# Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra & Anr v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 7 ILRA 20
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-07-03
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 5317 of 2025
- **Bench:** Rajnish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dhanu-krishi-sewa-kendra-anr-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54615
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

G.A.

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the trial and revisional courts were
justified in awarding interim compensation
under
Section
143A
of
the
Negotiable
Instruments
Act,
despite
the
applicant's
objections regarding cheque loss, stop payment,
and alleged absence of liability.
7 All. Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
21
HEADNOTES
Criminal
Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482, - Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section
- 528, - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
- Sections 138, 141, 143A, 118, 139 -
Application under Section 482 CrPC (now
Section 528 BNSS, 2023) - challenging the
impugned orders - whereby the trial court
allowed
the
application
moved
by
the
complainant under Section 143-A of the NI Act
for interim compensation and the Revision filed
against said order was dismissed by the
Revisional Court - financial obligation - Cheque
Dishonour - complaint - in defence, applicant
taken plea that cheques in-question were lost
and therefore a LAR was lodged with the bank,
and on account of which bank stopped the
payment - during pendency of complaint
complainant moved an interim compensation -
trial court awarded 15% compensation, within
statutory limit of 20%, - against which revision
filed - revisional court upheld the decision of
trial court - whether the trial and revisional
courts were justified in awarding interim
compensation under Section 143A of the NI Act,
despite the applicant's objections regarding
cheque loss, stop payment, and alleged absence
of liability - court observed that the
applicant had admitted to issuing the
cheques and signing them, - and the said
compensation amount was appropriately
awarded at the correct procedural stage -
applicant's conduct, including absconding
after bail, further justified the trial court's
decision - court held that trial court can
award the interim compensation but after
considering the pleadings of the parties
and other related facts - consequently,
court does not find any illegality or
infirmity
in
the
impugned
orders
-
accordingly, the Application found to be
misconceived and dismissed. (Para - 11,
12, 14, 15)

Application Dismissed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. The State of
Jharkhand and another (Criminal Appeal No.
741 of 2024 - order dated 15.03.2024)

LIST OF ACTS
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Cheque Dishonour -
Complaint - Interim Compensation - Section
143A NI Act - Lost Article Report (LAR) - Stop
Payment - Absconding Accused - Prima Facie
Case - Revision - Misconceived Application - Bail
Violation -

CASE ARISING FROM
Orders dated 15.05.2025 passed in Case No.
111255 of 2023 (Raj Kishore Sharma vs. Dhanu
Krishi Sewa Kendra and another) - and - order
dated 28.05.2025 passed in Criminal Revision
No. 282 of 2025 (Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra vs.
Raj Kishore Sharma and others) - District -
Lucknow.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant: - Shri Shantanu Mishra,
Counsel for Respondent: - Sri Anurag Verma,
AGA.

## Text

20 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
सुलह कायगिाही के ककस स्तर पर हुई है। यदि
सुलह विचारण के अिंततम स्तर पर होती है तो
न्यायालय को ऐसी सुलह के आिार पर
कायगिाही तनरस्त करने में शीघ्रता नहीिं दिखानी
चादहए, ककन्तु यदि सुलह विचारण के प्रारिंभिक
स्तर पर होती है तो यह तथ्य न्यायालय की
अिंततनगदहत शजक्तयों के प्रयोग में कायगिाही
तनरस्तीकरण के पक्ष में होगा।

12. उपरोक्त तनणगय के दृजष्र्गत मात्र
बलात्कार अथिा बालकों के विरुद्ि यौन
अपराि का आरोप अभिकधथत होने के कारण
आपराधिक कायगिाही के तनरस्तीकरण के
विरुद्ि कोई सम्पूणग प्रततबिंि नहीिं है तथा
प्रत्येक
प्रकरण
अपने
विशेर्ष
तथ्यों
एििं
पररजस्थततयों के आिार पर तनणीत होगा।

