# Dinesh Kumar Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 101
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-01-08
- **Case number:** Review Petition Defective No. 75 of 2014
- **Bench:** Anil Kumar, Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dinesh-kumar-singh-v-national-insurance-co-ltd-45601
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

- any order having civil consequences and
adverse effect - on a person against
whom it has been passed - if passed
without hearing or giving opportunity of
hearing
to
the
person
concerned/aggrieved - would be violative
of the principles of natural justice - liable
to be set-aside.(Para-14,15,20)

Without any notice to the review applicant and
without giving any opportunity of hearing to
him, the FAFO No. 521 of 99 was decided.
(Para-20)

Held:- The application for condonation of
delay as well as also the application for review
are liable to be allowed in the interest of
substantial justice - The judgment and order
dated 28.02.2013 passed in FAFO No. 521 of
1999 is hereby recalled - restored to its original
number.(Para-22)

Application for condonation of delay &
review application allowed. (E-7)

List of cases cited:-

## Text

2 All. Rajat Gangwar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
101
validity of such restriction has been made
in this case. Once restrictions are imposed,
no one can claim that he, individually or
collectively is entitled to breach such
restrictions and still can claim that his
action is lawful. Statutory Authority when
exercises a statutory power and certain
restrictions are imposed, such a statutory
order is obligatory to be complied with by
all concerned. No one can claim that with
impunity such restriction can be violated,
still he can claim immunity from legal
action, for what has been done by him,
individually or collectively.

44. At this stage, we find that
petitioner has not placed on record any
material to show that State has violated
any statutory provision. This Court does
not exercise its jurisdiction under Article
226 in absence of any cause of action or
any reason to show that there is any
infringement of legal or fundamental right
of an individual or group of individual by
the State. The stand taken by learned
ACSC is very fair and we do not find
infringement or even lack of transparency
on the part of State, particularly when
sufficient material is not on record to draw
any otherwise inference or conclusion.

45. In our view, therefore, the
relief sought by petitioner in the
present writ petition is not justified
to be granted at this stage.

46. Writ petition is therefore
dismissed in limine.
----------
(2020)02ILR A101

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 08.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Review Petition Defective No. 75 of 2014

Dinesh Kumar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
National Insurance Co. Ltd. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Mukesh Singh

Counsel for the Respondent:
-----

A. Principles of natural justice - to secure
justice - to prevent miscarriage of justice
- any order having civil consequences and
adverse effect - on a person against
whom it has been passed - if passed
without hearing or giving opportunity of
hearing
to
the
person
concerned/aggrieved - would be violative
of the principles of natural justice - liable
to be set-aside.(Para-14,15,20)

Without any notice to the review applicant and
without giving any opportunity of hearing to
him, the FAFO No. 521 of 99 was decided.
(Para-20)

Held:- The application for condonation of
delay as well as also the application for review
are liable to be allowed in the interest of
substantial justice - The judgment and order
dated 28.02.2013 passed in FAFO No. 521 of
1999 is hereby recalled - restored to its original
number.(Para-22)

Application for condonation of delay &
review application allowed. (E-7)

List of cases cited:-

1. Amar Singh Vs. Union of India and others,
(2011) 7 SCC 69

2. Neeraj Kumar Sainy and others Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and others, (2017) 14 SCC 136

3. Maneka Gandhi Vs.. Union of India, (1978) 1
SCC 248 : (AIR 1978 SC 597)
102 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
4.
Mohinder
Singh
Gill
Vs.
Chief
Election
Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : (AIR 1978 SC 851)

5. D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993)
3 SCC 259

6. Canara Bank Vs. V.K. Awasthy, (2005) 6 SCC
321 : (AIR 2005 SC 2090)

7. Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. Vs.
Central Valuation Board, (2007) 6 SCC 668 :
(AIR 2007 SC 2276)

8. Devdutt Vs. Union of India, 2008 (3) ESC 433
(SC) : ((2008) 8 SCC 725 : AIR 2008 SC 2513)

9. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State
of West Bengal and another, A.I.R. 1975 SC 266

10. Raghunath Thakur Vs. State of Bihar and
others , A.I.R. 1989 SC 620

11. Gronsons Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and others , A.I.R. 2001
SC 3707

12. Smt Rajni Chauhan Vs. State of U.P and
others , 2010 (6) AWC 5762 (All.)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anil Kumar, J.
Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard Shri Mukesh Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Puja
Arora holding brief of Shri S. C. Gulati,
learned counsel for the respondent.

