# Dinesh Kumar Maurya v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2016) 3 ILRA 258
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-02-19
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2073 of 2014
- **Bench:** Mrs. Ranjana Pandya
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dinesh-kumar-maurya-v-state-of-u-p-43526
- **Pages:** 12

## Text

258 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
34. In Rajoo & Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 858 the Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that :

"Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutirx should not be suspected and should be
believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on par with that of an injured
witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. It cannot be lost
sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the
same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage
to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of
false implication, there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement
of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration."

35. Thus, the court has been left with the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, which is
unreliable, untrustworthy and unworthy of credence. Thus, on the basis what has been stated
above, I find that the learned lower court has misled itself in reaching to the conclusion that
the accused is guilty for the offence charged. Thus, the accused is entitled to be acquitted
and the appeal is liable to be allowed. Hence the impugned judgement of conviction and
sentence dated 28.1.2014 passed by Special Judge S.C./S.T. Act/Additional Sessions Judge
in Special Criminal Case No. 91 of 2006 (State Vs. Dharmendra) arising out of Crime No.
80 of 2006, under Section 376 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(5) S.C./S.T. Act, Police StationBadausa, District-Banda, is hereby set aside.

36. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellant is in jail. He shall be released
forthwith in this case. The provisions of Section 437A Cr.P.C. shall be complied with.

37. Let a copy of this order be sent to the trial court concerned for compliance of the
order.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.02.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. RANJANA PANDYA, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 2073 of 2014

Dinesh Kumar Maurya ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for Appellant:
Gaurav Kumar Shukla, Rajiv Lochan Shukla

Counsel for Respondent:
Govt. Advocate
3 All. Dinesh Kumar Maurya Vs State Of U.P.
259

HELD:

1. The victim's statements under FIR, Section 164 Cr.P.C., and trial testimony were materially
contradictory, creating serious doubt about the prosecution case.
2. The FIR itself was doubtful-conflicting statements arose regarding who dictated it, and the scribe
admitted police pressure and personal enmity affecting its contents.
3. Independent witnesses to the alleged enticing and recovery (P.W.6 and P.W.7) turned hostile; the
scribe (P.W.4) denied knowledge, weakening the prosecution story.
4. Medical evidence showed **no internal or external injuries**, contradicting allegations of forceful
rape.
5. Victim admitted carrying ₹20,000 from home, telephonic contact with appellant for months, and
voluntarily traveling with him-indicating willingness rather than coercion.
6. The prosecution failed to explain the exact recovery of the victim; IO admitted he never visited the
place of alleged recovery.
7. The conduct of the victim and her mother (including laughing about her false 164 statement)
showed serious unreliability.
8. Age determination was doubtful-medical opinion varied between 15 and 18-20 years.
9. The prosecution's reliance on Supreme Court precedent about sole testimony of prosecutrix was
rejected because her testimony was **improbable and unreliable**.
10. The defence version that the accused was arrested from his village, not the bus stand, remained
unshaken.
11. The prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
12. Conviction dated 30.04.2014 under Sections 363, 366, 376(1), 506 IPC and Section 4 POCSO Act
was set aside; appellant was acquitted.
13. Appellant to be released forthwith; compliance with Section 437-A Cr.P.C. directed.

Case Law Discussed:

1. Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2006 SC 508.
2. Suresh N. Bhusare v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 1 SCC 220.
3. Mohd. Ali @ Guddu v. State of U.P., 2015 (3) SCC (Cri) 82.
4. Ram Raj v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2010 CrLJ 2062.
5. Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) SCC 191.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Ranjana Pandya, J.)

