# Dharam Vir Singh v. State &of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2001) 1 ILRA 143
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2001
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dharam-vir-singh-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-39579
- **Pages:** 6

## Text

1All] Dharam Vir Singh V. State &of U.P. and others 143
Regional
Transport
Authority,
The
finding of fact recorded by the Regional
Transport Authority that the portion of the
route was not being served by the
petitioner
and
other
operators
as
confirmed in appeal in now final and can
not be made a subject matter of scrutiny
in writ jurisdiction. The said finding is
based
on
tangible
and
believable
evidence. It can not be termed as perverse
or conjectural.

15. The order of the appellate
Tribunal is hedged with appropriate
reasons which provide links to the
conclusion arrived at by it. The impugned
order, as said above, has been passed after
serving due notice on the petitioner and
other operators. The bogey of violation of
the principles of natural justice in the
present case has been unnecessarily
raised. The Regional Transport Authority
as well as the appellate Tribunal have
taken due precautions to ensure that the
principle of natural justice are complied
with in all aspects. The Regional
Transport Authority has rightly passed the
order of curtailment of a portion of the
route by about 9 kilometres as it remained
totally unserved by the permit holders,
including the petitioner. The curtailment
of the route is also one of the kinds of
variation
of
the
conditions.

The
curtailment of the route is also one of the
kinds of variation of the conditions of
permit. Such an order could legally and
legitimately be passed by invoking the
provisions of S. 72 (2) (xxii) of the Act.

16. In the conspectus of the above
facts, I am of the view that is not a case fit
enough in which interference by this
Court
by
invoking
extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is warranted
The
writ
petition
is
dismissed
without any order as to costs.

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144
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By the Court

1. This is a plaintiff's second appeal
preferred against the judgment and decree
dated 11.4.1977 passed by Sri R.P. Misra
the then Civil Judge. Muzaffar Nagar in
Civil Appeal No.93 of 1976 arising out of
Original suit No.498 of 1972 Dharam Vir
Singh Vs. State of U.P. and another of the
Court of the then Munsif Kairana district
Muzaffar Nagar. Respondent No.1 to 3
are the State of U.P. Director of
Education U.P. at Allahabad and District
Inspector of Schools. Muzaffarnagar
respectively where as respondent No.4 is
the Manager, Ram Dai Inter College,
Sikka (Silwar) Muzaffarnagar.

2. The case giving rise to the second
appeal may be stated briefly for proper
appreciation.
The
plaintiff/appellant
Dharam Vir Singh brought the suit in the
Lower Court for recovery of Rs.415312
as arrears of his salary for the period
8.771 to 7.7.72 together with interim
relief. His case was that in consequence
of advertisement for the post of a lecturer
in Biology subject in Ram Dai Inter
College. Sikka (silvar), District Muzaffar
Nagar, he had applied for the said post
and was selected by the Selection
Committee of the college after interview.
He joined his post of 7.7.1971 for the
academic session 1971-72 on basic pay of
Rs.215 Rs.111 As D.A Rs.8-as interim
relief. Total Rs.334/- per Month. He
served the institution for the full session
and was thus entitled to get salary at the
above rate including the interim relief
granted by the State Government with
effect from 1.3.73 His salary totalling
Rs.415312 was not paid After 31st March
1971
the
lecturers
of
recognised
institution were paid their salary through
cheques issued by the State Government.
But no Cheque had been issued to him.
After serving a notice under Section 80
C.P.C. he brought the suit.

3. The State of U.P.. resisted the suit
with the defence that the appointment of
the plaintiff was without approval of the
District Inspector of Schools. Muzaffar
Nagar. No letter of appointment had been
issued to him by the Committee of
Management
of
the
institution.
His
appointment being not legal and in
accordance with regulations of the Board.
He was not entitled to get any salary from
the State Government. He could seek his
remedy only against the defendant No.2manager of the College. With this
defence the State of U.P. denied its
liability to pay any amount to the plaintiff
towards his alleged salary.

4. The defendant no.2 respondent
no.4 in this appeal filed a separate written
statement admitting that the plaintiff
worked in the College as lecturer with
effect from 7.7.71 and served for the
entire
session 1971-72 having been
appointed on temporary basis. His
appointment was made subject to the
1All] Dharam Vir Singh V. State &of U.P. and others 145
approval by the District Inspector of
Schools. Muzaffar Nagar and he was told
that the terms of his appointment would
be in accordance with the approval to be
granted by the District Inspector of
Schools.

