnesses
shows
that
the
complainant was firstly taken to B.P.L. Nursing
Home and from there he was referred to
Survodaya Hospital, Sector-8, Faridabad.

33. Analysing the entire prosecution case
while bestowing anxious consideration on the
fact as to whether on the basis of the ocular
testimony viz a viz the evidence so adduced by
the prosecution whether conviction is possible
or not this Court finds that not only there is
enormous delay in lodging of the FIR without
any plausible explanation coupled with the fact
that the nature of injuries do not support the
case of the prosecution that after three hits by a
four wheeler upon a two wheeler such type of
injuries could have been sustained particularly
when the four wheeler is alleged to have been
driven over the body of the injured as well as
the additional fact that even as stated by the
complainant he suffered serious injuries then to
he did not get himself medically examined in
the presence of law enforcing agency as well as
the fact that there are material contradictions
regarding the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses which also included the fact that the
P.W. 1 who happens to be brother of the injured
could not prove his actual presence in the place
of occurrence and further the issue with relation
to taking away the injured to Faridabad despite
adequate medical facilities available in Mathura
that too in a private Nursing Home and
referring to Survodaya Hospital, Faridabad after
the incident and the statement of D.W. 1 Pankaj
that he along with Tejveer had taken the injured
from the place of occurrence to his house.
These all factors shows that the prosecution
theory is engineered to falsely implicate the
accused who are two in number.

34. Hence, in any view of the matter
applying the principles of law so culled out by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the facts of the
present case, we have no option but to concur
with the view taken by the learned Sessions
Judge.

35. We find that it is not a case worth
granting leave to appeal. The application for
granting leave to appeal is rejected.

36. Since the application for granting
leave to appeal has not been granted,
consequently, present criminal appeal also
stands dismissed.

37. Records of the present case be sent
back to the concerned court below.
----------
(2022) 8 ILRA 349
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE VIKAS BUDHWAR, J.

Criminal Appeal U/S 372 No. 254 of 2022

Devendra Singh ...Appellant-Informant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties
350 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Ram Behari Saxena, Sri Aishwarya
Saxena

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 498 A,201,302,304,322 & 323 -
Prosecution witnesses and documents-weak
evidence-FIR lodged after enormous delay.

Appeal dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1.Tota Singh & anr. Vs St. of Pun., (1987) 2 SCC
529

2.Ramesh Babulal Doshi Vs St. of Guj., (1996) 9
SCC 225

3.St.of Raj. Vs St. of Guj., (2003) 8 SCC 180,

4.St. of Goa Vs Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC
755,

5.Chandrappa & ors. Vs St. of Kar., (2007) 4
S.C.C. 415

6.Ghurey Lal Vs St. of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450

7.Siddharth Vashishtha @ Manu Sharma Vs St.
(NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1

8. Babu Vs St. of Ker., (2010) 9 SCC 189

9. Ganpat Vs St. of Har., (2010) 12 SCC 59

10. Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) &
ors. Vs St. of Mah., (2010) 13 SCC 657

11. St. of U.P. Vs Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324,

12. Jafarudheen & ors. Vs St. of Ker., JT
2022(4) SC 445

13.Mohan @Srinivas @Seena @Tailor Seena Vs
St. of Kar., [2021 SCC OnLine SC 1233]

14.Vijay Mohan Singh Vs St. of Kar., (2019) 5
SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586]
15.Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai
Vs St. of Guj., (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC
(Cri) 108]

16. 1973) 3 SCC 114 Apren Joseph Alias Current
Kunjukunju & ors. Vs The St. of Ker.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vikas Budhwar, J.)

1. This appeal under Section 372 of
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short
'Cr.P.C.'), instituted by the appellant
informant
seeking
to
challenge
the
judgment and order dated 14.12.2018
passed by Additional District and Sessions
Judge, (Faminine) Fast Tract Court-1,
Mathura in Sessions Trial No.40 of 2012
(State Vs. Tejveer & others) in Case Crime
No.218 of 2010, under Sections 498A, 201,
302, 304 IPC, P.S. Mant, District Mathura
acquitting the accused opposite parties No.
2 to 8.

