# Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy 5775(S/S)2000 v. Sheo Narain Chaudhary

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 1178
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-02-26
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 619 of 2010
- **Bench:** Abdul Moin
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/director-indira-gandhi-rashtriya-udan-academy-5775-s-s-2000-v-sheo-narain-45640
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

A. Limitation - Article 215 of the Indian
Constitution
&
Section
20
of
the
Limitation Act, 1971 - the Court can
invoke the jurisdiction vested in it under
Article 215 but same has to be exercised
subject to the limitation prescribed under
Section 20 of the Act of 1971
The Special Appeal was filed on 27.08.2010
while the judgment was pronounced on
07.04.2015 and thus the present application, as
per the averments contained therein of the
special appeal having been filed by holders of
2 All. Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy 5775(S/S)2000 Vs. Sheo Narain Chaudhary 1179
such posts which have neither been creator nor
approved in the Academy whereby committing
contempt, would clearly be hit by the limitation
prescribed under Section 20 of the Act, 1971.
(para 13)
Appeal Rejected. (E-10)
List of cases cited:-

## Text

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1178 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
juncture it would be apt to again refer the
judgement of Apex Court in the case of
Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Another
(supra)
wherein
Apex
Court
has
deprecated the practice of issuing interim
orders against a show cause notice or
interference with the show cause notice to
stall the investigation or inquiry to find out
the truth.

36. However, this Court cannot also
loose sight of the fact that petitioners have
obtained employment on the basis of marks
sheet alleged to have been issued to them and
have been working for more than a decade.
Further, there may be cases where Principal of
the concerned college may refuse to put
signature on the questionnaire and the
petitioners cannot force the Principal of the
concerned college to put signature and seal on
the questionnaire and petitioners may be
rendered remedy less. Therefore, in the interest
of justice and fairplay, this Court is of the
opinion that University while carrying out the
exercise to verify the mark-sheet/degree should
follow the following observation of the Court:-

(i) The University while verifying
the mark-sheet/degree of a candidate may not
refuse to consider the questionnaire of a
candidate if the same does not bear the
signature & seal of the Principal of the college.

(ii). In case after verification, the
University disowns the degree of a candidate
being fake, the University is not required to
follow the procedure contemplated under the
Act, 1973 for cancellation of degree/marks
sheet. However, it is desirable in the interest of
justice and fairplay that the University in such
cases should pass reasoned and speaking order
giving the basis on which it has formed
opinion that degree is fake and has not been
issued by the University.

(iii). In case University finds that the
degree/marks sheet have been issued by it
though tampered, in such an event, the
University is expected to follow the procedure
provided in the Act, 1973 and give a show
cause notice to such candidate and thereafter,
pass appropriate orders.

37. For the reasons given above, this
Court does not find any good ground to
interfere with the notices impugned in the
petition. Consequently, the writ petition lacks
merit and is accordingly, dismissed subject to
observations made above.
----------
(2020)02ILR A1178

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 26.02.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 619 of 2010

Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan
Academy 5775(S/S)2000 ...Appellant
Versus
Sheo Narain Chaudhary ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
O.P. Srivastava, Virendra Kumar Dubey

Counsel for the Respondent:
N.N. Jaiswal, Anupam Verma, Rajan Singh

A. Limitation - Article 215 of the Indian
Constitution
&
Section
20
of
the
Limitation Act, 1971 - the Court can
invoke the jurisdiction vested in it under
Article 215 but same has to be exercised
subject to the limitation prescribed under
Section 20 of the Act of 1971
The Special Appeal was filed on 27.08.2010
while the judgment was pronounced on
07.04.2015 and thus the present application, as
per the averments contained therein of the
special appeal having been filed by holders of
2 All. Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy 5775(S/S)2000 Vs. Sheo Narain Chaudhary 1179
such posts which have neither been creator nor
approved in the Academy whereby committing
contempt, would clearly be hit by the limitation
prescribed under Section 20 of the Act, 1971.
(para 13)
Appeal Rejected. (E-10)
List of cases cited:-

1. Pritam Pal V. High Court of M.P. AIR 1992 SC
904

2. A. Mayilswami V. State of Kerala and ors
1995(2) KLJ 255 (distinguished)

3. Nallamala Venkateswara Rao and anr V. P.
Pradhakar
and
anr
1998(1)
ALD
370
(distinguished)

4. Pallav Sheth V. Custodian and ors (2001) 7
SCC 549 (followed)

5. Dr. L.P. Misra V. State of U.P. 1998(7) SCC
375 (followed)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Abdul Moin, J.)