13. प्रस्तुत प्रकरण में िब कक पीड़िता
के धचककत्सकीय परीक्षण में घर्ना के समय
उसकी आयु लगिग 18 िर्षग आई, उसने अपनी
मिी से प्राथी के साथ िाकर उसके साथ उसकी
पत्नी के रूप में रहने का कथन ककया है, ितगमान
में पीड़िता की आयु 21 िर्षग है तथा सुलहनामे में
उसने कहा कक िह और प्राथी एक ही घर में एक
साथ लगिग 12 िर्षों से रह रहे हैं तथा िोनों
आपस में शािी करना चाहते हैं एििं कोई िी पक्ष
अब आपराधिक कायगिाही नहीिं चाहता है,
न्यायालय का स्पष्र् मत है कक आपराधिक
कायगिाही िारी रखने से पीड़िता के दहतों पर िी
विपरीत प्रिाि प़िने की प्रबल सम्िािना होगी
एििं आपराधिक कायगिाही िारी रखना ककसी िी
प्रकार से न्यायदहत में नहीिं होगा।

14. उपरोक्त वििेचना के आलोक में
प्राथगना पत्र स्वीकार ककया िाता है। प्रथम
सूचना ररपोर्ग सिंख्या 106 सन 2022 अन्तगगत
िारा 363, 366, 376 िा०ििं०सिं० एििं लैंधगक
अपरािों से बालकों का सिंरक्षण अधितनयम की
िारा 3/4, थाना अदहरौली, िनपि-अम्बेडकर नगर
के अनुिम में प्रस्तुत आरोप पत्र दिनािंककत
25.06.2022 तथा उक्त के आिार पर उत्पन्न
आपराधिक िाि सिंख्या 408 सन् 2022 के
अनुिम में विद्िान मुख्य न्यायािीश, लैंधगक
अपरािों से बालकों का सिंरक्षण अधितनयम,
अम्बेडकर नगर द्िारा पाररत आिेश दिनािंक
09.09.2022, जिससे उक्त अपराि का सिंज्ञान
भलया एििं प्राथी को विचारण के भलए तलब
ककया गया तथा उक्त आपराधिक िाि की
सिंपूणग कायगिाही ननरस्त की िाती है।
---------
(2025) 7 ILRA 20
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 03.07.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 5317 of 2025

Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra & Anr.
 ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Shantanu Mishra, Mohd. Kaif Khan

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the trial and revisional courts were
justified in awarding interim compensation
under
Section
143A
of
the
Negotiable
Instruments
Act,
despite
the
applicant's
objections regarding cheque loss, stop payment,
and alleged absence of liability.
7 All. Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
21
HEADNOTES
Criminal
Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482, - Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section
- 528, - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
- Sections 138, 141, 143A, 118, 139 -
Application under Section 482 CrPC (now
Section 528 BNSS, 2023) - challenging the
impugned orders - whereby the trial court
allowed
the
application
moved
by
the
complainant under Section 143-A of the NI Act
for interim compensation and the Revision filed
against said order was dismissed by the
Revisional Court - financial obligation - Cheque
Dishonour - complaint - in defence, applicant
taken plea that cheques in-question were lost
and therefore a LAR was lodged with the bank,
and on account of which bank stopped the
payment - during pendency of complaint
complainant moved an interim compensation -
trial court awarded 15% compensation, within
statutory limit of 20%, - against which revision
filed - revisional court upheld the decision of
trial court - whether the trial and revisional
courts were justified in awarding interim
compensation under Section 143A of the NI Act,
despite the applicant's objections regarding
cheque loss, stop payment, and alleged absence
of liability - court observed that the
applicant had admitted to issuing the
cheques and signing them, - and the said
compensation amount was appropriately
awarded at the correct procedural stage -
applicant's conduct, including absconding
after bail, further justified the trial court's
decision - court held that trial court can
award the interim compensation but after
considering the pleadings of the parties
and other related facts - consequently,
court does not find any illegality or
infirmity
in
the
impugned
orders
-
accordingly, the Application found to be
misconceived and dismissed. (Para - 11,
12, 14, 15)

Application Dismissed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. The State of
Jharkhand and another (Criminal Appeal No.
741 of 2024 - order dated 15.03.2024)

LIST OF ACTS
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Cheque Dishonour -
Complaint - Interim Compensation - Section
143A NI Act - Lost Article Report (LAR) - Stop
Payment - Absconding Accused - Prima Facie
Case - Revision - Misconceived Application - Bail
Violation -