2. The factual matrix of the case as
worded in the present appeal are that the
appellant-informant being Devendra Singh
son of Deshraj had submitted a written
report in Police Station Mant, District
Mathura with an allegation that the sister of
the appellant-informant being Shreemati
solemnised marriage with Tejveer son of
Vijendra Singh being accused opposite
party no.2 in the year 2000.

3. As per the written report the
opposite party no.2 being Tejveer son of
Vijendra Singh husband opposite party and
the in-laws of the sister of the informant
demanded dowry and harassed his sister
pursuant whereof a first information report
was lodged against the accused herein
under being FIR No. 3 of 2006, under
Sections 498A, 322 IPC and also Criminal
Case No.141 of 2007, under Sections 498A
and 323 IPC. It has further been alleged
that proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
8 All. Devendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
351
was also lodged by the sister of the
informant which got registered as Case
No.502 of 2007 before the Police Station
Raya.
However,
thereafter
compromise/settlement was entered into
between the parties and thereafter the
informant sister being Shreemati started
residing in her in-laws place. Allegation
was also made to the effect that consequent
to the staying of the sister of the informant
in-laws place the attitude of the accused
husband and the in-laws did not change and
they acted in a manner which was
unbecoming of husband and in-laws and
the position which existed prior to lodging
of the above mentioned proceedings
continued.

4. As per prosecution the informant
use to visit his sisters in-laws place in every
two months in order to know about his
sisters marital position and relationship of
hers with her in-laws. As per the
prosecution theory on 23.10.2010 the
informant proceeded to his uncle's (Foofa)
place being Dharmpal son of Mohan Lal,
who was residing near the house of her
sister's in-laws place. According to the
informant in the intervening night of
23/24.10.2010, when he was sleeping in his
uncle's place then at 2.30 a.m. his uncle
heard screaming of Shreemati and he woke
up the informant and thereafter the
informant along with his uncle Dharmpal
immediately proceeded to the house of his
sister and at that relevant point of times the
accused herein met him as they were not
sleeping and they apprised the informant
that Shreemati (deceased) was having eight
month pregnancy and due to certain
complications
they
were
taking
the
deceased to Raya hospital.

5. Accordingly, the complainant and
his uncle Dharmpal apprised the in-laws of
the deceased that they are proceeded to
their own house and they will come in the
next morning in the hospital. As per the
prosecution theory on the next morning the
informant along with his second uncle
(Phupha), Sri Man Singh son of Sri Hari
Singh along with Dharmpal proceeded to
the hospital in question and when they
traced the whereabouts of the deceased
they could not find her thus according to
the informant, the husband and the in-laws
and the other accused herein have disposed
of his sister Shreemati and the baby which
was in the womb and hidden the dead body.
It has further come on record that the first
information
report
was
lodged
on
29.10.2010 before the police station Mant
which was registered as Case Crime
No.218 of 2010, under Sections 304, 498A
& 201 IPC against the accused herein.

6. Consequent to the lodging of the
first information report in question one Sri
Anil Kumar Sharma was nominated as the
Investigating
Officer.
Records
further
reveal that site plan was also prepared and
investigation was put to motion. A charge
sheet purported to be under Section 304,
498A and 201 IPC was also submitted
against the accused. In the Sessions Trial
No.40 of 2012 on 25.5.2012 proceedings
were also undertaken under Section 319 of
the Cr.P.C. and by virtue of order dated
8.7.2015 case was committed to sessions
and subsequently charges were read over to
the accused. Accused pleaded innocence
and not guilty.