C.M. Application No.8909 of 2020.

1. Heard.

2. This is an application filed by the
applicant, inter alia, praying for initiation
of proceedings under Article 215 of the
Constitution
of
India
against
the
respondents No.1, 2, 3 and 4 for having
filed the special appeal by purporting to
hold an authority and post which is non
existent in the Indira Gandhi Rashtriya
Udan Academy (hereinafter referred to as
the
Academy),
whereby
committing
contempt.

3. Sri Anupam Verma, learned
counsel for the applicant contends that
Special Appeal Defective No.619 of 2010
had been allowed on 7.4.2015 whereby the
order passed in the writ petition in favour
of the applicant was set-aside. It is only
now that the applicant has come to know
of the aforesaid fact of the special appeal
having been filed by persons alleging
themselves to be holders of such posts
which have neither been created nor
approved in the Academy.

4. The present application has been
filed on 22.1.2020 while the special appeal
had been decided on 7.4.2015 i.e. the
application is being filed after a period of
more than four and half years. Upon a
pointed query being put to the learned
counsel for the applicant as to how the
present application could be said to be
within the limitation prescribed in Section
20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
reliance has been placed by the learned
counsel for the applicant upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Pritam Pal vs. High Court of M.P.
reported in AIR 1992 SC 904, judgment of
the Full Court of the Kerala High Court in
the case of A. Mayilswami vs. State of
Kerala and others reported in 1995(2)
KLJ 255 and the judgment of Andhra
Pradesh High Court in the case of
Nallamala
Venkateswara
Rao
and
another vs. P. Pradhakar and another
reported in 1998(1) ALD 370 to contend
that the period of limitation prescribed
under Section 20 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to
as the Act, 1971) shall not be applicable
on an application filed under Article 215
of the Constitution of India.

5. Having heard the learned counsel
for the applicant and having perused the
record what emerges is that the application
under Article 215 of the Constitution of
India has been filed by alleging that the
special appeal had been filed by the
persons alleging themselves to be holders
1180 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of such posts which have neither been
created nor approved in the Academy and
thus this Court has been mislead in
entertaining the said special appeal.
However, the fact of the matter remains
that the present application under Article
215 of the Constitution of India is being
filed after a period of more than four and
half years of the final judgment and more
than nine and a half years of the filing of
the special appeal inasmuch as the
judgment in the special appeal had been
delivered on 7.4.2015, the special appeal
was
filed
on
27.8.2010
while
the
application under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India has been filed on
22.1.2020.

6. Section 20 of the Act, 1971, which
is relevant for the purpose of deciding the
controversy, reads as under:-

"20. Limitation for actions for
contempt. No court shall initiate any
proceedings of contempt, either on its own
motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a
period of one year from the date on which
the contempt is alleged to have been
committed."

7. A perusal of Section 20 of the Act,
1971 thus indicates that limitation for
action of contempt has been specified as
one year from the date on which the
contempt
is
alleged
to
have
been
committed. The filing of special appeal by
persons alleging themselves to be holders
of such posts which have neither been
created nor approved in the Academy is
said to be a contempt for which the present
application has been filed.

8. Whether the provisions of Section
20 of the Act, 1071 would be attracted in
applications filed under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India, would be next
question to be considered by this Court.