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the Judgment and order dated 30.4.2014 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.6/Special Judge(POCSO Act), Basti passed in
Special Sessions Trial No. 16 of 2013 (State Vs. Dhananjai Singh and others) arising out of
Crime No. 392 of 2013 under Sections 363, 366, 376 I.P.C. and POCSO Act, Police Station
Gaur, District Basti whereby the accused Dhananjai was acquitted of all the charges levelled
against him whereas the appellant Dinesh Kumar Maurya was found guilty for the offences
punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376 (1), 506 I.P.C. and Section 4 POCSO Act and was
convicted and sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment and Rs.20,000/- fine under
Section 376(1) I.P.C.; three years rigorous imprisonment and Rs.3,000/- fine under Section
363 I.P.C.; five years rigorous imprisonment and Rs.5,000/- fine under Section 366 I.P.C.;
one year rigorous imprisonment and Rs.1,000/- fine under Section 506 I.P.C. and ten years
260 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
rigorous imprisonment and Rs.16,000/-fine under Section 4 POCSO Act with default
stipulation. Out of the fine recovered, Rs.25,000/- were directed to be paid to the victim.

2. Filtering out unnecessary details, the prosecution case is that the informant Amar
Singh presented a written report to the S.O., Gaur, District Basti on 24.7.2013 stating that
his daughter was enticed away on 21.7.2013 by Dhananjai Singh and Dinesh. On the
information of the informer that his daughter will be taken away elsewhere from Gonda, he
accompanied by his pattidars went to Gonda bus-stand where he saw his daughter with
Dinesh, who was caught by these people on the bus-stand. The victim was aged 14 years.

3. Investigation of the matter was entrusted to P.W.9 S.I. Ram Nagina Prasad on
24.7.2013. On 25.7.2013, he copied the written report in the case diary and recorded
statements of Constable Ram Lal, Ram Lal Kureel, informant Amar Singh, victim and the
statement of the accused Dinesh Kumar Maurya. On 28.7.2013, he copied the medical report
of the victim in the case diary and recorded the statement of Sant Prakash Singh. On
29.7.2013, he copied the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. On
30.7.2013, accused Dhananjai Singh was arrested and his statement was recorded. On
1.8.2013, Section 6 of the POCSO Act was added in the matter. On 4.8.2013, he recorded
the statement of witnesses Harish Chandra Singh and Ajay Singh. On 9.8.2013, the
statement of Indra Sen was recorded. The investigation ended into a charge sheet which was
proved by this witness as Ext. Ka-6.

4. The victim was medically examined by Dr. Archana Pandey (P.W.10), who did not
find any external or internal injury on the body of the victim. She proved her medical report
as Ext.Ka-7, the supplementary report as Ext. Ka-9 and the examination report as Ext.Ka-8.
P.W.11 is Dr. Jitendra Pratap, who prepared the ossification report, which was proved by
this witness as Ext.Ka-9.

5. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses in support of its case. P.W.1 is
Amar Singh, the informant who has proved the written report as Ext.Ka-1 and the copy of
the order as Ext.Ka-2. P.W.2 is the victim, who has proved her statement recorded under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. as Ext.Ka-3. P.W. 3 is Soldi Singh, wife of the informant and mother of
the victim. P.W.4 is Sant Prakash Singh, who is said to be scribe of the written report. P.W.5
is Harish Chandra, who is said to be the witness about the enticing away of the victim by the
accused. P.W. 6 is Indra Sen, who is also said to be witness of enticing away of the girl.
P.W.7 Ajai Singh is witness of the same fact. P.W. 8 is Head Constable Ram Lal Kureel,
who has proved the chik report as Ext.Ka-4A and the copy of G.D. as Ext.Ka-5. The
statement of P.W.9 Ram Nagina Prasad, P.W.10 Archana Pandey and P.W. 11 Jitendra
Prasad has been discussed by me earlier.

