# Divyanshu v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 1660
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-01
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 219 of 2024
- **Bench:** Shree Prakash Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/divyanshu-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52013
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Education Law - The UP intermediate
Education Act, 1921 - Regulation 7 -
5 All. Divyanshu Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1661

Secretary issues a certificate of
passing the Council examination to
successful candidates - Corrections are
made to entries if errors are due to
clerical
errors
or
omissions
-
Corrections can only be made if the
candidate submits the certificate within
three years and sends a copy to the
Council of Secretaries.(Para - 6)

Petitioner made application before Board -
application sent on 5.9.2023 - mark-sheet issued on
27.6.2020 - application was sent after passing of the
prescribed period of three years - not allowed, as
per provisions of Regulation 7 - Board rejects
petitioner's claim for correction of date of birth in
mark sheet-cum-certificate - order of Regional
Secretary, Madhyamik Shiksha Parshad (Board)
under challenge .(Para - 3,17,19)

HELD:- Court restricts three-year limitation
period for moving an application for correction of
date of birth in mark-sheet-cum-certificate before
Board. Clarified in Anand. Singh's case. Petitioner
not entitled to relief. (Para - 22)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1660 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cannot be terminated on the aforesaid
ground as has been observed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Laxmi
Shanker Yadav (Supra).

39. Similarly, relying upon judgements
of the Division Bench of this Court in
Kuldeep Kumar Pathak (supra) and Laxmi
Shanker Yadav (Supra), A. Dharmraj vs.
The Educational Officer Puddukkottai &
Others : (2022) 11 SCC 692, this Court has
passed the judgement on 21.3.2023 in
Special Appeal No. 124 of 2023 (Rao
Mohammad Arif vs. State of U.P. and 4
Others), which reads as under:-

"24. Since the learned counsel for
the appellant had not pointed out a single
provision, which puts an embargo in
possession of two degrees obtained in the
same academic year, thus, this Court finds
its inability to hold the selection and
appointment of the writ petitioner illegal.
Our view further gathers support from the
fact that it is neither the case set out in the
order impugned of the second respondent /
Joint Director of Education, Saharanpur
Region, Saharanpur nor from the arguments
so advanced before us that the writ
petitioner did not possess the minimum
necessary qualifications for being selected
and appointed as Assistant Teacher
(Science).

25. More so, it is also the case of
the writ petitioner as pleaded in the
paragraphs-'10' and '11' of the writ
petitioner that the writ petitioner had
surrendered the BUMS degree, thus, we do
not find any error committed by the learned
Single Judge in allowing the writ petitioner
while quashing the order dated 05.04.2014
of the second respondent. Additionally, it
has not been demonstrated before us that
the degrees in question have been either
withdrawn or cancelled. "

(Emphasis Supplied)

40. Thus, in view of the aforesaid
observations, the appeal fails and the same
is dismissed without any orders to the cost.

41.

Consequently,
the
appellant/respondents are directed to permit
the petitioner/respondent no.1 herein to
discharge her duties on the post on which the
petitioner was appointed and the petitioner
shall also be entitled for payment of salary
with
continuity
in
service
and
all
consequential benefits.

Impleadment Application No. 1 of
2024.

42. Since the special appeal filed by the
Department has already been dismissed, the
impleadment application filed by Sughar
Singh,
father-in-law
of
the
petitioner/respondent no. 1 requires no
consideration and is hereby rejected.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1660
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 01.05.2024
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHREE PRAKASH SINGH, J.

Writ C No. 219 of 2024

Divyanshu ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rajeev Kumar Dwivedi, Rama Raman Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

(A) Education Law - The UP intermediate
Education Act, 1921 - Regulation 7 -
5 All. Divyanshu Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1661

Secretary issues a certificate of
passing the Council examination to
successful candidates - Corrections are
made to entries if errors are due to
clerical
errors
or
omissions
-
Corrections can only be made if the
candidate submits the certificate within
three years and sends a copy to the
Council of Secretaries.(Para - 6)