9. The aforesaid question is no
longer res-integra taking into consideration
the three Judges judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of Pallav Sheth v.
Custodian and Others reported in (2001)7
SCC 549, wherein the following has been
held:-

"The Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 was enacted, as per the Preamble,
with a view "to define and limit the powers
of certain Courts in punishing Contempts
of Courts and to regulate their procedure
in relation thereto". It provides for action
being taken in relation to civil as well as
criminal contempt. It is not necessary, for
the purpose of this case, to analyse various
Sections of the Act in any great detail
except to notice that Sections 3 to 7 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for
what is not to be regarded as contempt.
Section 8 specifies that nothing contained
in the Act shall be construed as implying
that any other valid defence in any
proceedings for Contempt of Court ceases
to be available merely by reason of the
provisions of the 1971 Act. Section 9
makes it clear that the Act will not to be
implied
as
enlarging
the
scope
of
contempt. Section 10 contains the power of
the High Court to punish contempts of
subordinate Courts, while Section 12
specifies the punishment which can be
imposed for Contempt of Court and other
related matters. Procedure to be followed
where contempt is in the face of the
Supreme Court or a High Court is
provided in Section 14, while cognizance
of criminal contempt in other cases is
dealt with by Section 15. Section 15 has to
be read with Section 17 which provides for
procedure after cognizance has been taken
2 All. Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy 5775(S/S)2000 Vs. Sheo Narain Chaudhary 1181
under Section 15. A decision of the High
Court to punish for contempt is made
appealable under Section 19 of the Act.

Sections 20 and 22, with which
we are concerned in the present case, read
as follows:

"20. Limitation for actions for
contempt.- No court shall initiate any
proceedings for contempt, either on its
own motion or otherwise, after the expiry
of a period of one year from the date on
which the contempt is alleged to have
been committed.

22. Act to be in addition to, and
not in derogation of, other laws relating to
contempt.- The provisions of this Act shall
be in addition to, and not in derogation of,
the provisions of any other law relating to
contempt of courts."

Learned counsel for the parties
have drawn our attention to various
decisions of this Court in support of their
respective contentions. While the effort of
both Mr. Venugopal and Mr. Bobde on
behalf of the Appellant was that even in
exercise of the power under Article 215 of
the Constitution the provisions ofSection
20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
prohibited any action being taken for
contempt if a period of one year had
elapsed, as was contended in the present
case, Mr. Rustomjee submitted that the
constitutional power contained under
Article 215 could not in any way be
stultified or curtailed by any Act of
Parliament including Section 20 of the
1971 Act.

It will be appropriate to refer to
some of the decisions which have a
bearing on the point in issue in the present
case.

In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi vs. The
Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu
High Court this Court was concerned with
the issue whether this Court could transfer
contempt proceedings from Pepsu High
Court to any other High Court. For
transfer reliance had been placed on
Section 527 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. While holding that Section 527 did
not apply in case where a High Court has
initiated proceedings for contempt of itself,
it was held that even the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1952 recognised the existence
of a right to punish for contempt in every
High Court and this right is vested in it in
the High Court by the Constitution. This
Court referred to Article 215 of the
Constitution and observed that so far as
contempt of a High Court itself is
concerned, the Constitution vests this right
in every High Court and no Act of a
legislature
could
take
away
that
jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue
of its own authority. It, accordingly, came
to the conclusion that the Code of
Criminal Procedure did not apply in
matters of contempt triable by the High
Court which could deal with it summarily
and adopt its own procedure which had to
be fair and that the contemner was to be
made aware of the charge against him and
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
defend himself. Reliance was placed by
Mr.
Venugopal
on
a
decision
in
Baradakanta Mishra vs. Mr. Justice
Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the
Orissa High Court and it was contended
that it was held in this case that Section 20
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
provided a period of limitation by saying
that no Court shall initiate any proceeding
for contempt either on its own motion or
otherwise, after the expiry of a period of
one year from the date on which the
contempt
is
alleged
to
have
been
committed. In Baradakanta Mishra's case
(supra) the Appellant had filed an
application before the High Court for
initiating contempt proceedings against
1182 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Chief Justice and other Judges in their
personal capacity. A Full Bench of three
Judges were of the opinion that no
Contempt of Court had been committed and
the application was rejected. The Appellant
then purported to avail the right of appeal
under Section 19(1) of the Act and filed an
appeal in this Court. A preliminary objection
was taken by the State against the
maintainability of the appeal on the ground
that where the High Court had not initiated
proceedings and had refused to take action, no
appeal as of right would lie under Section
19(1) . This was the only issue which arose for
consideration of this Court in Baradakanta
Mishra's case and this Court upheld the
preliminary objection and held that no appeal
under Section 19(1) was maintainable. It is no
doubt true that during the course of discussion
reference was made to Sections 15, 17 and 20
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 but this
Court was in that case not called upon to
consider the effect of the provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act vis-à-vis inherent
powers of the High Court to punish for
contempt. No reference is made in the
judgment to Article 129 or Article 215 of the
Constitution. Furthermore interpretation of
Section 20 was not an issue and no question of
limitation
arose
therein.
Under
the
circumstances, we hold that the observations
made by this Court with reference to Section
20 were in the nature of obiter dicta and not
binding on this Court in the present case. In
any case, Baradakanta Mishra's case decision
does not specifically deal with the question as
to when or how proceedings for contempt are
initiated for the purposes of Section 20 and nor
has it considered the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, to which we
shall presently refer.