2. Initially, the respondent/National
Insurance Co. Ltd. filed the appeal bearing
F.A.F.O. No.521 of 1999 against the
judgment and award 02.09.1999 passed by
Vith Additional District Judge, Faizabad in
Claim Petition No.2/93 (Ram Vishal Vs.
Dinesh Kumar Singh), which was allowed
by judgment and order dated 28.02.2013
passed by this Court.

3. By means of the present review
petition, the applicant has sought for
review of the judgment and order dated
28.02.2013 passed by this Court. The main
grounds for seeking the review of the
judgment and order dated 28.02.2013 are
as under :

"1. Because the judgment and
order dated 28.02.2013 has been passed
by Hon'ble Court Ex-parte.

2. Because in fact, notices were
never served to the applicant though he
was the necessary party and owner of the
vehicle
in
question
against
whom
insurance company filed the aforesaid
F.A.F.O.

3. Because the applicant was
never given opportunity of hearing and
contesting the appeal.

4. Because from the bare perusal
of the reading of the impugned order dated
28.02.2013, it is clear that though the
present appeal was directed against the
award and judgment dated 02.02.1999 and
applicant/owner was the necessary party
but he was never given opportunity to
contest the appeal and order dated
28.02.2013 was passed ex-parte therein.

5. Because Insurance Company
in the most arbitrary manner, without
complying with the order passed on
02.02.1999, did not serve the notice to the
applicant and only because of this
applicant remained unheard and judgment
dated 28.02.2013 was passed ex-parte.

6. Because the appellant i.e.
Insurance Company, by misleading the
cout and by concealment of fact that steps
have been taken to serve the notices to the
necessary parties, got the appeal decided
ex-parte, while opportunity of hearing was
never afforded by the applicant.

7. Because on account of mistake
or error apparent from the perusal of
record, ti is clear that applicant was not
given opportunity of hearing and he was
2 All. Rajat Gangwar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
103
never heard to plead and establish his
case before the Hon'ble Court and
therefore since this Hon'ble Court has
relied upon the submission made by the
insurance Company for passing the
judgment dated 28.02.2013, is liable to be
reviewed."

4. Ms. Puja Arora, learned counsel
for the respondent submits that affidavits
filed by review applicant/Shri Dinesh
Kumar Singh in the instant case including
the better affidavit filed along with the
application (C.M.A.No.140588 of 2019)
for condontion of delay are liable to be
ignored being not properly verified and
being so on the basis of the same, neither
delay can be condoned nor review petition
can be allowed. In support of her
arguments, she has placed reliance on the
para 24 judgment given by Hon'ble the
Apex Court in the case of Amar Singh vs.
Union of India and others, (2011) 7 SCC
69, wherein it has been held as under :-

"24. Another Constitution Bench of
this Court in A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of
India [(1969) 3 SCC 864 : AIR 1970 SC 652]
, held as follows: (SCC p. 867, para 8)

"8. ... The appellant filed an
affidavit in support of the petition. Neither
the petition nor the affidavit was verified.
The affidavits which were filed in answer
to the appellant's petition were also not
verified. The reasons for verification of
affidavits are to enable the Court to find
out which facts can be said to be proved
on the affidavit evidence of rival parties.
Allegations may be true to knowledge or
allegations may be true to information
received from persons or allegations may
be based on records. The importance of
verification is to test the genuineness and
authenticity of allegations and also to
make
the
deponent
responsible
for
allegations. In essence verification is
required to enable the Court to find out as
to whether it will be safe to act on such
affidavit evidence. In the present case, the
affidavits of all the parties suffer from the
mischief of lack of proper verification with
the result that the affidavits should not be
admissible in evidence."