6. The accused persons were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in which they denied
the occurrence and stated that they had been falsely implicated. Accused Dinesh had stated
that he was not arrested with the victim on Gonda and in fact the police apprehended him
from his village and falsely implicated. The accused produced Mahesh Maurya as D.W. 1. to
prove that the accused was apprehended from his village by the police.
3 All. Dinesh Kumar Maurya Vs State Of U.P.
261

7. Learned lower court, after hearing counsel for the parties, returned the finding of
guilt against the accused Dinesh Maurya while acquitting the accused Dhananjai as has been
mentioned in para 1 of the Judgment. Feeling aggrieved the accused Dinesh Maurya has
preferred this appeal.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the trial court record.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial court has wrongly
convicted the appellant Dinesh on the basis of inadmissible evidence. It is further submitted
that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is contradictory to each other. The case of the
prosecution is also not reliable inasmuch as she has resiled from her statement under Section
164 Cr.P.C. and, thus, the appeal is liable to be allowed.

10. Per contra the learned A.G.A. has submitted that the findings of the fact recorded
by the trial court is based on evidence of the victim and no corroboration was required when
the testimony of the victim was clear, cogent and convincing. He has further contended that
there was nothing to show that the victim has falsely implicated the accused and the appeal
is liable to be dismissed.

11. Generally, the court does not ponder to find corroboration if the statement of the
victim inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based
only on the solitary evidence of the victim and no corroboration would be required unless
there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement.
Corroboration of testimony of the victim as a condition for judicial reliance is not a
requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances.
Minor contradictions are insignificant. Discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing
out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The testimony of the victim has to be appreciated
on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of
probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject matter being a criminal charge.
However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the victim on its face value, it
may search for evidence, direct or substantial, which may lend assurance to her testimony as
has been held in Vishnu Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2006 SC 508.

12. The evidence of the prosecutrix is found suffering from serious infirmities and
inconsistencies with other material, prosecutrix making deliberate improvements on material
point with a view to rule out consedent on her part and there being no injury on her person
even though her version may be otherwise, no reliance can be placed upon her evidence as
has been held in Suresh N. Bhusare & others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 1 SCC
220.

13. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that there is inordinate delay in lodging the
F.I.R. Inasmuch as the accused are said to have been enticed away the girl on 21.7.2013 at 4
p.m. whereas the report was lodged on 24.7.2013 and no explanation has been given by the
prosecution for not lodging the report in time. Counsel for the appellant has also placed
262 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reliance on 2015 (3) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 82, Mohd. Ali @ Guddu Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down in paragraph 27 as under:-

"27. Be it clearly stated here that delay in lodging FIR in cases under Section 376
IPC would depend upon facts of each case and this Court has given immense
allowance to such delay, regard being had to the trauma suffered by the prosecutrix
and various other factors, but a significant one, in the present case, it has to be
appreciated from a different perspective. The prosecutrix was missing from home. In
such a situation, it was a normal expectation that either the mother or the brother
would have lodged a missing report at the police station. The same was not done. This
action of PW 2 really throws a great challenge to common sense. No explanation has
been offered for such delay. The learned trial Judge has adverted to this facet on an
unacceptable backdrop by referring to the principle that prosecutrix suffered from
trauma and the constraint of the social stigma. The prosecutrix at that time was
nowhere on the scene. It is the mother who was required to inform the police about
missing of her grown-up daughter. In the absence of any explanation, it gives rise to a
sense of doubt."

14. In 2010 Cr.L.J. 2062 , Ram Raj Vs. State of Chhatisgarh, the Hon'ble Apex
Court has observed that we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of rape, the statement of
the prosecutrix must be given primary consideration. But, at the same time, the broad
principle that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt applies equally
to a case of rape and there can be no presumption that a prosecutrix would always tell the
entire story truthfully.

15. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that there is vast contradiction in the F.I.R.,
statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the statement of the victim
recorded before the trial court, hence, the whole prosecution story becomes unreliable.