Petitioner made application before Board -
application sent on 5.9.2023 - mark-sheet issued on
27.6.2020 - application was sent after passing of the
prescribed period of three years - not allowed, as
per provisions of Regulation 7 - Board rejects
petitioner's claim for correction of date of birth in
mark sheet-cum-certificate - order of Regional
Secretary, Madhyamik Shiksha Parshad (Board)
under challenge .(Para - 3,17,19)

HELD:- Court restricts three-year limitation
period for moving an application for correction of
date of birth in mark-sheet-cum-certificate before
Board. Clarified in Anand. Singh's case. Petitioner
not entitled to relief. (Para - 22)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

1. Akash Sharma Vs St. of U.P. , 2015 (8) ADJ 693

2. N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)
7 SCC 123

3. Babu Ram Vs St. of U.P. & anr., Special Appeal
No.1202 of 2010

4. Anand Singh Vs U.P. Board of Secondary
Education & ors., (2014) 2 UPLBEC 1330

5. Anand Singh Vs U.P. Board of Secondary
Eduction & ors., 2014 (3) ADJ 443

6. Chandra Kishore Jha Vs Mahavit Prasad & ors.,
(1999) 8 SCC 266

7. Cherukuri Mani Vs Chief Secy., Govt. of A.P. &
ors., (2015) 13 SCC 722

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shree Prakash
Singh, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Shailendra Kumar Singh,
learned Chief Standing Counsel and Mr.
Pankaj Patel and Mr. Vivek Shukla, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsels for the
State.

2. Since a legal question is involved to
be adjudicated, therefore, notice to opposite
party no.5 is hereby dispensed with.

3. By means of the instant petition, the
petitioner has assailed the order dated
30.9.2023 passed by the opposite party no.3,
i.e.,
Regional
Secretary,
Madhyamik
Shiksha Parshad, Varanasi (hereinafter
referred to as 'Board") whereby the claim of
the petitioner with respect to correction of
date of birth of the petitioner in the mark
sheet-cum-certificate is rejected.

4. Brief factual matrix of the case is
that on 3.9.2005, petitioner took admission
in
the
institution,
namely,
Patiraji
Montessori School, Badhupur, Pratappur
Kamaicha and he remained over there till
class Vth, whereafter school leaving
certificate was issued in which date of birth
of the petitioner is mentioned as 30.9.2005.
After completion of class VIIIth standard,
the petitioner took admission in High School
at J.B.I.C., Mathura Nagar, Ramgarh,
Sultanpur, and he has submitted his school
leaving certificate of class VIII, wherein
also, his date of birth is mentioned as
30.9.2005 and further in class IXth, at the
time of pre-registration, the date of birth of
the petitioner is mentioned as 30.9.2005.
Further after passing of class IXth, the
petitioner took admission in class Xth and
also passed the examination with role
number 1813634 in the year 2022 but once
he received the mark sheet-cum-certificate,
he found that his date of birth is wrongly
mentioned as 30.5.2005, in place of
1662 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
30.9.2005. Being aggrieved, he moved an
application before the Regional Secretary of
the Board, who passed the order on
30.9.2023, thereby rejecting the request of
the petitioner for correcting date of birth in
the mark-sheat -cum- certificate of class
Xth.

5. Contention of the learned counsel
for the petitioner is that the petitioner from
very inception of his admission, mentioned
the date of birth as 30.9.2005, which is
evident not only from the school leaving
certificate, but, that too, from the preregistration for class IXth. He submits that
there is no fault on the part of the petitioner
so as to incorrectness in the date of birth
mentioned in the mark sheet-cum-certificate
of High School standard and as soon this
came into his knowledge, he objected the
same with a request to the Secretary Board
to correct it, but the same was rejected on the
wrong premise that the application is made
after passing of three years which is
impermissible as per the Regulation 7 of the
Regulations
made
under
the
UP
intermediate
Education
Act,
1921
(hereinafter referred to as 'Regulation').