7. In order to bring home the charges,
the prosecution produced the following
witnesses, namely:

1.
Devendra Singh
PW1
2.
Dharmpal
PW2
3.
Ved Prakash
PW3
352 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
4.
Karan Singh
PW4
5.
Munshi Lal Saraswat PW5
6.
Updesh Kumar
PW6
7.
Anil Kumar Sharma
PW7

The
prosecution
produced
the
following documents in order to prove the
charge:-

1.
Written report
Ex.ka1
2.
Report
of
Omvati
Nursing Home
Ex.ka2
3.
Receipts
of
Omvati
Nursing Home
Ex.ka3
4.
Receipts
of
Omvati
Nursing Home
Ex.ka4
5.
First Information Report Ex.ka5
6.
Nakal Report
Ex.ka6
7.
Site plan
Ex.ka
7
8.
Charge sheet
Ex.ka
8

The defence produced one Sri Charan
Singh, DW2 in order to substantiate their
version.

8. We have heard Sri Aishwarya
Saxena, holding brief of Sri R.B. Saxena,
learned counsel for the appellant and Sri
Ratan Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State.

9. Before delving upon the issue in
question which is being sought to be raised
at the behest of the informant/complainant
while filing the present appeal purported to
be under Section 372 Cr.P.C. against the
order of acquittal so passed in favour of the
accused herein.

10. This Court has to bear in mind the
judicial verdict and the mandate so
envisaged by the Hon'ble Apex Court
wherein the courts of law have been
cautioned while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 372 Cr.P.C. as well as
Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. when the courts
of law have been occasioned to deal with
the
Government
Appeal
against
the
acquittal.

11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
series of decisions have been consistently
mandating that it is well settled principle of
law that appellate courts hearing the appeal
filed against the judgment and the order of
the acquittal should not overrule or
otherwise
disturbing
the
judgment
acquittal, if the appellate court does not
find substantiate and compelling reasons
for doing so.

12. Nonetheless if the trial courts
conclusion with regard to the facts is
palpably wrong if the trial court decision
was based on erroneous view of law and
the judgment is likely result in grave
miscarriage of justice and the approach
proceeded towards wrong direction or the
trial court has ignored the evidence or
misread the material evidence which should
have determining the factor in the lis of the
matter then obviously the appellate court is
right in interfering with the order acquitting
the accused. However, Hon'ble Apex Court
has further held that in case two views are
possible and the view so taken by the trial
court while acquitting the accused is a
plausible view then in the backdrop of the
fact that there is double presumption of
innocence available to the accused then
obviously the appellate court should not
interfere with the order of acquittal.

13. The above noted proposition of
law is clearly spelt out in umpty number of
decisions, some of them are as under
namely:-Tota Singh and another vs. State
of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 529, Ramesh
8 All. Devendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
353
Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996)
9 SCC 225, State of Rajesthan vs. State of
Gujarat, (2003) 8 SCC 180, State of Goa
vs. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755,
Chandrappa and others vs. State of
Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415, Ghurey
Lal vs. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450,
Siddharth
Vashishtha
Alias
Manu
Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6
SCC 1, Babu vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 9
SCC 189, Ganpat vs. State of Haryana,
(2010)
12
SCC
59,
Sunil
Kumar
Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and others vs.
State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657,
State of U.P. vs. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC
324, State of M.P. vs. Ramesh, (2011) 4
SCC 786, and Jayaswamy vs. State of
Karnataka, (2018) 7 SCC 219.

