# Dilip Kumar Pandey v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 9 ILRA 75
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-05-26
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 6322 of 2018
- **Bench:** Saral Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dilip-kumar-pandey-v-state-of-u-p-anr-46075
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law
-The
Uttar
Pradesh
Finance and Accounts Service Rules, 1992:
Rule 17 - Promotion - The word used in
Rule 17 is "seniority subject to rejection of
unfit", which means that seniority alone is
not the sole criteria. The suitability of a
candidate is also the relevant criteria for
consideration for promotion. Thus, if a
candidate is not found fit by the Selection
Committee, he cannot be promoted solely on
the ground of seniority. The pendency of a
criminal case against an employee would be a
valid and proper circumstance to be taken into
account while considering the suitability of a
candidate for promotion under Rule 17 of Rules

## Text

9 All. Dilip Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
75
the petitioners for a review medical
examination should not be dismissed in the
manner
as
has
been
done
by
the
respondents.

16. In consequence and as a result of
above discussion, the writ petitions succeed
and are allowed. The respondents are
directed to constitute Review Medical
Board for re-examination of the petitioners
within a period of one week from the date
of production of true attested copy of the
instant order before them.

17. No order as to costs.
----------
(2020)09ILR A75
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.05.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ A No. 6322 of 2018

Dilip Kumar Pandey ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashok Kumar Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A.
Service
Law
-The
Uttar
Pradesh
Finance and Accounts Service Rules, 1992:
Rule 17 - Promotion - The word used in
Rule 17 is "seniority subject to rejection of
unfit", which means that seniority alone is
not the sole criteria. The suitability of a
candidate is also the relevant criteria for
consideration for promotion. Thus, if a
candidate is not found fit by the Selection
Committee, he cannot be promoted solely on
the ground of seniority. The pendency of a
criminal case against an employee would be a
valid and proper circumstance to be taken into
account while considering the suitability of a
candidate for promotion under Rule 17 of Rules
1992. (Para 14)

As the charge-sheet in the criminal cases has
been filed against the petitioner before the
meeting
of
D.P.C.,
therefore,
the
recommendation of the selection committee
should have been kept in the sealed cover in
view
of
respective
office
Order
(dated
28.05.1997). Hence, the petitioner could not
have been recommended by the selection
committee nor could he be promoted. Thus, the
promotion of the petitioner was illegal. (Para 15,
16)

B. Office Memorandum or government order
cannot override a statutory provision, but if
the rules are silent on any particular point,
the government can fill the gap and
supplement the rules and issue instructions
not inconsistent with the rules.

The object of adopting a sealed cover procedure
is to ensure that a person against whom a
decision is taken to proceed departmentally or
judicially on a charge constituting misconduct is
not left out of consideration for promotion
merely because an enquiry is pending against
him, therefore to balance the interest of the
Establishment, which is that an unworthy person
is not promoted, and that of the incumbent, so
that upon exoneration in enquiry he is not
deprived of the fruits of promotion, the
candidature of the incumbent for promotion is
considered but recommendation is kept in a
sealed cover to be opened and implemented
upon exoneration in the inquiry.

Thus, keeping in view the object for adopting
sealed
cover
procedure,
the
Office
Memorandum (dated 28.05.1997) cannot be
said to be inconsistent with Rule 17 of the
Rules, 1992. (Para 17, 18)

C. Principles of natural justice - It is
settled law that where the facts are
admitted and only one conclusion is
possible, the observance of principles of
natural justice is empty formality and
observance of it is not necessary since it
does not cause any prejudice to the
person concerned.
76 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Non-observance of the principles of natural
justice in the instant case had not caused any
prejudice to the petitioner as he could not have
been promoted due to pendency of the criminal
case. (Para 20, 21)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Dharam Narain Upadhyaya Vs St. of U.P. &
ors., 2016 (1) AWC 454 (LB) (Para 16)

2. Raj Karan Yadav Vs High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad, 2018 (10) ADJ 61 (DB) (Para 17, 18)

3. S.L. Kapoor Vs Jagmohan & ors., (1980) 4
SCC 379 (Para 20)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Dr. Rajendra Singh Vs St. of Punj. & ors., AIR
2001 SC 1769 (Para 8, 19)