CASE ARISING FROM
Orders dated 15.05.2025 passed in Case No.
111255 of 2023 (Raj Kishore Sharma vs. Dhanu
Krishi Sewa Kendra and another) - and - order
dated 28.05.2025 passed in Criminal Revision
No. 282 of 2025 (Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra vs.
Raj Kishore Sharma and others) - District -
Lucknow.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant: - Shri Shantanu Mishra,
Counsel for Respondent: - Sri Anurag Verma,
AGA.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Shri Shantanu Mishra,
learned counsel for the applicants and Shri
Anurag
Verma,
learned
Additional
Government Advocate.

2. This application under Section
482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS, 2023)
has been filed assailing the order dated
15.05.2025 passed in Case No. 111255 of
2023; Raj Kishore Sharma vs. Dhanu
Krishi Sewa Kendra and another by the
Additional Court No. 9 (NI Act), Lucknow
and order dated 28.05.2025 passed in
Criminal Revision No. 282 of 2025; Dhanu
Krishi Sewa Kendra vs. Raj Kishore
Sharma and others by the Session Judge,
Lucknow.

3.
Learned
counsel
for
the
applicants submits that the application filed
under
Section
143A
of
Negotiable
22 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Instruments Act (here-in-after referred as
NI Act) for interim compensation by the
respondent no. 2 has wrongly and illegally
been allowed by the concerned court. He
further submits that the presumption for
payment of interim compensation could not
have been drawn at this stage and it can be
drawn only at the stage of trial after
considering evidence. He further submits
that the cheques-in-question were lost,
therefore, a Lost Article Report (LAR) was
lodged with the bank, on account of which,
the stop payment was made and the
cheques were returned on account of stop
payment
and
not
on
account
of
insufficiency of funds. He further submits
that the payment in cash has been said to
have been made to the respondent no.2,
whereas no proof thereof has been placed
on record. He further submits that the total
amount paid has been shown as Rs.
12,50,000/-,
whereas
the
cheques-inquestion are of Rs. 2,50,000 and Rs.
6,00,000/- i.e. total of Rs. 8,50,000/-. He
further submits that being aggrieved by the
order passed by the trial court, the
applicants had filed a revision, which has
also been dismissed without considering
the grounds raised by the applicants. He
relies on the judgment and order dated
15.03.2024 passed in Rakesh Ranjan
Shrivastava vs. The State of Jharkhand
and another; Criminal Appeal No. 741 of
2024 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

4. Per contra, learned AGA submits
that the impugned order has rightly been
passed in accordance with law after
considering the pleadings of the parties. He
further
submits
that
the
interim
compensation under Section 143A of NI
Act can be awarded even at the threshold.
Even otherwise the trial has commenced.
He further submits that the presumption as
to negotiable instruments can be drawn
under Section 118 of NI Act and it can be
even in regard to the part payment as per
Section 139 of NI Act. He also submits that
information was given to the police on
06.03.2023 and the intimation to the bank
is
undated,
whereas
the
cheques-inquestion are of 03.02.2023 i.e. prior to the
date of alleged loss and the signatures on
cheques have also been admitted by the
applicants. He further submits that the
conduct of the applicants has also been
considered not only by the trial court but by
the revisional court also, according to
which, immediately after grant of bail by
the
concerned
court,
the
applicant
absconded and after recall of the order,
again he absconded, therefore, non bailable
warrant was issued. Thus, the submission is
that the impugned order does not suffer
from any illegality or infirmity, which may
call for any interference by this Court. This
application has been filed on misconceived
and baseless grounds. It is liable to be
dismissed.