6. Regulation 7 is extracted as under:-

"दवदनयर्-7

सदचव पररषि की ओर से सफि उम्र्ीिवररों को
पररषि की परीक्षर र्ें उत्तीणम होने कर प्रर्रण पत् दवदहत प्रपत् र्ें िेगर
और बरि र्ें उसकी प्रदवदियों र्ें कोई शुदद्व करेगर, बशते दक प्रर्रण
पत् र्ें दकसी ऐसी गित प्रदवदि दकसी अदवचरररत दिदपकीय िूि यर
िोप के कररण यर दकसी ऐसी दिदपकीय िूि के कररण की गयी हो,
जो असरविरनी से पररषि के स्तर के यर उस सांस्थर के, जहरां से अदन्तर्
बरर दशक्षर प्ररप्त की हो, स्तर पर अदििेख र्ें हो गयी हो। यह शुदद्व
सदचव द्वररर उसी दस्थदत र्ें की जर सकेगी जबदक अभ्यथी ने सांबांदित
परीक्षर के प्रर्रण पत् को पररषि द्वररर दनगमर्न की दतदथ से तीन वषम के
अन्िर ही दिदपकीय त्ुदट की ओर ध्यरन आकृि करते हुए सांबांदित
प्रिरनरचरयम/अग्रसररण अदिकररी को त्ुदट के सांशोिन हेतु प्ररथमनर पत्
प्रस्तुत कर दियर हो और उसकी प्रदत पांजीकृत डरक से सदचव पररषि
को िी प्रेदषत की हो।

प्रदतबांि यह है दक अभ्यथी के अांक पत् तथर प्रर्रण
पत् र्ें अभ्यथी के नरर् दपतर के नरर् अथवर र्रतर कर नरर् र्ें यदि
कोई वतमनी त्ुदट है तो अभ्यदथमयों द्वररर यथरसर्य आवेिन करने पर
उसे पररषि के सांबांदित क्षेत्ीय करयरमिय के क्षेत्ीय सदचवों द्वररर
प्रर्रदणत सरक्ष्यों के आिरर पर तत्करि शुद्व कर दियर जरयेगर।"

7. He argued that from bare reading of
Regulation 7, it is evident that the same
prescribes the provision regarding the
correction in the entries of the certificate
issued by the Board in case of any clerical
mistake or omission, which has occurred on
the part of the Board. So for the present
matter is concerned, the submission is that
here entries were rightly done in the records
by the petitioner, but it is the fault on the part
of the Board and, therefore, the Board is
under an obligation to correct the same. He
also added that while passing the impugned
order dated 30.9.2023, the Board has not
taken care of that so far as the incorrectness
in the certificate is concerned, that was not
intimated by the Board, and later on, when it
came into knowledge of the petitioner, he, at
once, written a letter to the Secretary Board
for correction of the same.

8. Further contended that the date of
issue of the certificate, is 27.6.2020 and the
petitioner moved the application on
10.9.2022, that too, within the time
prescribed under Regulation 7, though,
subsequently, the petitioner moved an
application on 5.9.2023, and the order
dated
30.9.2023
has
been
passed
considering petitioner's application dated
5.9.2023, ignoring the earlier application
of the petitioner dated 10.9.2022, and thus,
the observation of the Secretary Board is
inconsistent to the fact which he himself
has
mentioned
in
the
order
dated
30.9.2023.
5 All. Divyanshu Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1663

9. In support of his contentions,
learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance on the judgement reported in 2015
(8) ADJ 693, Akash Sharma Vs. State of
U.P. and has referred paragraph 16 and 18
of the said judgement, which are quoted as
under:-

"16. The law of limitation is
founded on public policy so as to limit the
life span of a litigation or the legal remedy.
It does not aims to defeat the rights of the
parties. In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 the
Supreme Court of India observed if the
remedy availed by the party who has been
wronged does not smack of malafides or is
not by way of dilatory tactics, the Courts
must show utmost consideration to the
suitor. In other words, a bona fide delay may
not by itself be treated as sufficient to debar
the remedy particularly where the record ex
facie shows miscarriage of justice.

18. The limitation of two years
provided in applying for rectification of the
certificate is applicable to the candidates but
there is no limitation for the Board to
exercise its inherent power to correct the
certificate issued by it. Thus, the Board
certainly in exercise of its suo motu inherent
power is authorised to correct a clerical
mistake or error appearing in the High
School Certificate once it is brought to its
notice. It is incumbent duty of the Board to
ensure that the certificates issued by it are
correct and does not suffer from any error or
mistake. Therefore, in order to put its
records straight, the Board is under an
obligation to correct all certificates issued
by it irrespective of the limitation placed
under Regulation-7 of Chapter- III of the
Regulation in exercise of its inherent power
in the particular facts and circumstances of
the each case. The law of limitation cannot
be pressed into service by the Board while
exercising its inherent power so as to defeat
the right of the petitioner to have his
incorrect date of birth recorded in the High
School Certificate rectified."