2. Anjani Mishra & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
2007 (1) UPLBEC 260 (Para 8, 19)

3. State of Punjab Vs K.R. Erry & Sobhag Rai
Mehta, AIR 1973 SC 834 (Para 9, 21)

Present petition challenges order dated
02.02.2018, passed by Principal Secretary
(Finance), Government of U.P., Lucknow.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saral Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ashok Kumar Pandey, learned
counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing
Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. The petitioner by means of the
present writ petition has assailed the order
dated
2.2.2018
passed
by
Principal
Secretary (Finance), Government of U.P.,
Lucknow by which promotion accorded to
the petitioner by order dated 30.6.2016 has
been withdrawn.

3. The case of the petitioner in the
writ petition is that he was initially
appointed as Treasury/Accounts Officer
pursuant to a selection held by Uttar
Pradesh Public Service Commission in
accounts
cadre.
The
petitioner
was
promoted in the next higher grade i.e. Rs.
6600/- as Senior Treasury Officer/Senior
Accounts Officer in September 2012. The
petitioner was subsequently promoted in
the grade of Rs. 7600/- as Chief Treasury
Officer/Chief Accounts Officer by order
dated 30.6.2016. The respondent illegally
and arbitrarily by order dated 2.2.2018
withdrew
the
order
dated
30.6.2016
according promotion to the petitioner and
directed
the
recommendation
of
the
selection committee to be kept in seal
cover. The order dated 2.2.2018 was passed
on account of pendency of criminal cases
against
the
petitioner
and
also
in
compliance of the order dated 18.1.2018
passed by the Lucknow Bench of this Court
in Writ Petition No. 772 (S/B) of 2018.

4. The petitioner has averred in the
writ petition that in Case Crime No. 308,
309 of 2003, the allegation against the
petitioner is that two teachers namely Sri
Mangla Prasad Singh and Sri Surendra
Kumar Singh have been illegally paid
salary for which Charge-sheet Nos. 15 of
2005 and 16 of 2005 have been filed in the
aforesaid criminal cases. The petitioner has
tried to justify his action of disbursement of
salary to the aforesaid two teachers on the
ground that the role of the Accounts Officer
in the disbursement of the salary is very
limited, and the salary was paid in
compliance of the order of the District
Inspector of Schools dated 6.5.2002 as he
being a subordinate officer was bound to
comply with the said order. In respect of
Case Crime No. 307 of 2005, the petitioner
has stated that he had joined at DistrictBallia in November 2001 whereas the
salary to Sri Ravi Shankar Pandey was
9 All. Dilip Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
77
released in the year 1999, and before his
joining at District-Ballia, there were about
three Accounts Officer who had ensured the
payment of salary to Sri Ravi Shankar
Pandey, therefore, it is a case of false
implication.

5. The respondent filed counter
affidavit contending inter-alia that the order
dated
2.2.2018 has
been
passed
in
compliance of order dated 18.1.2018 of the
Lucknow Bench in Writ Petition No. 772
(S.B.) of 2018 filed by one Umesh Kumar
Upadhyaya
claiming
parity
with
the
petitioner for promotion on the post of
Chief Treasury Officer/Chief Accounts
Officer on the ground that Dilip Kumar
Pandey (petitioner herein) had been granted
promotion despite the pendency of criminal
case against him whereas he was denied
promotion on account of pendency of
criminal case; this court directed the State
Government either to grant promotion pay
scale to the petitioner( Umesh Kumar
Upadhyaya) or withdraw the promotion
accorded to Dilip Kumar Pandey (petitioner
herein). In compliance of the order of
Lucknow Bench of this Court dated
18.1.2018, the case of Umesh Kumar
Upadhyaya was considered and it was
decided that it was not possible to grant the
promotion to Umesh Kumar Upadhyaya till
the conclusion of criminal cases against
him. Accordingly, the order dated 2.2.2018
was passed withdrawing the promotion
accorded to the petitioner.

