# Dharmendra Singh Rathor v. Hon'ble Chief Justice Hon. High Court Judicature at Alld. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 3 ILRA 1414
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-10-31
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 55500 of 2013
- **Bench:** Rajan Roy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dharmendra-singh-rathor-v-hon-ble-chief-justice-hon-high-court-judicature-at-43144
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art.-226-Petitioner
seeking benefit Division Bench judgment
-denied-while
all
other
7
persons
appointed as Routine Grade Clerk-along
with
petitioner-got
extended
same
benefits-held-once it is found that post
of RGC abolished and merged to AROpetitioner and 7 others representationst
3 All]. Dharmendra Singh Rathore Vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice Hon. High Court Judicature at Alld. & Ors. 1415
being appointed by the Chief Justice-can
not be termed illegal one-petitioner
entitled for every consequential benefit
of judgment in special appeal-even may
not be party-committee earred treating
differently having no rational basisimpugned order quashed-consequential
directions given.
Held: Para-34
On a perusal of the decision dated
31.05.2012 taken by the High Court on
the administrative side pursuant to the
judgment dated 20.09.2011 reveals that
the High Court did not at all consider and
failed to appreciate that the remaining
seven persons including the petitioner
were similarly situated to the seven
'representationists', referred therein, nor
did it draw any distinction on the ground
that the remaining seven were not
entitled to the benefit of the judgment
as they were not parties to the said
proceedings.
The
Committee
simply
treated these seven persons differently
without considering as to whether they
were similarly situated and entitled to
same benefit. I am of the view that it
erred in doing so.
Case Law discussed:
2006 (4) SCC 1; 1978 (1) SCC 405; 1983 (1)
LCD 201.

## Text

1414
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
has been recorded that in exceptional
circumstances i.e. where there is a dispute
with regard to the acquired land being
Abadi, where there is public agitation
against acquisition or law and order
situation has arisen, the Noida, Greater
Noida
and
Yamuna
Express-way
Industrial Development Authorities, while
recommending de-notification of the
acquisition, may examine the leasing out
of property in favour of the person whose
land has been so acquired.
6. We are of the considered opinion
that such Government Orders/Letters of
the Principal Secretary cannot be made a
tool to reopen the settled acquisition
proceedings specifically where the land
holder has accepted the compensation
without protest.
7. The State Government has to keep
in mind the provisions of Section 48 of
the Land Acquisition Act which confers a
right upon the State Government to
withdraw from the acquisition any land,
possession whereof has not been taken,
meaning
thereby
that
where
the
possession of the acquired land has been
taken, there cannot be a withdrawal of any
land from the acquisition proceedings
covered by Sections 4 and 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act.
8. We may record that a Division
Bench of this Court in the case of Abdul
Salam alias Babu versus State of U.P. &
Others, reported in 2008 (1) AWC 399,
has specifically held that once the land
has been acquired under the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act and possession
has been taken, no application for release
of the acquired land from the acquisition
proceedings can be made before the State
Government.
9. What logically follows is that the
letter of the Principal Secretary dated 24th
April, 2010 can be read to mean that
power to de-notify the land would be
available to the State Government only
where the possession of the land has not
been taken under the Land Acquisition
Act. Where the possession has been taken,
the letter of the Principal Secretary dated
24th April, 2010 will have no application.
10. Therefore, there cannot be any
mandamus as prayed for in the facts of the
case.
11. In view of the aforesaid, the
present writ petition is dismissed.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.10.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 55500 of 2013
Dharmendra Singh Rathor
..Petitioner
Versus
Hon'ble Chief Justice Hon. High Court
Judicature at Alld. & Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Anil Tiwari
Counsel for the Respondents
Sri Samir Sharma, Sri Ashish Mishra
Sri Manish Goyal, S.C.
Constitution of India, Art.-226-Petitioner
seeking benefit Division Bench judgment
-denied-while
all
other
7
persons
appointed as Routine Grade Clerk-along
with
petitioner-got
extended
same
benefits-held-once it is found that post
of RGC abolished and merged to AROpetitioner and 7 others representationst
3 All]. Dharmendra Singh Rathore Vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice Hon. High Court Judicature at Alld. & Ors. 1415
being appointed by the Chief Justice-can
not be termed illegal one-petitioner
entitled for every consequential benefit
of judgment in special appeal-even may
not be party-committee earred treating
differently having no rational basisimpugned order quashed-consequential
directions given.