14. The Apex Court recently in
Jafarudheen & Ors. vs. State of Kerala,
JT 2022(4) SC 445 has observed as under:-

"DISCUSSION Scope of Appeal
filed against the Acquittal:

25. While dealing with an appeal
against acquittal by invoking Section 378
of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to
consider whether the Trial Court's view can
be termed as a possible one, particularly
when evidence on record has been
analyzed. The reason is that an order of
acquittal adds up to the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused. Thus,
the Appellate Court has to be relatively
slow in reversing the order of the Trial
Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the
presumption in favour of the accused does
not get weakened but only strengthened.
Such a double presumption that enures in
favour of the accused has to be disturbed
only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted
legal parameters. Precedents:

Mohan
@Srinivas
@Seena
@Tailor Seena v. State of Karnataka,
[2021
SCC
OnLine
SC
1233]
as
hereunder: -

"20. Section 378 CrPC enables
the State to prefer an appeal against an
order of acquittal. Section 384 CrPC speaks
of the powers that can be exercised by the
Appellate Court. When the trial court
renders its decision by acquitting the
accused, presumption of innocence gathers
strength before the Appellate Court. As a
consequence, the onus on the prosecution
becomes more burdensome as there is a
double
presumption
of
innocence.
Certainly, the Court of first instance has its
own advantages in delivering its verdict,
which is to see the witnesses in person
while they depose. The Appellate Court is
expected to involve itself in a deeper,
studied scrutiny of not only the evidence
before it, but is duty bound to satisfy itself
whether the decision of the trial court is
both possible and plausible view. When
two views are possible, the one taken by
the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be
followed on the touchstone of liberty along
with the advantage of having seen the
witnesses. Article 21 of the Constitution of
India also aids the accused after acquittal in
a certain way, though not absolute. Suffice
it is to state that the Appellate Court shall
remind itself of the role required to play,
while dealing with a case of an acquittal.

21. Every case has its own
journey towards the truth and it is the
Court's role undertake. Truth has to be
found on the basis of evidence available
before it. There is no room for subjectivity
nor the nature of offence affects its
performance. We have a hierarchy of courts
in dealing with cases. An Appellate Court
shall not expect the trial court to act in a
particular
way
depending
upon
the
sensitivity of the case. Rather it should be
appreciated if a trial court decides a case on
its own merit despite its sensitivity.
354 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

22. At times, courts do have their
constraints. We find, different decisions
being made by different courts, namely,
trial court on the one hand and the
Appellate Courts on the other. If such
decisions are made due to institutional
constraints, they do not augur well. The
district judiciary is expected to be the
foundational court, and therefore, should
have the freedom of mind to decide a case
on its own merit or else it might become a
stereotyped one rendering conviction on a
moral
platform.
Indictment
and
condemnation over a decision rendered, on
considering all the materials placed before
it, should be avoided. The Appellate Court
is expected to maintain a degree of caution
before making any remark.

23. This court, time and again has
laid down the law on the scope of inquiry
by an Appellate court while dealing with an
appeal against acquittal under Section 378
CrPC. We do not wish to multiply the
aforesaid principle except placing reliance
on a recent decision of this court in Anwar
Ali v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, (2020)
10 SCC 166:

14.2. When can the findings of
fact recorded by a court be held to be
perverse
has
been
dealt
with
and
considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid
decision, which reads as under : (Babu case
[Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189
: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179]) "20. The
findings of fact recorded by a court can be
held to be perverse if the findings have
been arrived at by ignoring or excluding
relevant
material
or
by
taking
into
consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible
material. The finding may also be said to be
perverse if it is "against the weight of
evidence", or if the finding so outrageously
defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality.

(Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v.
Delhi Admn. [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v.
Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985
SCC (L&S) 131], Excise & Taxation
Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi
Nath & Sons [Excise & Taxation Officercum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath &
Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], Triveni
Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [Triveni Rubber
& Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC
665], Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [Gaya
Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC
501], Aruvelu [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10
SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] and
Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of
A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State
of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC
(Cri) 372] )"

It is further observed, after
following the decision of this Court in
Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police
[Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police,
(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429],
that if a decision is arrived at on the basis
of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable
evidence and no reasonable person would
act upon it, the order would be perverse.
But if there is some evidence on record
which is acceptable and which could be
relied upon, the conclusions would not be
treated as perverse and the findings would
not be interfered with.