6. The respondents further placed
reliance upon the office Order No.
13/21/89-Ka-1-1997 dated 28.5.1997 which
provides the procedure of sealed cover, and
according to the paragraph No. 2 (Ga) of
the said office Order, if the case of an
employee against whom a criminal case is
pending has been considered by the
selection committee for promotion, the
recommendation
of
the
Selection
Committee of such candidate shall be kept
in sealed cover till the conclusion of the
criminal trial. It is further averred that the
order impugned is per law and does not call
for interference by this Court.

7. The petitioner filed rejoinder
affidavit denying the averment of the
counter affidavit.

8. Challenging the aforesaid order,
learned counsel for the petitioner has made
two submissions; Rule 17 of The Uttar
Pradesh Finance and Accounts Service
Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as
'Rules 1992') does not postulate that a
person against whom a criminal case is
pending can be denied promotion on the
ground of pendency of the criminal case.
He submits that Rule 17 provides that the
criteria to grant promotion is seniority
subject to rejection of unfit. Thus, his
submission is that the seniority subject to
rejection of unfit is the sole criteria for
grant of promotion, and Office Order dated
28.5.1997 cannot override Rule 17 of
Rules, 1992 and cannot be invoked to deny
the promotion to the petitioner. In support
of the above submission, he has placed
reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court
in the case of Dr Rajendra Singh Vs.
State of Punjab and others, AIR 2001 SC
1769 and judgment of this Court in Anjani
Mishra and others Vs. State of U.P. and
others, 2007 (1) UPLBEC 260.

9. The second submission of counsel
for the petitioner is that the impugned order
has been passed in violation of principles of
natural justice inasmuch as once the
petitioner had been accorded promotion, it
was incumbent upon the authorities to give
due and proper opportunity of hearing to
78 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the petitioner before withdrawing the order
of promotion. Thus, the submission is that
the impugned order is illegal and not
sustainable in law. In support of the
contention of violation of principles of
natural justice, he has placed reliance upon
the judgement of Apex Court in the case of
State of Punjab Vs. K.R. Erry and
Sobhag Rai Mehta, AIR 1973 SC 834.

10. Per contra, learned Standing
Counsel contends that the impugned order
has been passed in compliance of the order
dated 18.1.2018 passed by Lucknow Bench
of this Court in Writ Petition No. 772 (S.B.)
of 2018 and so as long as the said order
stands, the respondents are bound to obey
it. He further contends that the Office
Memorandum dated 28.5.1997 is not
contrary to Rule 17 of the Rules 1992 as it
only provides the procedure to keep the
recommendation
of
the
Selection
Committee in sealed cover in certain
contingency. He submits that though the
seniority is the prime consideration for
promotion, that does not imply that an unfit
person can be accorded promotion.

11. He further contends that in the
case in hand, it is not in dispute that the
chargesheet in criminal cases have been
filed against the petitioner before the
promotion of petitioner and he could not
have been promoted. Therefore, he submits
that the observance of principles of natural
justice is not required and would be an
empty formality.

12. I have heard the rival submissions
of learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record.

13. To appreciate the first submission
of counsel for the petitioner that the office
Order dated 28.5.1997 cannot override
Rule 17 of Rules 1992, It would be
pertinent to extract Rule 17 of Rules 1992
which reads as under:-

"17. Senior Scale Grade-II.-
Selection to the Senior Scale, Grade II
shall be made on the recommendation of a
Selection Committee, on the basis of
seniority subject to rejection of unfit from
amongst
such
substantively
appointed
officers of the Ordinary Grade who have
completed eight years service, as such on
the first day of July of the calendar year in
which the selection is made. The Selection
Committee shall be constituted as under:-
(i)
the
Principal
Secretary or the
Secretary, as the
case may be to
the Government
in
Finance
Department.
Chairman
(ii)
Secretary to the
Government
in
Personnel
Department
or
his nominee not
below the rank
of
Joint
Secretary.
Member
(iii)
Director
Treasuries, Uttar
Pradesh
Member

Provided that the Government
may, in special circumstances relax the
limit of service fixed for selection to the
Senior, Grade-II."