16. As far as the F.I.R. (Ext.Ka-1) is concerned, it has been proved by P.W.1 Amar
Singh, father of the victim. According to the F.I.R., the accused Dhananjai Singh and Dinesh
both enticed away the girl making it abundantly clear that both the accused were named in
the F.I.R. P.W.1 Amar Singh has stated that he got the report scribed by Sant Prakash. He
had not mentioned the name of Sant Prakash. The written report was not read over to him.
This witness has further stated that it appears that due to enmity of Sant Prakash with
Dhananjai, the scribe Sant Prakash mentioned the name of Dhananjai Singh falsely. The
victim has also not taken the name of Dhananjai Singh, who is innocent meaning thereby as
per version of this witness, the name of Dhananjai Singh has wrongly been mentioned in the
F.I.R. As far as the F.I.R. is concerned, I think either Amar Singh was the person who could
state about the facts written in the F.I.R. or Sant Prakash Singh, who scribed, could have
thrown light on this issue.

17. P.W. 4 Sant Prakash Singh, who scribed the F.I.R., has stated that he did not have
any personal knowledge of the incident. Amar Singh had got the written report scribed on
3 All. Dinesh Kumar Maurya Vs State Of U.P.
263
the instigation of others. In cross-examination, he has admitted that he wrote the Tehrir as
was directed by the police. He has also stated that he asked Amar Singh as to why he was
falsely implicating Dhananajai Singh at which Amar Singh replied that if they do so, the
police would get angry. The trial court was vigilant enough while trying this case. Inasmuch
as when the trial court questioned this witness, he confessed that Dhananjai Singh was his
pattidar. He had written the written report on the saying of the informant Amar Singh and
whatever was stated to him by Amar Singh was written by this witness. The mother of the
victim and the wife of the informant while submitting an exaggerated version of the matter,
has stated that the scribe of the First Information Report is her brother-in-law (devar) and
whatever was dictated by this witness (wife of the informant PW 3) to Sant Prakash was
scribed by him. Thus, the prosecution has not cleared whether the report was dictated by the
informant or his wife. Thus, a shadow of doubt is created on the truthfulness of the F.I.R.
itself.

18. Another argument has been advanced on behalf of the appellants that the statement
of the prosecutrix has recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and that recorded before the trial
court are contradictory.

19. A perusal of the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
reveals that the appellant Dinesh and Dhananjai Singh forcibly took her away. She was
called telephonically by Dhananjai. She went out of the village where she met both the
accused. P.W. 2 victim has said that she took Rs.20,000/- from her home when she left her
home. They threatened her, hence, she went with them. Both raped her. At the Gonda busstand, Dhananjai fled away seeing the parents of the victim while Dinesh was arrested on the
spot. The appellant Dinesh and Dhananjai made her spent Rs.6,000/- out of Rs.20,000/- she
was carrying. This statement (Ext. Ka-4) was put to the victim P.W.2. This statement is a
previous statement of the victim recorded by the Magistrate, which could be used under the
provisions of Indian Evidence Act. P.W. 2 has stated that only the accused Dinesh Maurya
enticed her away. Dhananjai Singh has been falsely implicated in this case due to enmity.
Neither Dhananjai Singh had enticed her away nor raped her and the statement given by her
before the Magistrate as against the Dhananjai Singh was not the statement of her will. She
was threatened to state against Dhananjai Singh. Lady constable had conspired against
Dhananjai Singh and forced this witness to name Dhananjai Singh in the incident. Thus, this
witness has very calmly resiled from her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. She has also
gone to the extent of stating that the scribe Sant Prakash was her pattidar, who was inimical
with Dhananajai. Sant Prakash was also inimical to her father, who does not rely on Sant
Prakash. The trial court was vigilant enough while recording the statement of this witness
noted the demeanor of this witness and the trial court has observed that keeping in view the
gestures of this witness and her body language, it appears that the witness is telling lies in
the statement and the gestures are also falsifying her statement. Thus, there is contradiction
between the F.I.R., the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the
statement of the victim recorded before the court.