14.3. In the recent decision of
Vijay Mohan Singh [Vijay Mohan Singh v.
State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 :
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586], this Court again
had an occasion to consider the scope of
Section 378 CrPC and the interference by
the High Court [State of Karnataka v. Vijay
Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar
10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This
Court considered a catena of decisions of
this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para
31, it is observed and held as under:
8 All. Devendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
355

"31. An identical question came
to be considered before this Court in
Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai
v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 :
1978 SCC (Cri) 108]. In the case before
this Court, the High Court interfered with
the order of acquittal passed by the learned
trial court on reappreciation of the entire
evidence on record. However, the High
Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not
consider the reasons given by the learned
trial court while acquitting the accused.
Confirming the judgment of the High
Court, this Court observed and held in para
10 as under:

''10. Once the appeal was rightly
entertained against the order of acquittal,
the High Court was entitled to reappreciate
the entire evidence independently and come
to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High
Court would give due importance to the
opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same
were arrived at after proper appreciation of
the evidence.

This rule will not be applicable in
the present case where the Sessions Judge
has made an absolutely wrong assumption
of a very material and clinching aspect in
the peculiar circumstances of the case.'

31.1. In Sambasivan [Sambasivan
v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998
SCC (Cri) 1320], the High Court reversed
the order of acquittal passed by the learned
trial court and held the accused guilty on
reappreciation of the entire evidence on
record, however, the High Court did not
record its conclusion on the question
whether the approach of the trial court in
dealing with the evidence was patently
illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it
were wholly untenable.

Confirming the order passed by
the High Court convicting the accused on
reversal of the acquittal passed by the
learned trial court, after being satisfied that
the order of acquittal passed by the learned
trial court was perverse and suffered from
infirmities, this Court declined to interfere
with the order of conviction passed by the
High Court. While confirming the order of
conviction passed by the High Court, this
Court observed in para 8 as under:

''8.
We
have
perused
the
judgment under appeal to ascertain whether
the High Court has conformed to the
aforementioned principles. We find that the
High Court has not strictly proceeded in the
manner laid down by this Court in Doshi
case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of
Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 972] viz. first recording its conclusion
on the question whether the approach of the
trial court in dealing with the evidence was
patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at
by it were wholly untenable, which alone
will justify interference in an order of
acquittal though the High Court has
rendered a well-considered judgment duly
meeting all the contentions raised before it.
But then will this non-compliance per se
justify setting aside the judgment under
appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such
a case, the approach of the court which is
considering the validity of the judgment of
an appellate court which has reversed the
order of acquittal passed by the trial court,
should be to satisfy itself if the approach of
the trial court in dealing with the evidence
was patently illegal or conclusions arrived
at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and
whether the judgment of the appellate court
is free from those infirmities; if so to hold
that the trial court judgment warranted
interference. In such a case, there is
obviously no reason why the appellate
court's judgment should be disturbed. But if
on the other hand the court comes to the
conclusion that the judgment of the trial
court does not suffer from any infirmity, it
cannot but be held that the interference by
356 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the appellate court in the order of acquittal
was not justified; then in such a case the
judgment of the appellate court has to be
set aside as of the two reasonable views,
the one in support of the acquittal alone has
to stand. Having regard to the above
discussion, we shall proceed to examine the
judgment of the trial court in this case.'
31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan [K.
Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala,
(1999) 3 SCC 309: 1999 SCC (Cri) 410],
after observing that though there is some
substance in the grievance of the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the accused
that the High Court has not adverted to all the
reasons given by the trial Judge for according
an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set
aside the order of conviction passed by the
High Court after having found that the
approach of the Sessions Judge in recording
the order of acquittal was not proper and the
conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions
Judge on several aspects was unsustainable.
This Court further observed that as the
Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding
the
relevant/material
evidence
while
acquitting the accused, the High Court,
therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate
the evidence and record its own conclusion.
This Court scrutinised the evidence of the
eyewitnesses
and
opined
that
reasons
adduced by the trial court for discarding the
testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all
sound. This Court also observed that as the
evaluation of the evidence made by the trial
court was manifestly erroneous and therefore
it was the duty of the High Court to interfere
with an order of acquittal passed by the
learned Sessions Judge.