In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar vs.
Kalu Ram & Ors. where an Order of this
Court ordering delivering of premises had not
been complied with, an application was filed
for initiation of contempt proceedings. A
contention was raised on behalf of the alleged
contemner based on Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Dealing with
this contention, this Court observed as follows:

"Another point was taken about
limitation of this application under section 20
of the Act. S.20 states that no court shall
initiate any proceedings for contempt, either
on its own motion or otherwise, after the
expiry of a period of one year from the date on
which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed. In this case, the present application
was filed on or about 3rd November, 1988 as
appears from the affidavit in support of the
application. The contempt considered, inter
alia, of the act of not giving the possession by
force of the order of the learned Sr. Sub-Judge,
Narnaul
dated
12th
February,
1988.
Therefore, the application was well within the
period of one year. Failure to give possession,
if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this
nature is a continuing wrong. There was no
scope for application of s. 20 of the Act."

The
abovementioned
observations indicate that the contention
based on Section 20 was not accepted for
two reasons firstly that the application for
initiating action for contempt was filed
within one year of the date when the
contempt was alleged to have been
committed and secondly failure to give
possession amounted to continuing wrong
and, therefore, there was no scope for
application of Section 20 of the Act. This
case is important for the reason that the
Court
regarded
the
filing
of
the
application
for
initiating
contempt
proceedings as the relevant date from the
point of view of limitation.

The power of this Court and the
High Court under the Constitution for
taking action for contempt of subordinate
court came up for consideration in Delhi
Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari
2 All. Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy 5775(S/S)2000 Vs. Sheo Narain Chaudhary 1183
Court, Delhi vs. State of Gujarat and
Others etc. It referred to Sukhdev Singh
Sodhi's case (supra) and held that even
after codification of the law of contempt in
India the High Courts jurisdiction as the
Court of Record to initiate proceedings
and take seisin of the matter remained
unaffected by the Contempt of Courts Act.
It also referred to R.L.Kapur vs. State of
Madras and by following the said decision
observed as follows:

"... The Court further held that in
view of Article 215 of the Constitution, no
law made by a legislature could take away
the jurisdiction conferred on the High
Court nor it could confer it afresh by
virtue of its own authority".

Referring to the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 it observed with relation
of the powers of the High Court as
follows:

"...Inherent powers of a superior
Court of Record have remained unaffected
even after codification of Contempt Law.
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was
enacted to define and limit the powers of
courts in punishing contempts of courts
and to regulate their procedure in relation
thereto. Section 2 of the Act defines
contempt of court including criminal
contempt. Sections 5,6,7,8 and 9 specify
matters which do not amount to contempt
and the defence which may be taken.
Section 10 relates to the power of High
Court
to
punish
for
contempt
of
subordinate courts. Section 10 like Section
2 of 1926 Act and Section 3of 1952 Act
reiterates and reaffirms the jurisdiction
and power of a High Court in respect of its
own contempt and of subordinate courts.
The Act does not confer any new
jurisdiction instead it reaffirms the High
Court's power and jurisdiction for taking
action for the contempt of itself as well as
of its subordinate courts...."