20. P.W. 1 Amar Singh, father of the victim has stated that his daughter was taken
away by Dinesh Maurya. There was whisper in the village that P.W.2 victim was enticed
264 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
away by Dinesh. This witness was put to test of the cross-examination in which he admitted
that he had come to know about the occurrence on the day of occurrence itself. After three
days, he came to know that the victim had taken Rs.20,000/- with her and had also taken an
amount of Rs.1500 with her. It appears that this witness knowingly concealed this fact and
did not mention this fact in the First Information Report which found place in the statement
of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Although the victim had omitted to state this fact
before the trial court but the factum that the victim carried away Rs.20,000/- from her home
is indicative of the fact that she left her home willingly. Thus, P.W.1 Amar Singh is not a
witness of fact.

21. P.W. 2 victim is a witness of fact, who has stated that the accused Dinesh met her at
the village crossing and asked her to go to Bombay from Gonda and wanted to take her
Bombay to marry her. She believed him and went to Gonda. At 9 p.m. she reached Gonda
bus-stand from where Dinesh took her to a room and raped her. P.W. 2 the victim has said
that she took Rs.20,000/- from her home when she left her home. After that Dinesh took her
to Gonda bus-stand. When she was standing at the Gonda bus-stand, her father Amar Singh,
Sant Prakash and mother reached the bus-stand and she was caught with Dinesh Maurya.

22. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that even the recovery of the victim is
doubtful inasmuch as per the F.I.R., it appears that the victim was recovered by the parents
along with Dinesh and the scribe of the F.I.R. on 24.7.2013.

23. The recovery memo of the victim is not on record as to from where she was
recovered but the Investigating Officer was a person, who could state about from where the
victim was recovered. P.W.9 S.I.Ram Nagina Prasad has stated that he did not visit the busstand from where girl is said to have been recovered. The witness as regards the recovery of
the victim with Dinesh is P.W.6 Indra Sen and P.W.7 Ajai Singh. Although the names of
these witnesses have been mentioned by the informant but both P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 have
stated that neither they saw the victim going with accused Dinesh and Dhananjai nor she
was recovered in their presence. Both these witnesses were declared hostile by the
prosecution, who proceeded to cross examine these witnesses but even the crossexamination of these witnesses could not help the accused. Sant Prakash (P.W.4) is also said
to be present when the victim was recovered with Dinesh at the Gonda bus-stand. But, this
witness has specifically stated that he does not know whether the victim was traced at
Gonda bus-stand or not. Now, the evidence of Amar Singh (P.W.1) and Soldi Singh (P.W.3)
remained. Both these witnesses are interested witnesses whose evidence has to be
scrutinized with care and caution.

24. Amar Singh (P.W.1) has stated that he accompanying with Sant Prakash reached
Gonda when he came to know that his daughter would be taken away by Dinesh to Bombay.
He recovered his daughter and Dinesh. How he came to know that his daughter is at Gonda
bus-stand is a question which remained unanswered throughout the trial. He has stated that
he reached Gonda at 6 a.m. P.W.2 victim has stated that her parents and Sant Prakash
reached the Gonda bus-stand. The victim has admitted that prior to the occurrence, she knew
the appellant Dinesh. Two-three months prior to the occurrence, she used to converse with
3 All. Dinesh Kumar Maurya Vs State Of U.P.
265
appellant Dinesh telephonically. She has stated her time of recovery to be 9 p.m. from the
bus stand when she was sitting with Dinesh on a bench. She could not see her parents when
they suddenly caught her. She has admitted that she was waiting at the Gonda bus-stand for
the last two hours before she met with her family members. Thus, it is clear that this witness
was sitting with the accused on the bus-stand, which is a public place, without raising any
alarm. P.W.3 is the mother of the victim, who has stated that when her daughter left her
home without telling anybody, while she was searching for the daughter, she accompanied
with Harendra Singh, Chandra Bhan and her husband reached Gonda bus-stand where they
found the appellant with the victim. Even Sant Prakash was present with them. She has also
admitted that Dinesh used to come to her house. He used to talk to the victim but she did not
anticipate the conduct of Dinesh, hence, she did not restrict her movements. Thus, the time
of recovery of the victim is doubtful.