10. Referring the aforesaid, he submits
that the co-ordinate Bench of this Court,
while opting the ratio of the judgement in
the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M.
Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, has held
that bona fide delay may not by itself be
treated to be sufficient to debar the remedy,
particularly where the record ex-facie shows
miscarriage of justice. He further submits
that so far as the present matter is concerned
application of the present petitioner has been
rejected outrightly ignoring the settled
proposition of law and without application
of mind on the issue that whether the delay
which occurred is on the part of the
petitioner or the Board itself.

11. He has further placed reliance on
the judgement of the Division Bench of this
Court in Special Appeal No.1202 of 2010
Babu Ram Vs. State of UP and another
and has referred para 4 of the above said
judgement, which is quoted as under:-

"4. IN the petition filed by the
appellant, that plea was also taken before
the learned single Judge. However, the
learned Judge held that as the application
was filed beyond the time and was not
maintainable, and that the appellant herein
may file a civil suit for declaration of his
Date of Birth.

In the instant case, we find that
Regulation 7, referred to above, refers to
correction in the certificate of passing.
There is no mistake in the certificate of
passing. The mistake is in the records
maintained by the Board. Therefore, the said
Regulation would not be applicable so far as
the case of the appellant is concerned. Once
1664 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the respondents themselves had issued the
certificate showing the Date of Birth of the
appellant as 1st September, 1949, the
respondent No.2 was bound to correct the
clerical mistake in the record of the Board."

12. Drawing attention the above-said
Judgment, he submits that considering the
Regulation 7, the Court has held that the
records are maintained by the Board,
therefore, if there is any incorrectness in the
record of the Board, that is the fault on the
part of the Board and the student cannot be
thrown to suffer so as to any fault done by
the Board.

13. Concluding his arguments, he
submits that since the petitioner from very
beginning has transcribed/intimated his date
of birth as 30.9.2005, therefore, he is not at
fault and further he has also moved an
application on 1.9.2022, i.e., within three
years, prescribed in the Regulation and,
therefore, submission is that the order dated
30.9.2023 is unsustainable and the same
may be quashed and further the authorities
may be directed to re-consider the matter
with respect to correction of date of birth of
the petitioner in the record.

14. Refuting the aforesaid contentions
of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the
counsel appearing for the State submits that
it is evident from the record that the High
School certificate-cum- mark-sheet is issued
to the petitioner on 27.6.2020, and therefore,
as per the provision of Regulation 7, the
application for correction is admissible uptil
26.6.2023 but the petitioner has sent the
application on 5.9.2023, and, therefore, the
same was rejected. He further added that in
fact, the law position, which has been
referred by the counsel for the petitioner, is
not applicable in the case of the petitioner as
the petitioner has sought correction in the
mark-sheet and not in the record of the
Board and further correction is particularly
with respect to the date of birth, which is not
permissible as per the mandate of the
Regulation 7.

15. In support of his contention, he has
placed reliance on a judgement reported in
(2014) 2 UPLBEC 1330, Anand Singh Vs.
U.P. Board of Secondary Education and
others, and referred paras 6 to 8, which are
extracted as under:-