14. Rules 17 postulates that the
criteria for promotion is seniority subject to
rejection of unfit. Reading of Rule 17 of the
Rules 1992 does not suggest that the
promotion is automatic and seniority alone
is the sole criteria. The word used in Rule
17 is "seniority subject to rejection of
unfit", which means that seniority alone is
not the sole criteria. The suitability of a
candidate is also the relevant criteria for
consideration for promotion. Thus, if a
9 All. Dilip Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
79
candidate is not found fit by the Selection
Committee, he cannot be promoted solely
on the ground of seniority. The pendency of
a criminal case against an employee would
be a valid and proper circumstance to be
taken into account while considering the
suitability of a candidate for promotion
under Rule17 of Rules 1992.

15. In the instant case, it is not in
dispute that chargesheet has been issued
against the petitioner in three criminal
cases i.e. Case Nos. 1254 of 2005, 1252 of
2005 and 1253 of 2005 arising out of Case
Crime Nos. 307, 308, 309 of 2003. The
record reflects that further proceeding in
the aforesaid criminal cases has been
stayed by this Court in Application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 10770 of 2005
(Annexure No. 10 to the writ petition) but it
does not mean that the petitioner has been
exonerated from all the charges. The stay of
further proceedings in the criminal case
does not mean that the charges which have
been levelled against the petitioner in
criminal cases are false and have been
quashed. In the opinion of the court, as the
chargesheet in the criminal cases have been
filed against the petitioner before the
meeting
of
D.P.C.,
therefore,
the
recommendation of the selection committee
should have been kept in the sealed cover
in view of office Order dated 28.5.1997.
Hence, the petitioner could not have been
recommended by the selection committee
nor could he be promoted. Thus, the
promotion of the petitioner was illegal.

16. The Division Bench of this Court
in the case of Dharam Narain Upadhyaya
Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2016 (1)
AWC 454 (LB), has upheld the rejection of
promotion in a case where the competent
authority took a decision and sanctioned
the prosecution before the decision of
Departmental Promotion Committee. The
paragraph Nos. 13 to 15 of the said
judgment is extracted hereinbelow:-

"13. Under the terms of office
memorandum dated 28 May 1997 the term
'pendency of prosecution' has been clarified
with the words that 'the charge-sheet has
been submitted in the competent Trial
Court'.

14. In the case of Union of India
Vs. Kewal Kumar (supra) the Supreme
Court considered its judgment rendered in
the case of Union of India Vs. K.V.
Jankiraman (Supra) and held that in K.V.
Jankiraman itself it has been pointed out
that the sealed cover procedure is to be
followed where a Government Servant is
recommended
for
promotion
by
the
Departmental Promotion Committee but
before he is actually promoted, if he is
either
placed
under
suspension
or
disciplinary proceedings are taken against
him or decision has been taken to initiate
the proceedings or criminal prosecution is
launched or sanction for such prosecution
has been issued or decision to accord such
sanction is taken. The object of following
the sealed cover procedure has been
indicated by the Supreme Court in the case
of Delhi Development Authority Vs. H.C.
Khurana (1993) 3 SCC 196 the relevant
paragraphs No.13 and 14 are reproduced
as under:

"13. It will be seen that in
Jankiraman also, emphasis is on the stage
when 'a decision has been taken to initiate
the disciplinary proceedings' and it was
further said that 'to deny the said benefit
(of promotion), they must be at the relevant
time pending at the stage when chargememo/charge-sheet has already been issued
to the employee'. The word 'issued' used in
this context in Jankiraman it is urged by
learned counsel for the respondent, means
80 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
service on the employee. We are unable to
read Jankiraman in 'this manner. The
context in which the word 'issued' has been
used, merely means that the decision to
initiate disciplinary proceedings is taken
and translated into action by despatch of
the chargesheet leaving no doubt that the
decision had been taken. The contrary view
would defeat the object by enabling the
government servant, if so inclined, to evade
service and thereby frustrate the decision
and get promotion in spite of that decision.
Obviously, the contrary view cannot be
taken.