31.3. In Atley [Atley v. State of
U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ
1653], in para 5, this Court observed and
held as under:

''5. It has been argued by the
learned counsel for the appellant that the
judgment of the trial court being one of
acquittal, the High Court should not have
set it aside on mere appreciation of the
evidence led on behalf of the prosecution
unless it came to the conclusion that the
judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In
our opinion, it is not correct to say that
unless the appellate court in an appeal
under Section 417 CrPC came to the
conclusion that the judgment of acquittal
under appeal was perverse it could not set
aside that order. It has been laid down by
this Court that it is open to the High Court
on an appeal against an order of acquittal to
review the entire evidence and to come to
its own conclusion, of course, keeping in
view the well-established rule that the
presumption of innocence of the accused is
not weakened but strengthened by the
judgment of acquittal passed by the trial
court which had the advantage of observing
the
demeanour
of
witnesses
whose
evidence have been recorded in its
presence.

It is also well settled that the
court of appeal has as wide powers of
appreciation of evidence in an appeal
against an order of acquittal as in the case
of an appeal against an order of conviction,
subject to the riders that the presumption of
innocence with which the accused person
starts in the trial court continues even up to
the appellate stage and that the appellate
court should attach due weight to the
opinion of the trial court which recorded
the order of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the
evidence, keeping those principles in mind,
and comes to a contrary conclusion, the
judgment cannot be said to have been
vitiated. (See in this connection the very
cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal
Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State,
1951 SCC 1207 : AIR 1952 SC 52];
Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat
8 All. Devendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
357
Khan v. State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898 : AIR
1953 SC 122]) In our opinion, there is no
substance in the contention raised on behalf
of the appellant that the High Court was not
justified in reviewing the entire evidence
and coming to its own conclusions.' 31.4.
In K. Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal Reddy v.
State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979
SCC (Cri) 305], this Court has observed
that where the trial court allows itself to be
beset
with
fanciful
doubts,
rejects
creditworthy evidence for slender reasons
and takes a view of the evidence which is
but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of
the High Court to interfere in the interest of
justice, lest the administration of justice be
brought to ridicule."

N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N.,
[(2021) 3 SCC 687] as hereunder: - "20.
Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant that the view taken by the trial
court is a "possible view", having regard to
the evidence on record. It is submitted that
the trial court has recorded cogent and valid
reasons in support of its findings for
acquittal. Under Section 378 CrPC, no
differentiation is made between an appeal
against acquittal and the appeal against
conviction. By considering the long line of
earlier cases this Court in the judgment in
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4
SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 has laid
down the general principles regarding the
powers of the appellate Court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal.
Para 42 of the judgment which is relevant
reads as under: (SCC p. 432) "42. From the
above decisions, in our considered view,
the following general principles regarding
powers of the appellate court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full
power
to
review,
reappreciate
and
reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.

(2)
The
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,
1973
puts
no
limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the
evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of
law.

(3) Various expressions, such as,
"substantial
and
compelling
reasons",
"good and sufficient grounds", "very strong
circumstances", "distorted conclusions",
"glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to
curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of
"flourishes of language" to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere
with acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence and to
come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however,
must bear in mind that in case of acquittal,
there is double presumption in favour of the
accused.
Firstly,
the
presumption
of
innocence is available to him under the
fundamental
principle
of
criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence
is
further
reinforced,
reaffirmed
and
strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court."