25. Learned A.G.A. and counsel for the informant has placed reliance upon (2010)
SCC 191, Vijay @ Chinee Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, in which the Hon'ble Apex
Court has held as under:-

"9. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, this Court held
that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but
is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with
the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under:
(SCC p.559, para 16)

"16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She
is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence
cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly
a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight
as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and
caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured
complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive
to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is
interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind
and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of
law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section
114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant
to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence
which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case
of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of
the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a
conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy.
If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the
prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the
court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence."
266 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

10. In State of U.P. Vs. Pappu this Court held that even in a case where it is shown
that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a
ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was
consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be
a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be
conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with
the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which
it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597 para 12)

"It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the
offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her
testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She
stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on
the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and
emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the
prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which
would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood
in the context of an accomplice, would do."

11. In State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh, this Court held that in cases involving
sexual harassment, molestation etc. the court is duty bound to deal with such cases with
utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a
prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.
Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any
corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may
look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of
the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice.
The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even
properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof.
The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21)

"8. ...The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had
found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her
and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not
conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the
driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the
prosecutrix?The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the
negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of
the prosecutrix...The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact
that in a case of rape, no self- respecting woman would come forward in a court just to
make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission
of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which
have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in
the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are
of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case...Seeking
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267
corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases
amounts to adding insult to injury...Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on
the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence
under given circumstances....
* * *
21. ...The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get
swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the
prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable
prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied
upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some
reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look
for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration
required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be
appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its
responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."

12. In State of Orissa Vs. Thakara Besra this Court held that rape is not mere a
physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the
victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the
testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case
and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious
infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the
commission of the offence."

26. No doubt conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix but it
would not be safe to do so if the testimony of the victim is shaky, unreliable and not worthy
of credence. This witness P.W.2 victim can be termed to be unreliable witness inasmuch as
she had gone to the extent of even accusing the Magistrate who recorded her statement
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Besides, the evidence of P.W.3 Soldi Singh, mother of the victim,
is speaking volumes for itself. She has stated "मकजजरेट के बयान 164 में थनन्जय के कखिाि मेऱी िडकी से पुकिस
ने दबार् देकर बयान किखाया था। िडकी बयान देकर जब बाहर कनकि़ी तो बताया कक मम्म़ी मेरा बयान धनन्जय कसूंह के कखिाि पुकिस र्ािे
दबार् देकर कदिर्ा कदये। मैंने मकहिा कसपाह़ी से दबार् देने के बाबत कुछ नहीं पूछा। बातर जब मैं कचहऱी में इजिास से आय़ी और पूछा कक
ऐसा बयान कयों बेट़ी तुम किखर्ा कदया। तो र्ह हूंसने िग़ी।" This shows the arrogance and the conduct of the
victim, who was shameless enough to laugh when her mother asked her why she gave an
incorrect statement before the Magistrate. The victim has admitted that when Dinesh took
her on motor cycle, she was conveniently sitting behind Dinesh. This shows that the victim
was carrying twenty thousand rupees from her home and went on her own accord with the
accused. Thus, all along she was ready to go with the accused.

27. Learned A.G.A. and counsel for the informant have submitted as per the provision
of law, the victim was below 18 years of age, hence, her consent had no value and was of no
consequence. In support, the prosecution has relied upon 2013 (14) SCC 340, Kailash Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, in which it has been held that the issue of consent is rendered
inconsequential if the victim is below the age of consent.
268 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
28. As far as the age of the victim, i.e., whether she was below 18 years or not is
concerned, I do not think this issue would be very relevant because the whole prosecution
story is a bundle of lies. The testimony of the victim is improbable, unreliable and unworthy
of credence, hence, even if she is below 18 years, evidentiary value of her statement is zero
keeping in view the contradictions in her statements recorded before the Magistrate under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the statement recorded before the trial court. Dr. Archana Pandey
did not find any mark of internal or external injury on the body of the victim and opined that
the victim had 30 teeth in her mouth, which could only appear at the age of 18 to 20 years. I
think this is just an opinion of the doctor, which cannot be treated to be final. Dr. Jitendra
Pratap has stated the victim to be about 15 years.