5.
Having
considered
the
submissions of learned counsel for the
parties, I have perused the records.

6. The complaint under Section
138 read with Section 141 of NI Act has
been filed by the respondent no. 2 alleging
therein that on account of need of money
for start of business by accused, the
applicant had given Rs. 12,65,000/- as loan
in 2022 due to family relation, on promise
of accused that he will return in 1-2 months
but it was not returned. For clearing his
liabilities, the accused i.e. the applicant
gave two cheques of Rs. 4,15,000 vide
cheque no. 000029 and Rs. 2,50,000 vide
cheque no. 000030 dated 03.02.2023 and
Rs. 6,00,000/- vide cheque no. 000032
dated 16.05.2023 of Bank of Baroda,
Branch Chathuwa, Chathuwa against the
7 All. Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
23
cash loan of Rs. 12,65,000/-. During
pendency of the trial, an application under
Section 143A of NI Act was moved by the
respondent no. 2 for payment of 20% of
amount
of
cheque(s)
as
interim
compensation on the ground that he is in
need of money as he is suffering a lot of
inconvenience and financial loss as the
accused person has adversely affected the
business of the complainant by withholding
such a huge amount. The applicant filed
objection to the said application denying
the allegations made in the application and
stating therein that the burden of proof is
entirely upon the complainant. However,
the relations between the parties have not
been denied. The applicants have also
admitted the cheques and the signatures
thereon. The trial court, after considering
the pleadings of the parties and the grounds
raised in the application and the conduct of
the applicants after issuance of the
summoning order and finding prima facie
case in favour of the respondent no. 2,
awarded the interim compensation of 15%
of the amount of the cheques. Being
aggrieved by the same, the applicant no. 2
filed a revision, which has been dismissed
by the revisional court considering the
grounds
raised
therein.
Hence,
this
application has been filed.

7. Section 143A (1) of NI Act
provides that notwithstanding anything
contained
in
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an
offence under section 138 may order the
drawer of the cheque to pay interim
compensation to the complainant in a
summary trial or a summons case, where he
pleads not guilty to the accusation made in
the complaint; and in any other case, upon
framing of charge. Sub-section 2 provides
that the interim compensation under subsection (1) shall not exceed twenty percent of
the amount of the cheque. Sub-section 3
provides that the interim compensation shall
be paid within sixty days from the date of the
order under sub-section (1), or within such
further period not exceeding thirty days as
may be directed by the Court on sufficient
cause being shown by the drawer of the
cheque. Section 143A is extracted here-inbelow:

"Section 143A- Power to direct
interim compensation

(1)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained
in
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an offence
under section 138 may order the drawer of
the cheque to pay interim compensation to
the complainant-

(a) in a summary trial or a
summons case, where he pleads not guilty to
the accusation made in the complaint; and

(b) in any other case, upon framing
of charge.

(2) The interim compensation
under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty
percent of the amount of the cheque.

(3) The interim compensation shall
be paid within sixty days from the date of the
order under sub-section (1), or within such
further period not exceeding thirty days as
may cheque.

(4) If the drawer of the cheque is
acquitted, the Court shall direct the
complainant to repay to the drawer the
amount of interim compensation, with
interest at the bank rate as published by the
Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the
beginning of the relevant financial year,
within sixty days from the date of the order,
or within such further period not exceeding
thirty days as may be directed by the Court
on sufficient cause being shown by the
complainant.

(5) The interim compensation
payable
under
this
section
may
be
24 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
recovered as if it were a fine under section
421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.

(6) The amount of fine imposed
under section 138 or the amount of
compensation awarded under section 357
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
shall be reduced by the amount paid or
recovered as interim compensation under
this section."

8. In view of above, the order of
interim compensation to the extent of 20%
of the amount of cheque(s) can be passed at
any stage by the concerned court trying the
offence under Section 138 of NI Act and
there is no provision that it can be passed
only at the stage of trial after recording of
evidence. It is also not in dispute that the
substance of the acquisitions have been
denied by the applicant no. 2 and he has
pleaded not guilty. It is also apparent from
the impugned order, therefore, it has rightly
been considered and allowed at appropriate
stage in terms of Sub-section (a) of Section
143A (1), therefore, the contention of
learned counsel for the applicants that the
impugned order could not have been passed
is misconceived and not tenable.

9. The trial court at this stage, after
considering the pleadings of the parties,
also finds that the cheques and the
signatures thereon of the applicant no. 2
have been admitted by the applicant no. 2
as admitted in his objection against the
application under Section 143A NI Act.