21. Further in the judgment in
Murugesan [Murugesan v. State, (2012) 10
SCC 383: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 69] relied on
by the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant, this Court has considered the
358 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
powers of the High Court in an appeal
against acquittal recorded by the trial court.
In the said judgment, it is categorically held
by this Court that only in cases where
conclusion recorded by the trial court is not
a possible view, then only the High Court
can interfere and reverse the acquittal to
that of conviction. In the said judgment,
distinction from that of "possible view" to
"erroneous view" or "wrong view" is
explained. In clear terms, this Court has
held that if the view taken by the trial court
is a "possible view", the High Court not to
reverse the acquittal to that of the
conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

23. Further, in Hakeem Khan v.
State of M.P., (2017) 5 SCC 719 : (2017) 2
SCC (Cri) 653 this court has considered the
powers
of
the
appellate
court
for
interference in cases where acquittal is
recorded by the trial court. In the said
judgment it is held that if the "possible
view" of the trial court is not agreeable for
the High Court, even then such "possible
view" recorded by the trial court cannot be
interdicted. It is further held that so long as
the view of the trial court can be reasonably
formed, regardless of whether the High
Court agrees with the same or not, verdict
of the trial court cannot be interdicted and
the High Court cannot supplant over the
view of the trial court. Para 9 of the
judgment reads as under: (SCC pp. 722-23)
"9. Having heard the learned counsel for
the parties, we are of the view that the trial
court's judgment is more than just a
possible view for arriving at the conclusion
of acquittal, and that it would not be safe to
convict seventeen persons accused of the
crime of murder i.e. under Section 302 read
with Section 149 of the Penal Code. The
most important reason of the trial court, as
has been stated above, was that, given the
time of 6.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. of a winter
evening, it would be dark, and, therefore,
identification of seventeen persons would
be extremely difficult. This reason, coupled
with the fact that the only independent
witness turned hostile, and two other
eyewitnesses who were independent were
not examined, would certainly create a
large hole in the prosecution story. Apart
from this, the very fact that there were
injuries on three of the accused party, two
of them being deep injuries in the skull,
would lead to the conclusion that nothing
was premeditated and there was, in all
probability, a scuffle that led to injuries on
both sides. While the learned counsel for
the respondent may be right in stating that
the trial court went overboard in stating that
the complainant party was the aggressor,
but the trial court's ultimate conclusion
leading to an acquittal is certainly a
possible view on the facts of this case. This
is coupled with the fact that the presence of
the kingpin Sarpanch is itself doubtful in
view of the fact that he attended the Court
at some distance and arrived by bus after
the incident took place."

24. By applying the abovesaid
principles and the evidence on record in the
case on hand, we are of the considered
view that having regard to material
contradictions which we have already
noticed above and also as referred to in the
trial court judgment, it can be said that
acquittal is a "possible view". By applying
the ratio as laid down by this Court in the
judgments which are stated supra, even
assuming another view is possible, same is
no ground to interfere with the judgment of
acquittal and to convict the appellant for
the offence alleged. From the evidence, it is
clear that when the Inspecting Officer and
other witnesses who are examined on
behalf of the prosecution, went to the office
of the appellant-accused, the appellant was
not there in the office and office was open
8 All. Devendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
359
and people were moving out and in from
the office of the appellant. It is also clear
from the evidence of PWs 3, 5 and 11 that
the currency and cellphone were taken out
from the drawer of the table by the
appellant at their instance. There is also no
reason, when the tainted notes and the
cellphone were given to the appellant at
5.45 p.m. no recordings were made and the
appellant was not tested by PW 11 till 7.00
p.m."

15. Bearing in mind the proposition of
law so culled out by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the above noted decisions coupled
with the limitations so envisaged while
deciding the present appeal which emanates
at the instance of an informant against the
acquittal of the accused, now the present
case in hand is to be analysed while giving
the verdict as to whether the trial court was
in error in acquitting accused or not.

16. To begin with the ocular
testimony of the prosecution witness is to
be first analysed.

17. The prosecution produced PW1
being Devendra Singh in witness box and
as per the testimony of Devendra Singh, the
marriage of his sister Shreemati (since
deceased) was solemnised in the year 2000
with Tejveer and according to PW1 Tejveer
and his parents along with the relatives who
are accused herein used to demand dowry
and also kept on metting deceased with
harassment.