The view in Delhi Judicial
Service Association's case (supra) was
reiterated and reaffirmed in the case of In
re: Vinay Chandra Mishra and it was held
that the amplitude and power of this Court
to punish for contempt could not be
curtailed by the law made by the
Parliament or State Legislature. As
observed
in
Income
Tax
Appellate
Tribunal through President vs. V.K.
Agarwal and Another at page 25 that the
judgment in Vinay Chandra Mishra's case
was partially set aside in Supreme Court
Bar Association. vs. Union of India and
Another on the question of power to
suspend an advocate's licence under
contempt jurisdiction, the observation in
Vinay Chandra Mishra's case with regard
to amplitude of the courts power under
Article 129 not being curtailed by a law
made by the Central or a State Legislature
remained unaffected. It was in exercise of
the powers under Article 129 that this
Court held the respondent in V.K.
Agarwal's case (supra) guilty of Contempt
of Court as he had tried to influence or
question the decision making process of
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The
applicability
of
the
Limitation Act to Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 came up for consideration inState of
West Bengal and Others vs. Kartick
Chandra Das and Others . In that case
against a notice of contempt which had
been issued by the Single Judge a Letters
Patent Appeal were filed under Section 19
of the Contempt of Courts Act which was
dismissed on the ground that the delay was
not condonable as Section 5 of the
Limitation Act did not apply. While
reversing this decision of the Calcutta
High Court, this Court observed at page
344 as follows:

"7. In consequence, by operation
of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the
1184 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Limitation
Act,
limitation
stands
prescribed as a special law under Section
19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and
limitation in filing Letters Patent appeal
stands attracted. In consequence, Sections
4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stands
attracted to Letters Patent appeal insofar
as and to the extent to which they are not
expressly excluded either by special or
local law. Since the rules made on the
appellate side, either for entertaining the
appeals under clause 15 of the Letters
Patent or appeals arising under the
contempt of courts, had not expressly
excluded, Section 5 of the Limitation Act
becomes applicable. We hold that Section
5 of the Limitation Act does apply to the
appeals filed against the order of the
learned Single Judge for the enforcement
by way of a contempt. The High Court,
therefore, was not right in holding that
Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not
apply. The delay stands condoned. Since
the High Court had not dealt with the
matter on merits, we decline to express
any opinion on merits. The case stands
remitted to the Division Bench for decision
on merits."

A Constitution Bench in the case
of Supreme Court Bar Association's case
(supra) while considering this Court's
power to punish for contempt at page 421
observed as follows:

"21. It is, thus, seen that the
power of this Court in respect of
investigation
or
punishment
of
any
contempt including contempt of itself, is
expressly made "subject to the provisions
of any law made in this behalf by
Parliament" by Article 142(2). However,
the power to punish for contempt being
inherent in a court of record, it follows
that no act of Parliament can take away
that inherent jurisdiction of the court of
record to punish for contempt and
Parliament's power of legislation on the
subject cannot, therefore, be so exercised
as to stultify the status and dignity of the
Supreme Court and/or the High Courts,
though such a legislation may serve as a
guide for the determination of the nature
of punishment which this Court may
impose
in
the
case
of
established
contempt. Parliament has not enacted any
law dealing with the powers of the
Supreme
Court
with
regard
to
investigation and punishment of contempt
of itself, (we shall refer to Section 15 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, later on)
and this Court, therefore, exercises the
power to investigate and punish for
contempt of itself by virtue of the powers
vested in it under Articles 129 and 142(2)
of the Constitution of India. "

"24. Thus, under the existing
legislation dealing with contempt of court,
the High Courts and Chief Courts were
vested with the power to try a person for
committing contempt of court and to
punish him for established contempt. The
legislation itself prescribed the nature and
type, as well as the extent of, punishment
which could be imposed on a contemner
by the High Courts or the Chief Courts.
The second proviso to Section 4 of the
1952 Act (supra) expressly restricted the
powers of the courts not to "impose any
sentence in excess of what is specified in
the section" for any contempt either of
itself or of a court subordinate to it."