10. So far as the intimation given
to the bank for making stop payment is
concerned, the same is ambiguous, which is
apparent from the perusal of the same,
which has been placed on record at page
No. 16 of application, which does not
disclose the cheque numbers-in-question
also. It is also noticed that in the intimation
given to the police regarding loss of
cheques on 06.03.2023, the time of loss is
between 04:28 to 06:28 on 06.03.2023,
whereas the cheques-in-question have been
issued
on
06.02.2023,
therefore,
the
contention of learned counsel for the
applicants
in
this
regard
is
also
misconceived and not tenable.

11. The learned trial court also
recorded the conduct of the applicant no. 2
after he was admitted to bail after issuance
of the summons, according to which, the
case was filed on 29.02.2023 and the
summoning
order
was
issued
on
07.12.2023. The accused was admitted on
bail on 30.04.2024 and from the very next
date, he absconded and the warrant was
recalled on 09.07.2024. Again, the accused
defied the orders passed by the concerned
court on 18.11.2024, therefore, non bailable
warrant was issued. The substance of
accusations was denied on 01.08.2024.
Thereafter,
the
complainant
moved
application
for
granting
the
interim
maintenance. As per Sub-section (2) of
Section 143 A, the trial is to be conducted
as expeditiously as possible and an
endeavour is to be made by the Court to
conclude the trial within six months from
the date of filing of the complaint, but on
account of the aforesaid conduct of the
applicant no. 2, the court also appears to be
not in a position to proceed and conclude
the trial as provided under law.

12. So far as the plea of the
applicants is that the cheques are not of the
total amount shown to have been lend by
the respondent no. 2, Section 139 provides
that it shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that the holder of a
cheque received the cheque of the nature
referred to in section 138 for the discharge,
7 All. Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
25
in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability, therefore, it is immaterial as to
whether the cheques are of the whole
amount or not and application can be
filed for cheque(s) issued for part
payment. Even otherwise three different
cheques have been issued for the total
payment and if the cheques would have
been prepared after stealing, this Court
failed to comprehend as to why a person
will prepare three cheques. Since the
applicant
no.
2
has
admitted
the
cheques-in-question and the signature
thereon,
therefore,
the
presumption
under Section 139 of NI Act could have
been drawn under Section 118 of the
Act. Sections 139 and 118 of NI Act are
extracted here-in-below:-

"Section 139. Presumption in
favour of holder.?

It shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that the holder of a
cheque received the cheque of the nature
referred to in section 138 for the discharge,
in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability.

Section 118 - Presumptions as to
negotiable instruments

Until the contrary is proved, the
following presumptions shall be made:

1. of consideration; that every
negotiable instrument was made or drawn
for consideration, and that every such
instrument, when it has been accepted,
indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was
accepted,
indorsed,
negotiated
or
transferred for consideration;

2.
as
to
date;
that
every
negotiable instrument bearing a date was
made or drawn on such date;

3. as to time of acceptance; that
every accepted bill of exchange was
accepted within a reasonable time after its
date and before its maturity;

4. as to time of transfer; that
every transfer of a negotiable instrument
was made before its maturity;

5. as to order of indorsements;
that the indorsements appearing upon a
negotiable instrument were made in the
order in which they appear thereon;

6. as to stamp; that a lost
promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque
was duly stamped;

7. that holder is a holder in due
course; that the holder of a negotiable
instrument is a holder in due course:
Provided that, where the instrument has
been obtained from its lawful owner, or
from any person in lawful custody thereof,
by means of an SP offence or fraud, or has
been obtained from the maker or acceptor
thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or
for unlawful consideration, the burthen of
proving that the holder is a holder in due
course lies upon him."