"6. It would be useful to examine
the particulars of the candidate that are
contained in a certificate issued by the
Board. They include the year of the
examination, the name of the candidate, the
names of the parents, date of birth, subjects
opted, division obtained, name of the
School/Centre,
certificate
number,
appearance as a regular/private candidate
and the date of issue of the certificate. Of
these, the date of birth, the subjects opted,
the year of examination and the division
obtained by the candidate are particulars
which have an important bearing when
admission to higher classes or employment
is sought by the candidate. While making
any correction in the entries relating to these
matters, the requirement of moving the
application within three years has to be
adhered to as any correction ction in regard
to these entries would have on impact on the
rights of other candidates when they seek
admission to higher classes or employment.
However, the other particulars contained in
the certificate, like the name of the
candidate or the names of the parents of the
candidate are not that relevant and any
correction made in regard to these
particulars would have no impact on the
admission or employment ither candidates.
When so considered, we feel persuaded to
hold that the of time limit of three years
5 All. Divyanshu Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1665
prescribed in the substantive part of
Regulation
7
for
submission
of
an
application for making correction in the
certificate issued by the Board in regard to
the name of the candidate or the names of
the parents of the candidate should not be
insisted upon, particularly when the Board
itself has considered it appropriate to have
no time limit under the proviso for making
correction in regard to any spelling mistake
in the name of the candidate or his parents.
The applicant must, however, explain to the
Board the reasons on the basis of which the
application could not be submitted earlier
and if it is found that the claim is bona fide
and is otherwise justified, there is no reason
to reject the application, as in the present
case, merely on the ground of delay.
Undoubtedly, the Board has to examine
whether any genuine ground has been made
out for correcting the name and it would be
open to the Board to consider all the
relevant materials pertaining to the request
for correction of the name.

7. In the circumstances, we are of
the view that the impugned order of the first
respondent,
rejecting
the
application
submitted by the the a appellant for
correction of the name of his mother in the
High School and Intermediate examinations
only
on
the
ground
of
delay,
is
unsustainable. We, accordingly, direct the
first
respondent
to
re-consider
the
application having due regard to all the
documentary evidence which may be
produced by the appellant. The first
respondent would also be at liberty to
summon all the relevant records from the
concerned Institution for the purpose of
deciding the application of the appellant. We
clarify that the interpretation which we have
laced in the aforesaid terms governs only the
mistakes in the certificate in the name of the
candidate or in the names of his parents. The
first respondent shall now pass a fresh order
in accordance with law within a period of
four months from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this order. In order to
facilitate this exercise, the impugned order
dated 11.10.2013 is set aside. The order of
the
learned
Single
Judge
shall,
in
consequence, be set aside and be substituted
by the aforesaid directions.

8. The appeal is, accordingly,
allowed to the extent indicated above. There
shall be no order as to costs."

16. Referring the aforesaid, he submits
that Hon'ble Division Bench has held that so
far as the correction in the date of birth of
student in mark-sheet cum certificate is
concerned that is permissible within a period
of three years as prescribed under the
Regulation 7 and, therefore, any application
after
the
period
prescribed
is
not
entertainable and, thus, the Secretary Board
has rightly passed the order on 30.9.2023,
while rejecting the claim of the petitioner
with respect to the correction in the marksheet-cum-certificate.

17. Considering upon the submissions
of the learned counsel for the parties, and
after perusal of the material placed on
record, it transpires that the controversy
arose when the petitioner made an
application before the Secretary Board, on
5.9.2023 and that was rejected, vide order
dated 30.9.2023, while observing that the
application is preferred after the prescribed
period of time and is not permissible.

18. Sheet anchor of the arguments of
the learned counsel for the petitioner is that
there is no fault on the part of the petitioner
as the petitioner has sent letter on 1.9.2022
and, subsequently, on 5.9.2023, then it was
incumbent upon the Board to take a
decision, but the petitioner has failed to
1666 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
demonstrate that what is the mode of
sending the application dated 1.9.2022?
whereas, the subsequent application dated
5.9.2023 was sent through the registered
post, as per the procedure prescribed under
the Regulation 7 and, therefore, it seems that
the Secretary Board has rightly taken the
decision while considering the application
dated 5.9.2023.

19. The second question which
engaged the attention of this Court is that
whether as per the nature of the correction,
which involves in the present matter, can be
done after the limitation period of three
years prescribed under the Regulation 7, is
over. The fact remains that the application
was sent on 5.9.2023 as per the prescribed
procedure and the mark-sheet was issued on
27.6.2020 and, therefore, undisputedly, the
application was sent after passing of the
prescribed period of three years, which
could not have been allowed, as per
provisions of Regulation 7.