Referring to the powers of the
High Court under Article 215 to impose
punishment with reference to Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 at page 428, the Court
held as follows:

"37. The nature and types of
punishment which a court of record can
impose in a case of established contempt
under the common law have now been
specifically incorporated in the Contempt
2 All. Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy 5775(S/S)2000 Vs. Sheo Narain Chaudhary 1185
of Courts Act, 1971 insofar as the High
Courts are concerned and therefore to the
extent the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
identifies
the
nature
or
types
of
punishments which can be awarded in the
case of established contempt, it does not
impinge upon the inherent powers of the
High Court under Article 215 either. No
new type of punishment can be created or
assumed."

In Dr L.P. Misra vs. State of
U.P. a contention was raised that while
exercising powers under Article 215 in
punishing
the
Appellant
therein
for
Contempt of the High Court the procedure
contemplated by Section 14 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had not
been followed. This Court, dealing with
this contention, observed as follows:

"12.
After
hearing
learned
counsel for the parties and after going
through the materials placed on record,
we are of the opinion that the Court while
passing the impugned order had not
followed the procedure prescribed by law.
It is true that the High Court can invoke
powers and jurisdiction vested in it under
Article 215 of the Constitution of India but
such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in
accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law. It is in these circumstances the
impugned order cannot be sustained."

In the case of Om Prakash
Jaiswal vs. D.K.Mittal and Another a
Division Bench of this Court was called
upon to interpret Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In that case
an undertaking had been given before the
High Court on 19th December, 1986 that
the Municipal Corporation would not
demolish or disturb a construction till
disposal of the writ petition. Despite this
undertaking, demolition took place on 11th
January,
1987.
Soon
thereafter
the
Appellant filed an application before the
High Court seeking the initiation of
proceedings under Section 12 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. On 15th
January, 1987 the High Court issued a
show-cause notice to the opposite party as
to why contempt proceedings should not
be initiated against him for defiance of the
Court's order dated 19th December, 1986.
On 6th January, 1988, on a concession
being made by the Advocate-General the
High Court ordered that notices be issued
to show-cause why the opposite party be
not punished for disobeying the order
dated 19th December, 1986.

Subsequently,
on
23rd
November, 1989 the High Court came to
the conclusion that issuing of a showcause notice did not amount to initiation of
proceedings and, therefore, the bar
enacted by Section 20 of the Act was
attracted and the application was liable to
be rejected.

This Court had to consider
whether the order of 6th January, 1988
amounted to initiation of proceedings for
contempt. Dealing with the question of
initiation of proceedings the relevant
observations of the judgment are as
follows:

"14. In order to appreciate the
exact connotation of the expression
"initiate any proceedings for contempt" we
may notice several situations or stages
which may arise before the court dealing
with contempt proceedings. These are:

(i) (a) a private party may file or
present an application or petition for
initiating
any
proceedings
for
civil
contempt; or

(b) the court may receive a
motion or reference from the Advocate
General or with his consent in writing
from any other person or a specified law
officer or a court subordinate to the High
Court;
1186 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(ii) (a) the court may in routine
issue notice to the person sought to be
proceeded against;
or

(b) the court may issue notice to
the respondent calling upon him to show
cause why the proceedings for contempt be
not initiated;

(iii) the court may issue notice to
the person sought to be proceeded against
calling upon him to show cause why he be
not punished for contempt.

15. In the cases contemplated by
(i) or (ii) above, it cannot be said that any
proceedings for contempt have been
initiated. Filing of an application or
petition for initiating proceedings for
contempt or a mere receipt of such
reference by the court does not amount to
initiation of the proceedings by court. On
receiving any such document, it is usual
with the courts to commence some
proceedings by employing an expression
such as "admit", "rule", "issue notice" or
"issue
notice
to
show
cause
why
proceedings for contempt be not initiated".
In all such cases the notice is issued either
in routine or because the court has not yet
felt satisfied that a case for initiating any
proceedings for contempt has been made
out and therefore the court calls upon the
opposite party to admit or deny the
allegations made or to collect more facts
so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating
proceedings for contempt was made out.
Such a notice is certainly anterior to
initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself
suggestive of the fact that in spite of
having applied its mind to the allegations
and the material placed before it the court
was not satisfied of the need for initiating
proceedings for contempt; it was still
desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting
further material whereon to formulate
such opinion. It is only when the court has
formed an opinion that a prima facie case
for initiating proceedings for contempt is
made out and that the respondents or the
alleged contemners should be called upon
to show cause why they should not be
punished; then the court can be said to
have initiated proceedings for contempt. It
is the result of a conscious application of
the mind of the court to the facts and the
material before it. Such initiation of
proceedings
for
contempt
based
on
application of mind by the court to the
facts of the case and the material before it
must take place within a period of one
year from the date on which the contempt
is alleged to have been committed failing
which the jurisdiction to initiate any
proceedings for contempt is lost. The
heading of Section 20 is "limitation for
actions for contempt". Strictly speaking,
this section does not provide limitation in
the sense in which the term is understood
in the Limitation Act. Section 5of the
Limitation Act also does not, therefore,
apply. Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction
of the court to initiate any proceedings for
contempt."