Held: Para-34
On a perusal of the decision dated
31.05.2012 taken by the High Court on
the administrative side pursuant to the
judgment dated 20.09.2011 reveals that
the High Court did not at all consider and
failed to appreciate that the remaining
seven persons including the petitioner
were similarly situated to the seven
'representationists', referred therein, nor
did it draw any distinction on the ground
that the remaining seven were not
entitled to the benefit of the judgment
as they were not parties to the said
proceedings.
The
Committee
simply
treated these seven persons differently
without considering as to whether they
were similarly situated and entitled to
same benefit. I am of the view that it
erred in doing so.
Case Law discussed:
2006 (4) SCC 1; 1978 (1) SCC 405; 1983 (1)
LCD 201.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J.)
1. Heard Sri Anil Tiwari, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Samir
Sharma,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents.
2. The petitioner herein was
appointed as routine grade clerk in the
High Court along with 13 other persons
vide orders of the Registrar General dated
01.09.2004 on the same terms and
conditions. The appointment was on ad
hoc basis with the condition that he was
permitted to appear in the examination/
test to be held for direct recruitment of
routine grade clerks and his appointment
would be regularised and confirmed only
if he was selected in that examination/
test. This condition existed in the
appointment orders of all the 14 persons.
Six other persons were appointed on
various dates, whose appointment order
did not mention the word 'Ad Hoc'.
3. Prior to such appointment, an
advertisement was issued for selection on
the same post in March, 2004.
4. One Devendra Kumar Pandey,
who
claimed
to
be
eligible
for
consideration
as
per
the
aforesaid
advertisement filed a writ petition before
this court being Civil Misc. Writ Petition
No.45922 of 2004 praying for a writ of
certiorari for quashing the appointments
of respondents No.3 to 14 therein, vide
orders dated 26.07.2004, 01.09.2004 and
02.09.2004 (Annexures No.2, 3, 4, 5 & 6
to the writ petition) and other similarly
situated employees, if any. His claim was
that the respondents should hold the
recruitment as per the advertisement
issued in March, 2004.
5. The memo of the said writ
petition is annexed with the writ petition,
which shows that the respondents No.3 to
14 were those who were appointed along
with the petitioner on 01.09.2004 and four
others, whose order of appointment did
not mention the word ad hoc.
6. The petitioner was not impleaded
as respondent, but the fact is that in the
relief clause, relief had been sought for
quashing the appointment of 'other
similarly situated employees, if any'.
7. Ultimately, the advertisement
referred above was cancelled.
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
8. The aforesaid writ petition came
up for hearing and the same was decided
vide judgment dated 27.07.2007. This
court
observed
that
once
the
advertisement had been cancelled and the
writ petition had not been amended, the
cause of action in favour of the petitioner
therein did not survive any further. The
court also took note of the fact that a fresh
advertisement
had
been
issued
on
31.07.2006, but the petitioner therein had
not applied pursuant thereto. The service
Rules had also undergone a change,
according
to
which,
the
requisite
qualifications had also undergone a
change. In fact, the cadre of routine grade
clerk was declared as a dead cadre and its
employees were merged in the new cadre
of Assistant Review Officer, for which
new Rules prescribing new qualifications
had been prescribed. For the aforesaid
reasons, this court held that the petitioner
therein was not entitled to any relief,
however, referring to the Constitution
Bench judgment of the Supreme Court
reported in Secretary, State of Karnatka
and others Vs. Uma Devi (3) and others,
2006 (4) SCC 1 held that appointments
made by Hon'ble Chief Justice in exercise
of his powers under Rules 41 & 45 of the
Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff
(Condition of Service and Conduct)
Rules, 1976, i.e. the respondents before
the court, will be subject to regular
selection
by
direct
recruitment
in
accordance with Rule 8 of the Service
Rules and these appointees will not be
confirmed and regularised.
9. Being aggrieved the respondents
therein, who were similarly situated to the
petitioner herein filed special appeal
before a Division Bench of this court
challenging the aforesaid judgment dated
27.07.2007. The High Court on the
administrative side also felt aggrieved and
also filed a special appeal against the said
judgment. Both the aforesaid appeals
were clubbed together and allowed vide
judgment dated 20.09.2011.