5. We have heard learned counsel for
the parties and gone through the records as
well as the judgment cited by learned
counsel for the respondent.

6. From the perusal of the record, it
transpires that the appeal bearing F.A.F.O.
No.521 of 1999 was filed against the
judgment and award 02.09.1999 passed by
Vith Additional District Judge, Faizabad in
Claim Petition No.2 of 1993 (Ram Vishal
Vs. Dinesh Kumar Singh). By judgment
and order dated 28.02.2013, the appeal i.e.
F.A.F.O. No.521 of 1999 was finally
decided in favour of National Insurance
Co. Ltd.-appellant (in short "Company").

7.

After
the
judgment
dated
28.02.2013,
the
Company
filed
the
execution case. In the execution case, the
recovery
certificate
was
issued
on
07.07.2013 and thereafter the review
applicant came to know about the
judgment dated 28.02.2013, under review.
Thereafter, the review petition along with
application for condonation of delay was
filed before this Court mainly on the above
said grounds.

8. From perusal of the order sheet, it
appears that on 03.12.1999, the appeal was
admitted and order to issue notice to
respondents in the appeal was passed. The
order dated 03.12.1999 is quoted below :

"Heard.
104 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Admit.

Issue notice.

List after due service along with
the record of the claim petition. The
execution of the award shall remain
stayed, provided the petitioner deposits 1/2
of the amount under the award including
the amount, if any, deposited under
Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act
within one month from today."

9. Thereafter, the appeal was listed
before this Court on 28.02.2013 and on the
said date, the appeal was partly allowed.

10. From the record of the F.A.F.O.
No.521 of 1999 it is evident that on behalf
of respondent no.1 in appeal namely Sri
Ram Vishal Pandey, two Vakalatnamas
were filed. One Vakalatnama bears name
of Sri Radhey Lal Misra, Advocate and
Gaya Prasad Tiwari, Advocate and another
Vakalatnama bears the name of Sri P. C.
Agarwal,
Adovate
and
Sri
D.
K.
Srivastava, Advocates. The name of Sri P.
C. Agarwal and Sri D. K. Srivastava
appears in the judgment, under review.

11. It also appears from the record of
F.A.F.O. No.521 of 1999 that neither steps
were taken nor notices were issued nor the
review-applicant-Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh,
respondent no.2 in the F.A.F.O. No.521 of
1999 was served through any of the mode
provided for service of notice nor there is
anything
on
record,
including
Vakalanama, from which it can be
presumed that the review applicant-Sri
Dinesh Kumar Singh was served or was
having knowledge of the F.A.F.O. No.521
of 1999 decided vide judgment dated
28.02.2013, against which, present review
petition has been filed.

12. From the aforesaid, it is apparent
that F.A.F.O. No.521 of 1999 was decided
on 28.02.2013 without service of notice of
F.A.F.O. upon opposite party no.2, the
review applicant-Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh.
and without hearing him.

13. Taking into account the aforesaid
facts, which are evident from the record of
F.A.F.O. No.521 of 1999, we would like
refer the relevant portion of the judgment
passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Neeraj Kumar Sainy and others
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others,
(2017) 14 SCC 136, the same are as under
:

"26. The seminal question that is
required to be posed is whether the maxim
actus curiae neminem gravabit would be
applicable to such a case. In Jang Singh v.
Brij Lal [Jang Singh v. Brij Lal, AIR 1966
SC 1631], a three-Judge Bench noted that
there was error on the part of the court
and the officers of the court had
contributed to the said occur. Appreciating
the fact situation, the Court held: (AIR p.
1633, para 6)