It
was
contended
by
Mr.
Venugopal that Section 20 was mandatory
and it imposes a prohibition on the Court
in taking action once a period of one year
had elapsed. He submitted that Section 20
of the Act nowhere mentions the filing of
an application for initiating proceedings
of contempt and, therefore, the provisions
of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act
would have no application. Relying upon
Baradakanta Mishra's case, he submitted
that an action of contempt was between
the Court and the alleged contemner and
hence the date of filing of the petition was
not relevant. He submitted that the
judgment in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case
(supra) had not been correctly decided to
the extent that the judgment held that mere
2 All. Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy 5775(S/S)2000 Vs. Sheo Narain Chaudhary 1187
issuance of a show-cause notice was not
the initiation of contempt proceedings by
the Court. He, however, submitted that
contempt proceedings are initiated within
the meaning of Section 20when the Court,
on the application of mind, issued even a
show-cause notice within a period of one
year of the committal of alleged contempt.

There can be no doubt that both
this Court and High Courts are Courts of
Record and the Constitution has given them
the powers to punish for contempt. The
decisions of this Court clearly show that this
power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But
if the power under Article 129 and Article 215
is absolute can there be any legislation
indicating the manner and to the extent that
the power can be exercised? If there is any
provision of the law which stultifies or
abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or
Article 215 there can be little doubt that such
law would not be regarded as having been
validly enacted. It, however, appears to us
that
providing
for
the
quantum
of
punishment or what may or may not be
regarded as acts of contempt or even
providing for a period of limitation for
initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be
taken to be a provision which abrogates or
stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under
Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution.

This Court has always frowned
upon the grant or existence of absolute or
unbridled
power.
Just
as
power
or
jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be
exercised in accordance with law, if any,
enacted by the legislature it would stand to
reason that the power under Article 129
and/or Article 215 should be exercised in
consonance with the provisions of a validly
enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood
of conflict the provisions should be construed
harmoniously.

The Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 inter alia provides for what is not to
be regarded as contempt; it specifies in
Section 12 the maximum punishment
which can be imposed; procedure to be
followed where contempt is in the face of
the Supreme Court or in the High Court or
cognizance of criminal contempt in other
cases is provided by Sections 14 and 15;
the procedure to be followed after taking
cognizance is provided by Section 17;
Section 18 provides that in every case of
criminal contempt under Section 15 the
same shall be heard and determined by a
Bench of not less than two Judges;Section
19 gives the right of appeal from any order
or decision of High Court in the exercise
of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
There is no challenge to the validity of any
of the provisions of the Contempt of
Courts Act as being violative or in conflict
with any provisions of the Constitution.
Barring observations of this Court in the
Supreme Court Bar Association's case
(supra), where it did not express any
opinion on the question whether maximum
punishment fixed by the 1971 Act was
binding on the Court, no doubt has been
expressed about the validity of any
provision of the 1971 Act. In exercise of its
constitutional power this Court has, on the
other hand, applied the provisions of the
Act while exercising jurisdiction under
Article 129 or 125 of the Constitution. In
Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case (supra) it
recognised that the 1926 Act placed a
limitation on the amount of punishment
which could be imposed. Baradakanta
Mishra's case was decided on the
interpretation of Section 19 of the 1971
Act, namely, there was no right of appeal
if the Court did not take action or initiate
contempt proceedings. In the case of Firm
Ganpat Ram Rajkumar's case (supra) the
Court did not hold that Section 20 of the
1971 Act was inapplicable. It came to the
conclusion
that
the
application
for
1188 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
initiating
contempt
proceedings
(was
within time and limitation had to be
calculated) as for the purpose of limitation
date of filing was relevant and furthermore
that was a case of continuing wrong. In
Kartick Chandra Das case (supra) the
provisions of the Limitation Act were held
to
be
applicable
in
dealing
with
application under Section 5 in connection
with an appeal filed under Section 19 of
the Limitation Act. A three-Judge Bench in
Dr L.P.Misra's case (supra) observed that
the procedure provided by the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 had to be followed even
in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article
215 of the Constitution.
It would,
therefore, follow that if Section 20 is so
interpreted that it does not stultify the
powers under Article 129 or Article 215
then, like other provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act relating to the
extent of punishment which can be
imposed,
a
reasonable
period
of
limitation can also be provided."