14. 'Issue' of the charge-sheet in
the context of a decision taken to initiate
the disciplinary proceedings must mean, as
it does, the framing of the charge-sheet and
taking of the necessary action to despatch
the charge-sheet to the employee to inform
him of the charges framed against him
requiring his explanation; and not also the
further fact of service of the charge-sheet
on the employee. It is so, because
knowledge to the employee of the charges
framed against him, on the basis of the
decision taken to initiate disciplinary
proceedings, does not form a part of the
decision making process of the authorities
to initiate the disciplinary proceedings,
even if framing the charges forms a part of
that process in certain situations. The
conclusions of the Tribunal quoted at the
end of para 16 of the decision in
Jankiraman which have been accepted
thereafter in para 17 in the manner
indicated above, do use the word 'served' in
conclusion No.(4), but the fact of 'issue' of
the charge-sheet to the employee is
emphasised in para 17 of the decision.
Conclusion No.(4) of the Tribunal has to be
deemed to be accepted in Jankiraman only
in this manner."

15. In view of the aforesaid
proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme court, we are of the view that the
pendency of prosecution is not based upon
the submission of charge-sheet in the
competent Trial Court. Once the competent
authority took a decision to initiate a
criminal proceeding and sanctioned the
prosecution, it is an appropriate stage to
withhold the recommendations of the
Departmental Promotion Committee from
giving effect to. "

17. Now coming to the argument of
counsel for the petitioner that the Office
Order dated 28.5.1997 cannot override
Rule 17 of the Rules 1992 which does not
prohibit the promotion on the ground of
pendency of criminal proceedings. To
appreciate the aforesaid submission, it
would be apposite to extract one passage
from the Division Bench judgment of this
Court in the case of Raj Karan Yadav Vs.
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
2018 (10) ADJ 61 (DB) wherein this Court
has delineated the object of adopting sealed
cover procedure. Paragraph No. 30 of the
said judgment is extracted hereinbelow:-

"30. We have given our anxious
consideration to the rival submissions.
Before we proceed to address the issue as
to whether adoption of sealed cover
procedure was justified in the facts of the
case, if not, its consequences, it would be
useful to first notice as to what purpose
adoption of sealed cover procedure serves
in
matters
relating
to
departmental
promotion. The object of adopting a sealed
cover procedure is to ensure that a person
against whom a decision is taken to
proceed departmentally or judicially on a
charge constituting misconduct is not left
out of consideration for promotion merely
because an enquiry is pending against him,
therefore to balance the interest of the
Establishment, which is that an unworthy
9 All. Dilip Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
81
person is not promoted, and that of the
incumbent, so that upon exoneration in
enquiry he is not deprived of the fruits of
promotion from the date his fellow
collegues would enjoy, the candidature of
the incumbent for promotion is considered
but recommendation is kept in a sealed
cover to be opened and implemented upon
exoneration in the inquiry. "

18. There is no quarrel to the
proposition
of
law
that
Office
Memorandum or government order cannot
override a statutory provision, but if the
rules are silent on any particular point, the
government can fill the gap and supplement
the rules and issue instructions not
inconsistent with the rules. Thus, keeping
in view the object for adopting sealed cover
procedure as explained by this Court in the
case of Raj Karan Yadav (supra), the
Office
Memorandum
dated
28.5.1997
cannot be said to be inconsistent or
overrides Rule 17 of the Rules,1992.

19. Counsel for the petitioner could
not demonstrate as to how the Office
Memorandum
dated
28.5.1997
is
inconsistent with the aforesaid Rule 17.
Accordingly, the court is of the opinion that
the judgments of Dr Rajendra Singh
(supra) and Anjani Mishra (supra) relied
upon by counsel for the petitioner are of no
help to the petitioner. In view of the
aforesaid discussion, this Court does not
find any substance in the first submission
of counsel for the petitioner.

20. As regards the second submission
of the counsel for the petitioner that the
opportunity of hearing ought to have been
afforded
to
the
petitioner
by
the
respondents before passing the impugned
order, it is worth to mention that it is settled
law that where the facts are admitted and
only one conclusion is possible, the
observance of principles of natural justice
is empty formality and observance of it is
not necessary since it does not cause any
prejudice to the person concerned. The
Apex Court in the case of S. L. Kapoor vs
Jagmohan & Ors, 1980 (4) SCC 379.
Paragraph No. 17 of the said judgment is
extracted hereinbelow:-

"17. Linked with this question is
the question whether the failure to observe
natural justice does at all matter if the
observance of natural justice would have
made no difference, the admitted or
indisputable facts speaking for themselves.
Where on the admitted or indisputable facts
only one conclusion is possible and under
the law only one penalty is permissible, the
Court may not issue its writ to compel the
observance of natural justice, not because
it approves the non observance of natural
justice but because Courts do not issue
futile writs. But it will be a pernicious
principle to apply in other situations where
conclusions are controversial, however,
slightly, and penalties are discretionary."