The
papers
relating
his
appointment were sent to the District
Inspector of Schools for approval but no
approval was received and as such no
salary could be paid to him. The
defendant
no.2
(manager0
of
the
institution (Chandra Rani) denied her
liability to pay any salary to the plaintiff.
According to he defence. The liability to
make the payment of the salary of
plaintiff
was
that
of
the
State
Government. The trial Court held the
plaintiff to be entitled to the relief claimed
and decreed his suit against he State of
U.P. Aggrieved, the State of U.P.
preferred appeal and the first appellate
court by the impugned judgment dated
11.477 allowed the appeal and reversed
the judgment and decree passed by the
trial court with the result that the suit of
the plaintiff stood dismissed with costs
throughout it is now the plaintiff who has
come up second appeal before this Court.

5. This Court while admitting the
appeal. Formulated the following two
questions of law for decision in this
appeal as per order dated 23.7.81 which is
reproduced below:

"Admit. Issue Notice

The following questions of law are
formulated for decision in this second
appeal:
1. Because the approval of the
District inspector of Schools having been
sough by the management and no orders
having been passed on the said request the
appellant shall be deemed to have been
appointed as a Lecturer in the college by
virtue of Section 16 of the U.P.
Intermediate Education Act

2. Because the Management of the
Institution effectively represented through
its manager and the suit could not have
been dismissed for non-joinder
of
necessary parties.

Therefore this Court has to decide
the
above
two
questions
of
law
formulated in the appeal.

6. I have Heard Sri Arun Tandon.
Learned counsel for the appellant and
learned Standing Counsel on behalf of
respondent no.1 to 3. Service has been
deemed to be sufficient on the respondent
no.4-Magager of the institution by order
dated 27.7.2000. None turned up from his
side at the hearing of the appeal. I take up
the two question of law which have to be
decided one by one.

7. Question No.1: The argument of
the learned counsel for the appellant is
that the approval concerning appointment
of the plaintiff appellant having not been
accorded by the District Inspector of
Schools within two weeks, the was to be
deemed as having been accorded as per
Section 16F of the U.P. Intermediate
Education Act. 1921 and the plaintiff
appellant could not be deprived of his
salary on the premise of approval having
not been granted by the District Inspector
of Schools. On the other hand, the
submission of learned Standing Counsel
is that as matter of fact no appointment
letter had been issued in favour of the
plaintiff appellant. Nor was there any
resolution
concerning
his
selection.
Therefore, there could be no question of
his deemed approval by the District
Inspector of Schools.
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
146
8. On consideration I find that the
argument of "deemed approval" put forth
from the side of the plaintiff/appellant is
not so simple as has been sought to be
projected. Reference to the testimony of
Harpal
Singh
DW 1 and relevant
provisions of law would make the things
clear. Harpal Singh DW 1 was examined
in the Lower Court and he was the
member
of
the
Committee
of
Management of the college in question at
the relevant time. According to him, he
was the President of the Selection
Committee in which the plaintiff had been
selected for the appointment as lecturer
for
the
academic
session
1971-72
According
to
him,
the
Selection
Committee
recommended
the
appointment of the plaintiff to the District
Inspector of Schools, but no approval was
received. It is also his statement that the
plaintiff had been appointed subject to
approval of the District Inspector of
Schools and he had clearly been told that
if the approval for his appointment was
accorded by the District Inspector of
Schools for the lecturer's grade, then he
would be treated as lecturer and in case he
was approved for untrained grade, then he
would be treated accordingly. The witness
has further stated that as approval was not
received from the District Inspector of
Schools within 14 days, the approval was
deemed
as
accorded.
The
District
Inspector of Schools, however, refused to
sign the cheque for the salary of the
plaintiff. He also stated that the plaintiff
was entitled to his salary but the liability
was that of the State Government.
However, it is crystal clear from his cross
examination that no letter of appointment
was ever issued to the plaintiff. There also
does not appear to be any resolution of the
Committee of Management concerning
the appointment of the plaintiff. There is
also no document on record showing the
recommendation
of
the
Selection
Committee for the appointment of the
plaintiff as teacher. It appears as if all the
act proceedings were merely by word of
mouth without any proper recording of
documents as required by the law and
rules.

9. Section 16E of the Intermediate
Education Act. 1921 relates to the
appointment of teachers of different
subjects. Its sub clause (2) says that there
shall be constituted in every recognised
institution a Selection Committee for the
purpose
of
selecting
candidates
for
appointment as teacher in the institution.
Sub clause (2) of Section 16F of the said
Act reads as under.