18. As per PW1, he on the fateful day
i.e. 23/24.10.2010 was in his uncle
Dharmpal place which is nearby to the inlaws house and his uncle heard the
screaming of his sister, consequently when
they approached the in-laws place then they
were apprised that the deceased was
pregnant and her pregnancy was of eight
months and due to certain complications
she was unwell and labour pain occurred
which resulted into screaming and accused
assured the informant and his (Phupha)
uncles that they were proceeding to take
her to Raya hospital and on their assurance
informant along with uncle came back to
house and when they on the next day went
to the hospital whereas whereabouts of the
sister were not found.

19. PW1 in this statement has further
deposed that on 23/24.10.2010, he found
that the husband of the deceased being
Tejveer beating his sister with cuddle and
when
the
informant
and
his
uncle
Dharmpal tried to save her then he pushed
them and the Jeth of the sister of the
informant while holding the hand of the
deceased throwed her in the vehicle being
four-wheeler.

20. PW2 one Dharmpal presented
himself as PW2 and he in his examination
in chief has deposed that the deceased
Shreemati is the daughter of his brother-inlaw and she got married 13 years back and
adquate gifts were offered to the in-laws of
the deceased. According to PW2 Shreemati
the deceased used to complaint that she was
administered beating on account of nonpayment dowry commensurate to the
demand so raised. In the deposition of the
PW2, it has been further deposed that the
house of the in-laws of the deceased is just
4/5
steps
from
his
house
and
on
23/24.10.2010 PW1 had stayed with him
and when they had heard screams of the
deceased, they had proceeded to in-laws
house. It was further deposed that the
accused herein were beating the deceased
and when they resisted then it was of no
avail and they took away the deceased in a
four-wheeler being Bolero.
360 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

21. PW3 Dr. Ved Prakash in his
examination-in-chief has deposed that he is
the owner of the Omvati Nursing Home
Trans Jamuna, Mathura. According to him
on 23.10.2010, the deceased came to his
nursing home in connection with stomach
ache and she was having high pulse rate
and even the heartbeats were also high, she
was suffering from high-blood pressure and
fever also. According to PW3, he attended
her and provided medication and also put
her on sline and injected her and discharged
on the same day. According to PW1 the
stomach ache also disappeared.

22. PW4 Karan Singh also appeared
in the witness box and in his examinationin-chief he deposed that he knew Tejveer,
who happens to be the husband of the
deceased, however, he is not knowing the
deceased. He is also not conversant with
the fact that there was any marital discord
was between the deceased and the accused,
who happens to be the husband and he is
also not aware that the deceased died on
24.10.2010 in the village, however he had
heard about the same. It has further been
deposed that he is not aware about the
pregnancy of the deceased and he is totally
ignorant about the fact that Tejveer being
accused opposite party no.2 had used his
leg while putting it upon the deceased that
too on stomach on account whereof the
deceased died.

23. PW5 Munshi Lal Saraswat in his
deposition stated that he is an organiser of
the cremation place being Dhruva Ghat
since 2005 and he was holding the said
office on 24.10.2020 and according to him
the cremation ceremony was not conducted
on 24.10.2010 in the subject Ghat.

24. One Updesh Kumar PW6 also
appeared in the witness box, according to
him he is the head writer of the police
station
Mant
on
29.10.2010,
first
information report in question was lodged.

25. As PW7 Anil Kumar Sharma
appeared while deposing that he was SHO
of police station Mant on 29.10.2010 and
on the same day on the basis of the written
complaint so lodged by PW1 Devendra
Singh FIR under Section 304, 498A and
201 IPC was registered being Case Crime
No.218 of 2010.

26. So far as the defence witness
being DW1 the accused got Charan Singh
examined.