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava
vs. The State of Jharkhand and another
(Supra), has held in paragraph 14 that the
power can be exercised at the threshold
even before the evidence is recorded. In
paragraph 16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has disclosed the factors to be considered
while exercising discretion. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has drawn the conclusions
and summarised in paragraph 19 holding
that the exercise of power under subsection (1) of Section 143A is discretionary
and while deciding the prayer made under
Section 143A, the Court must record brief
reasons indicating consideration of all
relevant
factors.
The
parameters
for
exercising discretion under Section 143A
have been given in paragraph (c) of
paragraph 19, according to which, the court
will have to prima facie evaluate the merits
of the case made out by the complainant
26 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and the merits of the defence pleaded by
the accused in the reply to the application.
The financial distress of the accused can
also be a consideration. A direction to pay
interim compensation can be issued, only if
the complainant makes out a prima facie
case. Thus, the view taken by this Court is
also covered by the said judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant
paragraph nos. 14 to 19 are extracted
hereinbelow:-

"14. In the case of Section 143A,
the power can be exercised even before the
accused is held guilty. Sub-section (1) of
Section 143A provides for passing a drastic
order for payment of interim compensation
against the accused in a complaint under
Section 138, even before any adjudication
is made on the guilt of the accused. The
power can be exercised at the threshold
even before the evidence is recorded. If the
word 'may' is interpreted as 'shall', it will
have drastic consequences as in every
complaint under Section 138, the accused
will have to pay interim compensation up to
20 per cent of the cheque amount. Such an
interpretation will be unjust and contrary
to the well-settled concept of fairness and
justice. If such an interpretation is made,
the provision may expose itself to the vice
of manifest arbitrariness. The provision
can be held to be violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution. In a sense, sub- section
(1) of Section 143A provides for penalising
an accused even before his guilt is
established.
Considering
the
drastic
consequences of exercising the power
under Section 143A and that also before
the finding of the guilt is recorded in the
trial, the word "may" used in the provision
cannot be construed as "shall". The
provision will have to be held as a
directory and not mandatory. Hence, we
have no manner of doubt that the word
"may" used in Section 143A, cannot be
construed
or
interpreted
as
"shall".
Therefore, the power under sub-section (1)
of Section 143A is discretionary. \

15. Even sub-section (1) of
Section 148 uses the word ?may?.

In the case of Surinder Singh
Deswal v. Virender Gandhi1, this Court, after
considering the provisions of Section 148,
held that the word ?may? used therein will
have to be generally construed as ?rule? or
?shall?. It was further observed that when the
Appellate Court decides not to direct the
deposit by the accused, it must record the
reasons. After considering the said decision
in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal1, this
Court, in the case of Jamboo Bhandari v.
Madhya
Pradesh
State
Industrial
Development Corporation Limited & Ors.2,
in paragraph 6, held thus:

?6. What is held by this Court is
that a purposive interpretation should be
made of Section 148 NI Act. Hence,
normally, the appellate court will be
justified in imposing the condition of
deposit as provided in Section 148.
However, in a case where the appellate
court is satisfied that the condition of
deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing
such a condition will amount to deprivation
of the right of appeal of the appellant,
exception can be made for the reasons
specifically recorded.? (Emphasis added)

15.1. As held earlier, Section
143A can be invoked before the conviction
of the accused, and therefore, the word
?may? used therein can never be construed
as ?shall?. The tests applicable for the
exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section
(1) of Section148 can never apply to the
exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section
(1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act.

FACTORS
TO
BE
CONSIDERED
WHILE
EXERCISING
DISCRETION
7 All. Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
27

16. When the court deals with an
application under Section 143A of the N.I.
Act, the Court will have to prima facie
evaluate the merits of the case made out by
the complainant and the merits of the
defence pleaded by the accused in the reply
to the application under sub-section (1) of
Section 143A. The presumption under
Section 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no
ground to direct the payment of interim
compensation. The reason is that the
presumption is rebuttable. The question of
applying the presumption will arise at the
trial. Only if the complainant makes out a
prima facie case, a direction can be issued
to pay interim compensation. At this stage,
the fact that the accused is in financial
distress can also be a consideration. Even
if the Court concludes that a case is made
out for grant of interim compensation, the
Court will have to apply its mind to the
quantum of interim compensation to be
granted. Even at this stage, the Court will
have to consider various factors such as the
nature of the transaction, the relationship,
if any, between the accused and the
complainant and the paying capacity of the
accused. If the defence of the accused is
found to be prima facie a plausible defence,
the Court may exercise discretion in
refusing to grant interim compensation. We
may note that the factors required to be
considered, which we have set out above,
are not exhaustive. There could be several
other factors in the facts of a given case,
such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc.
While deciding the prayer made under
Section 143A, the Court must record brief
reasons indicating consideration of all the
relevant factors.

17. .......................

18. .......................

19. Subject to what is held
earlier, the main conclusions can be
summarised as follows:

a. The exercise of power under
sub-section
(1)
of
Section
143A
is
discretionary. The provision is directory
and not mandatory. The word "may" used
in the provision cannot be construed as
"shall."

b. While deciding the prayer
made under Section 143A, the Court must
record
brief
reasons
indicating
consideration of all relevant factors.

c. The broad parameters for
exercising the discretion under Section
143A are as follows:

i. The Court will have to prima
facie evaluate the merits of the case made
out by the complainant and the merits of
the defence pleaded by the accused in the
reply to the application. The financial
distress of the accused can also be a
consideration.

ii. A direction to pay interim
compensation can be issued, only if the
complainant makes out a prima facie case.

iii. If the defence of the accused is
found to be prima facie plausible, the Court
may exercise discretion in refusing to grant
interim compensation.

iv. If the Court concludes that a
case is made out to grant interim
compensation, it will also have to apply its
mind
to
the
quantum
of
interim
compensation to be granted. While doing
so, the Court will have to consider several
factors
such
as
the nature
of
the
transaction,
the
relationship,
if
any,
between the accused and the complainant,
etc. v. There could be several other
relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a
given case, which cannot be exhaustively
stated. The parameters stated above are not
exhaustive."

14. It is also noticed that according
to Section 143A, the court can award the
interim compensation up to 20 percent of
28 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the cheque amount, but the trial court, after
considering the pleadings of the parties and
their relations and facts of the case to be
considered under law, has awarded only 15
percent as interim compensation, which
appears to be adequate at this stage.

15. The revisional court also, after
considering the grounds raised by the
revisionist and considering the findings
recorded by the trial court, has rejected the
revision. This Court does not find any
illegality or infirmity in the impugned
orders, which may call for any interference
by this Court.

16.
In
view
of
above,
this
application has been filed on misconceived
and baseless grounds, which is liable to be
dismissed. It is, accordingly, dismissed.
---------
(2025) 7 ILRA 28
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 24.07.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 5510 of 2025

Ravindra @ Pappu ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Anuruddh Prasad

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Dharmendra Nath Verma

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether criminal proceedings against the
applicant under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and
Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act can be
quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the basis
of a compromise reached between the applicant
and the complainant.

HEADNOTES
Criminal
Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section - 482, - Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 498-A, 304-B,
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Sections -
3, 4 - Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. -
for quashing of Charge-sheet, Cognizance &
Summoning Order on the ground of settlement
- criminal proceedings arising in 2006 - offence
of harassment and dowry death - opposite
party no. 2 (brother of deceased) lodged an FIR
- investigation - charge-sheet - cognizance and
summoning order - trial starts - applicant
remained absconding throughout - trial court, in
2009, convicted and sentenced all co-accused
family members under Sections 498-A, 304-B
IPC and Sections 3/4 of the DP Act -
subsequent to conviction, applicant's parents
passed away - in 2025, applicant and opposite
party no. 2 entered into a compromise
agreement - however, court observed that the
applicant along with other accused family
members were involved in harassment and
dowry-related death of the complainant's sister
- trial court had already found the co-accused
guilty and convicted them, while the applicant
continued
to
evade
trial
and
remained
absconding - the guilt of all accused persons,
including the applicant, stood established by the
trial court's findings - the offence in question is
grave and heinous, involving mental depravity,
and is not a private dispute - it has serious
societal
implications
-
held
-
criminal
proceedings against the applicant cannot be
quashed merely on the ground of a subsequent
compromise, especially after conviction of coaccused - such quashing would defeat the ends
of justice - accordingly, the application is
dismissed. (Para - 15, 16)
Application Dismissed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Rajesh Kumari v. State of UP, 2024:AHC:26481
- Deepak Kumar and Another v. State of UP,
2024:AHC:135745 - Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 - Gian Singh v. State
of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 - Parbatbhai Aahir
v. State of Gujarat: (2017) 9 SCC 641.