"(2) The names of the selected candidate
shall be forwarded for approval, in the
case of a teacher, by the Principal or
Headmaster to the Inspector, and, in the
case of Principal or Headmaster, by the
Chairman of the selection committee to
the Regional Deputy Director, Education,
A
statement
showing
the
names,
qualifications and other particulars, as
may be prescribed of all candidates who
may have applied for selection shall also
be sent along with the name of the
selected candidate. The Inspector or
Regional Deputy Director, education, as
the case may be, shall give his decision
within two weeks of the receipt of the
relevant papers, failing which approval
shall be deemed to have been accorded."

10. There is nothing to show that the
compliance of the above provision of law
was made. In other words, it is not
established that the documents as required
by the above provisions had been sent to
the District Inspector of Schools. In the
1All] Dharam Vir Singh V. State &of U.P. and others 147
absence of the same, there could be no
question of invoking the provision of
deemed approval in respect of the plaintiff
appellant.

11. I also find that the Lower
Appellate court has rightly relied upon the
relevant provisions of Chapter II of the
Regulations under Intermediate Education
Act, 192211 on paragraph-9 of its
judgment. The list thereof is that there has
to be the constitution of Selection
Committee for appointment of teachers
and there is also the requirement for the
issuance of appointment letter within two
weeks of the receipt of approval of
selected candidate for appointment as
teacher. It is provided that the Manager
shall, on authorisation under a resolution
of the Committee of Management, has to
issue an order of appointment to the
candidate
mentioning
therein,
among
other particulars, the salary, scale of pay
and period of probation with instruction to
join duty within a fortnight of the receipt
of appointment letter. A copy of the order
of appointment has also to be sent to the
authority prescribed in Section 16F (2)
read with section 16C(5) for information
and record. The compliance of these
provisions was not made at all. Without
compliance of these legal requirements,,
the plaintiff was allegedly permitted to
work for the entire academic session. The
liability of paying his salary could not be
thrust upon the State Government of the
simple premise that under the U.P. High
School
and
Intermediate
Colleges
(payment of salary of teachers and other
employees) Act, 1971, it was the liability
of State Government to pay the salary of
the plaintiff.

12.

Learned counsel for the
appellant has argued that as per Section
10(2)
of
the
said
Act,
the
State
Government could recover the amount of
salary from the institution as arrears of
land revenue. I do not think that this
provision
could
saddle
the
State
Government with the liability of making
payment of any salary to the plaintiff. The
clear reason is that the basic requirement
of his appointment having been legally
made as per the provisions of law is
missing in the present case.

13. In the result, the first question is
answered this way that the approval of
District Inspector of Schools in respect of
the
alleged
appointment
of
the
plaintiff/appellant could not be deemed by
virtue of section 16F of the U.P.
Intermediate Education Act.

14. Question No.2: It is a fact that
the plaintiff/appellant did not implead the
Committee
of
Management
of
the
institution as a party to the suit. He only
impleaded the Manager and that, too.
Without his name. It goes without saying
that the legal person was the Committee
of Management of the College, and not
the Manager. The Manager was simply
the functionary of the institution, but not a
legal person who, as said above, was not
impleaded by name in his personal
capacity. The learned counsel for the
plaintiff/appellant has argued that as
admitted in the written statement of
defendant no.2/respondent no.4 (manager
of the Institution), the plaintiff had
worked as teacher for the entire academic
session 19971-72 and that he was entitled
to his salary. I do not think that it brings
about
any
betterment
for
the
plaintiff/appellant. The Committee of
Management of the institution having not
been impleaded as a party to the suit. No
liability could be fastened on the College
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
148
management. Had the Committee of
Management been impleaded as a party to
the suit, then it could be said that as the
plaintiff/appellant had admittedly worked
as teacher for the entire academic session
1971-72 he should be paid his salary by
the
Management
Committee
of
the
institution out of its own funds. (But it is
sad and bad that the plaintiff/appellant did
not care to implead the Committee of
Management of the institution as a party
to the suit and as such it is not possible to
grant any relief in his favour against the
institution). Non-impleadment of the
Committee of Management goes to the
root of the matter and it is not a proper
answer to over come this basic defect that
the Manager effectively represented the
Management of the Institution. This
Court is of the considered view that the
lower appellate court was perfectly
justified in finding that the suit was bad
for non-joinder of necessary parties.
Question no.2 is answered accordingly.

15. It follows from the above
discussion on the questions of law
formulated in the second appeal that the
appeal completely lacks merit and it is
destined to be dismissed.

16. This second appeal is hereby
dismissed.
However,
under
the
circumstances of the case, it is directed
that the parties shall bear their costs.

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By the Court

1. The short question that arises for
consideration in this petition is whether
the provisions of Regulation 101 of
Chapter III of the Regulations framed
under U.P. Intermediate Education Act