10. A Division Bench of this court
held that the appointments in question
were
validly
made,
therefore,
the
observations in Uma Devi's case were not
attracted. It also held that once the cadre
of routine grade clerks had been declared
a dead cadre and a new cadre had been
created, for which new Rules had been
framed, the conditions mentioned in the
appointment order of the appointees dated
01.09.2004 etc. became redundant. The
Division Bench was of the view that once
the learned Single Judge had held that the
petitioner therein was not entitled to any
relief
in
view
of
the
change
in
circumstances and his failure to amend
the writ petition, the same should have
been dismissed, and that, it erred in
proceeding to make the observations in
the operative portion of the judgment
based upon the Constitution Bench
Judgment in Uma Devi's case.
11. The Division Bench considered
the scope of the powers of Hon'ble the
Chief Justice under Rules 41 & 45 of the
Rules of 1976 in the light of various
decisions and held that the Chief Justice
was
empowered
to
make
such
appointments and as the same had been
made as per the relevant Rules, therefore,
they were not illegal nor irregular.
Accordingly, the directions given by the
learned Single Judge in para-21 of the
impugned judgment dated 27.07.2007
following
the
observations
of
the
Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case were
set aside. The writ petition was treated to
be dismissed on the basis of the
3 All]. Dharmendra Singh Rathore Vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice Hon. High Court Judicature at Alld. & Ors. 1417
observations of the learned Single Judge
himself in the earlier paragraphs of the
impugned judgment. Registrar General of
this court was directed to take appropriate
steps
with
regard
to
confirmation/
regularisation and consequential relief to
the employees.
12. A review petition was filed by
the High Court, which was dismissed on
08.11.2012,
inter
alia,
with
the
observation that the judgment in question
had already been given effect to and all
the concerned employees had been
confirmed/
regularised
and
given
consequential reliefs by way of promotion
etc. vide various orders.
13. Pursuant to the judgment of the
Division Bench dated 20.09.2011, a
meeting of the concerned Committee of
the High Court on the administrative side
was held on 31.05.2012, wherein, out of
the 14 persons referred hereinabove,
seven who were respondents before the
writ court and appellants in appeal were
given
benefit
of
regularisation/
confirmation etc., whereas, the remaining
seven persons were treated differently. In
respect to them, it was stated that as no
rule had been framed by the High Court
for regularisation of ad hoc employees,
therefore, as per sub-clause (2) of Rule 40
of
the
High
Court
Rules,
the
Regularisation Rules applicable to the
State
Government
employees
were
applicable and, as, the High Court had not
issued
any
order
of
modification,
variation and exception, therefore, the
same
were
applicable
without
any
modification and since the said seven
persons including the petitioner did not
fall within the date mentioned therein, i.e.
30.06.1998, therefore, they cannot be
given benefit of regularisation. The four
respondents before the writ court who
were not even appellants in the appeal as
referred hereinabove were also treated
similarly to the seven appellants referred
to hereinabove.
14. The petitioner herein submitted a
representation to the High Court on the
administrative side dated 19.09.2012
seeking confirmation on the post of
routine grade clerk with all consequential
benefits including promotion from the
date of promotion of his juniors as has
been done in the case of similarly situated
persons.
In
the
representation,
the
petitioner referred to the benefit given to
the seven other persons, who were
similarly appointed vide order dated
01.09.2004 and were respondents in the
writ petition filed by Devendra Kumar
Pandey and were appellants before the
Division Bench, as already referred
hereinabove. The representation also
referred to the similar treatment having
been given to six other persons, who were
appointed
without
there
being
any
stipulation in their appointment about
their appointment being ad hoc. He
referred to the judgments of the learned
Single Judge dated 27.07.2007 and the
judgment of the Division Bench dated
20.09.2011 and sought similar reliefs.
15. On receipt of the decision of the
Committee dated 31.05.2012, the Hon'ble
Chief
Justice
passed
an
order
on
01.06.2012 referring the matter of all such
employees, who could not get benefit of
the said judgment dated 20.09.2013,
including that of the petitioner to the
Rules Revision Committee which, on
27.05.2013, took a decision as quoted in
paragraph-12 of the counter affidavit of
the respondents and pursuant thereto, the
impugned order was passed indicating the
1418
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
last three lines thereof, which stated that
'Committee recommends that those have
become over-age be given relaxation in
age in the next examination provided they
possess
minimum
qualification
for
appointment'. The relevant extract of the
decision
of
the
Committee
dated
27.05.2013 as quoted in paragraph-12
shows that the Committee had taken into
consideration the conditions mentioned in
the
appointment
order
regarding
appearance in examination and also the
fact that the Regularisation Rules for
class-III employees provided for a cut off
date, i.e. 20.12.2001, but the petitioner
and others, who had represented likewise
did not fall within the said cut off date.