21. In the present case, it is admitted
on record that three criminal cases are
pending against the petitioner in which
chargesheet has been filed. The petitioner
could not have been promoted due to
pendency of the criminal cases against him
and sealed cover procedure should have
been adopted by the authorities as provided
in Office Order dated 28.5.1997, but the
petitioner was illegally promoted. Thus,
non-observance of the principle of natural
justice in the instant case had not caused
any prejudice to the petitioner as he could
not have been promoted due to pendency of
the criminal case. For the aforesaid reason,
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case
of State of Punjab (supra) is not applicable
82 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in the present case. Accordingly, the court is of
the opinion that the second submission of the
petitioner is also devoid of merit.

22. Further, it is pertinent to mention that
there is nothing on record to indicate that the
order of this court dated 18.01.2018 in Writ
Petition No. 772 (S.B.) of 2018 has either been
vacated or set aside in appeal and as long as the
order of this court dated 18.01.2018 stands, the
authorities are bound to obey it.

23. Given the reason above, the
impugned order cannot be said to be arbitrary or
illegal. The writ petition lacks merit and is,
accordingly, dismissed with no order as to cost.
----------
(2020)09ILR A82
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.04.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ A No. 15599 of 2019

Dr. Somu Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Ashok Khare, Sri Shantanu Khare, Sri
Kamlesh Kumar Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Krishna Raj Singh Jadaun, Sri
Vikram D. Chauhan, Sri Vinay Kumar Singh,
Sri V.K. Upadhyay

A.Education/ServiceLawDiscrimination/arbitrariness-
National
council of Teacher Education(Recognition
Norms & Procedure)Regulations, 2009:
Regulation
5;
Central
Civil
Services
(Redeployment of Surplus Staff)Rules,
1990: Rule 4; National Council for Teacher
Education Act, 1993: Section 17-The
University being instrumentality of the
state should act as a model employer and
should not treat its employees unequally,
arbitrarily or to put them in a position
which would seriously prejudice and
jeopardize the future of its employees.
(Para 38)

Advertisement No. 01/2009-10 pursuant to
which petitioners have been appointed as
Lecturers in B.Ed. Course, shows that the posts
were advertised for RGSC (Rajiv Gandhi South
Campus). Whereas, facts clearly show that B.Ed.
course at RGSC was being run without the
approval of the NCTE (National Council for
Teacher
Education).
Under
Secretary
(Inspection), NCTE vide letter dated 26.04.2017
approved to run B.Ed. course at the faculty of
education at the main campus of the University
with intake of 280 students, therefore, it could
not be justified as to how the posts have been
sanctioned for the faculty of education at RGSC
to run B.Ed. course, for which no permission
was granted by the NCTE. Therefore, Court
derived the conclusion that the petitioners were
appointed against the posts sanctioned at
Faculty
of
Education
at
the
University,
Kamachha Varanasi (main campus of the
University). (Para 34)

The action of university is discriminatory
and arbitrary in asking the petitioner to report
at RGSC. Once the University has allowed the
staff of B.P.Ed. (Bachelor of Physical Education)
to discharge their duties at main campus after
the closure of the B.P.Ed. Course at the South
Campus, the petitioners who are similarly placed
are entitled to discharge their duties at the Main
Campus of the University. (Para 36)

B. It is no doubt true that University has
prerogative
to
take
work
from
the
petitioners as and when it is required, but
this prerogative is subject to certain
limitations and restrictions that it should
be exercised in consonance with the
principle of right to equality and fairness.
(Para 37)

The University has not specified the nature of
work which the University would ask the
petitioners
to
discharge
at
RGSC.
The