10. From the aforesaid judgment, it
emerges that even for application filed
under Article 215 of the Constitution of
India, the procedure prescribed under the
Act, 1971 has to be adhered to.

11. This would be amply clear from a
perusal of the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case in the case of Dr. L.P. Misra
vs. State of U.P. reported in 1998(7) SCC
375, wherein the Apex Court held as
under:-

"6. Mr. Dwivedi, Learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the appellant in
Crl. Appeal No. 483 of 1994 assailed the
impugned order principally on the ground
that the court while passing the said order
did not follow the procedure prescribed by
law. Counsel urged that the court had
failed to give a reasonable opportunity to
the appellants of being heard. Assuming
that the incident as recited in the
impugned order had taken place, the court
could not have passed the impugned order
on the same day after it reassembled
without issuing a show cause notice or
giving an opportunity to the appellants to
explain the alleged contemptuous conduct.
The minimal requirement of following the
procedure prescribed by law had been
over looked by the Court. In support of his
submission, Counsel drew our attention to
Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 as also to the provisions contained in
Chapter XXXV-E of the Allahabad High
Court Rules, 1952. Emphasis was laid on
Rule 7 and 8 which read as under :-

"7. When it is alleged or appears
to t he Court upon its own view that a
person has been guilty of contempt
committed in its presence or hearing, the
Court may cause such person to be
detained in custody, and at any time before
the rising of the Court, on the same day or
as early as possible thereafter, shall-

(a) cause him to be informed in
writing of the contempt with which he is
charged, and if such person pleads guilty
to the charge, his plea shall be recorded
and the Court may in its discretion,
convict him thereon,

(b) if such person refuses to
plead, or does not plead, or claims to be
tried or the Court does not convict him, on
his plea of guilt, afford him an opportunity
to make his defence to the charge, in
support of which he may file an affidavit
on the date fiked for his appearance or on
such other date as may be fiked by the
court in that behalf.

(c) after taking such evidence as
may be necessary or as may be offered by
such person and after hearing him,
proceed either forthwith or after the
2 All. Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy 5775(S/S)2000 Vs. Sheo Narain Chaudhary 1189
adjournment, to determine the matter of
the charge, and

(d)
make
such
order
for
punishment of discharge of such person as
may be just.

8.
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in Rule 7, where a person
charged with contempt under the rule
applies, whether orally or in writing to
have the charge against him tried by some
Judge other than the Judge or Judges in
whose presence or hearing the offence is
alleged to have been committed, and the
court if of opinion that it is practicable to
do so and that in the interests of proper
administration of justice the application
should be allowed, it shall cause the
matter to be placed together with a
statement of the facts of the case, before
the Chief Justice for such directions as he
may think fit to issue as respects the trial
thereof."

Counsel urged that the impugned
order is totally opposed to the principles
of
natural
justice
and,
therefore,
unsustainable on this score alone. He,
therefore, urged that the impugned order
be quashed and set aside.

7. Learned Counsel appearing
for the other appellants adopted the same
arguments.

8. We heard Learned Solicitor
General who was requested to appear and
assist the Court.

9. After hearing learned counsel
for the parties and after going the rough the
materials placed on record, we are of the
opinion that the Court while passing the
impugned order had not followed the
procedure prescribed by law.