16. Being aggrieved, the petitioner
has filed this writ petition.
17. The court was informed during
the course of argument that six other
persons, who had also represented and
whose representations had been rejected
likewise had approached this High Court
sitting at Lucknow and their writ petitions
are still pending. Learned counsel for the
petitioner also informed the court that, as,
fresh advertisement was issued by the
respondents on 19.07.2014 for filling up
the vacant posts in question, therefore, a
writ petition being W.P. No.5288 (S/S) of
2013 was filed at Lucknow, wherein, an
interim order had been passed on
25.08.2014 to the effect that though the
selection for the post of routine grade
clerk, pursuant to the advertisement dated
19.07.2014, may go on, but, the result of
the same shall not be declared. A copy of
the said order was placed before the court.
18. The contention of Sri Tiwari,
learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the petitioners were similarly situated to
the seven persons who have been given
the benefit of confirmation and further
promotion in pursuance to the judgment
of the Division Bench dated 20.09.2011,
therefore, there is no reason as to why the
petitioner should be treated differently.
Learned counsel invited the attention of
the court to one of the appointment orders
of the other persons, which is annexed as
part of Annexure-3 and the appointment
order of the petitioner, which is also
annexed with the writ petition, to show
that except for the difference in the name,
all the orders were verbatim similar, with
the same terms and conditions.
19. He invited the attention of the
court to the decision of the Committee
pursuant to the judgment of the Division
dated 20.09.2011 to impress upon that the
committee decided to treat the seven
'representationists', who were respondents
in the writ petition and appellants in the
special appeal, referred above, as, on
probation for one year from the date of
their initial appointment and as confirmed
on the expiry of the said period, the six
persons, whose appointment orders did
not contain words 'ad hoc' and who did
not prefer any appeal against the
judgment of the learned Single Judge
dated 27.07.2007 were given similar
benefits. However, the remaining seven
persons including the petitioner were
dealt with differently.
20. The contention is that the High
Court completely failed to appreciate that
the seven persons including the petitioner,
who were not parties in the writ petition
and were not appellants in the special
appeal were similarly situated to those
who were parties therein and once the
Division Bench upheld the appointment
of others as being legal entitling them to
3 All]. Dharmendra Singh Rathore Vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice Hon. High Court Judicature at Alld. & Ors. 1419
confirmation/ regularisation, then the
same benefit was required to be extended
to these persons also, and there was no
rational distinction for treating them
differently as has been done by the
Committee,
vide
decision
dated
31.05.2012.
21.

Learned
counsel
further
submitted that out of the six persons, who
were not similarly situated to the 14
persons, referred to hereinabove, only
four were respondents in the writ petition
and none of them filed special appeal
against the judgment dated 27.07.2007,
yet, all the six of them were extended the
same benefits by treating them as on
probation for a period of one year from
the date of their initial appointment and as
confirmed on completion of the aforesaid
probation, under Rule 33. The contention
is that the petitioner was entitled to
similar treatment under Rule 33.
22. On the other hand, Sri Samir
Sharma, learned counsel for the High
Court submits that a perusal of the
Division
Bench
judgment
dated
20.09.2011 will show that the same was
applicable only to the employees who
were parties thereto, as is evident from the
use of the word 'employees hereunder' in
the last line of the said judgment. In this
context, he also invited the attention of
the
court
to
the
judgment
dated
08.11.2012 passed in the review petition
filed by the High Court, wherein, this
court had taken notice of the fact that the
judgment had been given effect to and all
the concerned employees had been
confirmed/ regularised. Based thereon it
was contended that this court clearly
meant that the said judgment dated
20.09.2011 was only confined to the
parties therein and not others.
23. The learned counsel invited the
attention of the court to paragraphs-8, 9,
10, 11 & 12 of the counter affidavit filed
by the respondents in support of his
contentions. The contention of the learned
counsel is that as the petitioner did not file
any special appeal against the judgment of
the Single Judge dated 27.07.2007,
therefore, the benefits under the judgment
passed in special appeal were not liable to
be extended to him and the decisions of
the respective committees in this regard
did
not
suffer
from
any
error.
Consequently, the impugned order passed
pursuant to the same does not warrant any
interference.
24.

In
rejoinder,
Sri Tiwari
submitted that the reliance being placed
by the learned counsel for the respondent
upon the words 'employees hereunder'
mentioned in the judgment of the appellate
court, as also mentioned in the counter
affidavit, does not find any mention in the
earlier decision of the Committee dated
31.05.2012 nor in the subsequent decision
dated 27.05.2013, therefore, the same is by
way
of
an
afterthought,
as
such
impermissible. He further submitted that
even out of the six persons, whose
appointment order did not mention the
words 'ad hoc', only four were respondents
in the writ petition and none filed special
appeal
against
the
judgment
dated
27.07.2007, yet, the respondents have
extended the benefit of the said judgment to
all the six persons. The petitioner herein
was similarly situated to the seven
representationists referred in the decision of
the Committee of the High Court dated
31.05.2012 and there was no reason for
treating him differently.
25. He further submitted that as the
High Court had also filed a special appeal
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
against the judgment dated 27.07.2007,
therefore, there was no need for the
petitioner to file such an appeal as his
interest was being looked after and
protected by the High Court itself,
therefore, the contention to the contrary
on behalf of the respondents is not
acceptable. He contended that the seven
'representationists' have not only been
confirmed but have been promoted to the
next higher post of Review Officer and
the petitioner is also entitled to the same
benefit.
26. There is no doubt about the fact
that the petitioner herein and the seven
representationists, as referred in the
decision dated 31.05.2012, who were
respondents in the writ petition filed by
Devendra Kumar Pandey, were similarly
appointed by verbatim similar orders of
the same date, on the same terms and
conditions. Except for the difference in
the name, the appointment orders did not
differ in any manner. It is also not in
dispute that when Devendra Kumar
Pandey filed the Writ Petition No.45922
of 2004, he sought the quashing of
appointment orders of respondents No.3
to 14 dated 01.09.2004, 02.09.2004 and
26.07.2004 and 'other similarly situated
employees, if any'. For the reasons best
known to him, he impleaded only some of
the appointees excluding the petitioner
herein but claimed relief against all of
them.
27. In any case, the subject matter in
issue in the writ petition was the validity
of the appointments made by the
respondents and if the court had held that
they were illegal, then obviously the
petitioner's (herein) appointment would
also have been rendered illegal as it was
also on the same terms. After the passing
of the judgment dated 27.07.2007, the
aggrieved respondents (therein) filed
special appeal. The High Court on the
administrative side also filed special
appeal. In special appeal, the Division
Bench
categorically
held
such
appointments to be legal and valid having
been made as per Rules and also that the
Chief Justice was empowered to do so.
The relevant observations of the Division
Bench are as under:
"In the instant case, High Court,
which is the employer, and the employees,
who have been appointed by the then
Hon'ble the Chief Justice and whose
appointments were challenged in the writ
petition, both are aggrieved by the same
order of the learned Single Judge and
have
preferred
these
appeals
independently from the same order,
therefore, it can be safely construed that
there is no conflict of interest between the
High Court as an employer and its
employees. Against this background, we
have to see whether passing of such order
at the instance of the respondent/writ
petitioner, who had no locus, was justified
or not. At least the ratio propounded in
2001 (10) SCC 447 (Mohd. Shafi Pandow
Vs. State of J&K and others), 2003 (8)
SCC 567 (Chairman & MD, BPL Ltd. Vs.
S.P. Gururaja and others), 2006 (3) SCC
758 (Gurpreet Singh Bhullar and another
Vs. Union of India and others), 2008 (3)
SCC 512 (K. Manjusree Vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh and another) and 2009
(1) SCC 386 (Mukul Saikia and others Vs.
State of Assam and others) does not say
so.
Admittedly,
appointment
of
the
appointees, who are either appellants or
respondents in these appeals, were made
on adhoc basis by the then Hon'ble the
Chief Justice in the year 2004 under
3 All]. Dharmendra Singh Rathore Vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice Hon. High Court Judicature at Alld. & Ors. 1421
Rules 41 and 45 of the Rules, 1976. Rules
41 and 45 of the Rules, 1976, which are
relevant for the purpose, are as follows:
"41. Residuary powers.-- Nothing in
these rules shall be deemed to affect the
power of the Chief Justice to make such
orders, from time to time, as he may deem
fit in regard to all matters, incidental or
ancillary to these rules, not specifically
provided for herein or in regard to
matters as have not been sufficiently
provided for:
Provided that if any such order
relates to salaries, allowances, leave or
pension, the same shall be made with the
approval of the Governor of U.P."
"45.
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in these rules, the Chief Justice
shall have the power to make such orders,
as he may consider fit, in respect of
recruitment, promotion, confirmation or
any other matter."
The preamble of the Rules, 1976
speaks that in exercise of the powers
conferred by Clause (2) of Article 229 of
the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice
of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad makes the following rules with
respect to the conditions of service of
persons serving on the staff attached to
the
High
Court
of
Judicature
at
Allahabad.
The
appointments
under
challenge made on adhoc basis appear to
be on the post of Routine Grade Clerk.
Source of recruitment on Class-III posts
as per Rule 8(a)(i), substituted by
notification dated 27th October, 1989, is
that direct recruitment will be made
through
competitive
examination
conducted by the Appointing Authority or
in any manner so directed by the Chief
Justice. Therefore, the appointments of
such employees are as per the respective
rules.
So
far
as
Constitution
Bench
judgement of the Supreme Court in Uma
Devi (supra) is concerned, it criticised
passing
of
orders
by
the
Courts
regularising the services through back
door process making burden on the Union
of India or the State only out of sympathy
for the continuance of service ignoring
the process of appointment. In this case
employer and employees are not in
dispute. Even the Supreme Court in Uma
Devi (supra) has eliminated irregular
appointments
under
certain
circumstances from illegal appointments
with the intervention of orders of the
Courts or of tribunals.
Moreover, by an order of the then
Chief Justice dated 19th October, 2005
the cadre of Routine Grade Clerk was
declared as dead cadre as per Rule 40 (3)
of the Rules, 1976 and merged with the
cadre of Assistant Review Officer (Lower
Division Assistant in the pattern of civil
secretariat). As a result whereof, the
condition stipulated in the appointment
letters of all the incumbents working as
Routine Grade Clerk looses force. A
deponent on the part of the Registry of the
High Court has stated that by virtue of
merger of the posts of Routine Grade
Clerk with the Assistant Review Officer
and the advertisement as made on 17th
April, 2004 for 79 posts of Routine Grade
Clerks
having
been
cancelled,
no
recruitment can be made to such posts
and accordingly, holding of any regular
selection by direct recruitment to the post
of Routine Grade Clerk does not arise. It
has been contended by the appellants that
the adhoc appointments as made in the
case herein are neither temporary nor
contractual nor casual, as was in the case
of Uma Devi (supra). Moreover, such
appointments are neither illegal nor
irregular but in accordance with the
1422
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relevant Rules and powers of the Chief
Justice of a High Court. Such power is
sovereign and plenary in nature, which
can not be questioned with the reference
of Uma Devi (supra). Learned Counsel
appearing
for
the
respondent-writ
petitioner has only contended that he has
nothing to say with regard to availability
of power of the Chief Justice but with
regard to use of such power of the Chief
Justice.
Upon hearing the parties, it can be
construed that when the Chief Justice is
empowered to appoint a person under the
Rules framed in exercise of powers
conferred under Article 229 (2) of the
Constitution of India, the appointment of
the person can not be said to be illegal or
irregular. .................................
Thus, in totality, both the appeals
succeed and are allowed. The direction
given by the learned Single Judge in
Paragraph-21 of the impugned judgement
dated 27th July, 2007 following the
observations of the Supreme Court
judgement in Uma Devi (supra) stands set
aside. The writ petition is treated to be
dismissed on the basis of the observations
of the learned Single Judge himself in the
earlier paragraphs of the impugned
judgement. Registrar General of this
Court
is
hereby
directed
to
take
appropriate
steps
with
regard
to
confirmation/
regularisation
and
consequential relief of the employees
hereunder.
However, no order is passed as to
costs."
28. This court is not in any doubt
that the observations of the Division
Bench, referred hereinabove, regarding
the validity of the appointments and the
entitlement
of
such
appointees
to
confirmation/ regularisation is applicable
to all such appointees, and there is no
rational basis for making any distinction
in this regard.