20. The identical controversy has
already been settled in the case of Anand
Singh Vs. U.P. Board of Secondary
Eduction and two others, 2014 (3) ADJ
443, while holding that the date of birth,
the subjects opted, year of examination
and the division obtained by the candidate
are particulars, which have an important
bearing, when admission to the higher
classes or employment is sought by the
candidate and, therefore, the correction in
the above said, are not permissible, if it is
sought after the period of three years as
prescribed
under
the
Regulation
7.
Further, the correction in the name of the
mother and father regarding spelling, can
be allowed after the period of three years.
In this view of the matter, so far as the
present case is concerned, undisputedly,
the application for correction is made after
the period of three years in the date of birth
of the petitioner and, therefore, the same is
not permissible under the law.

21. Having at glance the judgement
and order passed in Special Appeal
No.1202 of 2010, wherein it has been held
that the correction in the record of the
Board is permissible after the period of
three years as prescribed in the proviso of
the Regulation 7, but so far proviso of
Reguulation 7 is concerned that does not
contemplate the provision of limitation
and undisputedly the petitioner is not
seeking the benefit of the proviso of
regulation7, therefore, the case of the
present petitioner is different than the case
which has been decided by the Division
Bench as, here, the correction is sought
with respect to the date of birth in the
mark-sheet-cum-certificate and, therefore,
the law settled in case of Special Appeal
No.1202 of 2010 would not be attracted in
the present matter.

22. This Court finds that there is
reasonable restriction of limitation period of
three years for moving an application for
correction of the date of birth in the marksheet-cum-certificate before the Board and
this has been clarified finally in the
judgement and order in Anand Singh's case,
therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for
any relief.

23. It is trite law that if a statute
provides a thing to be done in a particular
manner, then it has be done in that manner
and not otherwise as this has been settled by
the Apex Court in the case of Chandra
Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavit Prasad & others,
(1999) 8 SCC 266 and in the case of
Cherukuri Mani Vs. Chief Secretary,
Government of Andhra Pradesh & others,
(2015) 13 SCC 722. Therefore, the time
5 All. National Highways Authority of India Vs. Musafir & Ors.
1667
period prescribed in the Regulation 7 cannot
be ignored.

24. In view of the aforesaid
submissions and discussions, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the writ petition
is devoid of merits, hence, dismissed.

25. No order as to costs.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1667
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.

Appeal U/S 37 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act
1996 No. 41 of 2021

National Highways Authority of India.
 ...Appellant
Versus
Musafir & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:

Counsel for the Respondents:

(A) Arbitration Law - The Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 33 -
Correction and interpretation of award ;
additional award , Section 34 - Application
for setting aside arbitral awards , Section
37 - Appeal , Principle of kompetenz-
kompetenz - empowers arbitral tribunals
to rule on their own jurisdiction - not a
carte blanche for unlimited authority -
Principle of functus officio - once an award
is rendered, the tribunal's jurisdiction is
terminated - it cannot revisit or modify its
decision
without
specific
statutory
provisions. (Para -8)

(B)
Arbitration
Law
-
principles
of
arbitration law - Judicial Role in Arbitral
Proceedings - Courts oversee arbitral
proceedings and ensure arbitration law
compliance
-
Courts
oversee
arbitral
proceedings and ensure arbitration law
compliance - Courts defer to arbitral
tribunals and uphold arbitral awards'
finality
-
Duty
to
intervene
when
arbitrators
exceed
authority
or
act
improperly. (Para - 11)

Arbitrator erred in passing awards dated
December 27, 2019, May 19, 2020 and May 28,
2020 - no statutory authority empowers arbitral
tribunal to review/modify its award - orders are
void ab initio -deserve to be set aside - hence
appeal. (Para - 9)

HELD:-Section 34 court's dismissal of the
application without addressing the arbitrator's
improper actions may be seen as a missed
opportunity to uphold the arbitral process's
integrity. Court sets aside order passed by
District Judge and awards.(Para - 11)

Appeal allowed. (E-7)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

1. Heard Sri Divakar Rai Sharma,
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
and Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent
Nos.1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 28, 32, 34 and 38 and Sri
Dharamveer Singh, counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent No.53.

2. This appeal under Section 37 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as "the Arbitration
Act") arises out of an order passed by the
District Judge, Mau dated November 5,
2020.

3. The facts of the case are briefly
provided below:

 i. A notification under Section
3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was