"6. ... It is no doubt true that a
litigant must be vigilant and take care but
where a litigant goes to Court and asks for
the assistance of the Court so that his
obligations under a decree might be
fulfilled by him strictly, it is incumbent on
the Court, if it does not leave the litigant to
his own devices, to ensure that the correct
information is furnished. If the Court in
supplying the information makes a mistake
the responsibility of the litigant, though it
does not altogether cease, is at least
shared by the Court. If the litigant acts on
the faith of that information the courts
cannot hold him responsible for a mistake
which it itself caused. There is no higher
principle for the guidance of the Court
2 All. Rajat Gangwar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
105
than the one that no act of courts should
harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty
of courts to see that if a person is harmed
by a mistake of the court he should be
restored to the position he would have
occupied but for that mistake. This is aptly
summed up in the maxim: Actus curiae
neminem gravabit."

27. Noting
that
there
was
mistake by the District Court concerned,
relief was granted by stating so: (Jang
Singh case [Jang Singh v. Brij Lal, AIR
1966 SC 1631] , AIR p. 1633, para 8)

"8. ... In view of the mistake of
the court which needs to be righted the
parties are relegated to the position they
occupied on 6-1-1958, when the error was
committed by the court which error is
being rectified by us nunc pro tunc."

28. Another three-Judge Bench
in Jagannath Singh v. Ram Naresh Singh
[Jagannath Singh v. Ram Naresh Singh,
(1970) 1 SCC 573 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 238] ,
took note of the fact that the judgment by
the High Court had been rendered ex
parte, and the application for recall did
not impress the High Court. Appreciating
the factual matrix that there was an error
in the cause-list and accepting that there
was an omission to mention the case
correctly in the cause-list and treating it
as a mistake of the court, the Court held
that though there was some negligence on
the part of the counsel or of his clerk but it
was not so grave as to disentitle the party
to be heard, and in any event, the alleged
contemnors could not be punished for a
mistake on the part of their counsel or the
counsel's clerk. Being of this view, this
Court set aside the order with costs.

29. In Atma Ram Mittal v.
Ishwar Singh Punia [Atma Ram Mittal v.
Ishwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4 SCC 284] ,
this Court, in the context of interpretation
of Section 13(1) in juxtaposition with
Section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban
(Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973,
adopting the purposive interpretation
ruled: (SCC pp. 288-89, para 8)

"8. It is well settled that no man
should suffer because of the fault of the
court or delay in the procedure. Broom
has stated the maxim actus curiae
neminem gravabit -- an act of court shall
prejudice no man. Therefore, having
regard to the time normally consumed for
adjudication, the ten years' exemption or
holiday from the application of the Rent
Act would become illusory, if the suit has
to be filed within that time and be disposed
of finally. It is common knowledge that
unless a suit is instituted soon after the
date of letting it would never be disposed
of within ten years and even then within
that time it may not be disposed of. That
will make the ten years' holiday from the
Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive
to the landlords to build new houses to
solve problem of shortages of houses. The
purpose of legislation would thus be
defeated. Purposive interpretation in a
social amelioration legislation is an
imperative irrespective of anything else."

30. The aforesaid authorities
deal with three different situations. There
cannot be an iota of doubt that no
prejudice shall be caused to anyone due to
the fault of the court, but it is to be seen in
what situations the court can invoke the
maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. In
this regard, reference to the authority in
Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph
Coelho [Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald
Joseph Coelho, (2001) 4 SCC 181] would
be apt. In the said case, the Principal
Judge,
Family
Court,
Bombay
had
modified the earlier decree. The same was
challenged in the writ petition which was
dismissed. The Division Bench confirmed
the order of the learned Single Judge,
106 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
which
compelled
the
appellant
to
approach this Court. Dealing with the
principle of rectification of decree under
Section 152 CPC, the Court opined that
there can be hardly any doubt that any
error occurred in the decree on account of
arithmetical or clerical error or accidental
slip may be rectified by the court. It has
been further observed that the basis of the
said provision is founded on the maxim
that an act of court will prejudice no man.
The Court referred to the authorities in
Assam Tea Corpn. Ltd. v. Narayan Singh
[Assam Tea Corpn. Ltd. v. Narayan Singh,
1980 SCC OnLine Gau 7 : AIR 1981 Gau
41] , Janakirama Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer
[Janakirama Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer, AIR
1962 SC 633] , Bhikhi Lal v. Tribeni
[Bhikhi Lal v. Tribeni, AIR 1965 SC 1935]
, Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State
of Orissa [Master Construction Co. (P)
Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1047]
, Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. [Dwaraka
Das v. State of M.P., (1999) 3 SCC 500]
and
Thirugnanavalli
Ammal
v.
P.
Venugopala
Pillai
[Thirugnanavalli
Ammal v. P. Venugopala Pillai, 1939 SCC
OnLine Mad 222 : AIR 1940 Mad 29] and,
eventually analysing the facts, opined that
rectification of the decree was totally
misconceived.