29. No doubt rape on the point of threat may be a circumstance for the court to believe
that the victim did not resist due to threat. I do not mean to say that conviction in the case of
rape would only be possible if there were external/internal injuries on the body of the victim
but I think if there had been any forcible sexual intercourse, the victim must have made
some strong resistance and, in the process, some injuries ought to have been found on the
vagina/private parts of the body or some other parts indicative of any such use of force and
it would be too much to assume that there would have been no injuries whatsoever on the
body on this account. Though injuries on the body is not always must or sine qua non to
prove the charge of rape having regard to the case of the prosecution, as the victim has been
helplessly raped and was subjected to sexual intercourse. As I have said earlier, absence of
injuries on the private part of the victim will not by itself falsify the case of rape nor
construe as evidence of consent. Similarly, the opinion of a doctor that there was no
evidence of any sexual intercourse or rape may not be sufficient to disbelieve the accusation
of rape by the victim. Bruises, abrasions and scratches on the victim specially on the
forearms, wrists, face, breast, thighs and back are indicative of struggle and will support the
allegation of sexual assault. The courts should, at the same time, bear in mind that false
charges of rape are not uncommon. There have also been rather instances where a parents
has persuaded a gullible or obedient daughter to make false charge of rape either to take
revenge or extort money or to get rid of financial liability but whether they were raped or
not, would depend only on facts and circumstances of each case.

30. The accused in the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has stated that he has been
falsely implicated and he was not arrested at the Gonda bus-stand with the victim. He was
arrested by the police from his village. He has tried to give evidence in this regard in the
shape of Mahesh Maurya (D.W.1) who has said that the police took the accused from the
village.

31. Thus, on the basis of what has been said above leads to the conclusion that the
statement of the victim is concocted, improbable and unreliable, and the prosecution has
miserably failed to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt.

32. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. the Judgment and order dated 30.4.2014 passed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.6/Special Judge(POCSO Act), Basti
passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 16 of 2013 (State Vs. Dhananjai Singh and others)
3 All. Asha Ram & Anr. Vs U.P.A.E.P. & Ors.
269
 arising out of Crime No. 392 of 2013 under Sections 363, 366, 376 I.P.C. and POCSO
Act, Police Station Gaur, District Basti whereby the accused appellant Dinesh Kumar
Maurya has been convicted and sentenced, is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted for
the charges framed against him.

33. The accused-appellant is in jail. He shall be released forthwith in this case. The
provisions of Section 437A Cr.P.C. shall be complied with.

34. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the trial court.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.12.2015

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.
THE HON'BLE RAKESH SRIVASTAVA, J.

First Appeal No. - 552 of 2001

Asha Ram & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
U.P.A.E.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for Appellants:-
Surendra Tiwari

Counsel for Respondents:-
Anand Prakash Srivastava

HELD:

1. The central issue before the Court concerned the determination of fair market value of the acquired
land, particularly whether the Reference Court erred in ignoring relevant exemplars and in making
excessive deductions.
2. The appeal arose from compulsory acquisition for a planned industrial and residential scheme; thus,
the benchmark for valuation must reflect both potential use and the surrounding development of the
area.
3. The Court held that the Reference Court improperly relied on post-notification sale deeds and failed
to give proper weight to pre-notification exemplars that were proximate in time, area, and location.
4. The principle reaffirmed is that the **best evidence for determining market value** is a bona fide
sale of comparable land within reasonable proximity to the notification date; forced, speculative, or
post-notification transactions must be excluded.
5. Circle rates, guideline values, or arbitrary government rates cannot form the basis of compensation,
since they do not reflect real market conditions and are meant only for fiscal purposes.
6. The Court reiterated that the **belting system** may be applied where the land exhibits nonuniform potentiality; however, in the present case, uniformity in location and advantage made belting
unnecessary.