29. So far as the use of the words
'employees hereunder' in the last line of
the said judgment is concerned, I have
perused the decision of the Committee
dated 31.05.2012 taken pursuant to the
aforesaid judgment dated 20.09.2011 and
I do not find any distinction having been
drawn by the Committee based on the
aforesaid ground. Thus, it is clearly an
afterthought, a post facto attempt to
justify
a
prior
action,
which
is
impermissible. The validity of an action
impugned is to be judged on the basis of
the reasons mentioned in the impugned
order/ decision, which cannot be allowed
to be supplemented by means of a counter
affidavit, therefore, this plea is not open
to the respondents. Reference may be
made in this regard to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder
Singh Gill Vs. The Chief Election
Commissioner, 1978 (1) SCC 405, para-8
of which is quoted hereinbelow:
"The second equally relevant matter
is that when a statutory functionary makes
an order based on certain grounds, its
validity must be judged by the reasons so
mentioned and cannot be supplemented
by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit
or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in
the beginning may, by the time it comes to
court on account of a challenge, get
validated by additional grounds later
brought out. We may here draw attention
to the observations of Bose J. in
Gordhandas Bhanji (1) "Public orders,
publicly made, in exercise of a statutory
3 All]. Dharmendra Singh Rathore Vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice Hon. High Court Judicature at Alld. & Ors. 1423
authority cannot be construed in the light
of explanations subsequently given by the
officer making the order of what he
meant, or of what was in his mind, or
what he intended to do. Public orders
made by public authorities are meant to
have public effect and are intended to
affect the actings and conduct of those to
whom they are addressed and must be
construed objectively with reference to
the language used in the order itself."
Orders are not like old wine
becoming better as they grow older: "
30. Mere use of the words
'employees hereunder' does not mean
others similarly situated are to be
deprived of similar benefits.
31.
It is trite that judgments of the
court are not to be read as statutes. Before
the Division Bench, it was not an issue as to
whether the benefit of regularisation/
confirmation etc. is to be confined to only
those who were parties in the writ petition
and the appeal or it was to be extended to
others also, therefore, the said judgment can
not be read or understood to mean that the
benefits therein were to be confined to the
parties therein. It is the ratio of the
judgment, which is to be read and
understood. The issue before the Division
Bench was the validity of the appointments,
which was upheld. It is also trite that once
the legal position has been settled by the
High Court in a writ petition at the behest of
some persons, then other similarly situated
should be extended the same benefit instead
of being compelled to approach the court
for the same relief. Reference may be made
in this regard to a Divison Bench judgment
of this court reported in R.N. Dixit Vs. State
of U.P., 1983 (1) LCD 201, in para-3 of
which it has been held as under:
"3. A qualifying examination for
promotion of Junior Engineers, to the
post of Assistant Engineers was held in
1970. The Government took a decision to
allow grace marks upto 9 in respect of
candidates of irrigation department and
not to P.W.D., whereupon five persons
filed two writ petitions nos.690 of '78 and
1523
of
'78
complaining
of
discrimination. These writ petitions were
allowed on 08.04.1982 by this court and
the government was directed to consider
the case of the petitioners who belonged
to the P.W.D., by allowing grace marks,
such as was done in respect of officers of
the irrigation department. The state
government has, accordingly, declared
those petitioners passed after allowing
their 9 grace marks. This order dated
3.2.83 is Annexure 4 to this writ petition.
Petitioner is one of the remaining officers
of the P.W.D. who could have succeeded
if 9 grace marks were allowed. The state
government has, however, given the
benefit only to the persons who had
earlier approached this court and not to
persons who were similarly situated and
had failed to approach this court. We find
no justification for the government
decision to deny the benefit of the
decision in 'Madan Gopal Popli Vs. State'
(Writ Petition No.1523 of 1978) to
persons who were similarly situated with
the petitioners of that case. Once the legal
position is declared by this court and the
same is not challenged before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, it is obligatory on the
State Government to given effect to the
law so declared. We, therefore, allow the
Writ Petition and direct that the case of
the petitioner and also of other persons
similarly situated be dealt with after
allowing them the benefit of 9 grace
marks in respect of 1970 qualifying
examination and to declare the result
1424
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
accordingly, at an early date, being,
within a month from today."
32. The petitioner was not made a
party in the writ petition filed by Sri
Devendra Kumar Pandey, though he
claimed relief against similarly situated
persons. Whether petitioner herein can be
faulted or made to suffer on account of
the above. The answer is in the negative.
The
High
Court
having
already
challenged the order of the Single Judge
dated 27.07.2007, obviously the rights
and interests of the petitioner herein were
being looked after and were protected in
its special appeal.
33. It is also important to note that
out of the six persons whose appointment
order did not mention the words 'ad hoc',
only four were respondents in the writ
petition and none of them filed special
appeal
against
the
judgment
dated
27.07.2007, yet, the Committee extended
the benefit of the Division Bench
judgment dated 20.09.2011 to all the six
persons.
34. On a perusal of the decision dated
31.05.2012 taken by the High Court on the
administrative side pursuant to the judgment
dated 20.09.2011 reveals that the High Court
did not at all consider and failed to appreciate
that the remaining seven persons including
the petitioner were similarly situated to the
seven 'representationists', referred therein,
nor did it draw any distinction on the ground
that the remaining seven were not entitled to
the benefit of the judgment as they were not
parties to the said proceedings. The
Committee simply treated these seven
persons differently without considering as to
whether they were similarly situated and
entitled to same benefit. I am of the view that
it erred in doing so.
35. The decision of the High Court
on
the
administrative
side
dated
27.05.2013 also does not consider the
issue of these persons being similarly
situated to the seven 'representationists',
instead, it refers to the conditions of
appointment
mentioned
in
their
appointment order, ignoring that the
Division Bench, vide its judgment dated
20.09.2011, had already held that those
conditions have lost force and these
observations of the Division Bench are
applicable as much to the appointment
letter of the petitioner as to that of others
who were before it. The said observations
have become final. The review petition
had been dismissed. This court has been
informed that no special leave petition
was preferred.
36. In my view, what has been held by
the Division Bench in respect of the seven
'representationists', is applicable to the
petitioner herein also and there is no rational
basis for treating him differently. The
respondents have erred in treating him so.
37. In view of the above discussion,
the impugned order cannot be sustained.
The same is accordingly quashed. The
respondents are directed to extend the
same benefits as has been extended to the
seven 'representationists' as referred by
the High Court in its decision dated
31.05.2012 pursuant to the judgment
dated 27.07.2007 and the judgment dated
20.09.2011. The petitioner shall also be
entitled to consequential benefits as has
been granted to the said persons. This
exercise shall be done within a period of
two months from the date a certified copy
of this order is produced before the
competent authority. The writ petition is
allowed in the aforesaid terms.
--------
3 All].
Panna Lal & Ors. Vs. The Collector, Allahabad. & Ors.
1425
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.10.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE TARUN AGARWALA, J.
THE HON'BLE SHRI NARAYAN SHUKLA, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 64061 of 2013
Panna Lal & Ors.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
The Collector, Allahabad & Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Harish K. Yadav.
Counsel for the Respondents
C.S.C., Sri S.P. Srivastava, Sri S.P. Singh
Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act
1976-Section 10 (b), 19 (5)-petitioner
seeking direction to delete the
State
from revenue record-claimimg in actual
physical possession-no specific denialmere taking possession on paper without
following procedure under Section 19
(5)-no possession in eye of law-direction
to struck of the name of state as well as
ADA given-petition allowed.
Held: Para-4
From
the
impugned
order,
it
is
apparently clear that no proceeding was
initiated under section 10(6) of the Act
and consequently, the alleged possession
taken
on
paper
and
thereafter
transferring
the
same
to
Allahabad
Development Authority appears to be
wholly
illegal
and
without
any
justification.
Case Law discussed:
2013 (4) SCC 280; 2014 (4) ADJ 305
(Delivered by Hon'ble Tarun Agarwala, J.)
1. Baladeen was the original tenure
holder of Gata No. 139 having an area
4872.94 sq. meter situate in village
Dadanpur,
Tehsil
Chail
District
Allahabad.
Under
the
Urban
Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the
competent authority declared 3372.94 sq.
meter as surplus land. The petitioners are
the children and grand children of late
Baladeen who have filed the present writ
petition alleging that they are still in
possession of the land in question and that
the order of the District Magistrate dated
22.5.2013
rejecting
their
application
should be set aside and the name of State
of U.P. should be deleted from the
revenue records and their names should
be incorporated in view of the fact that all
the proceedings under the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, stood
repealed by virtue of the Urban Land
(Ceiling
and
Regulation)
Repeal
Act,1999. This court under the earlier
ground of litigation had directed the
petitioner to make a representation which
has been rejected by an order dated
15.5.2013.
2. The petitioner in paragraph 10 of
the writ petition has made a categorical
statement that they are in actual and
physical possession. This fact has not
been denied by the respondents in
paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit.
3. From a perusal of the order of the
District Magistrate,the court finds that the
possession was alleged to have been taken
by the delegate of the District Magistrate
on 18.9.1984 pursuant to the order dated
18th September, 1984 declaring the land
as
surplus.
The
order
of
District
Magistrate aforesaid further indicates that
the land was transferred to Allahabad
Development Authority on 10.1.1990 and
possession of such transfer was recorded
in the notice under section 10(5) of the
Act. Nothing has been indicated in the