31. In this regard, we may
usefully
refer
to
a
passage
from
Kalabharati
Advertising
v.
Hemant
Vimalnath
Narichania
[Kalabharati
Advertising
v.
Hemant
Vimalnath
Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 : (2010) 3
SCC (Civ) 808] , wherein it has been ruled
that the maxim actus curiae neminem
gravabit, which means that the act of the
court shall prejudice no one, becomes
applicable when a situation is projected
where the court is under an obligation to
undo the wrong done to a party by the act
of the court. In a case, where any
undeserved or unfair advantage has been
gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction
of the court, and the same requires to be
neutralised, the said maxim is to be made
applicable.

32. In this regard, reference to
the Constitution Bench decision in Sarah
Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular
Diseases [Sarah Mathew v. Institute of
Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC
62 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 721] would be
seemly. In the said case, the question for
consideration
was
whether
for
the
purposes of computing the period of
limitation under Section 468 CrPC the
relevant date is the date of filing of the
complaint or the date of institution of the
prosecution or whether the relevant date is
the date on which a Magistrate takes
cognizance of the offence. Answering the
issue, the Court held that for that purpose
computing the period of limitation under
Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the
date of filing of the complaint or the date
of institution of prosecution and not the
date on which the Magistrate takes
cognizance. In the course of deliberation,
the larger Bench observed: (SCC pp. 9697, para 39)

39. ... The object of the criminal
law is to punish perpetrators of crime.
This is in tune with the well-known legal
maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit
regi, which means that a crime never dies.
At the same time, it is also the policy of
law to assist the vigilant and not the
sleepy. This is expressed in the Latin
maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus,
jura subveniunt. Chapter XXXVI CrPC
which provides limitation period for
certain types of offences for which lesser
sentence is provided draws support from
this maxim. But, even certain offences such
as Section 384 or 465 IPC, which have
lesser punishment may have serious social
2 All. Rajat Gangwar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
107
consequences. The provision is, therefore,
made for condonation of delay. Treating
date of filing of complaint or date of
initiation of proceedings as the relevant
date for computing limitation under
Section 468 of the Code is supported by
the legal maxim actus curiae neminem
gravabit which means that the act of court
shall prejudice no man. It bears repetition
to state that the court's inaction in taking
cognizance i.e. court's inaction in applying
mind to the suspected offence should not
be allowed to cause prejudice to a diligent
complainant.
Chapter
XXXVI
thus
presents the interplay of these three legal
maxims. The provisions of this Chapter,
however, are not interpreted solely on the
basis of these maxims. They only serve as
guiding principles."

14. It is settled principle that even
administrative order which involve civil
consequences
must
be
passed
after
following the principle of natural justice
and providing opportunity of hearing and
the orders which have been passed against
settled principle and are unsustainable.
The basic idea of observing principles of
natural justice is to secure justice or to put
in another way to prevent miscarriage of
justice.

15. Further, if any order which has
civil consequences and adverse effect on a
person against whom it has been passed,
he should be given an opportunity of
hearing prior to passing of the same. If the
same is not done, then the order so passed
will in violation of fair play, liable to be
set aside.

16. A seven-Judges' Bench of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC
248 : (AIR 1978 SC 597) has held that the
substantive and procedural laws and action
taken under them will have to pass the test
under Article 14 of the Constitution. The
test of reasons and justice cannot be
abstract. They cannot be divorced from the
needs of the nation. The tests have to be
pragmatic, otherwise they would cease to
be reasonable. The procedure prescribed
must be just fair and reasonable, even
though there is no specific provision in a
statute or rules, made thereunder, for
showing cause against action proposed to
be taken against an individual, which
affects the right of that individual. The
duty to give reasonable opportunity to be
heard will be implied from the nature of
the function to be performed by the
authority which has the power to take
punitive
or
damaging
action.
Even
executive
authorities
which
take
administrative
action
in-volving
any
deprivation of or restriction on inherent
fundamental rights of citizens, must take
care to see that justice is not only done hut
manifestly appears to be done. They have
a duty to proceed in a way which is free
from even the appearance of arbitrariness,
unreasonableness or unfairness. They have
to act in a manner which is patently
impartial and meets the requirement of the
natural justice.

17. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief
Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405
: (AIR 1978 SC 851), the Apex Court
reiterated the same view.

18. In the case of D.K. Yadav v.
J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259,
the Apex Court observed that an order
which involves civil consequences, must
be just, fair, reasonable, unarbitrary and
impartial and meet the principles of natural
justice. Same view has been reiterated in
the cases of Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy,
108 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2005) 6 SCC 321 : (AIR 2005 SC 2090);
Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. v.
Central Valuation Board, (2007) 6 SCC 668 :
(AIR 2007 SC 2276); and Devdutt v. Union of
India, 2008 (3) ESC 433 (SC) : ((2008) 8 SCC
725 : AIR 2008 SC 2513).

19. In the case of Erusian Equipment
and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal and another A.I.R. 1975 SC 266;
Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar and
others A.I.R. 1989 SC 620; and Gronsons
Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and others A.I.R. 2001 SC 3707
and the decisions of the Division Bench of
this Court in Smt Rajni Chauhan v. State
of U.P and others 2010 (6) AWC 5762
(All.) also it has been held that an order
which leads to civil consequences cannot
be passed without affording an opportunity
of hearing and the same must be passed in
conformity of principles of natural justice.

20. Keeping in view the aforesaid
facts, which are evident from the record of
the FAFO No. 521 of 99 particularly that
without any notice to the review applicant,
Dinesh Kumar Singh and without giving
any opportunity of hearing to him, the
FAFO No. 521 of 99 was decided vide
impugned judgment and order dated
28.02.2013 as well as the settled legal
preposition of law that any order having
civil consequences if passed without
hearing or giving opportunity of hearing to
the person concerned/aggrieved, then the
same would be violative of the principles
of natural justice and is liable to be setaside, we are of the view that the
arguments raised by the learned counsel
for the Company has got no force.

21. Taking into consideration the
aforesaid fact as well as the settled
principles of law, we are of the view that
the application for condonation of delay as
well as also the application for review are
liable to be allowed in the interest of
substantial justice.

22. Accordingly, the application for
condonation of delay as well as the review
application are allowed. The judgment and
order dated 28.02.2013 passed in FAFO
No. 521 of 1999 (National Insurance
Company Ltd. v. Ram Vishal Pandey), is
hereby recalled. The FAFO No. 521 of
1999 is restored to its original number.

23. Further, looking into the
valuation of the appeal, the same is
cognizable by a learned Single Judge.

24. Office is directed to place the
F.A.F.O.
No.521
of
1999
before
appropriate Bench.

25. On the next date of listing, the
name of Shri Mukesh Singh be shown as
counsel for the respondent no.2 in the
F.A.F.O. No.521 of 1999.
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(2020)02ILR A108

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 06.02.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Second Appeal No. 37 of 2020

Jagdish Chandra & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Krishna Mohan Aggrawal ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Samarth Saxena

Counsel
for
the
Respondent: